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1950 DIGILAW 162 (PAT)

Surendra Nath Chatterjee v. Surendra Nath Basu

1950-11-22

B.P.SINHA, C.P.SINHA

body1950
Judgement B. P. SINHA, J. :- This is an appeal by the Receiver in a litigation. He had been called upon by the Ct. appointing him as such to pay a certain sum of money to the resp who had worked for him as a lawyer in the case. This Second Appeal purports to have been made under the provisions of S. 47, C. P. C. but, as will presently appear, it is manifest that the second appeal is incompetent. 2. In a certain partition suit, the applt was appointed a receiver by the Ct. As a Receiver, the engaged the resp as his lawyer. For professional work done by the resp, the applt owed him money. The resp put in a petn in Ct. either to grant him permission to sue the Receiver for his dues or to direct the Receiver to pay his arrears of fees. The Ct. accepted the second prayer of the lawyer, and ordered payment of the amount found outstanding by the Ct. on the bills submitted by the lawyer. As the amount was not paid as directed by the Ct, the resp proceeded to execute that order by attachment and sale of the Receivers property. In the Ct. of first instance, the only objection raised on behalf of the Receiver judgment-debtor was that the property sought to be proceeded against should be valued under the provisions of the Bihar Money-Lenders Act. The Ct. overruled that objection, holding that that Act had no application to the nature of the dues owing to the resp. Hence, the Ct. directed that the valuation as stated by both the parties would be entered in the sale proclamation. An appeal was taken to the learned Dist J. of Bhagalpur who dismissed it after overruling all the objections raised before him on behalf of the applt. It is not necessary to reiterate here all the objections raised by the applt in the lower appellate Ct. It was contended in the Ct. below on behalf of the Receiver that the lawyer could not levy execution by treating the order of the learned Subordinate Judge as a decree for payment of money. The learned Dist J. has pointed out that the right of the lawyer to receive the money from the Receiver had not been seriously challenged: what was challenged was the method of realisation. The Ct. The learned Dist J. has pointed out that the right of the lawyer to receive the money from the Receiver had not been seriously challenged: what was challenged was the method of realisation. The Ct. of appeal below has pointed out that, under O. 40, R. 3 (c), it is within the competence of the Ct. appointing the Receiver to direct him to pay such amount as may be due from him The lower appellate Ct. has found that the Ct. below acted in accordance with the provision of R. 3 of O. 40. There was no appeal taken from the order passed upon the Receiver to pay the amount in question to his lawyer. In the Cts below, it appears that the matter was treated as one under S. 47, C. P. C. That appears to have been a mistake, because the matter comes directly under the provisions of R. 4, O. 40 which provides that, where a Receiver fails to pay the amount due from him as the Ct. may have directed, the Ct. may direct the Receivers property to be attached and sold, and the sale proceeds applied to liquidate the amount due from the Receiver. It may be that both the parties were under a misapprehension of the exact legal position. But it appears to me that the order passed by the Ct. of first instance would come within the purview of R. 4 (b), O. 40, Civil P. C. such an order is appealable as an order under the provisions of O. 43, R. 1 (s). It is clear, therefore, that the order passed by the Ct. of first instance was appealable as an order and not as an order passed in S. 47 proceedings having the force of a decree. The order passed by the learned Dist J., therefore, became final as an order passed on appeal in an appealable case. It is manifest, therefore, that no second appeal lies. 3. But Mr. Mustafi, the learned counsel for, the applt, has contended that in that event this appeal should be treated as an appln in revn, and he has contended that the Ct. of first instance had no jurisdiction to proceed against the so-called judgment-debtor, without first finding that the Receiver had failed to carry out the orders of the Ct. to pay a certain sum of money. of first instance had no jurisdiction to proceed against the so-called judgment-debtor, without first finding that the Receiver had failed to carry out the orders of the Ct. to pay a certain sum of money. In the events which have happened there is no doubt that the conditions laid down in Rr. 3 and 4 of O. 40 have been satisfied; but even then it will be open to the applt to move the Ct. of first instance to grant him sufficient time to pay the dues of the resp who worked for the Receiver as his lawyer. But it must be held that there is no want of jurisdiction in the Ct. of first instance to proceed as it did in enforcing payment of the money directed by it. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed but, in the circumstances, without costs. If the applt does not pay the amount within the time to be fixed by the Ct. below, the execution proceedings will naturally proceed. 4. C. P. SINHA, J. :- I agree. Appeal dismissed