Judgment Shearer, J. 1. The petitioner, Babu Lakhan Sao who is a dealer in kerosene oil, has been convicted under Section 7, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 , and has been sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-. On 3-3-1949, the premises of the petitioner were visited by, the supply inspector who found nine tins of kerosene oil in excess of the number of tins shown in his register. The inference to be drawn from this in the absence of any reasonable explanation by the petitioner would, of course, be that he intended to dispose of these nine tins in the black-market. The explanation which the petitioner put forward at the trial was that the tins in question were part of a larger consignment of twenty-five tins which he had that day sold to one Sankar Ram. According to the petitioner, Sankar Ram took away sixteen tins out of the twenty-five tins which he had purchased and left nine tins there intending to come back and take delivery of them later. It does not appear that this explanation was put forward by the petitioner immediately; nor does it appear that there were on the premises of the petitioner nine tins which had been specifically put aside; It is quite clear that what the inspector found was an excess in the stock. The finding of fact arrived at by the Courts below was, in my opinion, undoubtedly correct. Mr. Nageshwar Prasad for the petitioner has raised a somewhat curious point of law. The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, is a temporary Act and Sub-section (3) of Sec.1 states that "It shall cease to have effect on the expiration of the period mentioned in Sec. 4, India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946." The India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, which was an Act of the British Parliament conferred temporarily on the Central Legislature a power to make laws with respect to matters which otherwise would have been exclusively within the legislative jurisdiction of the provincial legislatures. Sec. 4 provided that the duration of legislative powers conferred by the Act should be "the period of one year beginning with the date on which the proclamation of emergency in force at the passing of this Act ceases to operate or if the Governor-General by public notification so directs, the period of two years beginning with that date." The proclamation of emergency ceased to operate on 1st April, 1946, and before 31st March, 1947, the Governor-General by public notification directed that the period should be extended to two years. The proviso to Sec. 4 states that "if and so often as a resolution approving the extension of the said period is passed by the Dominion Legislature, the said period shall be extended for a further period of twelve months from the date on which it would otherwise expire so, however that it does not in any case continue for more than five years from the date on which the proclamation of emergency ceases to operate." A resolution approving the extension of the period was passed by the Dominion Legislature on 3rd March, 1948. The petitioner is a resident of Dhanbad and the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 , was extended to Chotanagpur by a notification under Section 92 (1), Government of India Act on 13th December, 1946. The point taken by Mr. Nageshwar Pra-sad for the petitioner is that on or immediately after the 31st of March 1947, and on or immediately after the 31st of March, 1948, similar notifications ought to have been issued, and that in the absence of such notifications the Act ceased to operate in Chotanagpur. It is true that if the Act had been temporary Act which was to cease to operate on 31st Anarch, 1947, and if its operation had been extended by successive amending Acts, these amending Acts would have had to be applied to Chotanagpur, and notification similar to the "notification issued in 1946 would have been necessary. The language used in Section 92 (1), Gov-ernment of India Act does not, however, support the argument of Mr. Nageshwar Prasad. The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, was a temporary Act, its operation being the duration of a period of emergency. The language used in Section 92 (1), Gov-ernment of India Act does not, however, support the argument of Mr. Nageshwar Prasad. The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, was a temporary Act, its operation being the duration of a period of emergency. The British Parliament in enacting the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, left it in the first instance, to the Governor-General and ultimately to the two Houses of Parliament of the Dominion of India to determine when the period of emergency should be deemed to have come to an end. The power thus conferred on the Governor-General and on the two Houses of Parliament was not a legislative power. It is clear that in 1946 the Governor of Bihar decided that this Act should be applied to Chota-nagpur, and, as the necessary notification was issued, the Act continues in operation in Chotanagpur so long as the period of emergency continues. Mr. Nageshwar Prasad in the earlier part of his argument relied on my decision in -- Imam Bux V/s. The State, Cri. Revn. No. 69 of 1950, D/- 24-2,1950 (Pat). That case was decided under a misapprehension. It was stated by the learned advocate for the petitioner that the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act (Act 24 of 1946) was not applied to Chotanagpur until 18th May 1949. It appears that for some reason or other a notification was issued on 18th May 1949. The learned advocate appearing for the State was not aware that a similar notification had been issued previously on 13th December 1946. 2. Mr. Nageshwar Prasad has next pointed out that the license of the petitioner was not produced at the trial and has suggested that as the license was not before the Court there was no legal evidence that any provision contained in the license had been contravened. The license must, however, be in a form prescribed by the Kerosene Oil Control Order, 1948, and that form is set out in the order itself. The Courts are thus entitled to take judicial notice of the form of license. Mr. Nageshwar Prasad pointed out that it was open to the authority granting the license to exempt a particular licensee from anyone or more of the conditions contained in the license. There is no reason to presume that the petitioner was granted any such exemption. 3. The Courts are thus entitled to take judicial notice of the form of license. Mr. Nageshwar Prasad pointed out that it was open to the authority granting the license to exempt a particular licensee from anyone or more of the conditions contained in the license. There is no reason to presume that the petitioner was granted any such exemption. 3. A rule was issued on the petitioner to show cause why his sentence should not be enhanced. The petitioner is a man of sixty-five, and in view of this the learned trying Magistrate would appear to have exercised his discretion reasonably in not imposing a sentence of imprisonment. The learned Government Advocate is not in a position to tell us what the status of the petitioner is or how lucrative his business is. The learned trying Magistrate was thus very probably in a much better position than we are to decide what an appropriate fine would be. In my judgment, the application ought to be dismissed, and the rule which has been issued ought to be discharged. Jamuar, J. 4 I agree.