This second appeal arises out of a suit for pre-emption filed originally in the Court of the Munsiff, Ratangarh, against the appellant by the respondents. On the 15th September, 1947, the appellant Rameshwar, purchased for Rs. 700/- the divided share of Bhuruddin son of Jiwanshah Kasi of Ratangarh in a house situated at Holidhora in Ratangarh under a sale deed which was registered on the 16th September, 1947. On 22.12.47 one Musammat Nasiban widow of Jamaldin who held a third share in the said house, jointly with one Piria who, she alleged, was her adopted son, filed a suit against the vendee defendant 1 and the vendor defendant 2 for pre-emption of the suit property on the ground of being proprietor of a share of the whole house and on the ground of having a common door. The defendants resisted the suit on the following, among other, grounds: — (1) That Piriya plaintiff 2 was not the adopted son of the plaintiff 1, Musammat Nasiban; (2) That the plaintiff 1, Musammat Nasiban, had mortgaged by conditional sale her own divided one third share of the entire house to defendant 1 for Rs. 99/- on the 18th of September, 1947; (3) That the purchase of the suit property took place with the consent and knowledge of Musammat Nasiban who could not, anymore, claim any right of pre emption; (4) That the suit was defective as Piriya, plaintiff 2, who has no right of pre-emption has been joined as a co-plaintiff; (5) That the plaintiffs were not possessed of enough means to purchase the suit property; and (6) That Musammat Nasiban had waived her right of pre-emption. 2. On the abolition of the Court of the Munsiff, Ratangarh, and establishment of the Court of Sub-Judge at Ratangarh, the suit was transferred to the latter Court on the 22nd March, 1948. 3. The trial Court came to the conclusion that Piriya plaintiff No. 2 was not the adopted son of Musammat Nasiban plaintiff No. 1, and that Musammat Nasiban had relinquished her right of pre-emption, and dismissed the suit on 2S.6.1948. The plaintiffs, thereupon, went up in appeal to the District Judge, Churu, who has, though rejected the claim of Piriya and dismissed the appeals so far as Piriya was concerned, accepted the appeals and decreed the suits in favour of Musammat Nasiban, plaintiff 1, on the 24th March, 1948. The plaintiffs, thereupon, went up in appeal to the District Judge, Churu, who has, though rejected the claim of Piriya and dismissed the appeals so far as Piriya was concerned, accepted the appeals and decreed the suits in favour of Musammat Nasiban, plaintiff 1, on the 24th March, 1948. Rameshwar defendant 1, who is the vendee, has now come up to this Court in second appeal. 4. The following two main contentions have been raised on be-half of the appellants: — (1) That Musammat Nasiban who had a right of pre-emption, having joined as a co-plaintiff with her another person Piriya a stranger, who had no right of pre-emption-could not claim any right of pre-emption and the suit must have been dismissed; and (2) That Musammat Nasiban had waived her right of pre-emption and the suit must have been dismissed on that ground also. 5. The trial court has very elaborately discussed the evidence produced by the parties on the question of Piriyas being an adopted son of Musammat Nasiban. It has held that his alleged adoption was not proved. The learned District Judge has not disagreed with this finding of the Sub-Judge and has dismissed the appeals so far as Piriya is concerned. It was also found by the trial Court that Piriya had, jointly with bis natural father, Shamsuddin, sold his interest in the entire house to one Somedutta and could not claim in himself any right of pre-emption to the suit property. Very evidently, under the circumstances mentioned above, he is a stranger for the purposes of the suit for pre-emption—meaning of term stranger in relation to pre-emptor being a person who has not the right of pre-emption. The relief claimed in the plaint as well as in the appeal was a joint one and Musammat Nasiban could not have succeeded without amending the plaint and the appear, and striking out the name of Piriya which does not appear to have been done. The plea on which this contention is raised appears to have been taken in the written statement on be-half of the appellant. The plea on which this contention is raised appears to have been taken in the written statement on be-half of the appellant. The contention further appears to have been raised before the lower appellate Court which has dismissed the appeal so far as Piriya is concerned and passed a decree in favour of Musammat Nasiban without any application on her behalf for amendment of the plaint and the appeal by striking out the name of Piriya. In 19 Allahabad (I..L. R.) 384 their Lordships Mr. Justice Banerji and Mr. Justice Aikman of the Allahabad High Court have held that "the very fact of a person having the right of pre-emption joining with himself strangers, i. e. persons who have not a right of pre-emption, is in itself sufficient to estop him from asserting his claim". On the above authority, it is clear, that Mst. Nasiban, in this case before me, has forfeited her right of pre-emption. No application to strike out the name of Piriya has been made either to the Court of first instance or even to the court of first appeal. Piriyas right has been asserted to the last though as a last resort counsel for the plaintiffs may have suggested to the lower appellate Court to reject the appeal so far as Piriya was concerned and to decree the claim of Mst. Nasiban. This was not to be allowed. Vide another judgment of the same High Court reported in A.I.R. 1925 All. 355 where it has been held that the joinder of a stranger as co-plaintiff in a suit for pre-emption was a fatal defect which could not be cured by striking out the name of the stranger. In my opinion this contention on behalf of the appellant has great force and must succeed. I might mention that the case would have probably been different if an application had been made for amendment of the plaint to the Court of first instance or for amendment of the plaint and the Court of first appeal. 