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1950 DIGILAW 122 (KER)

Gopala Pillai v. Raghavan Pillai

1950-11-30

KUNHI RAMAN, SUBRAMONIA.IYER

body1950
Judgment :- 1. These appeals arise out of the order of the learned District Judge of Parur dated 23.1.1950 passed on C.M.P. 130 of 1950 in O.S. No. 37 of 1103. A.S. No. 98 is by the obstructor petitioner in C.M.P. 130 and A.S. No. 136, by defendant No. 7 and some other defendants. 2. A.S. No. 98 of 1950. The appellant in A.S. No. 98 obstructed delivery of possession of properties in execution of the decree in O.S. No. 37 of 1103 which was a decree for partition in a Malabar Tarwad. The obstruction related to six items. The obstruction was upheld in respect of items 2 to 6 and was disallowed in respect of the first item. A.S. No. 98 relates to the first item regarding which obstruction was disallowed and A.S.136 relates to items 2 to 6 regarding which the obstruction was allowed. 3. The respondent in A.S. No. 98 raises a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that the appellant is a transferee of properties pendente lite that is, the transfer relied upon by him which is a mortgage executed in his favour by the 4th defendant was after the institution of the suit O.S. No. 37 of 1103 which was a suit for partition. The transferee pendente lite, it is contended, is not a representative of the party and, therefore, will not come within the operation of S. 40 of the Travancore Civil Procedure Code with the result that the order passed by the lower court must be regarded as an order passed against a stranger to the suit and that only an original suit is competent as provided in the Code. In Parameshari Din v. Ram Charan (AIR 1937 PC 260) the Privy Council held that a transferee pendente lite is a representative-in-interest of the party from whom he got the transfer. The reason is obvious because a transfer after the institution of a contentious suit is not bad for all purposes; such a transferee would be disentitled to raise any claim against the decree or order that may ultimately be passed in the action. The learned counsel for the respondent relies upon Basappa Budappa v. Bhimangowda Shiddangowda (I.L.R. 52 Bom. 208) to support his position, namely, that a transferee pendente lite is not a representative. The learned counsel for the respondent relies upon Basappa Budappa v. Bhimangowda Shiddangowda (I.L.R. 52 Bom. 208) to support his position, namely, that a transferee pendente lite is not a representative. That decision when perused reveals that the non-representative character of the transferee is only for the purpose of questioning the plaintiff's right to sue and that for all other purposes the transferee is a representative. Thus on the respondent's own showing, where a transfer is affected by lis pendens the transferee is entitled to raise the objections and pursue the remedies which the transferor could have done. The preliminary objection is, therefore, overruled. 4. Coming to the merits of the matter, Mr. N.K. Narayana Pillai, the learned counsel for the appellant complains that his client has had no opportunity to adduce necessary evidence in the case and that the matter was straightaway posted for argument without posting the case for evidence. It appears to us that the case should have been posted for evidence and that the parties should have been afforded an opportunity to adduce evidence in the case. The learned counsel for the respondent is not prepared to argue the case as a demurrer accepting all allegations made on behalf of the appellant. We therefore, reverse the order of the court below in so far as it relates to item No.1 which is the subject matter of appeal suit No. 98, allow that appeal and remand the case to the court below for disposal according to law after affording an opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence, oral or documentary, or both. The Transfer of Property Act is not in the Statute Book of Travancore but the principles underlying S. 52 thereof have been accepted by the Travancore High Court and it is the common case of the litigants in this case that these principles apply. In fact the respondent depends upon these principles. We direct that the costs of this appeal shall abide and follow the result in the court below which will provide for it in the revised order to be passed by it. 5. A.S. No. 136 of 1950. This appeal as already mentioned relates to items 2 to 6 in the petition filed by the respondent. Those items were admittedly outstanding with lessees under the tarwad who were not parties to the suit. The obstructor obtained possession from these lessees. 5. A.S. No. 136 of 1950. This appeal as already mentioned relates to items 2 to 6 in the petition filed by the respondent. Those items were admittedly outstanding with lessees under the tarwad who were not parties to the suit. The obstructor obtained possession from these lessees. In a matter of obstruction, what the court is concerned with is only possession and title to possession. The tarwad not having had title to actual possession at the time the suit was filed the lower court rightly upheld the obstruction of the respondent. The fact of the properties being outstanding on lease under the tarwad before the date of the suit is not canvassed before us by the appellant. In this view the appeal is without merits and must be dismissed with costs.