Gupta, J.—This is an application for review of the judgment of this Court dated the 24th of January, 1950, passed in second appeal No. 57 of 1948 in which the applicants propose to rely mainly on a ruling of the Nagpur Judicial Commissioners Court reported in A. I. R. 1932 Nag. 177 in which it has been laid down that if an omission to notice one particular provision of law Was a satisfactory ground for entertaining an application for review which had been, pointed out by the applicant, much more so was the omission to consider the important facts which were on the record and which the Judge himself immediately on passing his order realised that he had overlooked; and which in his opinion, would have led him to pass an order materially different and that both were cases of an omission and not the cases of mis-application or of taking a wrong view of the law on fully considered facts of the case. 2. Before dealing with the main contention, one minor objection which is of no great significance may be disposed of. It is said that there was an apparent mistake on the face of the judgment, inasmuch as, in the judgment, name of — Bal Chand was omitted from the pedigree table which should have appeared below Dhansukh Das because Bal Chand was the son of Dhansukh Das and Suraj Mal and Sohan Lal were his sons. There is no such mistake in the judgment. It appears the copyist has while copying omitted in the copy of judgment the name of Bal Chand in the pedigree table after Dhansukh Das and before Suraj Mal and Sohan Lal and this omission on the part of the copyist has enabled the counsel to raise such a contention. 3. The main contention raised by the counsel on behalf of the petitioner is that the Court has not considered important facts which were on the record, namely, the—admission contained in the statement of Bheron Dan dated the 5th of March, 1927, the evidence of the applicant and the statements of the plaintiff and his witnesses given in the trial court. It appears from the judgment under review that the admission contained in Bheron Dans statement dated the 5th of March, 1927, was in the courts mind. It appears from the judgment under review that the admission contained in Bheron Dans statement dated the 5th of March, 1927, was in the courts mind. It also appears that the evidence of Bheron Dan, the plaintiff and his witnesses was also before the courts mind. I may almost go to the length of saying that the whole case as presented by the learned counsel of the applicant before me had been presented before us on his behalf by his learned counsel at the time the appeal was heard. Moreover, it would appear from the very authority relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant that it was not only the omission to consider the important facts which were on the record that would entitle the review to be granted but the facts must be such as the Judge himself immediately on passing his order realised that he had over-looked, and which in his opinion would have led him to pass an order materially different. In this case, there are no facts which, any of us—the two Judges constituting the Bench which passed the judgment —ever realised, had been omitted and which in oar opinion, would have led us to pass a judgment different. Again, "facts on record" mean facts on the face of the record having a direct relation to the order, the Court was about to make, facts which were actually within the courts own knowledge and which momentarily escaped its memory. These are facts on the face of the record and not embedded in the record and only to be brought to light by a discussion and appreciation of the evidence (vide A. I.E. 1935 Nag. 245 at page 246). 4. In this case the learned counsel for the applicant was at great pains to show that the judgment was wrong on the merits. In short, his arguments were tantamount to saying that if he will allow a fresh opportunity to— reargue the appeal, probably a different judgment would follow. In A.I.R. 1939 Lah. 460. His Lordship Tek Chand J. has held that a court hearing an application for review had no power to order a review upon the ground that the decision was wrong on merits. Agreeing with the learned Judge I do not see any sufficient reason to order a review in this case. 5. In A.I.R. 1939 Lah. 460. His Lordship Tek Chand J. has held that a court hearing an application for review had no power to order a review upon the ground that the decision was wrong on merits. Agreeing with the learned Judge I do not see any sufficient reason to order a review in this case. 5. As already stated, the case was fully presented to the Court and the aspect which is now pressed before me was put up before us. At any rate that aspect should have been presented at the time when the appeal was argued and there is no ground justifying exercise of the powers of review. No case for review, therefore, has been made out and the application is dismissed.