Judgment.- This second appeal has been preferred by the first defendant against a decree for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage, Exhibit P-1, dated 8th February, 1922, executed by the mother and guardian of the second defendant, then a minor, in favour of Vyapuri, the divided paternal uncle of the minor and assigned by Vyapuri to the 1st defendant under Exhibit D-3, dated 22nd August, 1927. The property mortgaged belonged to the minor second defendant as sole owner and was managed on his behalf by his mother who died shortly after the execution of the mortgage, Exhibit P-1 in 1922, Thereafter, Vyapuri, the divided uncle, professing to act as guardian of his minor nephew, the second defendant, mortgaged the property under Exhibit D-5, dated 22nd August, 1927, and subsequently sold it to the first defendant under Exhibit D-6, dated 7th June, 1939 in discharge of the prior mortgages and in consideration of a small cash payment. The second defendant attained majority some time later in 1939 and he sold the same property to the plaintiff, the son of Vyapuri, under Exhibit P-5, dated 10th May, 1943, ignoring the previous alienation by Vyapuri under Exhibit D-6. On 7th February, 1944, the plaintiff filed the present suit for redemption of the mortgage, Exhibit P-1 and the suit has been decreed by the Courts below. Hence this second appeal by the first defendant, the disappointed purchaser from Vyapuri. The Courts below held that the mortgage, Exhibit D-5, dated 22nd August, 1927, and the sale, Exhibit D-6, dated 7th June, 1939, executed by Vyapuri as the de facto guardian of the minor second defendant were neither supported by necessity nor beneficial to the minor second defendant and therefore not binding on him. Mr. Venkatadri, the learned Advocate for the appellant, could not successfully challenge this finding on second appeal. His legal contention is that Exhibit D-6, the sale by Vyapuri as de facto guardian of the minor, was not void but merely voidable and as it had not been set aside by the second defendant within three years of his attainment of majority, it was not open to his purchaser, the plaintiff, to sue for recovery of possession of the property, or for redemption of the mortgage, Exhibit P-1, which has become extinguished as a result of the sale, Exhibit D-6, dated 7th June, 1939. In other words he argues that Article 44 of the Limitation Act applies to transfers of the property of a Hindu minor effected by his de facto guardian. The expression “de facto” guardian, however unscientific and inappropriate from the point of view of an orthodox jurist, has become part of the vocabulary of lawyers and judges. It is now a settled rule of Hindu law that a sale or a mortgage of a Hindu Minor’s property by his de facto guardian is effective to convey a valid title to the transferee if the latter establishes that the transfer was for legal necessity or for the benefit of the minor or that he took the sale or mortgage after proper enquiries and with a bona fide belief in the existence of pressing necessity. It is needless at this time of the day to enquire the textual origin of this rule or to investigate whether it has any real foundation in Hunooman Persad’s case1, which is the usual starting point of discussions on this topic. The whole subject has been exhaustively and authoritatively dealt with and the entire case-law has been reviewed in the judgments of the Federal Court (now the Supreme Court) reported in Sree Ramulu v. Pundarikakshayya2and Bapayya v. Pundarikakskayya3 Suffice it to say that, in the opinion of the learned Judges of the Federal Court, the dealing of a de facto guardian with the estate of a Hindu minor by way of sale or mortgage would be regarded not as void altogether but voidable at the instance of the minor, and the same tests would have to be applied to determine the validity of such sale or mortgage as are applied in the case of a de jure guardian’s sale or mortgage. We are, however, concerned in this case with the interpretation of Article 44 of the Limitation Act, though the rules of Hindu law may also have a bearing on the point. If there is a trespass on a minor’s property, he has 12 years from the date of dispossession or three years after attaining majority, whichever is the longer period to sue for recovery of possession under Article 142. If there is a trespass on a minor’s property, he has 12 years from the date of dispossession or three years after attaining majority, whichever is the longer period to sue for recovery of possession under Article 142. If the father in a joint Hindu family alienates the interest of his minor son in the family property or the manager alienates the interest of a minor co-parcener, the co-parcener aggrieved by the alienation can sue to set it aside within 12 years from the date when the alienee takes possession of the property or three years after attaining majority, whichever period is longer, under Article 126 