Satyanarayana Rao, J.-At the instance of Mack, J., two questions have been referred to the Full Bench: "1. Whether section 15, Civil Procedure Code, governs Chartered High Courts, and whether in view of it all suits below Rs.10,000 in value should not be instituted direct in the City Civil Court; 2. Whether the City Civil Court is competent to try or dispose of suits filed in the High Court below Rs.10,000 in value which were instituted prior to the enhancement of its jurisdiction from Rs.8,000 to Rs.10,000; if so, can such transfers be legally made under either section 16, proviso (2), Madras City Civil Court Act or under section 24(1), Civil Procedure Code." This reference was occasioned as Mack, J., was of opinion that an earlier decision of Panchapagesa Sastri, J., in Mahomed Yusuf v. Khadir Badsha Sahib1, which held that the High Court had no power under section 16(2) of the Madras City Civil Court Act (VII of 1892) to transfer to the City Civil Court, suits instituted in the High Court on its original side before the date of the notification G.O. No.M.S.4175, Home, dated nth November, 1948, required reconsideration. In order to better appreciate the scope of the questions raised in the reference and the contentions urged before us, it is necessary to set out briefly the relevant provisions that have a bearing on the questions. In order to better appreciate the scope of the questions raised in the reference and the contentions urged before us, it is necessary to set out briefly the relevant provisions that have a bearing on the questions. The original jurisdiction of the High Court is derived under clause 12 of the Letters Patent which empowered the High Court of Judicature at Madras in the exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction to "receive, try and determine suits of every description, if, in the case of suits for land or other immoveable property, such land or property shall be situated, or in all other cases if the cause of action shall have arisen, either wholly, or in case the leave of the Court shall have been first obtained, in part, within the local limits of the ordinary jurisdiction of the said High Court, or if the defendant St the time of the commencement of the suit shall dwell, or carry on business, or personally work for gain within such limits; except that the said High Court shall not have such original jurisdiction in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court at Madras, in which the debt or damage, or value of the property sued for; does not exceed one hundred rupees." The High Court, therefore, has practically unlimited original jurisdiction except that if the debt or damage or the value of the property does not exceed Rs.100 and the case is one which falls within the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court at Madras, the High Court in its original jurisdiction cannot try such a suit. In 1882, the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, (IV of 1882) was passed to consolidate and amend the law relating to the Court of Small Causes established in the towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. In each of the Presidency towns, a Court of Small Causes was established by that Act subject to the superintendence of the High Court. The local limit of the jurisdiction of the Small Clause Court is co-extensive with the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court. In each of the Presidency towns, a Court of Small Causes was established by that Act subject to the superintendence of the High Court. The local limit of the jurisdiction of the Small Clause Court is co-extensive with the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court. A Small Cause Court was empowered to try all suits of a civil nature subject to the exceptions contained in section 19 of the Act if the amount or value of the subject-matter did not exceed Rs.2,000 and further subject to the conditions regarding the cause of action and the residence of the defendants contained in clauses (a) to (c) of section 18. Section 21 of the Act, however, gave an option to a plaintiff when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit exceeded Rs.1,000 to institute the suit either in the High Court on its original side or in the Small Cause Court. In 1892 the Madras City Civil Court Act (VII of 1892) was passed by the Legislature which empowered the Local Government by notification in the Official Gazette to establish a Court, to be called the Madras City Civil Court with jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of all suits and other proceedings of a civil nature not exceeding Rs.2,500 in value and arising within the City of Madras, except suits or proceedings which are cognizable (a) by the High Court as a Court of Admiralty or Vice-Admiralty or as a Colonial Court of Admiralty, or as a Court having testamentary, intestate or matrimonial jurisdiction, or (b) by the Court for the relief of insolvent debtors, or (c) by the Small Cause Court. In 1935 the Act was amended by introducing a new section, section 3-A. It states: "Subject to the exceptions specified in section 3, the Provincial Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, invest the City Court with jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of all suits and other proceedings of a civil nature arising within the City of Madras and of such value not exceeding ten thousand rupees as may be specified in the notification." Appeals against the decisions of the City Civil Court lie to the High Court and the right of appeal was conferred by section 15 of the Act. Sub-clause (2) of that section provides that the period of limitation for an appeal from a decree or order of the City Court shall be the same as that provided by law for an appeal from a decree or order of the High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. The next section, section 16 saves the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court and also confers a power of transfer on the High Court of suits pending before it. As the construction of this section is one of the important points in this case, it is necessary to set it out in extenso: "Nothing in this Act contained shall affect the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court: Provided (1) if any suit or other proceeding is instituted in the High Court which, in the opinion of the judge who tries the same (whose opinion shall be final), ought to have been instituted in the City Court, no costs shall be allowed to successful plaintiff and a successful defendant shall be allowed his costs as between attorney and client; (2) in any suit or other proceeding pending at any time in the High Court any Judge of such Court may at any stage thereof make an order transferring the same to the City Court if in his opinion such suit or proceeding is within the jurisdiction of that Court and should be tried therein; (3) in any suit or other proceeding so transferred, the Court-Fees Act, 1870, shall apply, credit being given for any fees levied in the High Court." The Code of Civil Procedure and the Civil Rules of Practice apply to proceedings before the City Civil Court. By virtue of section 117, Civil Procedure Code, the provisions of the Code except as provided in Part IX or in Part X or in the rules apply to High Court. Section 120 of the Code excludes the application of sections 16, 17 and 20 of the Code to High Courts as clause 12 of the Letters Patent provides also rules for determining the place of suing. Under Order 49, some of the rules of the various orders including rule 10 of Order 7 are excluded and are inapplicable to chartered High Courts in the exercise of ordinary and extraordinary original civil jurisdiction. Under Order 49, some of the rules of the various orders including rule 10 of Order 7 are excluded and are inapplicable to chartered High Courts in the exercise of ordinary and extraordinary original civil jurisdiction. The pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court was increased in 1935 to Rs.5,000 and by a further Notification G.O.No.4175, dated nth November, 1948, it was further increased to Rs.10,000. The notification is as follows: “In exercise of the powers conferred by section 3-A, Madras City Civil Court Act, 1892 (Central Act VII of 1892) and in supersession of Law (General) Department Notification No. 216, dated 22nd March, 1935, published at page 488 of Part I of the Fort St. George Gazette, dated 26th March, 1935, His Excellency the Governor of Madras hereby invests with effect on and from 1st day of December, 1948, the Madras City Civil Court, subject to the exceptions specified in section 3 of the said Act with jurisdiction to receive, try any dispose of all suits and other proceedings of a civil nature arising within the City of Madras and of value not exceeding ten thousand rupees.” The first of the questions referred to us relates to the applicability of section 15, Civil Procedure Code, to Chartered High Courts. In other words the question, is if a suit is below rupees ten thousand in value, is the litigant bound to institute it in the City Civil Court as the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it. Section 15 of the Code directs that suits shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it. Under clause 12 of the Letters Patent, subject to one qualification, the High Court has unlimited original jurisdiction and this jurisdiction was saved under section 16, City Civil Court Act (VII of 1892). Competency contemplated by this section is pecuniary competency and it has been held that this section lays down a rule of procedure and not of jurisdiction. While it enjoins the institution of a suit in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it, does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court of a higher grade. Competency contemplated by this section is pecuniary competency and it has been held that this section lays down a rule of procedure and not of jurisdiction. While it enjoins the institution of a suit in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it, does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court of a higher