Judgment :- 1. These are appeals by the 1st defendant from the preliminary and final decrees of the temporary Muniff of Nedumangad in O.S. No. 146 of 1118. A.S. No. 173 of 1124 is the appeal from the preliminary decree and A.S. No. 106 of 1124 is the appeal from the final decree. 2. One Meeran Pillai Mohammed Ibrahim Pillai died on 20.9.1114 leaving a widow the 2nd defendant, a major daughter the 3rd defendant and four minor children who are the plaintiff's in this case. Meeran Pillai Mohammed Ibrahim Pillai had executed a hypothecation bond in favour of the Sirkar towards an agricultural loan of Rs. 600. After the death of Meeran Pillai, the Sirkar took out proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act for the recovery of the balance amount due under the hypothecation. Reciting payment of the amount due to the Sirkar, a sale deed in respect of the plaint schedule properties, was executed on 7.10.1115 by the mother 2nd defendant in her own right and as guardian of the plaintiffs who were all at the time minors, in conjunction with her major daughter the 3rd defendant, in favour of 1st defendant for Rs. 425. The plaintiffs in this suit seek to set aside the sale deed to the extent of their 35/48th share over the properties and to recover the same with past and future mesne profits from the 1st defendant. 3. First defendant contended that the sale is valid and not liable to be set aside. The trial court gave a preliminary decree to the plaintiffs setting aside the sale deed Ext. C to the extent of the plaintiffs share and directing recovery of possession of their share on a division of the properties by metes and bounds on payment to the 1st defendant, the amount he paid to the Sirkar towards discharge of the hypothecation bond in their favour. In pursuance of this preliminary decree a final decree was also passed. 4. The main questions that arise for decision in these appeals are whether the mother's dealing with her minor childrens' properties under Ext. C, is binding on the infants and whether the alienation is liable to be set aside as prayed for by them. Under the Mohammedan Law, the first and primary natural guardian of the minor is the father. When he is dead, the guardianship devolves upon his executor. C, is binding on the infants and whether the alienation is liable to be set aside as prayed for by them. Under the Mohammedan Law, the first and primary natural guardian of the minor is the father. When he is dead, the guardianship devolves upon his executor. If the father has died without appointing an executor, then the father's father if he is alive becomes the guardian. If he too is dead, then the guardianship devolves upon the executor of the father's father. Therefore, the two near relations that are the natural guardians of the minor children of a Mohammedan are the father and the father's father. It is also clear that under Mohammedan Law the mother is only entitled to the custody of the persons of her minor children upto a certain age according to the sex of the children. Therefore under the strict rules of the Mohammedan Law, the mother is not clothed with any authority to sell the immovable properties of her minor children. There was some conflict in the decision of the High Courts in India with regard to the question of the mother's power to deal with her minor children's immovable properties. But the question has been set at rest by the decision of the Privy Council in Imambandi v. Mutsaddi reported in I.L.R. 45 Calcutta 878. After reviewing the law on the subject, Their Lordships have come to the conclusion that "under the Mohammedan Law a person who has charge of the person or property of a minor without being his legal guardian, and who may, therefore, be conveniently called a "de facto guardian," has no power to convey to another any right or interest in immovable property which the transferee can enforce against the infant; nor can such transferee if let into possession of the property under such unauthorised transfer, resist an action in ejectment on behalf of the infant as a trespasser." 5. The High Court of Travancore till recently took the same view. The question came directly for consideration in the case reported in 18 T.L.J. 1313. At page 1317 of the report Their Lordship say: "It is clear law that among Mohammedans an alienation of immovable property belonging to a minor by a person other than his legal guardian, either natural, testamentary or appointed is void and not binding on the minor. The question came directly for consideration in the case reported in 18 T.L.J. 1313. At page 1317 of the report Their Lordship say: "It is clear law that among Mohammedans an alienation of immovable property belonging to a minor by a person other than his legal guardian, either natural, testamentary or appointed is void and not binding on the minor. The fact that the alienation in question has been made by the minor's mother could not affect the position." The question again came up for consideration in the case reported in 28 T.L.J. 965. Following the prior decisions based on the ruling in 45 Calcutta 878, Their Lordship have held that "the law is well-settled now that under Mohammedan Law, the mother is entitled only to the custody of the person of her minor child up to a certain age, according to sex of the child, that she is not the child's natural guardian and that she has no power as a de facto guardian, to convey to another, any right or interest in immovable property which the transferee can enforce against the infant." Judged by the above principles, there can be no doubt that the alienation in question in the present case is liable to be set aside as prayed for by the plaintiffs. 6. However, a note different from the earlier decisions was struck in the Full Bench decision in Ahammathau Kunju Musaliar v. Pathumma Kunju (1945 T.L.R. 491.) Reliance is placed on this decision by the learned Advocate for the appellant. In this case, Their Lordships Krishnaswami Iyer, C.J. and Mr. Justice Abraham - His Lordship Mr. Justice Sankarasubba Iyer dissenting - have drawn a distinction between an act of alienation as such and an act of administration. Their Lordships think that where a de facto guardian alienates the property of the deceased for the purpose of discharging his debts such alienations have to be viewed as acts of administration of the estate of the deceased as according to their Lordships the estate of the deceased vests in his heirs at law who are sui juris at the time for the purpose of administration. It is therefore contended for the appellants that in as much as Ext. It is therefore contended for the appellants that in as much as Ext. C was executed for discharging the debt due to the Sirkar for which proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act was taken out by them, the act of the defacto guardian is only an act of administration and that therefore, the alienations valid and binding on the minors. 