or 144, of the Limitation Act; if, however, a guardian transfers his ward’s property for purposes not binding on the minor or at a gross undervalue, the minor has only three years after attaining majority for setting aside the alienation under Article 44 of the Limitation Act. If an improper alienation of the ward’s property is made by a guardian, say, a year before the ward attains majority, the ward will not have 12 years from the date of the alienation but only four years therefrom, within which time he must sue to set aside the alienation. The alienation is only voidable and requires to be set aside by the ward before he could recover possession of the property. He cannot disaffirm it by a mere notice of his intention to repudiate but must sue and obtain a judicial rescission of the sale by his guardian within the time prescribed by Article 44. His right to recover possession of the property improperly alienated by his guardian will be lost and his title thereto will be extinguished under section 28 of the Limitation Act on the expiry of the three years’ period prescribed by Article 44, if he does not sue to set aside the alienation within that period. His right to recover possession of the property improperly alienated by his guardian will be lost and his title thereto will be extinguished under section 28 of the Limitation Act on the expiry of the three years’ period prescribed by Article 44, if he does not sue to set aside the alienation within that period. The view of Venkatasubba Rao, J. in Ramiah v. Brahmaiah1 and Abdur Rahim and Sadasiva Ayyar, JJ., in Doraiswami v. Nondiswami2 that Article 44 is merely an illustration of the combined effect of Article 144 and section 6 of the Limitation Act, that Article 44 is controlled by the principle of section 6 and that even if Article 44 had not been there, the result would be the same, seems to me, with all respect, unsustainable, and I would prefer the view of Sundara Ayyar, J. in Doraiswami v. Nondiswami2and Varadachariar, J. in Ankamma v. Komeswaramma 3 .Article 144. is a residuary Article and cannot be resorted to, if a specific Article like Article 44 is applicable to a suit. The Limitation Act itself recognises the distinction between void and voidable transactions and provides a shorter period of limitation for remedies is respect of the latter (see, for example, Articles 12 and 91). These Articles would be applicable even if the suit is one for possession of immoveable property if the plaintiff cannot succeed without displacing an apparent title under a court-sale or an instrument by virtue of which the defendant is in possession. Article 44 cannot be evaded by omitting to sue for setting aside a transfer by the guardian and by professing to sue for possession or redemption. Numerous decisions of this and the other High Courts have taken this view (see Latchayyav. Mukkalinga,4; Siva Vadivelu v. Ponnammal5; Satyalakshmiv. Jagannathan6, Arumugham Pillaiv. Panayadian Ambalam7, Raja Ramaswamiv. Govindammal8, Muthukumara Chetty v. Anthony Udayar 9, Kandaswami v. Irusappa10, Doraiswami v. Thangavelu11 , Ankamma v. Kameswaramma 3 and Pakirappa Lumanna v. Lumanna Bin Mahadu12 .The law regards a dealing with the minor’s estate by his legal guardian as, in effect, an act of the minor himself through his guardian and prescribes a short period of three years after attainment of majority for setting aside an improper alienation by the guardian. As Article 44 is drastic in its operation it should be strictly construed and confined in its application to cases properly falling within its scope, i.e., to transfers of a minor’s property by his legal guardian. Article 44 of the Limitation Act does not differentiate between guardians and wards belonging to different communities. It does not lay down any special rule with reference to Hindu Minors. At the same time, the personal law of the parties determines who the natural guardians of a minor are. The question is whether it is permissible to read the word ‘guardian’ in Article 44 so as to include a person who is loosely styled a ‘de facto guardian’ and who is unknown to the law applicable to Mahomodens and Christians, but who has gained a limited recognition amongst Hindus as a result of Judge-made law. In my opinion, the word ‘guardian’ in Article 44 should be interpreted as referring only to guardians properly so called or legal guardians, that is to say, natural and testamentary guardians and guardians appointed by Court. The expression ‘de facto’ means the position in fact, and not in law. Therefore, a de facto guardian is not a guardian in law. Kania, C.J., in Sree Ramulu v. Pundarikakshayya13 observed:- “In law. there is nothing like a de facto guardian. There can only be a de facto manager, although the expression”de facto guardian “has been used in text books and some judgments of courts. If that description is adopted (and I consider it to be a correct description of a person, generally managing