Judgment :- 1. These cases were posted today for further arguments, in view of the complication created by the order passed by the Court below (which is the Sessions Court of Kottayam) and we are grateful to Mr. K.T. Thomas, the appellant's learned Advocate and Mr. Chacko, the learned Public Prosecutor for the assistance they have rendered in arguing all the different aspects of the case. 2. The question arises in respect of the prosecution that was started in Kottayam which culminated in the accused person whose name is Abhayagunavardhana being committed for trial to the Sessions Court of Kottayam. The offences mentioned in the charge are punishable under S.421 and 469, Travancore Penal Code. The facts are somewhat though not quite similar to the facts in Criminal Appeals Nos. 41 of 1124, 135,136 and 137 of 1124 which came upon on appeal from the Sessions Court at Trivandrum. Accused 2 who was the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 41 of 1124 is the accused in the present case tried by the Sessions Judge of Kottayam. We have, in dealing with Criminal Appeal No. 41 of 1124, narrated in detail the facts that led up to the detection of crimes alleged to have been committed by the accused appellant in the present case in respect of certain spurious money orders which were transmitted from Ceylon. The accused appellant here has been convicted in the case that was brought against him in Trivandrum, the learned trial judge holding that he has committed the offences of cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property. In the case in Trivandrum the learned judge also took the view that the evidence did not warrant a finding of guilty in respect of the offence of forgery which was also included in the charge. There the accused had resided in Trivandrum, according to the evidence for the prosecution, under the assumed name of Lionel Rajaratnam and there were money orders received by him in that name. He had admittedly signed these money orders and in these circumstances, the learned trial judge held that the offence of forgery was not made out against him. 3. There the accused had resided in Trivandrum, according to the evidence for the prosecution, under the assumed name of Lionel Rajaratnam and there were money orders received by him in that name. He had admittedly signed these money orders and in these circumstances, the learned trial judge held that the offence of forgery was not made out against him. 3. On a perusal of the judgment of the trial Court in the present case which has come up on appeal from the decision in Sessions Case No. 21 of 1950 in the Sessions Court at Kottayam, we notice that the facts are different in the following particulars. The real name of the accused is Abayaguna Vardhana and he had given that name in the Court below at the trial. Here also the spurious money orders had come from Ceylon for Rs. 500 each. Altogether there were 24 such money orders. They were all received in the Post Office at Kottayam and the addressee was Newton Sylva. We have to take the facts from the judgment of the learned trial judge and this is what he says in para 7 of his judgment: "Now coming to the question for consideration, P.W. 3 swears that 24 money orders each for Rs. 500 addressed to Newton Sylva, Hotel Philips, Kottayam arrived in the local Post Office between 6th and 10 February 1947 and he is corroborated by Ext. A series Money Order Forms, and the testimony of P.Ws.1, 2 and 6. The next question is whether the money orders were addressed to the accused. He admits that his name is Ranjit Abhaya Guna Vardhana. Prima facie it is not addressed to him. But there is no harm in a person assuming another name and a money order or letter being addressed to him in that assumed name and if he accepts the same, he commits no offence. But in the present case, the accused denies that he has signed Ext. A series money orders or received payment thereunder. The implication of that is that he is not the addressee and has not received payment of these money orders after signing them " 4. But in the present case, the accused denies that he has signed Ext. A series money orders or received payment thereunder. The implication of that is that he is not the addressee and has not received payment of these money orders after signing them " 4. It is on the basis of these facts that the learned judge, after believing the witnesses who were called on behalf of the prosecution to prove that the accused did sign as Newton Sylva and did receive the moneys under those various money orders, has reached the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence of forgery. The learned Counsel for the accused appellant argues that it was incumbent upon the trial judge to have asked questions to the accused appellant at the trial to enable him to explain the circumstances appearing in evidence against him and had the learned trial judge put questions to him, it might have been elicited that he had assumed the name of Newton. But in view of the fact that the accused appellant gave his name as Abhayaguna Vardhana and not as Newton Sylva and in view of the fact that he denied having signed and received the money orders bearing the signature of