grade. Even if the Court of a higher grade tries and disposes of a suit which could have been instituted in a Court of a lower grade, the decision rendered is not without jurisdiction and is not a nullity-(see Nidhilal v. Mazhar Husain1, Matra Mondal v. Hari Mohan2, Krishnasami v. Kanakasabai3 and Gourachandra v. Vikrama Deo4. It has now been decided by the Privy Council in Sabitri Thakurain v. Savi5 that the Civil Procedure Code of 1908 and the rules contained in the orders apply to proceedings in the High Court whether original or appellate except so far as the Code expressly provided to the contrary. The question that actually arose for decision in that case was whether the provision in Order 41, rule 10, Civil Procedure Code of 1908, applied to an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent as this provision was not expressly excluded by the Code and it was held that an appeal under section 15 of the Letters Patent was governed by that provision. The scheme of the Code, according to their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, is to provide: “Generally for the mode in which the High Court is to exercise its jurisdiction, whatever it may be while specifically excepting the powers relating to the exercise of original civil jurisdiction to which the Code is not to apply. It confers a general rule making power saving only what is excepted in the body of the Code.” It would appear, therefore, that unless there is some other provision which is inconsistent with section 15 or there is other reason for inferring that the Legislature did not intend by enacting section 15 in the Code to affect in any manner or to any extent the original civil jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under clause 12 of the Letters Patent, section 15 necessarily would apply. Section 15 occurs in the fascicule of sections 15 to 20 relating to place of suing. Section 15 occurs in the fascicule of sections 15 to 20 relating to place of suing. The Calcutta High Court had occasion to examine the scheme of these sections in order to determine whether section 21 which is not expressly excluded under section 120 applied to the original jurisdiction of the High Court. The view taken by the Calcutta High Court was that it did not. Dealing with section 15 of the Code, Rankin, C.J., in Manindra Chandra v. Lal Mohan1, observed that it had no application either in practice or in substance to the original jurisdiction of the High Court. He, however, expressly stated that he was not considering the position of the City Civil Court in Madras or matters of that kind. The Rangoon High Court in Bank of Chettinad v. S.P.K.V.R. Firm2, was also of opinion that section 15 did not apply to the High Court in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction notwithstanding that it is not one of the excepted sections mentioned in section 120 of the Code. The conclusion was based on the arrangement of the group of sections relating to place of suing most of which were expressly excluded by section 120 as inapplicable to Chartered High Courts. In my view there is much to be said in favour of the view taken by the Calcutta and Rangoon High Courts in the two decisions above referred to. The City Civil Court Act expressly saved the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court and the policy of the Legislature has been not to touch the original jurisdiction of the High Court. The scheme of the entire group of sections relating to place of suing cannot be made applicable when a self-contained provision relating to place of suing was laid down in clause 12 of the Letters Patent. The practice has also been so far not to apply section 15 to the original jurisdiction of the High Court. Apart from this, in my opinion, proviso (1) to section 16, Madras City Civil Court Act, is clearly inconsistent with section 15 and does not make it obligatory on the plaintiff to choose the lowest Court of pecuniary jurisdiction to institute a suit when the conflict is between the City Civil Court and the High Court. Apart from this, in my opinion, proviso (1) to section 16, Madras City Civil Court Act, is clearly inconsistent with section 15 and does not make it obligatory on the plaintiff to choose the lowest Court of pecuniary jurisdiction to institute a suit when the conflict is between the City Civil Court and the High Court. The only disability which the proviso imposes in a case where a suit which ought to have been instituted in the City Court, has been instituted in the High Court is that the successful plaintiff, should be deprived of his costs and the successful defendant should be allowed his costs as between attorney and client. It must be remembered that Order 7, rule 10 was not made applicable to the Chartered High Courts and if a plaint which ought to have been filed in a court of lower pecuniary jurisdiction is in fact filed in the higher Court, viz., the High Court, the High Court cannot return the plaint and in such a case the High Court has the option of following one of two courses, either to try the suit subject to the penalties, provided in the first proviso to section 16 or to transfer the suit under proviso (2) to the said section. Proviso (1) recognises the right of the litigant to institute a suit which ought to have been filed in the City Civil Court even in the High Court and there is no mandatory provision like section 15 in the City Civil Court Act enjoining upon him the duty of resorting to the Court of lowest pecuniary jurisdiction. The proviso (1) to section 16, in my opinion clearly negatives the applicability of section 15 when the City Civil Court happens to be the Court of the lowest grade competent to try the suit. It was also argued with some force that the gradation contemplated by section 15 is only the gradation or subordination of Courts provided in section 3 of the Code. Section 3 says that for the purposes of this Code, the District Court is subordinate to the High Court and every Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes is subordinate to the High Court and District Court. Section 3 says that for the purposes of this Code, the District Court is subordinate to the High Court and every Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes is subordinate to the High Court and District Court. It follows that in the gradation of Courts contemplated by the Madras Civil Courts Act, i.e., the Munsif Court, the Sub-Court, the District Court and the High Court and the Small Causes Courts, there are two kinds of gradation. One is the gradation beginning with the District Court and ending with the District Munsif’s Court so far as the institution of the suits is concerned and the High Court and the Small Causes Court constituted another kind of gradation. At the head of all no doubt, is the High Court but in the chain of gradation of Courts the City Civil Court does not come in and it is possible to assume that for the purpose of the Code, the gradation contemplated is the gradation referred to in section 3. In this view section 15 would apply only when there is necessity to choose the forum in the gradations of Courts referred to in section 3. The lowest Court of pecuniary jurisdiction must be the Court in which the suit should be instituted. But section 3 speaks only of subordination of Courts and defines it whereas section 15 speaks of the Court of the lowest grade “competent” to try and competency in this section can only mean pecuniary competency. If this view of the section is right, it follows that when there are two Courts of different pecuniary jurisdiction like the City Civil Court and the High Court exercising original civil jurisdiction there is no reason for not treating the City Civil Court as the Court of the lowest grade if the value of the suit is within the pecuniary jurisdiction of that Court. It is, therefore, difficult to restrict the meaning of section 15 in the manner contended. But, for the reasons I have already given, I am definitely of opinion that section 15 has no application to the High Courts exercising ordinary original jurisdiction, when there is a conflict between the original jurisdiction of the High Court and City Civil Court constituted under the Madras City Civil Court Act. But, for the reasons I have already given, I am definitely of opinion that section 15 has no application to the High Courts exercising ordinary original jurisdiction, when there is a conflict between the original jurisdiction of the High Court and City Civil Court constituted under the Madras City Civil Court Act. The answer therefore, to the first question referred must, in my opinion, be in the negative. The second question referred to us is expressly restricted to suits instituted in the High Court of the value of Rs.10,000 filed prior to the date when the notification under section 3-A, City Civil Court Act, took effect, i.e., 1st December, 1948. Transfer of suits of the said value after the aforesaid date does not present any difficulty as such suits can undoubtedly be transferred to the City Civil Court under section 16, proviso (2). In the arguments before us by the learned advocates representing the bar and Advocate-General, contentions were urged against the power of transfer and none in support of this power. This is apparently because the bar is interested in retaining the suits, above 434 in number, on the original side of the High Court. We had, therefore, to rely on the results of our research in order to resolve the difficulty in interpreting the proviso. It is objected that section 3-A of the Act and the power delegated thereunder is a legislative power, the delegation of which is not permissible under law in view of the recent decision of the Federal Court in Jatindranath v. Province of Bihar1 and a decision of this Court In re Kalyanam Veerbadrayya2. From an examination of section 3-A it will be seen that the Local Government is authorised by it by a notification in the Official Gazette to invest the City Civil Court with jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of suits and other proceedings of a civil nature arising within the City of Madras of the value not exceeding