Gupta, J.—The first respondent in this second appeal had filed a suit in the court of the Judicial Superintendent, Jodhpur City for partition and separate possession of his share in a house situated in the city of Jodhpur and described in para 2 of the plaint against the three appellants, the remaining six respondents and one Husain who has not been made a party to this appeal. The table given below shows the relationship between the parties as alleged by the plaintiff:— Kasam Piru Ghisu Subrati Azim alias Nena Anu Bhura Allah Rakh (said to have come in adoption) NabuD7 IlahibuxD8 RamzanD9 KasamD10 Allahbeli|| Mahmud (D4) Issac|| Allahrakh is said to have gone in adoption to Azim Lal Mohd.Pltf. Gulab Musa Usman Khudabux(D5) Husain(D6) 2. Excepting the adoption of Allah-rakh by Ajim, which was disputed by the appellants, the above table is admitted by the parties. 3. The plaintiffs case was that the house in dispute was purchased by his great grandfather Kasam and that the parties to the suit and before them their forefathers had been living in it as joint owners since its purchase. It was alleged by the plaintiff that at the time of its purchase the house in dispute contained an Ora, a Kachcha shed, a Kachcha Barsali and Chabutris while the additions were made jointly by Ghisu, Azim and Azims sons. The plaintiff claimed 1/8th of the property as his share and added that if Allah-rakhs adoption to Azim was not upheld he was entitled to 1/5th share instead of 1/8. The suit was contested only by the appellants Gulab, Musa and Usman while the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 and Husain admitted the plaintiffs claim and prayed for a decree for partition and possession of their share also and the respondents Nos. 4 to 7 allowed the suit to proceed against them ex-parte. The appellants resisted the suit mainly on the ground that certain apartments viz., Barsali, a room, a Dalan, a Chabutri and a latrine were built by their father Ailahbeli alone and that the same were in their exclusive possession and therefore, not subject to partition. They, further, claimed the share of Anu and Bhura who, they alleged, had transferred to them their right and title in the ancestral house in Samwat 1954 on the Krishna 14th of Ashadh. They, further, claimed the share of Anu and Bhura who, they alleged, had transferred to them their right and title in the ancestral house in Samwat 1954 on the Krishna 14th of Ashadh. It was also contended by the appellants that the defendants-respondents, Ilahibux, Nabu, Ramzan and Kasam, sons of Allahrakh had no claim to any share in the suit property. The pleas of limitation, adverse possession and non-joinder of a necessary party viz., Noormohammad S/o Bhura and grandson of Subrati were also taken to the effect that they had spent a sum of Rs. 2,000/- on repairs of the house, marriages of Khudubux, Husain, Mohammad and the plaintiffs daughter and maintenance and funeral etc. of their grandmother and that the plaintiff could not claim partition without paying that amount. The appellants also denied the plain tiffs allegation that the parties constituted a joint family of which Allahbeli was the manager. In his replication, the plaintiff did not admit the transfer by Anu and Bhura of their share to Allahbeli and his sons and, in the alternative claimed that the alleged transfer in favour of Allahbeli and his sons, if at all it took place, was for the benefit of all the members of the family inasmuch as, at the time of the alleged transfer, Allahbeli was the manager of the whole family. It was also pleaded that the alleged transfer of Anu and Bhuras share was obtained fraudulently by Allahbeli in the name of himself and his sons. 4. The trial court held that the plaintiffs suit was barred by time, that the transfer of their shire in the house in dispute by Anu and Bhura was in favour of Allahbeli and his sons alone. On these findings the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs suit. 5. The plaintiff, thereupon, appealed to the Additional District Judge, Jodhpur, who reversed the Judgment and decree of the trial court. The learned Judge held that the family of the parties was joint, that Allahbeli, so long as he was alive, was the manager of that Joint family and that the transfer of their share by Anu and Bhura in favour of Allahbeli and his sons was in the nature of release or relinquishment in favour of the whole family. He further held that the suit was not barred by limitation and that there was no adverse possession of the appellants. He further held that the suit was not barred by limitation and that there was no adverse possession of the appellants. He, therefore, passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff-res-pondent for partition and separate possession of his share in the house which he declared to be 1/5th because he did not uphold the adoption of Allahrakh to Azim. 6. The appellants, who contested the suit, have now come up in second appeal to this court. 7. It is contended on their behalf that : (1) There was no joint family at any time and Allahbeli was never a manager of any joint family and that the transfer by Anu and Bhura was a transfer in favour of Allahbeli and his sons only and in no case a release or relinquishment in favour of all the members of the family. (2) The respondents 4-7 had given up their shares nearly 25 years ago and neither they were in possession of any portion of the house in dispute nor had any construction been ever made by them or their father or grandfather. (3) The constructions that had been made by Allahbeli and his sons formed their own property which should go to them in addition to their own shire in the ancestral house. 