Research › Browse › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

1950 DIGILAW 150 (RAJ)

Keshri Prasad v. Bodhraj

1950-10-03

RANAWAT

body1950
Ranawat, J.—Under the Jhalawar Municipal Election Rules, dated the 29th March, 1943, an election was held at Bhawani Mandi on the 3rd of September, 1948, of the members of the Municipal Committee of Bhawani Mandi and Bodhraj and Tribhowan Dayal were declared elected by the Returning Officer the same day. Keshari Prasad, Asabhai and Keshri-mal who were unsuccessful at the election filed their objections under rule 15 of the Jhalawar Municipal Election Rules in the court of the First Class Magistrate, Bhawani Mandi on the 10th September, 1948. The First Class Magistrate, Bhawani Mandi, held certain enquires into the matter. In the mean time, on the 19th of February, 1948, the United State of Rajasthan passed an Ordinance repealing the Jhalawar State Municipal Election Rules of the 20th March, 1943, and applying the U. P. Municipal Act of 1916 as amended upto U.P. Act I of 1945 with certain modifications to the territories of the Rajasthan State. 2. Under the Jhalawar State Municipal Rules, petitions relating to objections against elections were to be heard and decided by the First Class Magistral? having jurisdiction at the place. But under the new Ordinance such petitions were cognisable by the District Judge having jurisdiction in the place. The Magistrate First Class, Bhawani Mandi,before whom the aforesaid application of Keshri Prasad and other was pending, transferred the case to the District Judge, Jhalawar, on the 19th July, 1949. The District Judge having heard the parties made an order on the 10th October, 1949, directing the petitioners to put their pleadings in proper form before the 26th of October, 1949, when the petitioners failed to comply with the directions given by the District Judge, he dismissed the petition. The petitioners have filed this revision petition under section 115 of the C.P.C. against the order of the District Judge, dated the 10th October, 1949, by which the petitioners were directed to put their pleadings in proper form. 3. A preliminary objection was raised by the Counsel on the opposite side that no revision under section 115 lay against an order of the District Judge acting under the provisions of the Municipal Act as a persona designata. 4. 3. A preliminary objection was raised by the Counsel on the opposite side that no revision under section 115 lay against an order of the District Judge acting under the provisions of the Municipal Act as a persona designata. 4. Section 22, sub-clause (1) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, as adapted to Rajasthan runs as follows:- "An election petition shall be heard by the District Judge within whose jurisdiction the municipality concerned is situated, unless some other person or tribunal has been appointed by rule in this behalf, and at a place in the district within which such Municipality is situated." 5. It may be pointed out that a District Judge, acting "under the provisions of section 22 of the Municipalities Act, is not a civil court subordinate to the High Court in the meaning of sec. 115 C.P.C. but it is an authority created under the Municipalities Act. The mere fact that the person designated under section 22 happens to be the District Judge does not in any way make his position different. In A.I.R. 1933, Alld., 764, Mukerji and Bernet, JJ. held that "a District Judge hearing an election petition is not a civil court, but a persona designata, even though he has the powers and privileges of a civil court; and hence he is not under the superintendence of the High Court under S. 107, Government of India Act." Similarly in 1946 Bom., 64, it was held that a judge acting under section 15 of the Municipal Boroughs Act is not a court, but a persona designata, and the High Court has therefore no jurisdiction to revise his order under sec. 115 C.P.C. or to correct any mistake committed by him whether he exercises jurisdiction not vested in him, or fails to exercise jurisdiction vested in him, acts with material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction. 115 C.P.C. or to correct any mistake committed by him whether he exercises jurisdiction not vested in him, or fails to exercise jurisdiction vested in him, acts with material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction. In 1931, Bom., 582, A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that where a Judge or a Presiding Officer of a Court as distinguished from the court itself is directed to perform any function of an authority created by a statute, such Judge may be considered as a persona designata and not a court, but where a civil court subordinate to the High Court, as constituted, has authority to decide the rights between the parties and is directed to perform judicial functions, it is difficult to hold that such a court is a persona designata and not a court subordinate to the High Court. This was a case of a court adjudicating in the matter of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act. The position of a court under the Land Acquisition Act is different from the one under section 22 of the Municipalities Act. Under sec. 22, an authority has been designated by the Act to deal with certain matters regarding elections & it cannot be said that the authority so constituted is a subordinate court in the meaning of section 115 C.P.C. The counsel for the petitioner has put his reliance on the authority of a case reported in A.I.R. 1948, Sind, 116, wherein it has been held that where a judge of the Karachi Small Cause Court is a persona a designata under section 17 of the City of Karachi Municipal Act, acts without Jurisdiction, he ceases to act as a persona designata and becomes a court subordinate to the Chief Court under section 115 C.P.C. and the Chief Court has power to revise his orders. 6. It has been argued that the . Magistrate First Class Jhalawar continued to "have the jurisdiction to deal with the petition of Keshri Prasad and others even after the 16th February, 1949, when the new Municipal Ordinance was enacted, by virtue of section 6(e) and 24 of the General Clauses Act, and that the District Judge, Jhalawar, had no jurisdiction to deal with this case. Magistrate First Class Jhalawar continued to "have the jurisdiction to deal with the petition of Keshri Prasad and others even after the 16th February, 1949, when the new Municipal Ordinance was enacted, by virtue of section 6(e) and 24 of the General Clauses Act, and that the District Judge, Jhalawar, had no jurisdiction to deal with this case. It is claimed that since the District Judge had no jurisdiction, he cannot be treated as a persona designata, but the action taken by him in this matter is to be regarded as that of a court subordinate to the High Court. 7. Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act provides that where an act repeals any enactment, then unless a. different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect an investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid. The legal proceedings that were pending in the court of the First Class Magistrate, Jhalawar,at the time the Jhalawar State Municipal Rules were repealed, did not become invalidated because of the repeal of municipal Rules, but this would however not continue the jurisdiction of the First Class Magistrate Jhalawar,when, by the new Act a different authority was constituted in his place. The District Judge was under the new act given the jurisdiction to deal with such matters. It was therefore not contrary to the provisions of the new Act that the First Class Magistrate transferred the proceedings which were pending before him to the court of the District Judge who, under the new Act, was invested with such jurisdiction. Section 24 of the General Clauses Act relates to the matters of the continuance of orders and appointments under enactments repealed and re-enacted. The appointment of the First Class Magistrate under the old Jhalawar State Municipal Rules would have continued under the provisions of section 24 of the General Clauses Act, had it not been provided by the new Act that such jurisdiction shall be exercised by the District Judge. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, does not appear to be sound that the First Class Magistrate continued to enjoy the jurisdiction to deal with this case even after the passing of the new Municipal Ordinance. It cannot be said that the District Judge, Jhalawar, had no jurisdiction to deal with this matter. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, does not appear to be sound that the First Class Magistrate continued to enjoy the jurisdiction to deal with this case even after the passing of the new Municipal Ordinance. It cannot be said that the District Judge, Jhalawar, had no jurisdiction to deal with this matter. The question therefore does not arise of exceeding the jurisdiction, and it is not necessary to consider the correctness of the authority of the decision in 1946 Sind, 116. 8. The District Judge, Jhalawar,was persona designata under section 22 of the U. P. Municipalities Act of 1916, as applied to the United State of former Rajasthan, and his action in dealing with election petitions cannot be revised under section 115 of the C.P.C. 9. This application therefore is not maintainable and is dismissed with costs.