Rs.10,000 which may be specified in the notification. In other words, the Local Government was empowered by this section to fix the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court within a limit not exceeding Rs.10,000. That a legislative power cannot be delegated has been settled by the decision of the Federal Court above referred to. In other words, the Local Government was empowered by this section to fix the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court within a limit not exceeding Rs.10,000. That a legislative power cannot be delegated has been settled by the decision of the Federal Court above referred to. The question therefore, is, is the power of fixing the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court within the limit prescribed by section 3-A a legislative power or merely an executive or administrative act. In my judgment In re Kalyanam Veerabadrayya2, I pointed out the difficulty in drawing the line between a legislative power and a non-legislative power. In that decision I examined the cases on either side of the line and pointed out that if the Legislature had exercised its will and judgment regarding all matters such as the place, the person or the laws and powers but merely entrusted to some other authority the power of determining the time of commencement of the Act and the places to which it should be applied, it is not a delegation of a legislative power at all. Following the view of the Federal Court, I was of opinion that the power of extending the life of an Act was really a legislative power, as in substance and in effect such a power was to bring the Act itself into existence for a further period. The decision of the Privy Council in Empress v. Burah3 and Emperor v. Benoan Lall4, are instances where a power to extend an Act which removed the jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Court and Criminal Courts and vested such power in officers to be appointed by an outside authority and a power to constitute special Criminal Courts with power to determine the class of cases to be tried by such Courts were treated as non-legislative powers. In the light of those decisions, it is difficult to hold that in an Act which is complete in itself a power to constitute and establish a Court as under section 3, City Civil Court Act, by notification and a power to fix the pecuniary jurisdiction of such a Court within stated limits as under section 3-A of the Act can be considered a legislative power the delegation of which is prohibited. I do not propose to enter into a detailed examination of the cases on the point as in my judgment already referred to I had considered them fully. For the reasons given in that judgment and in the light of the principles contained therein, I have no doubt that the delegation under section 3-A of the Act is perfectly valid. It was next contended relying on the expression “arising within the City of Madras” in section 3-A and in the notification that suits instituted after 1st December, 1948, alone could be transferred under the second proviso to section 16 but not suits filed prior to that date. It is said that the expression used in the section as well as in the notification is “arising” and not “arose” and therefore it is contended that it is a clear indication that the power to transfer is restricted to suits instituted after 1st December, 1948. This was the view which was accepted by Panchapagesa Sastry, J., in Mohamed Yusuf v. Khadir Badsha1. Under the second proviso to section 16, the High Court is empowered to transfer a suit or proceeding pending at any time and at any stage, if in the opinion of the Court such suit or proceeding is within the jurisdiction of that Court and should be tried therein. Under this proviso, therefore, when the High Court wishes to exercise the jurisdiction to transfer all that it has to see is whether on the date of the proposed transfer the suit or proceeding is or is not within the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court and unlike the language in the first proviso, the ground of the transfer under the second proviso is not that the suit ought to have been instituted in the City Civil Court but was wrongly instituted in the High Court. The power is on the ground that, in the opinion of the Judge, the suit or proceeding is at the moment of transfer, within the jurisdiction of that Court. The power is on the ground that, in the opinion of the Judge, the suit or proceeding is at the moment of transfer, within the jurisdiction of that Court. It follows, therefore, that even at the date of the institution of the suit in the High Court the City Civil Court had no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit but as subsequently by the notification the jurisdiction is increased to Rs.10,000 so as to bring the particular suit within the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court, the High Court has, in my opinion, an undoubted power to transfer the suit to the City Civil Court. In my opinion, the use of the language “suit or proceeding is within the jurisdiction of the Court”, by the Legislature is deliberate and is intended to enable a High Court to transfer suits if the City Civil Court by the date of such transfer acquired pecuniary jurisdiction to try such suit or proceeding. Even if the meaning of the expression “arising” in section 3-A of the Act and in the notification is to be understood as indicative of suits instituted after the said date, that would not in my view, prevent the High Court from exercising the power of transfer under the second proviso. In my opinion, the expression “suit or proceeding of a civil nature arising within the City of Madras” is used to denote the class of suits over which the jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of was intended to be conferred upon the City Civil Court by the Legislature. They must be suits or proceedings which arise within the City of Madras and not outside it. The expression “arising” is not indicative in the context of a point of time, past or future; but is part of the description of a class of suits. I am, therefore, unable with great respect to accept the interpretation placed upon it by Panchapagesa Sastri, J. It was also argued that a suitor had a vested right to have the suit validly instituted in a Court of competent jurisdiction, to have it tried and disposed of in that Court and that any subsequent legislation or notification issued in pursuance of a power conferred by a statute could not defeat that right nor take away the jurisdiction of that Court to try and dispose of the suits. No exception can be taken to the proposition and authority in support of it is to be found in the judgment of the Federal Court in Venugopala v. Krishnaswami1, particularly in the judgment of Varadachariar, J.-See also C.P. Bannerjee v. B.S. Irani2. It is also settled law that when a suit is instituted, it carries with it the implications that the rights of appeal then in force are preserved to it throughout its career unaffected by any subsequent alterations unless the Legislature has expressly abolished the Court to which an appeal then lay or has, expressly or by necessary implication, made the legislation retrospective in effect. This principle is established by the well-known decision in the Colonial Sugar Refining Co., Ltd. v. Irving3, which was applied by a Full Bench of this Court in In re Vasudeva Samiar4 in the case of Letters Patent appeals, against the decisions of a single Judge in second appeals. The vested right to continue an action in a Court in which it was instituted can be made subject to a power of transfer by the very Act which constituted and established the Court or in cases governed by Civil Procedure Code under section 24. So long as the power of transfer in cases in which such a power exists is not exercised the action would undoubtedly continue its course in the Court in which it was originally instituted. The very institution of the suit in a Court under a procedure which recognises a power of transfer makes the vested right subject to the power of transfer. In a suit in which the pecuniary jurisdiction is below Rs.10,000 in view of my opinion on the first question, when the suit arises in the City of Madras the plaintiff is entitled to institute it either in the City Civil Court or in the High Court. If the suit is instituted in the High Court it is subject to the power of transfer under the second proviso to section 16. If the High Court does not choose or does not think it proper in a given case to transfer the suit to the City Civil Court, but if it is really a suit which ought to have been instituted in the City Civil Court, power is given to the High Court under the first proviso to impose a special penalty. If the High Court does not choose or does not think it proper in a given case to transfer the suit to the City Civil Court, but if it is really a suit which ought to have been instituted in the City Civil Court, power is given to the High Court under the first proviso to impose a special penalty. It cannot, therefore, be said that because a person has a right and a vested right to have a suit tried in a particular Court the power of transfer recognised in the statute is abrogated. The vested right is always subject to the overriding power of the Court subject to the restrictions contained in the statute to transfer to another Court competent to try the same. It is unnecessary for me to examine in detail the decisions that have been cited on this part of the case as I have stated succinctly the principles deductible from those decisions. The very case in C.P. Bannerjee v. B.S. Irani2, recognised the fact that in the legislation under examination in that case there was no power to transfer which shows that if there was a power of transfer, the Court would have transferred it and the vested right could be to that extent affected. It was then pointed out if such a power of transfer is recognised the litigant in the suit would be deprived of the valuable right of instituting suits contemplated by Order 7 of the Original Side Rules, what are usually described as under Chapter suits. There