Judgment The Chief Justice.-This second appeal originally came on before Panchapagesa Sastry, J., who referred it to a Division Bench in view of the conflict of decisions between Demudu v. Papayya Raju1and Korada Atchanna v. Jayanti Seetharamaswami2. This second appeal arises out of a suit for evicting certain tenants in occupation of lands in an agraharam which became an estate by virtue of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, which amended clause (d) of section 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act (I of 1908). The only facts necessary for understanding the point which falls for decision are as follows: The first respondent’s father, an inamdar, obtained a decree for eviction in respect of the suit lands on 7th April, 1933 and obtained delivery of them on 23rd May, 1933. He let the lands to the defendants by a lease, dated 22nd June, 1933. The period of lease was one year ending 15th March, 1934. The defendants, however, continued to remain in possession thereafter. In 1937, the inamdar gave a notice to quit and eventually filed the suit for eviction on 24th April, 1944. The main defence of the tenants was that they had acquired occupancy rights under the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936 and therefore the suit for eviction was not maintainable. Both the courts decreed the suit and defendants 1 and 2 are the appellants. The relevant provisions which have a material bearing on the question to be decided are section 6, sub-section (1) Explanations (1) and (2) and section 8, subsection (5) of the Madras Estates Land Act (I of 1908) as amended by Act XVIII of 1936, i.e., the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936. Section 6(1) declares that “Subject to the provisions of this Act, every ryot now in possession or who shall hereafter be admitted by a landholder to possession of ryoti land situated in the estate of such landholder shall have a permanent right of occupancy in his holding”. Explanation (1) runs thus- “For the purposes of this sub-section, the expression ‘every ryot now in possession’ shall include every person who, having held land as a ryot, continues in possession of such land at the commencement of this Act”. Explanation (1) runs thus- “For the purposes of this sub-section, the expression ‘every ryot now in possession’ shall include every person who, having held land as a ryot, continues in possession of such land at the commencement of this Act”. Ordinarily the word “now” in sub-section (1) and the words “at the commencement of this Act” must be taken to refer to the date of the passing of Madras Act I of 1908. Explanation (2) became necessary, because by the provisions of Madras Act XVIII of 1936 certain inam villages, which did not fall within the definition of an estate originally contained in Madras Act I of 1908, became estates by virtue of the new provisions. It was necessary to provide for a different construction of the words “now” and “at the commencement of this Act” in relation to such inam villages. Explanation (2), therefore, declares that the expressions “now” and “commencement of this Act” in sub-section (1) and Explanation (1) shall be construed as meaning the thirtieth day of June, 1934, and the expression “hereafter” in the sub-section shall be construed as meaning the period after the thirtieth day of June, 1934. Madras Act XVIII of 1936 came into force on 31st October, 1936. But for reasons which need not detain us now, the Legislature took a date prior to the date of the coming into force of that Act as the material date to denote the tenants in occupation of the lands in such villages who would be entitled to permit rights of occupancy. It will be noticed that sub-section (1)of section 6 commences with the words “subject to the provisions of this Act” and the provisions of section 8(5) are to take effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Act. That sub-section provides that “If before the first day of November, 1933, the landholder has obtained in respect of any land in a village which became an estate by virtue of Act XVIII of 1936 a final decree or order of competent Civil Court”. That sub-section provides that “If before the first day of November, 1933, the landholder has obtained in respect of any land in a village which became an estate by virtue of Act XVIII of 1936 a final decree or order of competent Civil Court”. Declaring that the tenant has no occupancy right in such land, the landholder shall, if the land is not private land, have the right for a period of 12 years from the commencement of Madras Act XVIII of 1936, i.e., from 31st October, 1936, of admitting any person to the possession of such land on such terms as may be agreed upon between them, provided also that “no tenant has acquired any occupancy right in such land before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936”. It is this last condition that has given rise to a difference of opinion between Horwill, J. and Viswanatha Sastri, J. The construction which found favour with Viswa natha Sastri, J., in Korada Atchanna v. Jayanti Seetharamaswami1 was that the land holder would not have the rights declared under that sub-section against tenants who were in possession or who might have been admitted into possession on and after the 30th day of June, 1934, and before the 30th October, 1936, i.e., the commencement of Madras Act XVIII of 1936. The reasoning of the learned Judge is that though the Amending Act came into force on 31st October, 1936 and its operation commenced on that date, still, section 6, Explanation (2) of that Act (sic) gives it retrospective operation from 30th June, 1934, in respect of one important matter, namely, the accrual of occupancy rights. In the case before him, the tenant