Judgment Reuben, J. 1. We have already passed our order dismissing the appeal. We are giving below our reasons for the order. 2. This is an appeal by the plaintiff against an order of restitution under Sec.144, Civil P. C., passed by the Additional Subordinate Judge 2nd Court, Patna. 3. The suite out of which the appeal arises relates to the Math of Rajipore and Dhana in the district of Patna. The plaintiff claims to be the Mahanth as being the initiated Sadhu Chela of the late Mahanth Sri Madhawa Nand Ramji. The defendant-respondent denies that the plaintiff is the initiated Chela of the late Mahanth, and claims to have succeeded himself to the late Mahanth as his Gurubhai. The defendant obtained possession of the estate from the District Judge of Patna by an application under Sections 192 and 195, Succession Act. Hence, the present suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The suit was decreed by the Subordinate Judge and, in execution of the decree, the plaintiff was given possession of the estate. The decision of the Subordinate Judge was set aside by this Court on 6-12-1949, in F. A. No. 8 of 1945, and the suit was dismissed. The appeal is directed against an order of the Subordinate Judge allowing the defendants prayer for restitution under Sec.144. 4. The first point urged is that the application under Sec.144 was premature. It is pointed out that each an application is an application in execution, as held by the Full Bench in Bhaunath Singh V/s. Kedar Bath Singh, 13 pat. 411: (A. I. R. (21) 1934 pat. 246 F. B.) and it is urged that the Civil Procedure Code provides only for the execution of a decree; a decree not having been prepared as yet, that execution will not lie. The Full Bench was concerned with a point of limitation, as to whether an application under Sec.144 is governed by Article 181 or Article 182 of the Schedule to Limitation Act. They held that Article 182 applies, inasmuch as an application for restitution is intended to give effect to the decision by which the decree which was challenged is reversed. This does not mean, however, that such an application is governed by all the rules in the Civil Procedure Code relating to execution in the ordinary course. They held that Article 182 applies, inasmuch as an application for restitution is intended to give effect to the decision by which the decree which was challenged is reversed. This does not mean, however, that such an application is governed by all the rules in the Civil Procedure Code relating to execution in the ordinary course. Courtney-Terrell, C. J. in the course of his Judgment, pointed out on the contrary that the procedure for dealing with such applications differs in some respects from the procedure for carrying out other decrees of the Court. 5. The second objection urged was of a technical nature, namely, that the application as made to the Subordinate Judge did not specify the property of which restitution was Bought. It is asked how is it possible for the Court to know which property to make restitution of, unless the application specifies the property. This is urged as another reason why an application of this kind, made before the preparation of the decree, must be treated as premature. The answer to this objection is that the defendant-applicant was merely asking for restoration of property, possession of which had been given by the Court itself to the plaintiff; therefore, the records necessary for the Court to ascertain the identity of the property must have been avail, able to the Court, Further, for identifying the property, the decree of the appellate Court would be of no use. It is the decree of the original Court which specifies the subject-matter of the suit, and sc, the identity of the property could have been established before the Subordinate Judge, if necessary, by the production of the Subordinate Judges own decree. 6. The third contention based on the distinction drawn by the Civil Procedure Code between a Judgment and a decree at first impressed me as one of substance. 6. The third contention based on the distinction drawn by the Civil Procedure Code between a Judgment and a decree at first impressed me as one of substance. A decree is defined as "the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit," and a Judgment as "the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order"; the Judgment, therefore, merely gives the reasons and it is the decree which contains the order, and there being no decree yet in F. A. No. 8 of 1945, there is no operative order, and the decree of the Subordinate Judge cannot yet be regarded as having been reversed. This contention is supported at first sight by various subsequent provisions in the Code. Under Order 20, Rule 4, the Judgment "shall contain a concise statement of the ease, the points for determination, the decision thereon and the treasons for such decision," whereas, under Rule 6, the decree, in addition to certain other particulars, "shall specify clearly the relief granted and other determination of the suit". Again Order 41, Rule 31, provides that the Judgment of the appellate Court shall state the points for determination, the decision thereon, the reasons for the decision, and where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, "the relief to which the appellant is entitled" (the italics are mine), and, under Rule 82, the Judgment may be "for confirming, varying or reversing" the decree from which the appeal is preferred, and it is only when there is a compromise between the, parties that the appellate Court "may pass a decree or make an order". Contrasted with this is Order 41, Rule 35, which requires the decree to contain "a clear specification of the relief granted or other adjudication made." 7. On a closer analysis of these provisions, however, and on a consideration of the general scheme of the Code, I do not find it possible to accede