the estate of a minor without having any legal title to do so) the powers of a natural guardian are not brought into consideration in defining the position of such a manager.” Mahajan, J., also remarked that the expression ‘de facto guardian was a loose phrase and the words ‘de facto manager’ used in Hunooman Persaud’s case1would be more appropriate to denote the position of a person who assumes the management of a minor’s estate without legal warrant. Most systems of law recognise a guardianship by nature or nurture. Under the Mohamedan Law, the father, and under the Hindu Law, the father and, in his absence, the mother, but no others, are the natural guardians of a minor (see Chennappav. Onkarappa2. Most systems of law recognise a guardianship by nature or nurture. Under the Mohamedan Law, the father, and under the Hindu Law, the father and, in his absence, the mother, but no others, are the natural guardians of a minor (see Chennappav. Onkarappa2. The Guardians and Wards Act makes provision for the appointment of a guardian for a minor, to whichever community he may belong. In these cases the status of a guardian and the consequential right to deal with the property of a minor arise from the legal relationship between the parties, or the order of Court. Ties of natural affection or the vigilance of the Court, as the case may be, would be a sufficient safeguard against an improper alienation of the estate of a minor by his natural or certificated guardian and on this basis a shorter period of limitation for questioning their alienations as provided in Article 44 of the Limitation Act is intelligible. But a de facto guardian is a creature improvised by judicial decisions out of the necessities of the situation and in the interests of the minor’s estate. His powers of alienation may be analogous to those of a natural guardian but he is not a guardian properly so called. In Matadin v. Ahmad Ali3,the Judicial Committee observed:- “It is difficult to see how the situation of an unauthorised guardian is bettered by describing him as a ‘de facto’ guardian”. The case related to a Mohamedan minor. With respect to Hindus, Beaumont, C.J., in Tulasidas v. Baghela Rai Singji4 held that a so-called de facto guardian was no guardian at all but was a mere intermeddler. Kumaraswami Sastri, J. in Ramaswamiv. Kasinatha5 was inclined to accept the description of the position of a de facto guardian in Matadin v. Ahmad Ali3 as equally applicable to Hindus. It is only as the result of a long course of decisions and on the principle of stare deems that a de facto guardian’s power, in case of necessity or benefit to the minor to charge, mortgage or sell the minor’s property has been recognised under the Hindu law (see Seetharamannav. Appiah 6 and Sree Ramuluv. Pundarikakshayya7.) But this is not to say that a de facto guardian is a ‘guardian’ for all purposes or a guardian within the contemplation of a statute-law which applies to all communities. Appiah 6 and Sree Ramuluv. Pundarikakshayya7.) But this is not to say that a de facto guardian is a ‘guardian’ for all purposes or a guardian within the contemplation of a statute-law which applies to all communities. The expression ‘de facto guardian’ is further not capable of a precise definition. It is not possible to say precisely what conditions and circumstances must exist before a person can be described as a de facto guardian (see Chinna Alagumperumal v. Vinayakathammal8.)It was observed by Mahajan, J. in Bapayyav. Pundarikakskayya9 that “a person who is not attached to the minor by ties of affection or other reasons of affinity and remains in charge of his estate is, in truth, a mere intermeddler with his estate.” as distinguished from a relation of a minor who assumes management of his estate in his interests, who alone could according to the learned Judge, be properly described as a de facto guardian. In the case of natural guardians the law ascribes the guardianship to a definite and intimate natural and legal relationship existing between the guardian and ward. Is it to be said that precisely the same status can be acquired on the basis of any remote relationship? The existence of any particular degree or kind of relationship between the de facto guardian and the minor is not required as an indispensable legal requisite of de facto guardianship. Nor is it practicable to embark upon an enquiry into the motives actuating the de facto guardian in assuming the management of the minor’s estate, whether it was the protection of the minor’s estate or a less laudable purpose. In many cases it would be difficult to say whether a person who posed as a guardian in respect of a particular transaction affecting the minor’s estate was a guardian ad hoc, or a guardian de facto. It is not possible to fix any period of time during which a person must have managed a minor’s estate before he can be recognised as a de facto guardian or manager. Nor is it possible to formulate any