6. Now, coming to the second contention, it must be said that the judgment of the lower appellate Court is based upon a reasoning which has no basis. The learned Judge has entirely ignored the direct sworn testimony of reliable persons, Roopehand, the scribe and Kaluram and Shanker Lal witnesses who have attested the deed of mortgage by conditional sale executed by Mst. The learned Judge has entirely ignored the direct sworn testimony of reliable persons, Roopehand, the scribe and Kaluram and Shanker Lal witnesses who have attested the deed of mortgage by conditional sale executed by Mst. Nasiban in favour of Ramesh war appellant under which she has mortgaged her share in the entire house and relinquished her right of pre-emption by saying that she had no right of pre-emption in the property of Bnuruddin etc. This direct evidence was corroborated by the evidence of an handwriting expert who said that the thumb impression on the aforesaid mortgage deed, though not very clear, and the admitted thumb impression of Mst. Nasiban were quite similar and of one and the same person. The learned District Judge has based his judgment mainly on the suspicious circumstances that the ink of the first two lines and of the signatures of the attesting witnesses was different from the ink in which the rest of the deed was written, that after nine lines of the deed had been written on the stamp paper, the scribe felt the remaining space to be insufficient and therefore wrote the deed in lines very close to each other, that the thumb mark of Mst. Nasiban appeared from the deed to have been affixed before the sentence embodying the statement that she had no right of pre-emption was written, that the expert had admitted that the disputed thumb impression was not very clear and that it was only from some points of similarity in the disputed and the admitted thumb impressions, that the expert had testified that the two impressions were of one and the same person though he had to admit that there could be found some points of similarity in the thumb impressions of two different person. The fact of difference between the ink of the signatures of the attesting witnesses and that of the main body of the deed had been sufficiently explained by Kaluram D. W. 6. The fact of difference between the ink of the first two lines and that of the rest of the body of the deed has been explained by the scribe Roopchand D. W. 8. As regards the circumstance of the thumb impression appearing to have been affixed before the writing of the said sentence, it seems that the idea of having her right of pre-emption relinquished by Mst. As regards the circumstance of the thumb impression appearing to have been affixed before the writing of the said sentence, it seems that the idea of having her right of pre-emption relinquished by Mst. Nasiban struck after she had put her thumbmark. Even a cursory examination of the document shows that the ink with which is written the said sentence under which Mst. Nasiban is said to have disowned her right of pre-emption to the suit property is the same with which the rest of the deed b written and this fact when considered in the light of the sworn testimony of the witnesses mentioned above leaves no doubt that it was written at the same time when the deed was executed. Moreover, it is not the case that Mst. Nasiban has admitted the execution of the deed by her but denied to have agreed to forego her right of pre-emption. On the contrary, she has altogether denied the execution of the deed which has been proved to have been executed by her. The mortgage deed having been proved to have been executed by her, it is fair to presume that she had agreed to forego her right of pre-emption. So far as the evidence of the expert is concerned it is pertinent that he has not been asked the straight question whether or not the disputed thumb mark could be of a person different from the person with whose thumb mark the former had been compared. Nor has any question been put to him as to the points of similarity that could be found on the thumb marks of two different persons and as to the existence of those points in the thumb mark in question. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to agree with the finding of the appellate Court. Besides, there is sufficient positive evidence on the record coupled with the admission of Mst. Nasiban to show that she is, not only not possessed of sufficient means to pay the price of the property in question, but is also indebted and it would be only reasonable to come to the conclusion that she had relinquished her right of pre-emption to enforce which she had no means. To me the finding of the trial court, on this point, appears to be correct. I, therefore, hold that it was proved that Mst. To me the finding of the trial court, on this point, appears to be correct. I, therefore, hold that it was proved that Mst. Nasiban had relinquished her right of pre-emption as a condition of the mortgage. 7. The conclusion is that this appeal succeeds. I therefore, accept this appeal with costs throughout, set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court and restore that of the Court of first instance by which the respondents suit for pre-emption had been dismissed. 8. Attention of the subordinate Civil Courts in the territory of the former State of Bikaner is drawn to the mandatory provisions of Section 17 of the Bikaner State Pre-emption Act. No. 1 of 1919 under which it has been made obligatory for the Courts to require the plaintiff at, or at any time before, the settlement of issues, to deposit in Court such sum as does not exceed one-fourth of the price paid by the vendee for the property according to the deed of sale, such sum being available for the discharge of costs. Both the trial Court as also the Court of first appeal have, in this case, failed to comply with the very salutory requirement of Law.