to the contention that it is the decree and not the Judgment which disposes of the case. On a closer analysis of these provisions, however, and on a consideration of the general scheme of the Code, I do not find it possible to accede to the contention that it is the decree and not the Judgment which disposes of the case. It is true that the Judgment is defined as a statement of the grounds of the decree or order, but it is required to contain the points for determination and "the decision thereon" (Order 20, Rule 4). One of the points for determination in every case is whether fee plaintiff or the petitioner, as the case may be, is entitled to relief, and, if he is, what that relief shall be. The word "decision" will cover the finding on this point, and that finding would amount to a decision of the suit or other proceeding before the Court. The word "decision" is clearly used in this sense in Order 20, Rule 5, which speaks of "the decision of the suit" and in Order 41, Rule 34, which requires a dissenting Judge to state in writing "the decision or order" which he thinks should be passed on the appeal. Coming to the definition of a decree, I would point out that it is stated to be "the formal expression of an adjudication"; it is not the adjudication but is merely indicative of what that adjudication is. In the course of argument before us, it was pointed out that execution is provided for, of the decree and not of the Judgment, and that, in the event of a discrepancy between the decree and the Judgment, it is not open to the executing Court to proceed on the decree, but it is necessary for the party prejudicially affected thereby to get the decree amended by the Court which passed it. This does not mean, however, that it is the decree which is the real adjudication. If it was, there would be no question of amending it. It is not open to the executing Court to go behind the decree and act upon the Judgment because, by its definition, a decree conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to the matters in controversy in the suit. The legislature has placed upon the Court which passed the decree the duty of embodying its decision in the form of a decree. The legislature has placed upon the Court which passed the decree the duty of embodying its decision in the form of a decree. Obviously, it is not always possible for the Court when disposing of a ease to pass an order complete in all its details so that, when it becomes necessary to act on that decision, it will be clear to the executing Court or other authority acting on the decision what that decision is. One simple item which ordinarily forms part of the decree is the item of costs. This is an item which has to be ascertained by a careful examination of the record. To take another instance, the decision may involve a matter of accounting. It will not always be possible for the Judge to make the necessary calculations himself and to arrive at a definite figure. He may merely indicate the lines on which the accounting should be made, and the result so arrived at will be incorporated in the decree. Other details required in the decree are the names and particulars of the parties and specifications of the subject, matter of the litigation. Obviously the Court which passed the decree is in the best position to give these particulars and to determine what is the real effect of the decision contained in the Judgment. It is, therefore, that, in the case of discrepancy between the Judgment and the decree, the executing Court cannot go behind the decree, and the party aggrieved must seek amendment of the decree. As I have remarked, the question of amendment would not arise if the decree was itself the adjudication. It is true that Sec.152, Civil P. C., provides for amendments in Judgments, but this is confined to clerical or arithmetical mistakes; but, if there is a mistake of substance, the remedy is by "review of Judgment". This incompleteness of the Judgment and the necessity for a decree giving a formal expression to the adjudication explains why the Code has provided for the execution of decrees and for an appeal against a decree; to give effect to the decision, the executing Court must know exactly what the decision is, and, to deal with the appeal, the appellate Court must know who the parties are and what the subject-matter of the suit is. That the decree is subordinate to the Judgment and that it is the Judgment and not the decree which disposes of the case is made clear by the fact that the decree is required to be in agreement with the Judgment and to bear the date of the day on which the Judgment was pronounced although, ordinarily, it is not possible for the decree itself to be drawn up and signed on that very day. The validity and effect of the decision are not affected by a Judge vacating office after pronouncing Judgment or by the Court itself ceasing to exist (Vide Order 20, Rule 8). 8. That the Code itself regards the decision as operative from the moment of the pronouncement of the Judgment appears from Sub-rule (1) of Rule 11 of Order 21, under which the Court at the time of pronouncing Judgment for the payment of money may order immediate execution by the arrest of the Judgment-debtor. It is noticeable that the sub-rule provides for this action to be taken by the Court "at the time of the passing of the decree", although it is not likely, nor is it contemplated by the forms of decrees prescribed in App. D of the Code, that a decree will have been drawn by at that time. Therefore, the Court pronouncing Judgment may proceed as if there is an operative decree although a formal decree baa not been drawn up. In Golain Gaffar V/s. Goljan Bibi, 25 Cal. 109. Banerjee J., went so far as to suggest that, in the unlikely event of a decree not having: been prepared during the period of three months following the pronouncement of Judgment, it would be open to the