precise course of conduct in reference to the management of the minor’s estate as being necessary to create a de facto guardianship. Nor is it possible to formulate any precise course of conduct in reference to the management of the minor’s estate as being necessary to create a de facto guardianship. The leasing out of the properties of the minor, the collections of rents and profits, the payment of Government revenue, the maintenance of the minor, the discharge of debts binding on the estate and similar acts spread over a substantial period of time might constitute the manager of the minor’s estate a de facto guardian. (Compare Sankaranarayanan Ayyar v. Poovananathaswami Temple1). But no definite rule can be laid down as to what acts constitute, or are insufficient to constitute de facto guardianship. I am referring to the difficulties that may arise in applying Article 44 of the Limitation Act to transfers by de facto guardians, whose status as such depends on so many uncertain and debatable factors and is incapable of verification or ascertainment by references either to natural relationship or an order of appointment by Court. Whatever be the degree of recognition accorded to de facto guardians of Hindu minors by the decisions, the Limitation Act had not placed de facto guardians on the same footing as natural or certificated guardians. A de facto guardian has no authority to acknowledge a debt on behalf of a minor under sections 19 and 21 of the Limitation Act, and the minor’s estate is not affected by such acknowledgement of liability. The de facto guardian is not a “lawful guardian” within the meaning of section 21 of the Limitation Act (see Chennappa v. Onkarappa2). For purposes of the Registration Act, a de facto guardian is not in the same position as a natural or certificated guardian (see Amba v. Shrinivas Kamathi3). There is no reason why the word ‘guardian’ in Article 4 should receive a different interpretation. The very notion of a de facto guardian involves and implies that there is 110 jural relationship of guardian and ward; but, that is exactly what Article 44 of the Limitation Act requires. Holding as I do, in deference to authority that the expression ‘ward’ in Article 44 is not limited to a minor for whom a guardian has been appointed by Court and that the word ‘guardian’ includes natural and testamentary guardians also, I cannot stretch the word ‘guardian’ so as to include a de facto manager of the minor’s properties. Holding as I do, in deference to authority that the expression ‘ward’ in Article 44 is not limited to a minor for whom a guardian has been appointed by Court and that the word ‘guardian’ includes natural and testamentary guardians also, I cannot stretch the word ‘guardian’ so as to include a de facto manager of the minor’s properties. In my opinion, a person who is not equipped with the requisite legal authority as a natural, testamentary or certificated guardian but who is in management of a minor’s estate, is only a de facto manager and not a “guardian” within the meaning of Article 44. In Thayammal v. Kuppanna4, Ramaswami v. Kasinatha5 and Purushothama v. Brundavana6, this Court held that Article 44 did not govern suits by a quondam minor for recovery of possession of property alienated by a de facto guardian, though there is not much discussion of the reasons for this conclusion. In Chinna Alagumperumal v. Vinayakathammal7, an alienation by a de facto guardian not justified by necessity or benefit was treated as void and as a transfer not requiring to be set aside within the period limited by Article 44, though in another portion of the judgment the alienation is stated to be merely voidable. An alienation by the de facto guardian of a Christian minor was held not to be governed by Article 44 (see Sundara Nadan v. Annamalai8). Mr. Venkatadri, the learned advocate for the appellant, contends that these decisions are no longer law in view of the recognition of the validity of a transfer by the de facto guardian of a Hindu minor by the Federal Court in Sree Ramulu v. Pundarikakshayya9. He also placed reliance on the decisions in Bangarammal v. Lydia Kent10 and Karri Adayya v. Tammalampudi Govindu11and the comments on Article 44 by the learned editors of Mitra’s Limitation Act (7th edition), Vol. 1, at pages 434 and 435. The argument runs as follows: Under the Hindu Law, the powers of a de facto and a de jure guardian to alienate the minor’s. property are the same. An alienation in excess of such powers is only voidable at the instance of the minor and not void. A voidable transfer must be set aside before possession of the property can be recovered. An alienation in excess of such powers is only voidable at the instance of the minor and not void. A voidable transfer must be set aside before possession of the property can be recovered. Article 44 provides only a period of three years for a suit to set aside the transfer and the residuary provision in Article 144 