Newton Sylva, we do not feel that there was nay duty cast upon the learned trial judge to put questions to the accused appellant regarding the name 'Newton Sylva'. There was a straight case made against him. He had been tried in Trivandrum for assuming the name of Lionel Rajaratnam and for signing money orders under that assumed name and collecting moneys thereunder and he perhaps felt that he had burnt his fingures there, because he admitted that his name was Lionel Rajaratnam and because he admitted also that he had signed and received money orders under that assumed name. Therefore, he was entering on a new venture when he was tried in the Court of Sessions at Kottayam, banking perhaps on the difficulty which the prosecution may have in establishing that he was the person who signed the money orders under the name of Newton Sylva. Therefore, he was entering on a new venture when he was tried in the Court of Sessions at Kottayam, banking perhaps on the difficulty which the prosecution may have in establishing that he was the person who signed the money orders under the name of Newton Sylva. Whatever might have been his motive, there was a complete change of front when he faced the prosecution in the Sessions Court at Kottayam and that landed him in more serious trouble, because the learned judge in his judgment has discussed the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3, 5 and 6 and believing their evidence has held that the case has been made out conclusively against the accused that he did sign those money orders as Newton Sylva and receive moneys thereunder. In these circumstances, the learned judge has correctly arrived at the conclusion that the charge under S. 469, Travancore Penal Code has been proved against the accused. We are in complete agreement with this view expressed in the judgment of the learned trial judge. 5. There is also a finding that the accused appellant is guilty under S.421 as well, that is, cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property. This offence also has been proved against the accused as in the case in Trivandrum. Then the learned judge states that although he convicts the accused under both these sections, he should not award separate punishments under these sections. In his opinion only one sentence is called for. Since S.469, imposes a higher penalty, the learned judge says the accused is to be punished under that section only. Considering the circumstances of the case and the age of the accused at the time the trial took place, the Court below has sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years under S.469, Travancore Penal Code. Although there is a finding that he is also guilty under S.421, Travancore Penal Code, that finding is not followed by a sentence. The direction with regard to rigorous imprisonment for two years is that the sentence shall run after the expiry of the other sentence imposed upon the accused in the other Courts in the State. Reference is obviously made to the previous conviction in the Sessions Court of Trivandrum. 6. The direction with regard to rigorous imprisonment for two years is that the sentence shall run after the expiry of the other sentence imposed upon the accused in the other Courts in the State. Reference is obviously made to the previous conviction in the Sessions Court of Trivandrum. 6. We cannot accept the view taken by the learned trial judge that on the facts of the present case, although he has found the accused guilty under S.421 and 469, Travancore Penal Code, these convictions should not be followed by separate punishments. If the learned judge wanted to avoid sentencing the accused to a longer period of imprisonment than the circumstances warranted, he could have passed sentences under both these sections separately and directed that they should run concurrently. That would have been the proper procedure to adopt in a case like the present. Otherwise if the accused had succeeded in his appeal in respect of the offence of forgery, the result would have been that the conviction for forgery would have had to be set aside and the conviction under S.421, alone would have been left intact, but that conviction is not followed by a sentence. The position has necessitated the learned Counsel appearing for the accused appellant and the State to address arguments for and against the powers that can be exercised by an appellate Court when such a complication has arisen. There is no doubt that under S.350 Travancore Criminal P.C. which refers to the powers of an appellate Court (the terms of which are similar to the corresponding provision under the Indian Criminal Procedure Code), in a case of this description the appellate Court has the power of directing that the sentence should be apportioned for the two offences which the accused has been found to be guilty of, provided the direction does not amount to enhancement of the sentence, because the fundamental rule that is recognised in the case of criminal appeals is that whatever the appellate Court does, it shall not enhance the sentence. Here in the present case, that difficulty does not stand in the way of this Court, because there is a criminal revision petition filed on behalf