8. The learned counsel for the appellants has argued that among Muslims there is no joint family as it is among the Hindus. The lower appellate court, according to him, had misread the whole evidence and come to a wrong conclusion. He maintained that in the present case none of the factors that would give a family the status of jointness was present. There was no joint messing, no joint business and no joint property except the undivided house in dispute which was left by Kasam. Under the circumstances, the finding of the lower appellate court deserved to be set aside, argued the learned counsel He further argued that there was no presumption under the Mohammedan Law as there was under the Hindu Law that acquisitions of the several members of a Muslim family were made for the benefit of the whole family. In support of his arguments the learned counsel cited before us a number of decisions which we shall presently discuss. In support of his arguments the learned counsel cited before us a number of decisions which we shall presently discuss. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, on the other hand, argued that the conclusion of jointness of the family of the parties arrived at by the lower appellate court was justified by the evidence on the record and the fact that the defendants themselves had claimed money spent by Allahbeli on account of the marriages of Khudabux, Husain, Mohammad and the plaintiffs daughters and for maintenance and funeral of their Dadi (grandmother) indicated that the family was a joint one. He also referred to the admission made by Musa or Mustafa D.W. 5 who had stated in his evidence that Sub-rati and Gheesa used to live jointly. He further argued that the finding of the lower court could not be interfered with even if the evidence were considered by this court to be insufficient. He relied upon a decision reported in AIR 1932 Cal. 538 in which the true position with regard to the existence of any presumption or otherwise regarding acquisitions by members of a joint Mohammedan family has been reaffirmed to be that where members of Mohammedan family live in com-mensality they do not form a joint family in the sense that that expression is used with regard to Hindus and under the Mohammdan Law there is not as under the Hindu Law any pre-sumption that the acquisitions by any one of the members occupying the position of a managing member, during the jointness of the family are made for the benefit of all the members of the family but on account of particular facts of that case that the members of the Mohammedan family involved therein possessed the properties in common and in jointness, and that one of the members was the managing member of the family, it was held that the burden of proof lay on the managing member for establishing that the properties which were acquired during the jointness of the family and which were shown to stand in his name did not really belong to the joint family, not because of any presumption regarding acquisition kin to the Joint Hindu family but because such person occupied fiduciary relationship with other members and had an obligation to discharge towards other members. He maintained that the family of the parties was joint, that Allahbeli was its managing member and that the appellants had not proved that the share of Anu and Bhura in the joint family property acquired by Allahbeli in the name of himself and his sons was his self-acquired property. We are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent. There is no evidence on the record to show that the parties had a common kitchen or that they had any joint business or that they had jointly acquired any property. The lower appellate court appears to have accepted the ready made opinion of the witnesses who deposed that the family of the parties was joint and that Allahbeli was a managing member. That Court appears to have ignored the statements made by the witnesses in their cross-examination. P.W. Usman, though he had deposed in his examination-in-chief that the family of the parties was joint and Allahbeli was its managing Member, could not say whether the family was, at the time of his statement, joint or not, nor could he say if there was anybody occupying the position of managing member. He could not either say whether the parties were putting their earnings in a common pool. In short, in cross-examination he has failed and his evidence is of no use to establish that the family of the parties" was at any time joint. P. W. Nathu though deposed in his examination-in-chief that Allahbeli, during his lifetime, was all in all and the managing member of the family, had to admit in his cross examination that he did not know whether the parties had a common mess or not. When asked to explain what did he mean by a manag-ing member, he replied by saying that everybody did what Allahbeli asked them to do and, therefore, he concluded that Allahbeli was a manag-ing member. The evidence of this witness also did not establish that the family of the parties was joint. P. W. 4 Nathu II had, similarly to admit that he never saw the parties or their ancestors putting their earnings in a common pool. Similarly, P.W. 4 Abdullah Khan had to admit that he imagined that Allahbeli and his brothers were joint and that, therefore, the brothers of Allahbeli used to give their earnings to him. P. W. 4 Nathu II had, similarly to admit that he never saw the parties or their ancestors putting their earnings in a common pool. Similarly, P.W. 4 Abdullah Khan had to admit that he imagined that Allahbeli and his brothers were joint and that, therefore, the brothers of Allahbeli used to give their earnings to him. P.W. Khudabux who is a defendant and supports the plaintiffs case and himself wants a share in partition, had to admit that after Allahbelis death they were living separate, that he constructed