Judgment :- The interesting question of law debated before me in this second appeal is whether when a company in winding up attaches certain property in execution of a decree in its favour as that its judgment debtor, any claim petition by a third party is to be regarded as "other legal proceeding" within the meaning of Section 171 of the Indian Companies Act which shall not be proceeded with or commenced against the company the company except by leave of the court The appellant before me is the plaintiff in the original suit who sued to set aside an order on a claim petition filed by the first defendant on the basis of an assignment in his favour by the second defendant regarding the rents of certain properties which had been attached by the plaintiff. The claim succeeded in the execution court, and the case of plaintiff is that the assignment was a sham transaction unsupported by consideration which was entered into by the second defendant with a view to defendant with a view to defeating the claim of the plaintiff in execution of its decree against the second defendant in O.S. No. 195 of 1936 on the file of the District Munsiff's Court at Palghat. Both the courts below have found against the case of the plaintiff in the attack made against the transaction on its merits, and the only question which arises for consideration is whether the claim proceeding started by the fast defendant and the order made on it by the execution court should be regarded as null and void on account of want of leave of the court in the winding up under Section 171 of the Indian Companies Act. On this latter question too the courts below have concurrently held against the plaintiff The argument for the appellant is that the claim proceeding constitutes an independent legal proceeding which cannot be proceeded with or commenced against the company except by leave of the court, while the contention for the respondents is that it is in the nature of a defensive proceeding in answer to the execution petition of the plaintiff, for which no leave is necessary under the Act. The learned counsel for the appellant says that as ruled by Kuppuswami Ayyar, J., in Calicut Bank Ltd. v. Nekkat, the word "proceeding" in the section of the Act applies to execution proceedings also ans is not confined to original proceedings, and that the claim petition is itself a proceeding in execution which falls within the mischief of the section. But as the lower court rightly puts the matter, "In the present case no execution proceedings were started by the 1st defendant against the Wariar Bank (in liquidation). On the other hand, the Official Liquidators a representing the Wariar Bank (in liquidation) applied in I.A. No. 225 of 1943 for attachment of the mesne profits or of the rent payable by the 3rd defendant to the 2nd defendant the claim petition was filed by the 1st defendant as E.A. No. 506 of 1943 only in the attachment proceedings started by the liquidators". The decision in Calicut Bank Ltd. v. Nekkat does not therefore apply to the present case where the first defendant only put forward a claim as a defence to the execution proceedings already started by the Official LiquidatorsIt is observed in Palmer's Company Law, 19th edn., by A. F. Topham, K.C., at page 404 : "The object of the winding up provisions of the Companies Act, 1862, said Lindley, L.J., in Re Oak Pits Colliery Co., 'is to put all unsecured creditors upon an equality and to pay them pari passu.' To accomplish this it was indispensable that proceedings against the company by way of action, execution, distress or other process should be suspended; otherwise the winding up would resolve itself into a scramble for the assets. Accordingly the Act of 1862 gave the court jurisdiction in various case to restrain proceedings. Section 24(5) of the Judicature Act, 1873, modified these provisions to some extent by providing that no proceeding in the High Court can be restrained by injunction; but this did not alter in substances the jurisdiction. Now by Section 226 of the Act of 1948 the court can, after presentation of the petition, restrain proceedings, and by Sections 227 and 231, on a winding up order being made, or a provisional liquidator appointed, proceedings are automatically stayed and cannot be proceeded with, without leave of the court. Now by Section 226 of the Act of 1948 the court can, after presentation of the petition, restrain proceedings, and by Sections 227 and 231, on a winding up order being made, or a provisional liquidator appointed, proceedings are automatically stayed and cannot be proceeded with, without leave of the court. In this way creditors and others are compelled to come in and prove their claims in the winding up and a rateable and just distribution of the company's assets is effected." * Judged from the standpoint of the object and purpose of the statutory provision it is clear to my mind that the proceeding by way of a claim petition with which the first defendant intervened in the course of the execution proceeding of the plaintiff does not fall within the purview of the section of the Act It may be that where the language of the statute is sufficiently wide to cover case not within its professed or implied purpose and object the language must still be given effect to. But as pointed out in Rustomji's Company Law, 2nd edn., at page 396 : "When once an action by the company itself has been proceeded with, there is no necessity for the defendant in the action to obtain leave for any defensive proceeding on his behalf. Where a company in liquidation is plaintiff, the defendant may put in a counter claim (against the company) in the nature of a defence without obtaining the leave of the court." * Reference is made by the learned author in this connection to a case in Humber & Co. v. John Griffiths Cycle and Co., and to a case in Mersey Steel and Iron Co. v. Naylor. v. John Griffiths Cycle and Co., and to a case in Mersey Steel and Iron Co. v. Naylor. In the former case it was ruled by the House of Lords that, "Where a company is being wound up under the direction of the court, an appeal to the House of Lords in which the company is respondent, brought in an action in which the company was originally plaintiff, is not a proceeding against the company within Section 87 of the Companies Act, 1862." * In the latter case Jessell, M.R., observes in the course of the argument at page 656 - and that appears as part and parcel of the headnote - that a counter claim is in the nature of a defence which if raised in answer to an action by a company for debt can be entertained without the leave of the court. That case has been affirmed in the House of Lords in Mersey Steel and Iron Co. v. Maylor Bonzon and Co. An attachment proceeding like the one with which we are concerned in the present case started in the course of execution proceedings taken by the plaintiff, it is said, is not strictly in the nature of a defensive proceedings by a party to the execution petition but is in the nature of an independent proceeding by a stranger to the execution petition but is in the nature of an independent proceeding by a stranger to the execution petition in vindication of hi right to the property attached. True; but I am inclined to think on a careful consideration of the argument that the principle of the decisions above cited does apply to the present case of a claim petition which in substance is only incidental to the main proceeding in execution started by the plaintiff bank itselfIt is urged for the appellant that had the claim petition failed and not succeeded and had a suit been filed by the present respondent that would obviously have been hit at by the requirement of leave of court in the winding up, and that there is no reason why merely because the claimants succeeded, that should make any difference. The argument is, strictly speaking, beside the point, because what we have to consider is not so much the case of the suit under Order 21, Rule 63, Civil Procedure Code, as the nature of the claim proceeding itself As put in the case in Mr. Zamrut v. Peoples Bank, which has been relied upon by the lower appellate court in the present case, where the decree-holder it is who has set the law in motion, the position of a claimant who intervenes in execution is analogous to that of a defendant in a suit. I agree with Middleton, J., in that case when he observes : "It appears to me to be not inequitable that a company in liquidation should institute execution proceedings and rely upon Section 171, Companies Act, to debar persons from defending their property in those execution proceedings." * I am satisfied that the point taken for the appellant in this case has no merits and must fail The second appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs (No leave) Appeal dismissed.