Judgment Subba Rao, J.-These appeals arise out of two suits O.S. No. 51 of 1946 and O.S. No. 67 of 1946 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Mathurai. Gopalakrishna Talkies is a Cinema Theatre situate in the West Masi Street, Mathurai town. On 23rd May, 1945, the Hindi picture of “Kanoon” was being exhibited in the theatre. The late Jeshubhai D. Patel, his wife and the first plaintiff with three others attended that show at 7 p.m. and occupied the seats in the balcony of the said theatre. After the show started there was rain and heavy gale and the front ornamental wall above the roof of the theatre. fell down over the roof and the roof and the truss underneath gave way and collapsed and Patel and his wife along with others received serious injuries. The injured persons were removed to the Government Hospital at Mathurai and unfortunately Patel succumbed to the injuries and died in the Hospital on 25th May, 1945. Pushpa Ben, his widow who was pregnant at the time of the injury, gave birth to a female child later on. The widow, the daughter and the father of the deceased filed O.S. No. 52 of 1946 on the file of the Sub-Court, Mathurai, for damages for loss incurred by them on account of the death of Patel. The widow Pushpa Ben then filed O.S. No. 67 of 1946 for damages for injuries caused to her. The first defendant is the owner of the theatre; the second defendant was the lessee of the theatre when the accident took place. The first defendant in both the suits contended inter alia that the front wall was in existence from the time the theatre was constructed in the year 1934 and 1935, that the said theatre was constructed in compliance with the statutory provisions of the District Municipalities Act, Public Health Act, the Places of Public Resort Act and the Cinematograph Act, that the wall was slightly raised at the request of the second defendant and that the accident was due to an act of God by reason of unprecedented rain and storm in Mathurai on that day. The second defendant generally supported the first defendant, but alleged that the wall was in existence even from the very beginning. The second defendant generally supported the first defendant, but alleged that the wall was in existence even from the very beginning. The learned Subordinate Judge found that the front ornamental wall above the roof of the theatre was newly constructed about the end of 1942 by the first defendant in consultation with the second defendant and on his suggestion. He, however, held that the wall so constructed was an unsafe and faulty structure and a hidden death trap to the occupants of the seats in the balcony of the theatre. He assessed the damages at Rs. 30,000 in O.S. No. 51 of 1946 and at Rs. 3,500 in O.S. No. 67 of 1946 and decreed the suits against both the defendants. The first defendant preferred A.S. No. 655 of 1947 against the decree in O.S. No. 51 of 946 and A.S. No. 798 of 1948 against the decree in O.S. No. 67 of 1946. The second defendant filed A.S. No. 678 of 1947 against the decree in O.S. No. 51 of 1946 and A.S. No. 799 of 1947 against the decree in O.S. No. 67 of 1946. Pending the appeals the appellant in A.S. Nos. 655 of 1947 and 798 of 1947 became insolvent and the Official Receiver, Mathurai, in whom his properties vested expressed his disinclination to proceed with the appeals. The said appeals were therefore dismissed with costs. In the appeals filed by the second defendant, we shall first consider the nature and the condition of the wall, which collapsed and caused the damages. The site of the building was owned by Abdul Khader Sahib, who leased it to the first defendant in the year 1917. In 1935 the cinema theatre was constructed by the first defendant. Though according to specifications the walls should be built up of brick and lime as a matter of fact, they were built of brick and mud. From 11th February, 1938 to 10th February, 1941, the cinema hall was leased out to one Patel. By the end of 1942, as the original gable front was not prominent to give it a better frontal appearance an ornamental facade was built, over the gable front, of a height of over 12 feet on which the words “Sri Gopalakrishna Talkies” were artistically engraved. On 19th October, 1942. the cinema hall was leased out to the second defendant for a period of three years. On 19th October, 1942. the cinema hall was leased out to the second defendant for a period of three years. The executive engineer states in his report that the later construction was not properly bonded into the old gable wall and that a weak cleavage plane had existed at the joint of the old and new construction. He was of the opinion that the ornamental structure was not evidently designed to take extra heavy wind loads, not to speak of storms and that the bonding of the old and new structure was not designed to take up heavy wind