two rooms and half of Sal out of his own earnings. P. W. Mahmud had to admit that they had a separate kitchen. In our opinion, the entire evidence, did not go to show that there was a joint family of the parties and that Allahbeli was the managing member of any such joint family. The mere fact that Allahbeli was in his life time the eldest of the descendants of Kasam and that he commanded respect at the hands of the other members of the family did not mean that there was a joint family and that Allahbeli was a managing member of the same. On careful examination of the evidence through which the learned counsel for the appellants has taken us, we are satisfied that the lower appellate court has misread the evidence and that it is, in no way, a ease of insufficient evidence on which the conclusion of that court is based and that an interference with that conclusion is called for. Every branch of the family of the descendants of Kasam appears to us to have lived separately and carried On their separate business. 9. In the Privy Council case reported in 58 I.C. at page 843, the facts of which were similar to the facts of this case it was held that prima facie, in the absence of other evidence, property bought by the elder brother of a Mohammedan family, wherein partition had not taken place, would be property bought with his own money because there was no presumption of jointness in the case of a Mohammedan family such as exists in the case of a Hindu family and the succession of a Mohammedan was an individual succe-ssion. In the case reported in A.I.R. 1928 Madras 14, their lordships of the Madras High Court have gone further and observed that it was not proper to apply the principles governing the Hindu Joint family system to a Mohammedan family and laid down that children in a Mohammedan family were not co-owners in the sense that what is purchased by one person enures for the benefit of another inspite of the fact that some cash was left by the father and a portion of it was utilized for the purchase of the property, and, so far as the amount taken from the general assets was concerned, their lordships remarked that when accounts were taken the family would be entitled to debit the same against that person. In a recent decision reported in AIR 1947 Madras 287 in which almost all aspects have been considered, the learned Judges have observed : "There is no doubt that if the parties had been governed by the Hindu Law according to Mitakshara and had constituted a joint Hindu family, and the business that the members of the family were carrying on had been an ancestral business and the properties in suit had been acquired in the course of and from and out of the business, that the properties would become the assets of the joint family in which every member of the Joint family would have a share. But it is now well established that the Moham-medan Law by which prima facie the parties in the case are governed does not recognise such a system of holding property and the principle on which that system is founded cannot be applied to the determination of questions relating to tenure and devolution of property among Mohammedans. Mohammedan heirs take their shares in severalty and are deemed to be tenants in common without any right of survivorship. The Mohammadan Law does not recognise a Joint family as legal entity; In fact, according to the rules of the Mohammedan Law of succession, heirship does not necessarily go with membership of the family." The case reported in A.I.R. 1929 Sind at page 212 is another case the facts of which are exactly similar to the facts of the case before us as alleged by the plaintiff. In that case a Sunni Mohammedan had died leaving three sons and one daughter. In that case a Sunni Mohammedan had died leaving three sons and one daughter. The eldest of the sons continued to manage the property and his name was recorded in the Record-of-Rights as the manager of Joint pro-perty. Subsequently he acquired new property in his own name and. in the name of his son.. All the members of the family lived and messed together. The manager died leaving his one brother, sister and sons... It was held by the learned Judges that it was incumbent on the younger brother who had filed the suit for partition to have averred and strictly proved, in order to succeed in getting a share of the immovable properties subsequently acquired by the elder brother who was, the manager of the family property and the cash and moveable property he died possessed of, that such properties were acquired and possessed by him, under an express agreement, on behalf of himself and the plaintiff and other co-heirs and that he had agreed to account to them in respect thereof. The learned counsel for the appellants cited three more judgments reported in A.I.R. 1923 Cal. at page 369, 1932 All. at page 512 and 1933 Allahabad at page 206 in which almost the same view has been expressed. We have no reason to differ from this view and accordingly, we hold that none of the members of the family acquired and property for the benefit of all the others and that the acquisition of Anu and Bhuras share by Allahbeli in the name of himself and his sons was for the benefit of himself and his descendants and, not for the benefit of other members of Kasams descendants because there is no evidence that the family of the parties was joint or that Allahbeli was its manager and occupied any fiduciary position with respect to other members of the family or that he acquired and possessed the share of Anu and Bhura in the property left by Kasam, under an express agreement, on behalf of himself and the plaintiff and other co-heirs of Kasam or that he had agreed to account to them in respect thereof. 10. 