does not apply to the case. If the ex-minor does not bring a suit for possession within three years of attaining his majority, his title to the properties is lost and extinguished and the transferee’s title becomes absolute and unimpeachable. A subsequent transferee of the property from the ex-minor is in the same position as this transferer. This last proposition rests on the principle that a person who claims under another, whether as his legal representative or transferee, should in such character be governed by the same rule as would apply to the person from whom he derives his title, the only limitation being that he is not entitled to any privileges or exemptions from limitation which the latter had. There is some authority for this view (see Laxmana v. Rachappa1 and Raja Ramaswami v. Govindammal2). But the rest of the argument is open to question though it is supported by the decision of Curgenven, J., in Karri Adeyya v. Tammalampudi Govindu3. I am. unable, with all respect, to accept the reasoning of the learned Judge. The expressions ‘void’ and ‘voidable’ are loosely and indiscriminately used in discussions on this topic. An alienation by a Hindu widow without legal necessity is not void, but voidable, in the sense that the transfer has a qualified operation even after the death of the widow and it is only the reversioner and nobody, else, that has a right to disaffirm or impugn the transfer. In this sense, the transfer is voidable. The reversioner, however, need not sue to set aside the alienation, but can disaffirm it or treat it as a nullity and sue for possession of the property within 12 years of the widow’s death. In this sense, the transfer is voidable. The reversioner, however, need not sue to set aside the alienation, but can disaffirm it or treat it as a nullity and sue for possession of the property within 12 years of the widow’s death. In this sense, it is void as against the reversioner (Bejoy Gopal Mukherjee v. Krishna Mahishi Debi4, In re Appavu Naicken5.) Similarly, an alienation by a father or manager of a joint Hindu family in excess of his powers is voidable in this sense that only the junior members of the family can disaffirm it and no others, but it is void so far as the junior members are concerned, for, they need not sue to set aside the alienation, but can straightaway sue for recovery of possession within the period limited by Article 126 or 144, of the Limitation Act. In this context, the expression ‘voidable’ is not used in the sense in which it is used in the Contract Act, Amirthalinga v. Arumuga6. I am aware that in Muthukumara Chetti v. Anthony Udayar7, the learned Judges in dealing with an improper alienation of a minor’s property by a duly appointed guardian, observed as follows:- "We cannot uphold Mr. Rangachariars contention that wherever a transaction is voidable, it can be avoided only by getting a decree of Court setting it aside. The party who is entitled to avoid may do so by an unequivocal act repudiating the transaction (see Mala Din v. Ahmad Ali8 and Bern Gopal Mukerjee v. Krishna Mahishi Debi4) If Rajagopalan (the minor) after attaining majority should wish to repudiate the lease, there can be no doubt he can do to without a suit, but can. anyone else do so? The right to avoid appears to be a personal privilege. The reference in this context to Mata Din v. Ahmad Ali8 which was a case of an alienation of the property of a Mohamedan minor by a de facto guardian, and to Bijoy Gopal Mukkerjee v. Krishna Mahishi Debi4 which was a case of an improper alienation by a Hindu widow, is unhappy. In these cases, the Mohamedan minor or the Hindu reversioner was not a party to the transaction directly or in contemplation of law on any theory of representation and a suit for setting aside the alienation was not therefore necessary, a mere repudiation being sufficient. In these cases, the Mohamedan minor or the Hindu reversioner was not a party to the transaction directly or in contemplation of law on any theory of representation and a suit for setting aside the alienation was not therefore necessary, a mere repudiation being sufficient. In these two cases, Articles 144 and 141 would govern a suit for recovery of possession of the property by the minor or the reversioner. The learned Judges themselves in another part of their judgment held that Article 44 of the Limitation Act applied to the case: of an improper alienation by the guardian of a minor. If a transfer by a guardian is only voidable, then as decided in Raja Rajeswara Dorai v. Arunachalam Chettiar1, a unilateral repudiation by him or rescission in pais would not be sufficient. In Satgurprasad v. Harnarayan Das2, the Judicial Committee, while setting aside a conveyance of property as having been obtained by fraud and undue influence, observed:- “Their Lordships are unable to regard the deed of the 25th November, 1924, merely as a contract voidable at the option of the plaintiff, but good until avoided. It