stresses. It is also found that the extended wall was built of brick and mud. The learned Judge found that the collapse of the wall was due to this defective and flimsy construction, and this finding has not been canvassed before us. But Mr. Kuttikrishna Menon, the learned counsel for the second defendant, contended that whatever might be the liability of the first defendant, his client was not liable for damages, as he had no knowledge of the flimsy structure and that he was not guilty of want of any reasonable care. He fairly conceded that in case we should hold that the second defendant was equally liable, the amount of damages awarded would not be unreasonable. The principles regulating the liability of an occupier to a person permitted to enter his premises and injured therein are well settled, though their application to the peculiar circumstances of each case is not free from difficulty. Entry by permission of the occupior is of two kinds: invitation or licence. The distinction between the two is expressed by Salmond in his book on the “Law of Torts” (10th edition) at page 476 in the following formula: “The invitor says: ‘I ask you to enter upon my business’. The licensor says: ‘I permit you to enter on your own business’.” This somewhat over simplified formula was commented on by Mackinnon, L.J. in Ellis v. Fulham Borough Council1. The licensor says: ‘I permit you to enter on your own business’.” This somewhat over simplified formula was commented on by Mackinnon, L.J. in Ellis v. Fulham Borough Council1. Asquith, L.J., in Pearson v. Lambeth Borough Council2would prefer to define an invitee in the following manner: “It is more exact to say that an invitee is a person who comes on the occupier’s premises with his consent on business in which the occupier and he have a common interest, e.g., a shopper has an interest to buy and a shopkeeper an interest to sell.” Whether common interest for this purpose necessarily should be accompanied by some pecuniary gain, immediate or remote, is a question on which no final opinion has yet been expressed by judicial decisions and it is not necessary to attempt to do so in this case, as even on that assumption the plaintiffs would be invitees in the technical sense of the term. The second defendant was running the cinema and the deceased and his wife entered the premises after purchasing tickets. The plaintiffs therefore entered the premises with the consent of the occupier on business in which the occupier and the plaintiffs have a common interest. They are certainly invitees, and therefore, the liability of the second defendant should be ascertained, having regard to that relationship. The extent and the scope of the liability of an occupier to an invitee is equally well established. In Salmond on the “Law of Torts”, 10th edition, at page 478 the learned author says: “The class to which the customer belongs includes persons who go not as mere volunteers, or guests, or servants, or persons whose employment is such that danger may be considered as bargained for, but who go upon business which concerns the occupier and upon his invitation, express or implied. And with respect to such a visitor at least, we consider it settled law, that he, using reasonable care on his own part for his own safety, is entitled to expect that the occupier shall on his part use reasonable care to prevent damage from unusual danger which he knows or ought to know.” The same view is expressed in different language in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 23, (Lord Hailsham’s edition) at page 604 as follows:- “The duty of the occupier of premises, on which the invitee comes, is to take reasonable care that the premises are safe, and to prevent injury to the invitee from unusual dangers which are more or less hidden, of whose existence the occupier is aware or ought to be aware or, in other words, to have his premises reasonably safe for the use that is to be made of them.” The question is whether the second defendant was aware or ought to have been aware of the hidden danger and whether he had taken reasonable care to prevent injury to the invitee. The first defendant, as D.W.1, deposed that the new wall was constructed a month after the second defendant took the lease and that the construction was made on the suggestion of the second defendant. A perusal of his evidence shows that he is attempting to shift the burden to the second defendant, but that in itself is not sufficient for ignoring his entire evidence. The learned Subordinate Judge disbelieved his evidence when he stated that the entire additional structure was put up after the lease, but accepted his evidence that the wall was put up on the second defendant’s suggestion and at his instance. The learned counsel for the second defendant contended that the lower Court was wrong in relying upon his evidence when it