is no doubt a difference between suits under the summary procedure under Order 37, Civil Procedure Code and Order 7, Original Side Rules, both regarding the period of limitation and also the nature and the class of suits that could be instituted. If a suit under Order 7, Original Side Rules, of the value below Rs.10,000 was instituted on the original side of the High Court taking advantage of the favourable provisions under Order 7, it would not be competent for the High Court to transfer it to the City Civil Court as the second proviso to section 16 empowers the Court to transfer the suit or proceeding only if the suit or proceeding is within the jurisdiction of that Court. A suit which is triable as an under Chapter suit under Order 7, Original Sides Rules, cannot be tried by the City Civil Court as an under Chapter suit under a summary procedure under Order 37, having regard to the difference in the subject-matter of the two suits. I do not think, therefore, that a Judge in making an order of transfer under the second proviso to section 16 would overlook these considerations and transfer the suit automatically to the City Civil Court. The Judge has to be satisfied before making an order of transfer, that in his opinion the suit or proceeding is within the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court and that it could be tried by that Court. I do not think, therefore, that this difficulty pointed out in the course of the arguments really affects the power of transfer recognised under the second proviso. The third proviso to section 16 provides for the levy of the court-fees under the Court-Fees Act after giving credit to fee already paid where a proceeding is transferred to the City Civil Court. There can, therefore, be no hardship if a suit is transferred to the City Civil Court as the party gets credit to what he had already paid on the original side of the High Court, as court-fees and would be called upon to pay only the difference. I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that the suits instituted before 1st December, 1948 and of the value below Rs.10,000 can be transferred to the City Civil Court and that the City Civil Court is competent to try such suits when so transferred. It is unnecessary therefore to answer the question whether the High Court has or has not the power of transfer under section 24(1), Civil Procedure Code. This is my answer to the second question. Subba Rao, J.-I intended to deliver a separate judgment in view of the importance of the question referred to us. But after perusing the judgments prepared by my learned brethren, I feel that anything I may add would merely be a repetition. I am content to express my respectful agreement with the conclusions arrived at by them. Viswanatha Sastri, J.-There are three Courts of different grades having original civil jurisdiction within the City of Madras, namely, the High Court of Madras, the Madras City Civil Court and the Presidency Small Cause Court. I am content to express my respectful agreement with the conclusions arrived at by them. Viswanatha Sastri, J.-There are three Courts of different grades having original civil jurisdiction within the City of Madras, namely, the High Court of Madras, the Madras City Civil Court and the Presidency Small Cause Court. The classes of suits triable by these Courts and the minimum and maximum limits of their pecuniary jurisdiction vary. A short analysis of the relevant statutory provisions constituting these Courts and investing them with jurisdiction to try suits is necessary. Clauses 11 and 12 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Madras invested it with ordinary original jurisdiction to receive, try and determine suits of every description subject to limitations as to the situation of the property, the arising of the cause of action and the residence of the defendant within the local limits of the City of Madras. The High Court has unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction, the lower limit, however, being prescribed by clause 12 in these terms: “The said High Court shall not have such original jurisdiction in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court at Madras, in which the debt or damage or value of the property sued for does not exceed Rs.100.” All small cause suits above this pecuniary limit and all suits not cognizable by the Small Cause Court are cognizable by the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original jurisdiction. In pursuance of the authority vested in it by clause 37 of the Letters Patent, the High Court has framed rules for the purpose of regulating suits and proceedings instituted on the original side of the Court. The provisions of the Letters Patent are amenable to modification by the appropriate legislative authority in India. Acting under section 3, Madras City Civil Court Act (VII of 1892), an Act of the Central Legislature, the Provincial Government by notification established the City Civil Court with jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of all suits and other proceedings of a civil nature not exceeding Rs.2,500 in value and arising within the City of Madras, other than suits and proceedings cognizable by the High Court in the exercise of its admiralty, testamentary, matrimonial and insolvency jurisdiction and suits triable by the Small Cause Court. Under section 2 of Madras Act V of 1916, suits cognizable by the Court of Small Causes whereof the amount or value of the subject-matter exceeds Rs.1,000 may, at the option of the plaintiff be instituted in the City Civil Court. Section 3-A, Madras City Civil Court Act (VII of 1892), inserted by Madras Act I of 1935, empowered the Provincial Government by notification in the Official Gazette to invest the City Civil Court with jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of all suits and proceedings of the kind specified in section 3 of such value not exceeding Rs.10,000 as may be specified in the notification. By G.O.No.1018, dated 22nd March, 1935, the Provincial Government extended the limit of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court to Rs.5,000 and by a further G.O.No.4175, dated 11th November, 1948, to Rs.10,000. Section 14 of the Act recognized the power of the High Court to transfer to itself a suit filed in the City Civil Court acting under clause 13 of the Letters Patent and section 25, Civil Procedure Code (section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1908). Section 15 provides that the High Court is authorised to hear appeals from the City Court. Section 16 expressly declares that nothing in the Act shall affect the original jurisdiction of the High Court. Proviso (1) to section 16 requires a Judge of the original side of the High Court to disallow costs to the successful plaintiff", if, in the opinion of the Judge, the suit is one which, ought to have been instituted in the City Civil Court. Proviso (2) to section 16 empowers any Judge of the High Court at any stage of any suit or proceeding, to transfer the same to the City Court if, in his opinion, such suit or proceeding is within the jurisdiction of that Court and should be tried therein. Though section 8 of Act VII of 1892 requires the City Civil Court to administer the law for the time being administered by the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, the procedure in suits and other proceedings in the City Civil Court is governed by Civil Procedure Code. See Khumchand Dhulaji v. Gomraj Fatechand1. Though section 8 of Act VII of 1892 requires the City Civil Court to administer the law for the time being administered by the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, the procedure in suits and other proceedings in the City Civil Court is governed by Civil Procedure Code. See Khumchand Dhulaji v. Gomraj Fatechand1. Section 19, Presidency Towns Small Cause Courts Act (XV of 1882), bars the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court constituted under that Act, to try the various classes of suits enumerated in the section, irrespective of the value of the subject-matter. Section 18 of the Act invests the Small Cause Court with jurisdiction to try suits of a civil nature arising within the City of Madras other than those excepted under section 19 where the amount or value of the subject-matter does not exceed Rs.2,000. Section 21 of the Act gives a suitor the right to file a suit of a small cause nature on the original side of the High Court if the amount or value of the subject-matter exceeds Rs.1,000. Section 2 of Madras Act V of 1916 gives the suitor an option to file a suit of the nature cognizable by the Court of Small Causes in the City Civil Court, if the amount or value of the subject-matter exceeds Rs.1,000. Under section 22, Presidency Towns Small Cause Courts Act (XV of 1882), the High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction is required to disallow costs to a successful plaintiff if he obtains a decree for less than Rs.1,000-in the case of a suit founded on contract and in case of any other suit of a small cause nature, a decree for less than Rs.300 unless the Judge of the High Court trying the suit certifies that it was a fit one to be brought in the High Court. This section proceeds on the basis that the High Court has jurisdiction to try on its original side, suits of a small cause nature of the value of over Rs.100 as provided for in clause 12 of the Letters Patent. This section proceeds on the basis that the High Court has jurisdiction to try on its original side, suits of a small cause nature of the value of over Rs.100 as provided for in clause 12 of the Letters Patent. Under section 39 of the Act, the High Court is empowered to remove a suit from the Small Cause Court to its own file and try it, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, if the value of the subject-matter exceeds Rs.1,000, and the defendant applies for a transfer. This section again proceeds on the basis that High Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Small Causes in such suits. By section 3 of Madras Act V of 1916, the High Court to which an application is made under section 