had been let into possession of the land on 26th June, 1936. Speaking of such a tenant the learned Judge says: "In the present case, it could not be said that the tenant had not acquired occupancy rights in the land before the commencement of the Amending Act XVIII of 1936, i.e., 31st October, 1936, because Explanation (2) to section 6 which, by express declaration, operates retrospectively from 30th June, 1934, clothed him with a right of occupancy as from 26th June, 1936, the date when he was admitted to possession by the landholder. The tenant, therefore, had acquired occupancy rights before the commencement of the Amending Act XVIII of 1936, as a result of the provision in that very enactment embodied as Explanation (2) to section 6." With great respect to the learned Judge we are not in agreement with this construction of section 8(5) or of Explanation (2) to section 6(1). "Before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936," can mean only before 31st October, 1936. It is impossible to give an earlier date, because that Act did not commence to have operation before that date. This much was also conceded by Mr. Dikshatulu, the learned counsel who appeared for the appellant before us. Now the only question is whether before the date, i.e., before 31st October, 1936, it could be said that a tenant has acquired any occupancy right, because he was in possession on and after 30th June, 1936. The only provision under which it is contended that the tenant has acquired such rights is a provision contained in that very Act which did not come into force till 31st October, 1936. Therefore it follows that the tenant did not acquire any right prior to the commencement of that Act under a provision of that Act which did not exist at the time. In other words it cannot be held that on any date before the coming into force of Madras Act XVIII of 1936 he had acquired any occupancy right by virtue of a provision in that Act which was to come into force. With due deference to the learned Judge Viswanatha Sastri, J., we think that it is wrong to assume that the effect of section 6(1), Explanation (2) is to confer permanent occupancy rights on tenants as and from 30th June, 1934, or such other later date when the tenant was admitted into possession. There is nothing in Explanation (2) which says anything of the sort. It only lays down who are the tenants who would be entitled to the benefits of Madras Act XVIII of 1936. It helps us to ascertain the class of such tenants. They are ryots who were in possession on 30th June, 1934, and ryots who had been admitted subsequently and continued in possession. This does not mean that they are deemed to have obtained rights of occupancy from 30th June, 1934. It helps us to ascertain the class of such tenants. They are ryots who were in possession on 30th June, 1934, and ryots who had been admitted subsequently and continued in possession. This does not mean that they are deemed to have obtained rights of occupancy from 30th June, 1934. They obtained such rights only from 31st October, 1936. It follows therefore that such tenants cannot be deemed to be tenants who have acquired occupancy rights before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, within the meaning of section 8(5) of the Act. Horwill, J., took practically the same view which we are taking in Demudu v. Papayya Raju1, though the way in which he put his view is slightly different. The learned Judge observed: There seems to me no doubt when the Legislature spoke of the tenant acquiring occupancy-right during the period between passing of the final decree and the commencement of the Act they were referring to an acquisition of occupancy right otherwise than under the Act * * * *The Legislature must have intended by this sub-rule to except from the general operation of section 6 all cases where the landholder had obtained a decree prior to 1st November, 1933, unless the tenant subsequent to the passing of the final decree had acquired occupancy right independently of the Act." The dates which occur in section 6(1), Explanation (2) and section 8(5) have a meaning and significance in relation to a prior Act, namely, Madras Act VIII of 1934 30th June 1934, happens to be the date on which that Act became law Section 127(2) of that Act was as follows: "No tenant in possession on the 1st day of November, 1933, of any land in an inam village, not being an estate within the meaning of sub-clause (d) of clause (2) of section 3 of the said Act as amended by this Act, or admitted by the inamdar to possession of any such land subsequent to the said date shall be liable to be ejected until the 1st day of November, 1936 and all proceedings in ejectment of any such tenant and all proceedings involving a decision whether or not the inamdar has the kudivaram right in such land, shall be stayed until the 1t day of November, 1936". The proviso to this sub-section is the forerunner to section 8(5) which was inserted by Act XVIII of 1936. It runs thus: “Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to any land the kudivaram interest in which has been declared or recognised before the 1st day of November, 1933, to vest in the inamdar by a decree or order of a competent Court which has become final.” It is therefore clear that the rights of an inamdar which had ripened into a final decree or order of a competent Court were intended to prevail over the rights which the Legislature was conferring for the first time on tenants of inam villages which became estates by virtue of Madras Act XVIII of 1936. Section 8(5) declared definitely what the rights of such inamdars were. This second appeal must therefore be dismissed with costs of the first respondent. K.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.