was, in effect, a conveyance, under which the title to the properties passed to the defendant, and which had to he formally set aside” Their Lordships also held that the plaintiff, exercising his option to rescind the transfer, was entitled to the rents and profits of the property “from the date of the transfer and not merely from the date of the suit.” An alienation by a de jure or lawful guardian of the property of the ward in excess of his powers as a guardian is treated differently from an improper alienation by a Hindu widow or the manager of a joint Hindu family for purposes of the Limitation Act. The transfer by the guardian is not void as against the minor, but only voidable at his instance and the minor must sue to set aside the unauthorised transfer within the three years limited by Article 44 or lose his title to the property.. As I have already stated, the law regards the minor as being a party to the alienation through his guardian, and Article 44 allows only a period of three years for setting aside the transfer, the same period being allowed under Article 91 for a man who seeks to set aside his own deed. As I have already stated, the law regards the minor as being a party to the alienation through his guardian, and Article 44 allows only a period of three years for setting aside the transfer, the same period being allowed under Article 91 for a man who seeks to set aside his own deed. But, if a de facto manager of a minor’s estate improperly alienates his property, the alienation is one to which the minor is not a party through his legally authorised representative and does not require to be set aside within the period limited by Article 44. The minor can sue for recovery of possession within the period of 12 years allowed by Article 142 or Article 144. The word ‘guardian’ in Article 44 must be interpreted as meaning only a lawful or de jure guardian and not as including a de facto manager of the property of a Hindu minor, whatever be the effect of an alienation by a de facto guardian or manager under the Hindu law. Mr. Venkatadri’s further contention is that the sale in favour of the plaintiff by the second defendant after he attained majority of property which had been previously sold to the first defendant by his de facto guardian, is, in effect, a transfer of a right to sue which is prohibited by section 6 (e) of the Transfer of Property Act. Mon Mohan v. Bidhu Bhusan3, was the only decision cited by learned counsel on both sides on this point. In that case the sale of the minor’s property was by his natural guardian and not by a de facto guardian. Mr. Venkatadri’s contention is that this does not make any difference, for, the propriety of sale by a de facto guardian has to be judged by the same tests as are applicable to the case of an alienation by a de jure guardian and a sale in excess of the power of the guardian de facto or de jure can only be avoided by the minor. In the case of an unauthorised alienation by a de facto guardian, the setting aside of the transaction is not a condition precedent to the minor recovering the property from the alienee and the minor can sue for possession of the property within the period limited by Article 142 or 144. In the case of an unauthorised alienation by a de facto guardian, the setting aside of the transaction is not a condition precedent to the minor recovering the property from the alienee and the minor can sue for possession of the property within the period limited by Article 142 or 144. Assuming that a sale by a de facto guardian without necessity or benefit to the minor is only voidable, the question is whether the right to question an excessive or improper alienation by a guardian and recover possession of the property from the alienee is only a personal right of the minor and whether it is a mere right to sue which could not be availed of by a transferee of the property from the minor on his attaining majority. Sen, J., held that the right of the minor to avoid the alienation was a mere right to sue and could not be validly transferred in Mon Mohan v. Bidhu Bhusan 3,relying on the decision in Jhaverbhai Hathibhai v. Kabhdi Becker4 in support of his conclusion. I may also point out that there as an earlier decision of the Bombay High Court (Macleod, C.J. and Coyajee, J.,) in Narasinga Charya v. Tulsa Bai1 that till an unauthorised sale by his guardian was set aside by the minor, he had no transferable interest in the property. I am unable to accept these decisions as embodying a correct statement of the law. There was here a sale of property by the ex-minor and not an assignment of a mere right to sue. No doubt, the vendee from the minor had to sue the previous purchaser from the guardian for recovery of possession of the property, but, in my opinion, that did not render the sale by the minor a transfer of a mere right to sue. A unilateral disaffirmance or rescission in pais of the guardian’s improper alienation by the