39(1), Presidency Towns Small Cause Courts Act, may either remove the suit to its own file or transfer the same to the Madras City Civil Court. Under section 6, Presidency Towns Small Cause Courts Act (XV of 1882), the Small Cause Court is a Court subordinate to the High Court. It may be observed that Act XV of 1882 is a self-contained enactment, Order 51, Civil Procedure Code, merely extending a few of the provisions of the Code to suits and proceedings in the Small Cause Courts. The result of the foregoing statutory provisions as regards the pecuniary jurisdiction of Courts established for the trial of the civil suits in the City of Madras, is as follows: (1) Over certain suits and proceedings, the High Court has exclusive jurisdiction, irrespective of the value of the subject-matter, as for instance, matrimonial, testamentary, admiralty and insolvency proceedings. (2) Over certain suits the High Court has no original jurisdiction, that is to say, suits triable by the Court of Small Causes where the value of the claim does not exceed Rs.100. (3) The pecuniary jurisdiction of the High Court is otherwise unlimited. (4) The City Civil Court has no jurisdiction over suits and proceedings falling under head (1) or over suits and proceedings cognizable by a Small Cause Court of a value not exceeding Rs.1,000. (3) The pecuniary jurisdiction of the High Court is otherwise unlimited. (4) The City Civil Court has no jurisdiction over suits and proceedings falling under head (1) or over suits and proceedings cognizable by a Small Cause Court of a value not exceeding Rs.1,000. Subject to a maximum of Rs.10,000, the City Civil Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court, (a) in suits cognizable by the Small Cause Court exceeding Rs.1,000 in value and (b) in all suits and proceedings not cognizable by the Small Cause Court other than those referred to under head (1) supra as being exclusively cognizable by the High Court. It has concurrent jurisdiction with the Small Cause Court in suits of a small cause nature exceeding Rs.1,000 but not exceeding Rs.2,000. (5) The Presidency Small Cause Court has exclusive jurisdiction over suits of a small cause nature not exceeding Rs.100 in value and concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court in suits exceeding Rs.100 but not exceeding Rs.2,000. It has concurrent jurisdiction with the City Civil Court in suits exceeding Rs.1,000 but not exceeding Rs.2,000 provided the suits are of a small cause nature. This somewhat anomalous overlapping of jurisdiction is due to the piecemeal character of the legislation. Under section 375, Constitution of India, “All Courts shall continue to exercise their respective functions subject to the provisions of this Constitution.” In these circumstances the question for consideration is, whether section 15, Civil Procedure Code, applies to the High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, and whether all suits below Rs.10,000 other than suits specially exempted from the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court under section 3, Madras City Civil Courts Act (VII of 1892), should be instituted in the City Civil Court. Rankin, C.J., in Manindra Chandur v. Lal Mohan1, and Braund, J., in Bank of Chettinad v. S.P.K.V.R. Firm2, and Mockett, J., in P.K. Kandasami Chetti v. Arumuga Naicker3, expressed the opinion that section 15, Civil Procedure Code, had no application to suits instituted on the original side of the High Court. The practice of this Court has also been in conformity with this view. The opposite view might be put in a form which much resembles a syllogism. Unlike sections 16, 17 and 20, section 15 is not excluded from application to the original side of the High Court by section 120, Civil Procedure Code. The practice of this Court has also been in conformity with this view. The opposite view might be put in a form which much resembles a syllogism. Unlike sections 16, 17 and 20, section 15 is not excluded from application to the original side of the High Court by section 120, Civil Procedure Code. There is also nothing in the Original Side Rules of the High Court displacing section 15, Civil Procedure Code. Order 1, rule 3, Original Side Rules, recognises that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code would be applicable to suits and proceedings on the original side unless a contrary provision is made in the rules. Section 15, Civil Procedure Code, requires a suitor to file his suit in the Court of the lowest grade competent to entertain it. The City Civil Court is a Court of a lower grade than the High Court because its pecuniary jurisdiction is limited to Rs.10,000 while the jurisdiction of the High Court is unlimited and because appeals lie from the City Civil Court to the High Court, Though the City Civil Court might not come within the hierarchy of Courts specified in section 3, Civil Procedure Code, which contemplates Courts established under the Madras Civil Courts Act (III of 1873), still it is a Court of a grade lower than the High Court within the meaning of section 15, Civil Procedure Code. Section 15 would, therefore, seem to apply to the High Court and compel a suitor to file his suit for less than Rs.10,000 in the City Civil Court even though both the High Court and the City Civil Court might have concurrent jurisdiction. The object of section 15, Civil Procedure Code, is to prevent superior Courts being flooded or overcrowded with suits triable by Courts of inferior grade. The section merely regulates procedure and not jurisdiction. It does not deprive Courts of superior pecuniary grade of their jurisdiction to try suits which should ordinarily be tried by Courts of inferior grades. Sections 12 and 13, Madras Civil Courts Act (III of 1873), do not fix the lower limit of the pecuniary jurisdiction of District Munsiffs, Subordinate Judges and District Judges. It does not deprive Courts of superior pecuniary grade of their jurisdiction to try suits which should ordinarily be tried by Courts of inferior grades. Sections 12 and 13, Madras Civil Courts Act (III of 1873), do not fix the lower limit of the pecuniary jurisdiction of District Munsiffs, Subordinate Judges and District Judges. Section 6, Civil Procedure Code, merely deprives a Court of an inferior grade, of jurisdiction to try a suit the subject-matter of which exceeds the pecuniary limit of its jurisdiction, this limit being imposed under the Madras Civil Courts Act and the Madras City Civil Court Act. Section 15 itself recognises that Courts of more than one grade would have jurisdiction to try a suit by the use of the expression “Court of the lowest grade” which would have no meaning if only one Court had exclusive jurisdiction to try the suit. Consequently it has been held that a Court of a superior grade does not act without jurisdiction in trying a suit which, under section 15, might and ought, by reason of its valuation, to have been tried by an inferior Court. See Nidhilal v. Mazar Hussain1, Krishnasami v. Kanakasabai2, Matra Mondal v. Harimohun3 and Ramaswami Iyer v. Veerayan Raja4. Clause 12 of the Letters Patent expressly confers jurisdiction on the original side of the High Court to try all suits other than suits of a small cause nature of the value of Rs.100 and below. Not only has this jurisdiction not been taken away by subsequent legislation, but the course of subsequent legislation has recognised and proceeded on the basis that the jurisdiction of the High Court even in small cause suits of the value of over Rs.100 is concurrent with that of the Small Cause Court. See sections 21 and 39, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (XV of 1882). Under section 21 of that Act, a suitor has the right to file a suit of a small cause nature exceeding Rs.1,000 in value in the High Court. The only penalty imposed on a suitor who brings a suit in the High Court which could properly have been filed in the Small Cause Court is the disallowance of costs under section 22 of that Act. Section 16, Madras City Civil Court Act (VII of 1892), leaves intact the original jurisdiction of the High Court. The only penalty imposed on a suitor who brings a suit in the High Court which could properly have been filed in the Small Cause Court is the disallowance of costs under section 22 of that Act. Section 16, Madras City Civil Court Act (VII of 1892), leaves intact the original jurisdiction of the High Court. Proviso (1) to section 16 is significant and provides the penalty for instituting in the High Court a suit which could have been filed in the City Civil Court in the shape of a disallowance of costs to the successful plaintiff. The second proviso to section 16 empowers a Judge of the High Court to transfer any pending suit or proceeding to the City Civil Court if the suit or proceeding is otherwise competent to be tried by that Court. This proviso gives a discretion to a Judge of the High Court to try the suit himself or to send it for trial to the City Civil Court. Section 15, Civil Procedure Code, requires a suitor to file his suit in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it and Order 7, rule 10 is the machinery or sanction provided for enforcing or compelling compliance with section 15. The language of Order 7, rule 10 is mandatory and the superior Court is bound to return the plaint to the Court of the lowest grade where it should have been instituted. There is no provision in the Original Side Rules corresponding to Order 7, rule 10, Civil Procedure Code. Order 49, rule 3, Civil Procedure Code, expressly excludes the application of Order 7, rule 10, Civil Procedure Code, to the High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Under the two provisos to section 16, Madras City Civil Court Act, the High Court can either try a suit which should have been, but was not instituted in the City Civil Court mulcting the plaintiffs, in costs, or transfer the suit to the City Civil Court at any stage. Under the two provisos to section 16, Madras City Civil Court Act, the High Court can either try a suit which should have been, but was not instituted in the City Civil Court mulcting the plaintiffs, in costs, or