10. An argument was advanced by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent that the transfer deed Ex.; D-1 had not been proved to have been executed by Anu in as much as it was not proved to that Anu was illiterate and that the thumb mark on the deed was that of Anu. The learned counsel contended that the presumption under Sec. 90 of the Evidence Act related only to the signatures a definition of which had been given in S. 2 (52) of the General Clauses Act. We see no force in this contention of the learned counsel. Ex.D-1 was more than thirty years old. It was not challenged that it was produced from proper custody and a presumption arose that it was duly executed and presumption with regard to due execution meant that all the formalities necessary for execution of the document had been complied with. A presumption, therefore, arose in the case of a document which bore the thumb-mark of a person that that person was illiterate. 11. It was attempted on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent to make out a new point that had not at all been raised in the lower Courts. It was argued by the learned counsel that Ex.D-1 bore the thumb-mark 6f only Anu and as it was signed neither by Bhura nor by the mother of Anu and Bhura, the appellants could claim only the share of Anu and not the share of Bhura and their mother which was 9/16th of the share of Subrati. As this point does not appear to have been raised in either of the two courts below, we disallow it. 12. It was next argued that the defendants, Gulab, Musa and Usman and their father Allahbeli made certain constructions, which in case of partition should be given to them over and above their share. They claimed that they had constructed a Kitchen, Barsali, a room in the Barsali latrine, and Chabutra in the first storey, Dalian over Barsali in the* second storey, and the staircase leading from the first to the second storey. The evidence in support of the construction having been made by these defendants or their father Allahbeli and their exclusive possession over them, when scrutinized, however, only supports their case with respect to Dalian. The Barsali, latrine, Chabutra and staircase are used by all the co-sharers in the house. The evidence in support of the construction having been made by these defendants or their father Allahbeli and their exclusive possession over them, when scrutinized, however, only supports their case with respect to Dalian. The Barsali, latrine, Chabutra and staircase are used by all the co-sharers in the house. The Barsali is the common entrance to the house. The latrine Chabutra and staircase are similarly in common enjoyment. The room in the Barsali is in the possession of Lal Mohammed. The contesting defendants state that Lal Mohammed, plaintiff, was permitted by them to occupy the room, but the evidence in this respect is very scanty and is insufficient for a finding in their favour. As regards the Dalian, it is not only proved by the evidence of the said defendants but also by the plaintiffs witnesses that it is in the exclusive possession of the defendants ever since its construction. P.W. 4, Nathu, P.W.6, Nabi Bux and P.W.7, Mehboob, admit that defend, ants ever since its construction. The defendants have produced Ghabru Mistri, who constructed the Dallan, and stated that payment for its construction was made by Allahbeli. D.W. 6, Allahbeli carpenter deposes to have constructed wooden door for that Dalian which he calls the upper room. As regards Rasoi, there is no evidence except the statements of the defendants Moosa and Gulab, however, speaks of the construction of two Rasois by his father while in the written statement only one Rasoi is claimed. In the circumstances, the defendants Gulab, Moosa and Usman are entitled to get Dallan in their exclusive possession over and above their share. The defendants Mahmud and Khudabux have also stated that they made certain constructions, but in their written statements they did not claim such properties as being their exclusive property. According to them, the constructions were made by the joint funds of the parties. Since they concede the constructions made by them to be joint property, no question of their being allowed to any particular defendant can arise in this case. No argument has been addressed on the point that respondents Nos. 4 to 7, the sons of Allahrakh, were not entitled to any share in the property. They would, therefore, get their share. 13. As a result, the appeal is accepted and the judgment and decree of the lower Court is modified. No argument has been addressed on the point that respondents Nos. 4 to 7, the sons of Allahrakh, were not entitled to any share in the property. They would, therefore, get their share. 13. As a result, the appeal is accepted and the judgment and decree of the lower Court is modified. The plaintiff Lal Mohammed is declared entitled to 1/10th share in the house property left by Kasam and subsequently built upon by the parties. The appellants Gulab, Moosa and Usman will get 1/13th share in their own right and 1/2 share which belonged to Anu and Bhura and acquired by them. Mahmud defendant No. 4 will get 1/10th share. Khudabux and Hussain will jointly get 1/10th share in the joint property. Nabu, Ilahi, Ramzan and Kasam will jointly get 1/10th share of the joint property. The Dalian will go to the share of Gulab, Moosa and Usman exclusively over and above their share. The Trial Court will appoint a commissioner for actual partition by metes and bounds. As the appellants have succeeded in regard to Anu and Bhuras share and also regarding the Dalian, they will get 3/4th of their costs from the plaintiff throughout. The plaintiff also succeeds in so far as certain constructions claimed by the appellants and will get 1/4th of his costs throughout from the appellants.