successful party to save limitation by applying for execution without; the decree. Some support for this suggestion, may be found in Sub-rule (3) of Rule 11 of Order 21, which indicates that a Court may entertain a petition for execution without a copy of the decree sought to be executed. Some support for this suggestion, may be found in Sub-rule (3) of Rule 11 of Order 21, which indicates that a Court may entertain a petition for execution without a copy of the decree sought to be executed. For the purposes of the present case, however, it is unnecessary to express an opinion on the correctness of the view expressed by Banerjee J. My view, that, the adjudication is made by the Judgment and not by the decree, is supported by the fact that limitation for the execution of a decree runs not from the date on which the decree is signed but from the date of the pronouncement of the Judgment. 9. What I have said above regarding the meaning of the word decision, applies also to Order 41, Rule 31. Where the appellate Court is not, interfering with the decree of the Court below all that is necessary is that it should be stated in the form of a decision that the appeal be dismissed or that the decree of the Court below be confirmed. In the case of a decree of the subordinate Court being reversed or varied, it becomes necessary that the relief which the appellant is to get should be specified. This is, therefore, provided for in the rule. What the rule contemplates is not merely a specification of what relief the appellant should get but that the Judgment, in fact, purports to grant that relief, It is in the light of these observations that Order 41, Rules 32 and 35 should be read. 10. The contentions on behalf of the appellant have even less force with reference to a decision of this Court than they would have with reference to a decision of a subordinate-Court. This is by reason of Order 49, Rule 3, under the provisions of which a chartered High Court is not affected, in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction, by Rules 1 to 8 of Order 20 and, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, by Rule 35 of Order The provisions as regards the preparation of decrees in this Court are contained in chap. VIII of the Rules of the High Court, to the rules in which Chap. I shall refer for what immediately follows. VIII of the Rules of the High Court, to the rules in which Chap. I shall refer for what immediately follows. Under Rule 5, every Judgment delivered and every order passed by the Court shall be recorded by a Judgment writer except when the Court delivers a written Judgment The Judgment or order so recorded is required to be filed with the paper-book and, at the end of the record so prepared, is to be entered the date of the passing of the order or the delivery of the Judgment (Rule 6). The Bench Clerk is then to submit the Judgment or order which has been recorded for signature by the Judge or Judges who delivered or passed it, "unless each Judge or Judges otherwise order or have resigned or proceeded on leave, or are absent on ac-count of illness or any other cause (Rule 7)." There is no provision as to what will happen in these exceptional cases, and it is not necessary for the present case to consider what will happen. Then come the provisions for the preparation of "decrees and orders;" apparently, all decisions of this Court are to be given a formal expression. The responsibility for doing this is placed on the Deputy Registrar. He will give the parties an opportunity of objecting to the decree or order which is drawn up and, in the case of such an objection being made, will obtain the orders of the Bench. The decree or order, when drawn up, will be signed by the Deputy Registrar, and will bear the date of the day when the Judgment was delivered (Rule 14). The formal decree in this Court, therefore, need not even come before the Bench and will not bear the signature of any Judge. In these circum-Stances, I do not find it possible to hold that it is the decree and not the Judgment which is the adjudication in the case. 11. Our attention has been drawn to Gola Ram V/s. Ganga Ram, A. I. R. (7) 1920 Lah. 395: (l Lah, 223), in which Scott-Smith and Le Rossignol JJ., following the observations of Piggot J. in Dulin Golab Koer V/s. Radha Dulari, 19 Cal. 11. Our attention has been drawn to Gola Ram V/s. Ganga Ram, A. I. R. (7) 1920 Lah. 395: (l Lah, 223), in which Scott-Smith and Le Rossignol JJ., following the observations of Piggot J. in Dulin Golab Koer V/s. Radha Dulari, 19 Cal. 463 (F.B.), held that a paragraph in a Judgment not drawn up in the form of a decree, and not embodied in a separate form, is not a decree within the terms of the Code of Civil Procedure. The question before their Lordships was whether an appeal lies against an order in a Judgment mot drawn up in the form of a decree. Under the express provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, it does not, because Order 41, Rule 1 expressly requires that "the memorandum shall be accompanied by a copy of the decree appealed from and (unless the appellate Court dispenses therewith) of the Judgment on which it is founded." It is a point for remark that Dulhin Golab Koers case, 19 Cal. 463 (F.B. ) was itself a case of this kind and that, in the absence of objection on the point, the Pull Bench held that an appeal lay. These decisions, however, do not concern us. We are dealing with a proceeding under Sec.144, which section does not in terms require a decree to give the Court jurisdiction to fact, All that it requires is that "a decree is varied or reversed." In the view which I have taken of the effect of the pronouncement of Judgment, it must be held that the decree of the Subordinate Judge has been reversed. The Subordinate Judge, therefore, had jurisdiction to make] restitution under the provisions of this Sec.12. Jamuar, J. 12 I agree.