minor might not be sufficient to revest title to the property in the minor and enable him to sue for recovery of possession of property within 12 years of such repudiation under Article 144 of the Limitation Act. A judicial rescission may be necessary as held in cases decided under Article 91 of the Limitation Act (see Janki Kunwar v. Ajit Singh2, Raja Rajeswara Dorai v. Arunachalam Chettiar3 and Someshwar Dutt v. Tribhawan Dutt4). A judicial rescission may be necessary as held in cases decided under Article 91 of the Limitation Act (see Janki Kunwar v. Ajit Singh2, Raja Rajeswara Dorai v. Arunachalam Chettiar3 and Someshwar Dutt v. Tribhawan Dutt4). I have already referred to the decisions of this Court taking the same view of the effect of Article 44 of the Limitation Act. It does not, however, follow that the right to obtain a judicial rescission of an unauthorised and therefore voidable transfer by a guardian, is a mere personal privilege of the minor as observed in Muthukumara Chetty v. Anthony Udayar5 in the passage already cited. It is a right annexed to the ownership of property or an interest in property and is available to the legal representatives of a minor who dies without avoiding the transfer. Where an ex-minor transfers property unauthorisedly sold by his guardian during his minority, he transfers not a mere right to sue but his interest in the property, though a suit may be necessary to avoid the transfer by the guardian and possession of the property from his alienee. Conversely, the liability of the transferee from the guardian is not a liability to pay damages for the unauthorised act of the guardian, but is a liability to restore the property to the rightful owner or his transferee (compare sections 36, 94 and 96 of the Trusts Act). If, as held by Sadasiva Ayyar, J., in Muthukumara Chetty v. Anthony Udayar5 , a mere repudiation by the minor on attaining majority is sufficient to avoid the transfer, then the transfer by the ex-minor of the property previously alienated by the guardian is a sufficient repudiation of the guardian’s act. It is significant that section 60 (e) of the Civil Procedure Code, which is in pari materia with section 6 (e) of the Transfer of Property Act exempts from attachment and sale “a mere right to sue for damages”. The right to get a re-conveyance of property through Court or otherwise, is a valuable right in the nature of a right of property and can be validly transferred. The Transfer of Properly Act itself recognises transfers of actionable claims as defined in the Act. The transferee as the representative of the transferor can sue for specific performance of a contract to re-convey land. (See Venkateswara Ayyar v. Raman Nambudiri 6 and Sakalaguna Nayudu v. Chinna Munuswami Naicker7). The Transfer of Properly Act itself recognises transfers of actionable claims as defined in the Act. The transferee as the representative of the transferor can sue for specific performance of a contract to re-convey land. (See Venkateswara Ayyar v. Raman Nambudiri 6 and Sakalaguna Nayudu v. Chinna Munuswami Naicker7). The prohibition of a transfer of a mere right to sue in section 6 (e) of the Transfer of Property Act is an adaptation for India of the English equitable doctrine that a right to complain of a fraud is not a “marketable commodity”. (See Turner, L.J., in De Hoghton v. Money8).The English Courts of Equity held that the transfer of such a right savoured of champerty and maintenance and refused relief on that ground. But the Judicial Committee held as early as Ramcoomar v. Chunder Cante 9 that the English doctrines as to champerty and maintenance were not in force as specific laws in India (see also Achalram v. Kazim Hussain10and Bhagwat Dayal Singh v. Debt Dayal Sahu11). Even in England, the rigour of the rule has been considerably relaxed, as might be found from the authoritative exposition of the present state of the law in the judgment of Parker, J., in the Court of Appeal in Glegg v. Bromley1, approved and accepted by the Judicial Committee in Venkata Jagapati v. Venkatapati2. Parker, J., laid down the law in these terms: “Ordinary choses in action were not assignable at law, but were, generally speaking, assignable in equity whether themselves legal or equitable choses. In the former case, equity compelled the assignor to allow his name to be used for their recovery in legal proceedings, in the latter case the assignee could sue in equity in his own name. There was one exception to this rule. Equity on the ground of public policy did not give validity to the assignment of what is in the cases referred to as a bare right of action, and this was so whether the bare right were legal or equitable. I have looked at a good many authorities on that point, and I am satisfied that the real reason why equity did not allow the assignment of a bare right of action, whether legal or equitable, was on the ground that it savoured of or was likely to lead to maintenance. I