of the State for enhancing the sentence. Here in the present case, that difficulty does not stand in the way of this Court, because there is a criminal revision petition filed on behalf of the State for enhancing the sentence. No doubt in the grounds for revision this particular ground has not been taken and it has not been specifically pointed out that since the conviction under S.421 is not followed by a sentence, this Court is revision should pass a sentence. In fact when the matter has come to the notice of this Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, it is open to this Court to exercise very wide powers even including the power to enhance the sentence. It is needless to refer to the extent of the jurisdiction, since we do not propose to enhance the sentence already passed by the court below, but we are going to make an apportionment in order that the conviction under each of the two sections may be followed by a sentence. The question arose in two cases in other High Courts as to whether such a power can be exercised by an appellate Court. In the case in Pradip Chaudhari v. Emperor (48 Crl. LJ 182), two learned judges of the Patna High Court had to consider the question. The Head Note of the report which is fairly accurate is worded as follows and gives the views taken by the Court : "The appellate Court has ample power to transpose the sentence so long as the transposition does not amount to an enhancement. The accused was convicted by the trial Court under Ss. 148 and 324, (Indian Penal Code) but was sentenced only under S. 324. The High Court set aside the conviction under S. 324, as well as the sentence. Held that the case was covered by S.423(1)(b); if it was not then it was covered by S.423(1)(d) and the High Court could pass a sentence for the offence under S.148 for which the trial Court had not passed any sentence". Similarly in the case reported in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs Bengal v. Hosoein Ali (39 Crl. Held that the case was covered by S.423(1)(b); if it was not then it was covered by S.423(1)(d) and the High Court could pass a sentence for the offence under S.148 for which the trial Court had not passed any sentence". Similarly in the case reported in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs Bengal v. Hosoein Ali (39 Crl. LJ 684) a Bench of two learned judges of the Calcutta High Court took a similar view: Here again the head note may be read: "Under S.423(b), Criminal P.C., in an appeal from conviction, the appellate Court may alter the finding maintaining the sentence or with or without altering the finding reduce the sentence. The accused were tried by a Magistrate who convicted them under S.363 and 498, Penal Code, and sentenced them under S. 363 to rigorous imprisonment for one year and six months each and awarded no separate sentence under S. 498. In appeal the Sessions Judge found the accused not guilty under S.363, but guilty under S.498. He upheld the conviction under S. 498, but felt that he had no authority to pass a proper sentence as the Magistrate had not passed any sentence under that section. Held that the Sessions Judge had jurisdiction to pass appropriate sentence under S.498 subject to the limit of one year and six months which the Magistrate had imposed". 7. Since we are dismissing the appeal holding that the convictions under S.421 and 469 and are both correct and must be upheld, it may appear that the question that we have considered in this judgment is only of academic interest and not of any practical value, but in view of the lengthy arguments addressed respectively on behalf of the accused appellant and the State, we feel that the matter should be dealt with in this judgment in order that it may not arise again as a problem in this Court. Having taken the view that in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, we can exercise a discretion both under S.350(b) and 350(d) according to which the Court may "make any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper," we reduce the sentence of two years rigorous imprisonment passed by the learned Trial Judge and direct that for each of the offences under S.421 and 469 the accused shall be sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment respectively with a direction that these sentences shall run concurrently. We also direct that the sentences shall commence after the expiry of any other sentence that may have been already passed on the accused as stated in the judgment of the learned trial Judge. We are reducing the sentences in this manner, in view of the period during which the accused appellant was in prison when the trials were going on in the Courts below and in view of the punishment already inflicted upon him by the Sessions Judge of Trivandrum. So far as the revision petition is concerned, we see no reason to enhance the sentence. 8. At this stage Mr. Thomas, the learned Counsel for the accused appellant makes an oral application for a certificate to enable him to appeal to the Supreme Court in this case and in Criminal Appeal No. 41 of 1124. We are not satisfied that there is any ground for granting such a certificate and we cannot therefore, grant it. Appeal dismissed.