Judgment :- 1. This is an application on behalf of one Srikantan Nair, 1st accused in C.C. No. 196 of 1124 on the file of the Division First Class Magistrate, Quilon. On 26th Edavam 1124 the Inspector of Police, Quilon Town filed a charge-sheet against the petitioner and 21 others for commission of offences punishable under Ss. 140, 141, 332, 353 and 337 of the Travancore Penal Code and for commission of certain 'prejudicial acts' punishable under S. 9 (1) and (5) of the Travancore Emergency Powers Act, 1122. The Magistrate refused bail to the petitioner and his application before the Sessions Court, Quilon, was equally unsuccessful. Motion is now made on his behalf invoking this Court's jurisdiction under S. 409, Criminal Procedure Code, to admit him to bail. 2. Of the several offences with which the accused in the case are charged, that under the Emergency Powers Act alone is non-bailable. The maximum punishment that can be imposed under S. 9 (5) thereof is imprisonment for three years. Though the High Court's jurisdiction under S. 409 to enlarge an under-trial prisoner on bail is unfettered by anything contained in the preceding S. 408, it is settled law that it would be a relevant circumstance for the High Court in disposing of applications for bail to consider whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the prisoner is guilty of a non-bailable offence. Among the case laying down this rule mention may be made of Emperor v. Hutchinson A.I.R. 1931 All. 356 and Jogelker v. Emperor A.I.R. 1931 All. 504 which arose out of applications for bail made by the Meerut Conspiracy case prisoners before the Allahabad High Court. Reference will have to be made to these cases again in this order. They say, among other things, that the question whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the prisoner is guilty of a non-bailable offence is a matter appropriate for consideration along with all other circumstances of the case. 3. Reference will have to be made to these cases again in this order. They say, among other things, that the question whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the prisoner is guilty of a non-bailable offence is a matter appropriate for consideration along with all other circumstances of the case. 3. The substance of the case against the petitioner is that on the after noon of 11th Edavam 1124 at about 3.15 p.m. he led an unlawful assembly of about 200 persons armed with deadly weapons, such as sticks, stones, etc., and forcibly attempted to enter the premises of the A.D. Cotton Mills, Quilon, after overcoming or overpowering the Police force stationed there to maintain law and order, and that he himself used or attempted to use force against responsible Police Officers on duty. It would appear that in the incidents that followed, some among the Police party got actually injured at the hands of the members of the unlawful assembly led by the petitioner. It is also alleged that the members of the unlawful assembly indulged in raising slogans calculated to bring the then Government of Travancore into hatred and contempt. The charge-sheet gives sufficient indication that the prosecution will be able to produce good prima facie evidence in support of the charge. One cannot reasonably expect or look for more at this stage. Against the background of the happenings on the 10th, and again earlier in the day on the 11th itself, which happenings form the subject of the charges against the petitioner and several others in P.E. No. 13 of 1124 on the file of the Quilon Second Class Magistrate's Court and C.C. No. 195 of 1124 on the file of the Division First Class Magistrate's Court, Quilon, out of which Crl. M.P. Nos. 8 and 11 of 1124 respectively arise, it is difficult to hold that the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge acted wrongly in refusing to enlarge on bail the petitioner who led in open defiance of law and constituted authority a riotous assembly of nearly 200 persons. In the two other cases referred to, it would appear the petitioner is charged only as an abetter who was not present at the scene of occurrence. The incidents giving rise to those cases themselves would seem to have caused serious breach of peace and actual harm or fear of danger to person and property. In the two other cases referred to, it would appear the petitioner is charged only as an abetter who was not present at the scene of occurrence. The incidents giving rise to those cases themselves would seem to have caused serious breach of peace and actual harm or fear of danger to person and property. It is most unlikely and extremely improbable the petitioner was not aware of the consequences of the prior incidents and to have ventured on another expedition putting himself at the head of a riotous assembly of about 200 persons armed with deadly weapons is not anything commendable to a man of his position and academic qualifications. It is well known that there is serious labour unrest throughout the land and to foment or lead the same through unconstitutional channels does not do credit to any leadership. 4. The two Allahabad cases mentioned above show the danger of the offence being repeated is a relevant consideration for the courts to look into, in the matter of admitting an under-trial prisoner to bail. The petitioner does not apparently agree to have terms imposed on his movements and activities if he were to be released. In answer to a question put by me whether the petitioner would agree to be put under certain conditions in case bail is granted the reply given by his learned advocate was absolutely non-committal. The cases mentioned are also authority for the position that the fact the Sessions Judge refused to exercise his discretion in favour of the accused must also be given due weight. Cochin case law bearing on the subject is also to the same effect. See Kunju Muhammad Hajee v. Cochin Sirkar 26 Cochin 144, Kunju Muhammad Hajee v. Cochin Sirkar 26 Cochin 204 and Venguswami Ayyar v. Sirkar 27 Cochin 382. In this case the learned Sessions Judge has given liberty to the petitioner to move for bail again after some of the material witnesses are examined. 5. In these circumstances I do not think it would be a sound exercise of judicial discretion for me to admit the petitioner to bail at this stage and I would accordingly reject this application. This order will not, however, stand in the way of the petitioner moving again as suggested by the learned Sessions Judge. 5. In these circumstances I do not think it would be a sound exercise of judicial discretion for me to admit the petitioner to bail at this stage and I would accordingly reject this application. This order will not, however, stand in the way of the petitioner moving again as suggested by the learned Sessions Judge. The court will then decide whether the merits or the exigencies of the case permit the petitioner being released on bail and, if so on any or what terms. Order accordingly. Petition dismissed.