transfer the suit to the City Civil Court at any stage. The result is that the peremptory direction given to the suitor by section 15, Civil Procedure Code, to rile his suit in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it and the imperative provision in Order 7, rule 10 requiring the superior Court at any stage to return the plaint to the Court of the lowest grade where it should have been filed, are applicable to the original side of the High Court. In such cases the High Court has only the limited power of disallowing costs in case it tries the suit, or of transferring the suit to the City Civil Court. This is the effect of the two provisos to section 16, Madras City Civil Court Act. The object of section 15, Civil Procedure Code, has been achieved to a limited extent by the power of transfer given to the High Court by the second proviso to section 16 and the power to mulct the unruly or irresponsible litigant in costs given by the first proviso. Similar provisions with reference to suits of a small cause nature would be found in section 22, Presidency Towns Small Cause Courts Act and in section 3 of Madras Act V of 1916. I am aware that it has been authoritatively decided by the Judicial Committee in Sabitri Thakurain v. Savi1, that the Civil Procedure Code applies to proceedings on the original side of the High Court save and so far as the Civil Procedure Code or the Original Side Rules of the High Court expressly provide the contrary and that there is nothing in the Original Side Rules expressly excluding the operation of section 15, Civil Procedure Code, to suits on the original side of the High Court. It is also true that the Civil Procedure Code is a consolidating enactment intended to be of wide and general application. It is also true that the Civil Procedure Code is a consolidating enactment intended to be of wide and general application. All the same, can it be said that the general language of section 15, Civil Procedure Code, has, by implication, repealed the special provisions of the Letters Patent, the provisions of the Presidency Towns Small Cause Courts Act and the Madras City Civil Court Act already referred to? It is a question of construction whether section 15, ‘Civil Procedure Code, has by necessary implication taken away a right of procedure provided for by these special enactments by substituting another procedure or left the procedure sanctioned by the special enactments unaffected. If there was an intention on the part of the Legislature to repeal the special enactments by enacting section 15, Civil Procedure Code it could have been declared in express terms. No palpable absurdity results if both the provisions co-exist and there is no compelling reason why section 15, Civil Procedure Code, should not be interpreted as applying to cases and Courts not dealt with by the special enactments. In Barker v. Edgar2, the Judicial Committee observed: “When the Legislature has given its attention to a separate subject and made provision for it the presumption is that a subsequent general enactment is not intended to interfere with the special provision unless it manifests that intention very clearly. Each enactment must be construed in that respect according to its own subject-matter and its own terms.” If section 15, Civil Procedure Code, were held to apply to suits on the original side, it would pro tanto deprive the; parties interested of their right to have their suits instituted and heard on the original side in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by clause 12 of the Letters Patent. Where power is given to a suitor to take proceedings in different Courts he has a choice of the forum and his remedy is also subject to the lex fori. A suitor has a longer period of limitation for the institution of summary suits and the execution of decrees and a more expeditious remedy in some suits, if he were allowed to sue on the original side of this Court than he would have if the suit were instituted in the City Civil Court. A suitor has a longer period of limitation for the institution of summary suits and the execution of decrees and a more expeditious remedy in some suits, if he were allowed to sue on the original side of this Court than he would have if the suit were instituted in the City Civil Court. Unless the Court is driven to adopt such a construction, a repeal by implication of the special provisions conferring jurisdiction on the original side of the High Court and a choice of forum on the suitor, is not to be assumed. The omission of a reference to section 15 in section 120, Civil Procedure Code which excludes sections 16, 17 and 20 from application to the original side of the High Court is not a sufficient ground for implying that all the other provisions not so expressly excluded by section 120 must be held to apply to suits on the original side. It seems to me that the only reasonable construction is to hold that section 15 Civil Procedure Code, as well as clause 12 of the Letters Patent stand together the subject-matter of clause 12 of the Letters Patent not being dealt with by section 15, Civil Procedure Code. It may be observed that the language of section 15 of the Code of 1882 was the same as that of section 15, Civil Procedure Code of 1908. During all these years this Court as well as the other High Courts have consistently taken the view that section 15, Civil Procedure Code, does not govern suits on the original side of the High Court and does not override the provisions of the Letters Patent and the Presidency Towns Small Cause Courts Act and the Madras City Civil Court Act. I recoil from overruling a construction of statutory provisions so long and so invariably acted upon by the Courts for over half a century, a construction which presumably reflected the intention of the Legislature and was therefore left unaffected by any amendment of the law. I recoil from overruling a construction of statutory provisions so long and so invariably acted upon by the Courts for over half a century, a construction which presumably reflected the intention of the Legislature and was therefore left unaffected by any amendment of the law. Having regard to the provisions of clauses 11 and 12 of the Letters Patent, section 16, Madras City Civil Court Act, and sections 21, 22 and 39, Presidency Towns Small Cause Courts Act, I am constrained to hold section 15, Civil Procedure Code, does not fit into this scheme of legislation and is therefore inapplicable to suits filed on the original side of the High Court. This is my answer to the first of the questions referred to us. The second question referred to us has been answered in the negative by Panchapagesa Sastri, J., in Md. Yusuf v. Khadir Badsha,1. The suit under reference which was for damages for Rs.7,500 was properly instituted on the original side of the High Court and could have been instituted only on the original side, for on the date of its institution the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court did not extend beyond Rs.5,000. By G.O.No.4175, dated nth November 1948, issued under section 3-A, Madras City Civil Court Act, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court was raised to Rs.10,000, the relevant portion of the G.O. being as follows: “His Excellency the Governor of Madras hereby invests, with effect on and from 1st December, 1948, the Madras City Civil Court, subject to the exceptions specified in section 3 of the Act (VII of 1892) with jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of suits and other proceedings of a civil nature arising with in the City of Madras and of value not exceeding Rs.10,000. If the suit now in question had been instituted after 1st December, 1948, the City Civil Court would have had jurisdiction to entertain it. A valid transfer of a suit or other proceeding can be made from one Court to another only if the Court which transfers the suit or proceeding had initially the jurisdiction to entertain it, and the Court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred has jurisdiction under the law to try and dispose of the suit or proceeding. A valid transfer of a suit or other proceeding can be made from one Court to another only if the Court which transfers the suit or proceeding had initially the jurisdiction to entertain it, and the Court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred has jurisdiction under the law to try and dispose of the suit or proceeding. The question is whether these two conditions are satisfied in any given case If the High Court had the Jurisdiction to entertain the suit when it was filed and the City Civil Court had not then the necessary pecuniary jurisdiction but acquired it during the pendency of the suit in the High Court, is the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court as it stood at the date of the institution of the suit or is it its jurisdiction as it stands on the date of the order for transfer, the criterion of its competency to receive and try the transferred suit? I am of the opinion that the competency of the transferee Court-to use a compendious expression-must be judged with reference to the state of things as they exist on the date when the suit or other proceeding is transferred. Section 3-A, Madras City Civil Court Act (VII of 1892) as well as G.O.No.4175, dated nth November, 1948, issued thereunder empower the City Civil Court to receive, try and dispose of all suits of a value not exceeding Rs.10,000”. The City Civil Court may “receive” a suit not only by receiving the plaint in the first instance directly from the plaintiff but also by transfer from the High Court of a suit instituted on its original side if on the date of the transfer it had pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. The City Civil Court gets seisin of the suit only by and as a result of the order of transfer by the High Court in the exercise of its power under proviso (2) to section 16, Madras City Civil Court Act and its jurisdiction and competency to try the suit on the date of the transfer would alone be material. The fact that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit on the date it was actually