7. It is however argued by the learned Advocate for the respondent that if the heirs of the deceased who are sui juris are declared to be competent to administer the estate vested in them and the minor heirs in specific shares it is in effect permitting the application of the rule of representation which is unknown to Mohammedan Law, that the theory of the right of administration of the estate of the deceased as propounded in 1945 T.L.R. 491 entails serious inroads into the well-established principles of Mohammedan Law and that therefore the decision requires reconsideration. But we do not think that even viewed as an act of administration Ext. C can he held to be valid. Hence the position canvassed by the learned Advocate for the respondent does not call for consideration in this case. 8. Their Lordships observe in the 1945 T.L.R. case cited above at page 511 " that even in seeking to set aside an alienation by way of administration, the question to be considered would be was the alienation bona fide and reasonable having reference to all the circumstances of the estate of the deceased". In this case the alienation could not be said to be bona fide or reasonable. The property that was alienated under Ext. C sale deed is 11 acres and 35 cents in extent. It is seen that the money borrowed from the Sirkar under the agricultural loan was for the purpose of improving the identical property. Commissioner's report Ext. K indicates that there are a large number of cocoanut and arecanut trees and pepper vines planted in the property before the sale deed in favour of the 1st defendant. There can therefore be little doubt that the money borrowed from the Sirkar has been utilised for improving the property. Having thus invested the money borrowed, in the property itself, its original value must naturally have gone considerably up. Yet what we see is that the property was sold under Ext. C for Rs. There can therefore be little doubt that the money borrowed from the Sirkar has been utilised for improving the property. Having thus invested the money borrowed, in the property itself, its original value must naturally have gone considerably up. Yet what we see is that the property was sold under Ext. C for Rs. 425 an amount less than the original agricultural loan. As the learned Munsiff says the value of the property if it is worked out even at one rupee per cent will be more than Rs. 1100. We feel no doubt that with the improvements that were effected in the property the price per cent at the time of the sale would have been far in excess of Re. 1. 9. There is yet another circumstance disclosed in this which would show that even the 1st defendant has felt that the transaction was not fair. It is admitted in para. 24 of the 1st defendant's written statement that he has executed a sale deed without receiving any consideration for 3 acres of the plaint schedule properties in favour of the plaintiffs and their mother. No doubt he has his own explanations to offer that by the pressure of his father he was compelled to execute the document and that possession of the property was not handed over as he came to know that there are prior encumbrances over the property. But taking his statement at its best, why should his father persuade him to reconvey without any consideration a portion of the property to the widow and the minor children and why should he allow himself to be persuaded to do it. The fact, it seems to us is that the father and the son were alive to the unconscionable nature of the transaction and wanted to do some recompense. In the circumstances of this case, we are inclined to infer that what really happened was that the 1st defendant took advantage of the helplessness of the widow and her children and wanted to knock off a very large extent of the property of the deceased under the guise of helping them to discharge the debt due to Government. We are therefore unable to think that the transaction evidenced by Ext. C was actuated by good faith or that it was reasonable. 10. We think that viewed from any standpoint, Ext. We are therefore unable to think that the transaction evidenced by Ext. C was actuated by good faith or that it was reasonable. 10. We think that viewed from any standpoint, Ext. C is not valid and binding on the plaintiffs or other share of the plaint properties and that it is liable to be set aside. Of course, the 1st defendant will get a charge on the plaintiffs' share of the properties to the extent of Rs. 386-chs.12-cash 6 being the plaintiff' share of the debt discharged by 1st defendant. We agree with the finding of the learned Munsiff in his preliminary judgment. We confirm the preliminary decree and dismiss A.S. No. 173 of 1124 with costs. 11. In A.S. No. 106 of 1124 two points were urged before us by the learned Advocate for the appellants, one relating to the value of improvements and the other in regard to the question of mesne profits. 12. We have gone carefully through Ext. XV report of the Commissioner. We think that the valuation is proper and does not call for any interference. We therefore confirm the findings of the learned Munsiff in respect of the value of improvements. 13. Regarding the question of mesne profits, it is contended that the plaintiffs can claim any mesne profits for their share of the property only from the date on which they deposit in court the amount of Rs. 386-chs.12-cash 6 made a charge of under the preliminary decree. We think that there is much force in this contention. The claim for mesne profits for the period before the deposit of the amount due to the 1st defendant is not well-founded. From the records it does not appear that the plaintiffs have deposited any amounts in court. We hold that the plaintiffs are not entitled to any mesne profits past or future till the date of deposit of Rs. 386-chs.11-cash 6 decreed to be paid to the 1st defendant. Plaintiffs will however get future mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 52-chs-20-cash 8 from the date of deposit of the abovesaid sum of Rs. 386-chs-12, cash 6 until delivery of possession to the plaintiffs of their share of the properties or until the expiration of three years from the date of the decree which ever event first occurs. The final decree is confirmed in all other respects. 52-chs-20-cash 8 from the date of deposit of the abovesaid sum of Rs. 386-chs-12, cash 6 until delivery of possession to the plaintiffs of their share of the properties or until the expiration of three years from the date of the decree which ever event first occurs. The final decree is confirmed in all other respects. A.S. No. 106 of 1124 is partly allowed as indicated above. We make no order as to costs in A.S. No. 106 of 1124.