JUDGMENT : Plaintiff-petitioner filed a suit in the Court of Additional Munsiff, Hatod, against the defendant-opponent for a sum of Rs.940/-. The facts of the case which gave rise to this suit are as follows: Plaintiff's father had money dealings with, and had lent money to, Kanhiram, brother of the defendant. On 3-5-1940 the accounts were settled and a balance was struck. Rs.1200/- were found due to the plaintiff's father in Kanhiram's account. Kanhiram agreed to pay Rs.1200/- and it was arranged that the plaintiff's father should take the defendant's field known as 'Khajurwala khet' for a period of 12 years and get his liability discharged by crediting Rs.100/- every year for the enjoyment or occupation. 2. The agreement was reduced to writing and recorded in the account-book of plaintiff's father and is alleged to have been signed by the defendant and his brother Kaniharm. The agreement is in the following form: "The balance due today is Rs.1200/-. In lieu of this amount I give my field Khajurwala to the plaintiff for a period of 12 years. The Government dues will be paid by the plaintiff. I will have no objection to this. In case debt is not discharged I shall pay interest at the rate of Re.1 annas 8 per month from this date and shall pay the debt in one lump sum." 3. According to the plaint, the plaintiff's father continued in possession of the field for two years; but thereafter he was ousted. For a period of 4 years thereafter, the defendants paid Rs.40/- every year upto Samvat 2002, but subsequently there was no payment. The plaintiff's father and Kanhiram are both dead The plaintiff has, after giving credit to Rs.360/-filed a suit for recovery of the balance. 4. The defendant resisted the claim on many grounds, one of them being that the document of mortgage being unregistered is not admissible in evidence and it cannot be the basis, of a suit. The learned Munsiff has decided this point in favour of the defendant. 5. I am now asked by the petitioner, to interfere under S.115, Civil P.C. and a preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of the opposite party that the order is not revisable Reliance is placed by Mr. The learned Munsiff has decided this point in favour of the defendant. 5. I am now asked by the petitioner, to interfere under S.115, Civil P.C. and a preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of the opposite party that the order is not revisable Reliance is placed by Mr. Pandit on - 'Raghunandan v. Raghubar Singh', AIR 1933 Oudh 345 (1), wherein a Division Bench held that an application under S.115, Civil.P.C. to revise the order of refusal to receive documentary evidence by the lower court does not lie as such order cannot be construed to be a decision of a case, nor is there any illegality in exercise of the jurisdiction which is vested by law. This was a suit for redemption wherein the defendants, after the issues had been framed, but before the evidence was commenced, filed an application for permission to tender in evidence certain documents in support of their defence. Permission was not granted by the trial Court and the order was held to be only an interlocutory one. The learned Judges, however, felt that the order passed by the subordinate Court was wrong and observed: "We would, therefore, formally reject these applications, but we cannot take leave of them without pointing out to the learned Subordinate Judge that having regard to the nature of the documents which these applicants tendered in evidence before the trial commenced, he would have been better advised to have received them and to have proceeded to decide the case on the merits. We trust that the learned Subordinate Judge will do so when he is moved in that behalf again by these applicants." 6. With respect to the learned Judges, I fail to appreciate the effect of this formal rejection of the revision. For all practical purposes, the revision seems to have been accepted. 7. In - 'Isa Adam v. Bai Mariam', AIR 1927 Bom 664 also it was held that an interlocutory order of the lower Court rejecting certain evidence as inadmissible during the pendency of a suit is not revisable. 8. There has formerly been a divergence of judicial opinion on the question whether a revision could be entertained against an interlocutory order. In - 'Isa Adam v. Bai Mariam', AIR 1927 Bom 664 also it was held that an interlocutory order of the lower Court rejecting certain evidence as inadmissible during the pendency of a suit is not revisable. 8. There has formerly been a divergence of judicial opinion on the question whether a revision could be entertained against an interlocutory order. The entire case law on the subject has been carefully considered by a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in - 'Gurdevi Bibi v. Mohammad Bakhsh', ILR (1943) Lah 257, which has held that the word 'case' 'in S.115, Civil P.C. is wide enough to include interlocutory orders. The High Court thus is competent to entertain revision against an interlocutory order provided the three con-ditions mentioned in the first part of S.115 are satisfied. In - 'T.A. Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Ayyar', 40 Mad 793, the Privy Council pointed out that S.115 applies to jurisdiction alone, the irregular exercise, or non-exercise of it, or the illegal assumption of it, and that the section is not directed against conclusions of law and fact in which the question of jurisdiction is not involved. In a recent case - 'Joy Chand Lal v. Kamalaksha Chaudhury', AIR 1949 PC 239 , Sir John Beaumont, delivering the judgment of the Board observed: "There have been a very large number of decisions of the Indian High Courts on S.115, to many of which their Lordships have referred. Some of such decisions prompt the observation that High Courts have not always appreciated that although error in a decision of a Subordinate Court does set by itself involve that the Subordinate Court has acted illegally or with material irregularity so as to justify interference in revision under subsection (c), nevertheless, if the erroneous decision results in the subordinate Court exercising a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or failing to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, a case for revision arises under subsection (a), or Sub-S.(b) and Sub-S.(c) can be ignored." 9. It is difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule on the question, when does an erroneous decision result in Subordinate Court exercising a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or failing to exercise a jurisdiction so vested. Each case must be considered on the facts and circumstances of that case. 10. It is difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule on the question, when does an erroneous decision result in Subordinate Court exercising a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or failing to exercise a jurisdiction so vested. Each case must be considered on the facts and circumstances of that case. 10. Ordinarily an order of the lower Court rejecting certain evidence as inadmissible cannot be called an erroneous decision resulting in the irregular exercise of jurisdiction. The Lower Court has perfect jurisdiction to decide the question and it can decide it rightly as well as wrongly. Even if it decides wrongly it cannot be said that the Court failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law. But there may be interlocutory orders of extraordinary nature, e.g., if a plaintiff comes to. depose and he is not allowed to be examined, surely, this will be a case of an erroneous decision resulting in the irregular exercise of jurisdiction. Then, as Sir Lawrence Jenkins said in 41 Cal 323, S.115 can be called in aid when the failure of justice has been due to one or other of the faults of procedure; and, where the Court fails to apply its mind at all to the mandatory provisions of law relevant on the question - 'Raghubir Singh v. Mulchand', ILR (1937) All 805 (FB), it acts in the exercise of its jurisdiction with material irregularity. 11. In - 'Mt, Sukhia v. Kirpa Ram', ILR (1945) All 684, a wrong interpretation of the provision of law rendered the orders of the lower Court open to revision; and in - 'Mahomed Ihtisham Ali v. Lachhman Prasad', 15 Luck 641, it was held that where a Judge proceeds with a suit as a result of misinterpretation of law he acts with material irregularity. 12. So if a plaintiff's whole case depends upon a single document, as in the present case, and if as a result of the faults of the procedure, and of not applying the mind at all to the mandatory provisions of the law relevant on the question, or as a result of wrong interpretation or mis-interpretation of the provisions of law, the document is not admitted in evidence, and the Court proceeds with the suit, it will be virtually striking at its very foundation, denying the plaintiff a chance of presenting his case at all. In my opinion, this will amount to an erroneous decision resulting in the subordinate Court failing to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law; and if the error is gross and palpable and is likely to lead to injustice; it is an error such as S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure definitely intended to correct. I, therefore, overrule the preliminary objection and hold that this revision is competent. 