instituted is not in my opinion, material. The fact that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit on the date it was actually instituted is not in my opinion, material. Panchapagesa Sastri, J., relies on the use of the word “arising” in sections 3 and 3-A and in G.O.No.4175 which reproduces the Language of the sections. The argument is that the use of the word arising points suits filed and proceedings started after 11th December, 1948, when the G.O. came into force. The word “arising” is in juxtaposition to, and may be read with the words “within the City of Madras” both in the section and in the G.O. In the context, the word "arising" is not, in my opinion, used as denoting futurity and has no reference to the time factor, but to the place where the lis has its source or origin. The words "suits arising within the City of Madras" are descriptive of the nature of the suit and do not connote the future tense so as to be applicable only to suits instituted after the date of the G.O. The limits of territorial jurisdiction prescribed by sections 16, 19 and 20, Civil Procedure Code, which apply to the City Civil Court are compendiously referred to by the use of the words "arising within the city of Madras" in sections 3 and 3-A and the G.O. above referred to. On a literal reading of the language of these sections and G.O.No.4175 it can be said that the High Court has power to transfer a suit instituted on the original side to the City Civil Court where the value of the suit is below Rs.10,000 and the suit is not exempted by section 3, Madras City Civil Court Act from the cognizance of the City Civil Court even though at the time when the suit was first instituted it was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court. It is, however, contended that there are certain well-established principles of statutory construction, which have to be taken into account in arriving at a conclusion as to whether this power of transfer can be exercised in respect of suits pending in this Court which were beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court at the date of their inception. Mr. K.S. Ramamurthi, who argued this part of the case, cited with great rapidity a large number of Indian decisions. Mr. K.S. Ramamurthi, who argued this part of the case, cited with great rapidity a large number of Indian decisions. The rule of construction applicable to cases of this kind is clearly and concisely stated by Wright, J., in In re Athlumney1 in these terms: "No rule of construction is more firmly established than this: that a retrospective operation. is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation otherwise than as regards a matter of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as retrospective only." If an enactment deals merely with the procedure in an action and does not affect the rights of the parties it will prima facie apply to all actions, pending as well as future, for, no one is considered as having a vested right in any course of procedure. The line of demarcation between what is a matter of right or remedy and what is a matter of procedure is difficult to draw in many cases: "The questions whether a person is entitled to maintain a particular action or to do so in a particular form and what defences are open to the defendant cannot be affected by any statute passed after its institution." Ramakrishna v. Subbaraya2. If at the date of its institution in this Court the City Court had no jurisdiction over the suit, and this Court had no power to transfer it, is the suitor, who had the right to have his suit tried by this Court, to be deprived of such right because the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court happened to be enlarged by a notification of the Government pending the suit? So ran the argument. The substitution of an inferior forum for a superior tribunal where an action is pending, is no doubt an interference with the right of the suitor and is a different thing from regulating mere procedure. The right is analogous to a right of appeal to a superior Court which was the subject of decision in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving3. The right is analogous to a right of appeal to a superior Court which was the subject of decision in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving3. In that case, pending an action in the Supreme Court of Queensland,, the right of appeal from that Court to the Judicial Committee was taken away and a right of appeal to the High Court of Australia was substituted by the Judiciary Act of 1903, which came into force before the action was decided by the Supreme Court. It was held by the Judicial Committee that the right of appeal to Judicial Committee was a right vested in the suitor when the action was brought and was not affected by the Judiciary Act, which became law pending the action. The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows: "The Judiciary Act is not retrospective by express enactment or by necessary intendment. And, therefore, the only question is, was the appeal to His Majesty in Council a right vested in the appellants at the date of the passing of the Act, or was it a mere matter of procedure? It seems to their Lordships that the question does not admit of doubt. To deprive a suitor in a pen ding action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating procedure. In principle their Lordships see no difference between abolishing an appeal altogether and transferring an appeal to a new tribunal. In either case there is an interference with existing rights, contrary to the well-known general principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested.“ The law, as laid down in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving1, has invariably been accepted and acted upon in India, see Daivanayaka Reddiar v. Renukambal2 and Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax3. v. Irving1, has invariably been accepted and acted upon in India, see Daivanayaka Reddiar v. Renukambal2 and Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax3. Notwithstanding that a suit and all appeals from the decree made therein are, according to the processual law of India, to be regarded as one legal proceeding or as steps in a series of proceedings”connected by an intrinsic unity,“it is now settled law that the right of litigant to enter a superior Court by way of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure, but is a right which, for the present purpose, is deemed to accrue or arise to him at the date of the institution of the suit and before any decision is given by the trial Court. The presumption against impairing vested rights by the retrospective operation of an enactment is not confined to substantive rights, but extends equally to remedial rights or rights of action including rights of appeal. In two Full Bench decisions, one of this Court in In re Vasudevaswamiar4 and the other of the Calcutta High Court in Sadar Ali v. Dalimuddin 5, it was held that the amendment of clause 15 of the Letters Patent making the judgment of a single Judge of the High Court in a second appeal appealable only with the leave of the Judge, did not apply retrospectively to second appeals pending at the time of the amendment. Coutts-Trotter, C.J., in delivering the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court observed: ”The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all appeals then in force are preserved to it through the rest of its career, unless the Legislature has either abolished the Court to which -an appeal lay, or has expressly or by necessary intendment given the Act a retrospective effect.“It will be observed that the right of appeal was not taken away altogether by the amendment of clause 15 of the Letters Patent but the leave of the Judge who decided the second appeal was interposed as a condition of the maintainability of an appeal from this judgment. The result of the leading cases above referred to is, whether a statutory provision takes away an existing right of action or appeal or whether it it imposes an onerous condition for the exercise of such a right, it is not to be given retrospective effect unless the language of the statutory provision is quite clear and no other interpretation is possible. We are here concerned with a suit properly instituted on the original side of the High Court, at a time when it was the only forum open to the plaintiff. It is true that at the moment when the suitor entered this Court, he was not liable to be ejected therefrom by the exercise of this Court’s power of transfer under the second proviso to section 16, Madras City Civil Court Act, and he had a right to have his suit tried and decided by this Court itself. That the principle of the decision in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving1, with reference to a right of appeal applies equally to a right to continue a suit to its termination in a Court in which it was properly filed, has been held by the Federal Court in Venugopala Reddi v. Krishnaswami Reddi6, where Varadachariar, J., in delivering the judgment of the Court observed: ”Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving1 was sought to be distinguished on behalf of the application on the ground that a right of appeal against a decree stands on a different footing from a right to continue a suit to its normal termination. This may be a difference in the facts. But we are unable to see any distinction in principle between the two cases. Their Lordships’ pronouncement emphasises the limitation to be placed upon the rule, sometimes broadly stated, that all alterations in procedure are retrospective unless there is some good reason to the contrary. The general principles. referred to above must yield to the express language or the necessary intendment of legislative enactments. Wholly different considerations govern the present case. When the suit was filed on the original side of this Court there were the following statutory provision to which the suitor and his suit were already subject, namely, section 3-A and the second proviso to section 16, Madras City Civil Court Act, and