have looked at a good many authorities on that point, and I am satisfied that the real reason why equity did not allow the assignment of a bare right of action, whether legal or equitable, was on the ground that it savoured of or was likely to lead to maintenance. There is no doubt in the cases about the rule, and there is no doubt in the cases with regard to the exception, but difficulties often arose in deciding whether a particular right was within the exception or was within the rule. It is to be observed that an equitable assignee of a chose in action, whether it is legal or equitable, could institute proceedings and maintain proceedings for its recovery. The question was whether the subject-matter of the assignment was, in the view of the Court, property with an incidental remedy for its recovery, or was a bare right to bring an action either at law or in equity.” (Glegg v. Bromley1). In my opinion, the right of the ward to recover property improperly alienated by his guardian would have been treated in equity as property and not as a bare right of action and the same rule must prevail here. The conveyance, Exhibit P-5, by the ex-minor in favour of the plaintiff in this case is of the property itself and not of a mere right to sue. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the decision of Sen, J., in Mon Mohan v. Bidhu Bhusan3 and the observations of Macleod, C.J., in Narasingachari v. Tulsa Bai4 and of Patkar and Murphy, JJ., in Jhaverbhai Hathibhai v. Kabhai Becher5. The decision in Hanmant Gurunath v. Ramappa Lagamappa6 points out the difficulty of applying the language of Article 44 of the Limitation Act to a suit by a transferee from the ward and though there is a passing reference to section 6 (e) of the Transfer of Property Act in the judgment, there is no decision on the point whether a transfer by the ward on attaining majority is hit at by section 6 (e) of the Transfer of Property Act. In that case, both the ward and his transferee were plaintiffs and the Court held that the transferee would get the benefit of an adjudication setting aside the improper alienation of the ward’s property by his guardian. In that case, both the ward and his transferee were plaintiffs and the Court held that the transferee would get the benefit of an adjudication setting aside the improper alienation of the ward’s property by his guardian. In Kamaraju v. Gunnayya7 and Raja Ramaswami v. Govindammal8, two Division Benches of this Court and in Laxmappa v. Rachappa9, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court recognised though without discussion of the point, the right of a transferee of property from the ex-minor to sue to set aside an improper alienation of that property by the guardian of the minor. The Bombay High Court itself has, in a later case, held that where the manager of a joint Hindu family, acting in excess of his powers, alienates the joint family property for himself and his minor brother, the latter continues to have an interest in the property alienated, which he can transfer so as to clothe the transferee with a right to avoid the manager’s alienation and recover possession of interest of this transferor (see Hanumanthappa v. Dundappa10).The same view is implicit, though not expressly stated, in Iburamsa Rowthan v. Thiruvenkataswami Naick11. In Raja Ramaswami v. Govindammal8, Article 44 of the Limitation Act was applied to a suit by the transferee from the ward and in Ramaiah v. Brahmaiah12 , the same article was applied to a suit by the legal representative of a ward who died a minor. As pointed out in Hanumant Gurunath v. Ramappa Lagamappa6 ,it is difficult to bring a suit by the transferee or legal representative of a deceased minor within the language of columns 1 and 3 of Article 44 of the Limitation Act. In the view I have taken that Article 44 does not apply to transfers by de facto managers or de facto guardians of a Hindu minor, a decision on this point is unnecessary. If it were, I would, sitting singly, be bound by the decision in Raja Ramaswami v. Govindammal1 to hold that Article 44 applies even to suits by transferees from an ex-minor for recovery of possession of property improperly alienated by the minor’s guardian. If it were, I would, sitting singly, be bound by the decision in Raja Ramaswami v. Govindammal1 to hold that Article 44 applies even to suits by transferees from an ex-minor for recovery of possession of property improperly alienated by the minor’s guardian. For the foregoing reasons, I dismiss this second appeal, but, having regard to the fact that the transferee, the plaintiff, is no other than those of the de facto guardian and that there is more than a suspicion that the first defendant is sought to be deprived of the fruits of his purchase by the concerted action of the ward, the de facto guardian and the plaintiff, I disallow the plaintiff his costs throughout. No leave. K.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.