13. Now I take the point whether the agreement in question, reduced to writing, but not registered, can be admitted in evidence. The deed is drawn up in rather a crude and inartistic language. It gives possession of land, to the creditor and authorises him to retain possession for a fixed period of twelve years only. He also binds himself to repay the mortgage-money, and where a mortgagor incurs a personal liability to repay, the mortgage cannot fall within the definition of a pure 'usufructuary mortgage' - 'Bishan Das v. Nand Ram'. AIR 1936 Pesh 48, the principal characteristic of this mortgage being an absence of a personal liability of the mortgagor to pay and the remedies of foreclosure or sale not being open to the mortgagee - 'Lachhman Singh v. Natha Singh', AIR 1940 Lah 401 (FB). 14. Either it is an 'anomalous mortgage, or it is a lease. In constructing a document as to whether it is a lease or a mortgage, according to the Privy Council in - 'Nidhasah v. Murlidhar', 25 All 115, at p.119, the following test may be applied: "If it is not a security for the payment of any money or for the performance of any engagement, if no accounts are to be rendered or required, and if there is no provision of redemption, expressed or implied, it is simply a grant of land, for a fixed term free of rent, in consideration of a sum made up of past and present advances, though it may be described as a mortgage." 15. In this case, it is quite clear from the (contents of the document that the transfer was made only to secure a debt and the parties intended to maintain the relation of a debtor and a creditor rather than that of landlord and a tenant. In this case, it is quite clear from the (contents of the document that the transfer was made only to secure a debt and the parties intended to maintain the relation of a debtor and a creditor rather than that of landlord and a tenant. The existence of debt was specifically mentioned and the sentence "in case debt is not discharged then I shall pay interest at the rate of Re.1 annas 8 and shall pay the debt in one lump sum", implied that the accounts are to be maintained, and after taking the accounts it was to be seen how much debt, if any, remained. Moreover, the nature of the contract is not altered by the fact that the calculation is made beforehand of the period for which rent and profits will be sufficient to pay off both the principal and interest. It is true that there was no express provision for redemption but the creditor was to take possession of the field for 12 years and appropriate the income in liquidation of the debt, and it was clearly implied that after the expiry of the said period the right to the land was to cease. In - 'Tukaram v. Ramchand', 26 Bom 252 at p. 258 (FB), it was held that in such case the mortgagor was entitled to redeem. The Full Bench further observed; "There is no apparent reason why such a contract should not come within the category of anomalous mortgages as defined in S.98 of the T. P. Act, which lays down, that "the rights and liabilities of the parties shall be determined by their contract, as evidenced in the mortgage-deed, and, so far as such contract does not extend, by local usage"." After taking every thing into account I am of opinion, that the transaction in the present case was not a "Zur-i-peshgi' lease, as held by the learned Munsiff, but was an anomalous mortgage - a combination of simple and usu-fractuary mortgage. The document created personal liability as divisible from a property obligation. The suit filed by the plaintiff was simply for the money debt and not for enforcement of lien, or charge, or, for possession of the property. The document created personal liability as divisible from a property obligation. The suit filed by the plaintiff was simply for the money debt and not for enforcement of lien, or charge, or, for possession of the property. The document, in fact, is not tendered in evidence for the purpose of proving a "transaction affecting property", nor does the plaintiff seek to establish the amount he is entitled to recover as compensation for relinquishing possession of that property. As there is an express covenant on the part of the mortgagor to repay the loan the document can be used as the basis of a claim for return of the money acknowledged to be due therein. 16. Although the bond is not registered, in such a case, it can well be received in evidence in .support of a claim to enforce the money obligation: vide - 'Sheo Pal v. Prag Dat', 3 All 229 (FB); - 'Gomaji v. Subbarayappa', 15 Mad 253; - 'P. V. M. Kunhu Moidu v. T. Madhava Menon', 32 Mad 410; - 'Basant Lal v. Jowahar Singh', AIR 1925 Lah 356; - 'Baru Mal v. Daulat Ram', AIR 1932 Lah 400 and - 'Khan-tamoni Dassi v. Biswa Nath', AIR 1933 Cal 786. In my opinion the document was clearly admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving a monetary transaction. 17. I, therefore, allow the revision, set aside the order of the trial Court and send the case back to that Court so that it may decide this case after taking into consideration the document which it has rejected as inadmissible. Costs will abide the result.