section 24,, Civil Procedure Code. Wholly different considerations govern the present case. When the suit was filed on the original side of this Court there were the following statutory provision to which the suitor and his suit were already subject, namely, section 3-A and the second proviso to section 16, Madras City Civil Court Act, and section 24,, Civil Procedure Code. Under section 3-A the Legislature had fixed a maximum limit for the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Court at Rs.10,000 and had also empowered the Provincial Government by notification to invest that Court with pecuniary jurisdiction up to Rs.10,000. The second proviso to section 16, with its sweeping and all embracing language, empowered any judge of this Court at any time in any suit and at any stage of that suit, to transfer it to the City Court, if the suit was within its pecuniary jurisdiction. It is not a requisite of proviso (2) to section 16, that the suit should have been within the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court at the time when it was instituted. Indeed, the proviso was enacted with a view to prevent this Court being overcrowded with suits over which this Court and the City Civil Court had concurrent jurisdiction. All that is required by the second proviso to section 16 is that, at the time of the transfer by this Court to the City Civil Court, the latter should have pecuniary jurisdiction to receive and try the suit. The City Civil Court acquired an extended pecuniary jurisdiction up to Rs.10,000 on 1st December, 1948, in consequence of G.O.No.4175 of 1948. Thereafter a transfer by this Court of a suit the value of whose subject-matter is below Rs.10,000 to the City Civil Court would be within the authority conferred on this Court by the second proviso to section 16. Section 24(a), Civil Procedure Code, empowers the High Court at any stage to transfer any suit pending before it for trial or disposal to any Court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same. Even here the competency of the subordinate Court to receive and try a suit transferred to it is its competency on the date of the transfer of the suit by this Court. Even here the competency of the subordinate Court to receive and try a suit transferred to it is its competency on the date of the transfer of the suit by this Court. As already pointed out, the City Civil Court is a Court subordinate to the High Court though it may not be in the hierarchy of the Courts established by the Madras Civil Courts Act III of 1873 and contemplated by section 3, Civil Procedure Code. That section 24, Civil Procedure Code, applied to the City Civil Court is recognised by section 14 of the Madras City Civil Court Act. That section 24 empowers the High Court to transfer a suit on the original side for trial to a subordinate Court which would have jurisdiction to try the suit: has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in Krishna Mudaliar v. Sabapathi Mudaliar1. It was subject to these statutory provisions that the suitor filed his suit on the original side of the High Court. This is not a case where a right, which inhered in a suitor at the time of the suit is taken away by subsequent legislation. The incident of liability to be transferred to another competent tribunal at any stage of the suit attached to it from its very inception. The language of the second proviso to section 16, Madras City Civil Court Act and section 24, Civil Procedure Code, is explicit and empowers this Court to transfer pending suits not exceeding Rs.10,000 in value to the City Civil Court even though the suits had been instituted prior to 1st December, 1948, the date when the City Civil Court acquired an extended pecuniary jurisdiction. That, in my opinion, is the inescapable effect of the statutory provisions above referred to. The fact that some of the privileges of a suitor are affected or impaired by the exercise of the power of transfer is a matter for consideration by the Judge in this Court in exercising his discretion to transfer and does not exclude the power of transfer conferred by the express language of section 24, Civil Procedure Code and by the necessary intendment as well as the express language of the second proviso to section 16, Madras City Civil Court Act. For these reasons, I would answer the second question referred to us in the affirmative. For these reasons, I would answer the second question referred to us in the affirmative. The transfer of suits can legally be made either under section 16, proviso (2), Madras City Civil Court Act, or under section 24(1), Civil Procedure Code. Lastly, it was argued by Mr. Alladi Kuppuswami, the learned advocate for the defendant that G.O.No.4175 of 1948 was ultra vires on the ground that there was a delegation of legislative power to the Provincial Government under section 3-A, Madras City Civil Court Act, which, according to him, was impermissible. This argument was answered by the Judicial Committee in Empress v. Burah1 in these words: “It is no uncommon thing to find legislation conditional on the use of particular powers, or on the exercise of a limited discretion entrusted by the Legislature to persons in whom it places confidence.” This limitation on the powers of the Legislature in enacting what has been styled “delegated”, “subordinate” or “conditional” legislation have been the subject of discussion in recent times. I do not propose to cite the whole range of authority and I am content to say that looking at the terms of section 3-A, Madras City Civil Court Act, I find no abdication, surrender, delegation or transfer by the Legislature of its legislative power and responsibility to the executive. It is merely an example of the common legislative arrangement now widely prevalent both here and in other countries, by which a provision of a legislative enactment is authorised by the Legislature itself to be applied to a particular case according to the judgment of a local administrative body as to its necessity or propriety. It cannot be disputed that it is open to the Legislature to appoint a subordinate agency and confer upon it powers which need not be wholly administrative but also legislative in character. Conditional legislation of this kind is both convenient and common and is not delegated legislation at all. Such exercise of power by a subordinate agency or authority entrusted by the Legislature with discretion to exercise it has been variously styled as subordinate or subsidiary or conditional legislation: Emperor v. Benoari Lal2 Russel v. Reg3. Section 3-A, Madras City Civil Court Act does not delegate any legislative power to the Provincial Government. It fixes the amount of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court and contains the whole of the legislation on that point. Section 3-A, Madras City Civil Court Act does not delegate any legislative power to the Provincial Government. It fixes the amount of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court and contains the whole of the legislation on that point. The legislative policy has been laid down by the Legislature and the carrying out of that policy alone has been left to Provincial Government. The expression that the Provincial Government may by notification “invest the City Court with jurisdiction” found in section 3-A is, perhaps, unhappy. The Legislature itself has created and invested the City Court with jurisdiction over suits not exceeding the value of Rs.10,000. The Legislature has exercised its judgment and will in enhancing the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court to Rs.10,000. But the provision is to come into operation on a notification by the Provincial Government whose only function is to fix the date from which the higher jurisdiction is to be exercised by the City Civil Court. The Legislature itself has provided for the jurisdiction of the City Court which follows upon a condition being fulfilled. The decision of the majority of the Federal Court in Jatindranath v. Province of Bihar4 does not really touch the present case for, there, an act which seriously affected the personal freedom of citizens and whose life was statutorily limited by the Legislature to a period of one year, was extended by a notification of the Provincial Government in the exercise of the power conferred by section 1, sub-section (3), Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947. In those circumstances, the Court held that section 1, sub-section (3) amounted to a wholesale delegation of legislative power, which was bad. The distinction between conditional legislation and delegation of legislative authority is fine and no accurate line of demarcation can be drawn. The whole topic is exhaustively discussed and the relevant authorities are assembled in the judgment of my learned brother, Satyanarayana Rao, J., in In re Kalyanam Virabadrayya5 and there is no need for me to travel along that weary road when I find that the problem now presented to us is easily soluble by resort to practical considerations of commonsense and the authoritative exposition of the law by the Judicial Committee in the three cases above cited. After this long and tedious marshalling of the relevant consideration, I have come to the decision that the contention of the learned Advocates who appeared before us should not prevail. I cannot, however, take leave of the case without expressing my regret that so much time has had to be spent in unravelling a tangle which could easily have been straightened out by the Legislature and I hope that an early opportunity will be taken of placing the original jurisdiction of the three Courts which are functioning within the City of Madras on an easily workable basis, so as to avoid overlapping and confusion, As I was about to deliver my judgment the recent decision of the Bombay High Court in Narottamdas v. Aloysious Pinto Phillips1, holding that the provisions of section 4, Bombay City Civil Courts Act, 1948, were ultra vires the Provincial Legislature was placed before me. I respectfully but firmly dissent from the opinion of the learned Judges in the case cited. K.S. ----- Reference answered.