disbelieved him in regard to other and more important parts of his evidence. We agree with the lower Court that though the first defendant is an interested witness, his statements that the ornamental wall was put up at the instance of the second defendant accords with the probabilities of the case. When B.C. Patel was the lessee from nth February, 1938 to 10th February, 1941, the first defendant did not put up the ornamental facade, but he found it necessary to build it when he entered into an agreement with the second defendant about the end of 1942. It is therefore very likely that he built it at the request of the second defendant, and when the first defendant says that he did so, at his request, we do not see any reason to reject his evidence. D.W.2, V.G. Menon, second defendant’s power-of-attorney agent, totally denies. It is therefore very likely that he built it at the request of the second defendant, and when the first defendant says that he did so, at his request, we do not see any reason to reject his evidence. D.W.2, V.G. Menon, second defendant’s power-of-attorney agent, totally denies. He says that neither the second defendant nor he asked the first defendant to build that wall and that there was no talk about it at any time. We have no hesitation to reject this evidence as it is obviously a deliberate attempt to wriggle out of the second defendant’s liability. We have also gone through the cross-examination of this witness and we are satisfied from his laboured and prevaricating answers that he was supporting the second defendant’s false case. He also admits in the cross-examination that the new structure was not shown in the plans available for inspection and that he knew that the rules had been contravened by the first defendant. P.W.6, an employee under B.C. Patel, says that the front wall was raised by October, November, 1942. D.W.3, the mason who built the wall, is definite that he built it at the instance of the first defendant, D.W.2, and one Sait. He also says that he worked on the wall for about 25 days and that the plastering work was begun on or about November 15th. The account books of the first defendant, Exhibits B-5 and B-6, disclose that expenses were incurred in regard to this contruction on the 12th October and also on the 23rd October. On a consideration of the entire evidence we hold that the ornamental facade was built by the first defendant on the gable front on the suggestion and at the instance of the second defendant, that the work was commenced before the new lease took effect, but completed only after the second defendant took possession, and that the second defendant or his agent knew full well the defects in the structure and also the fact that it was built in disregard of the provisions of the Places of Public Resort Act and the Cinematograph Act. The second defendant, therefore, had knowledge of the hidden danger and did not take any reasonable care to prevent injury to the invitee. He is therefore clearly liable to pay damages to the plaintiffs. The second defendant, therefore, had knowledge of the hidden danger and did not take any reasonable care to prevent injury to the invitee. He is therefore clearly liable to pay damages to the plaintiffs. The learned counsel relied upon the decision in Pritchard v. Peto1, in support of his contention that the second defendant is not liable. In that case, the plaintiff went to a house owned and occupied by one of the defendants, a married woman, to collect money due to him from her. While he was standing upon the doorstep, a projecting cornice from the top of the house fell on his head and injured him. The house was in apparently good repair, and the defendant did not know of the defect in the cornice. The defect, which was an old one, was due to the action of the weather upon the cement. On those facts the learned Judge held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover damages, inasmuch as the defendant’s duty was to exercise reasonable care to keep the house in such a state of repair as not to expose the plaintiff to any hidden danger of which the defendant was aware or ought to have been aware; and that the plaintiff had not shown that she was aware, or ought to have been aware, of the decay of the cornice. Indeed, in the course of the argument it was admitted that she was ignorant of the defect, but no attempt was made to show that her ignorance was due to neglect of some reasonable precaution. That decision accepts the principles above stated, but on the facts accepts the defendant’s plea. That decision is, therefore, of no avail to the appellant. Even so the learned counsel pressed on us that we should confine the liability of the second defendant to the amount of Rs. 13,500 recovered already from him. On our findings we cannot say that his liability as the occupier and lessee is in any way less than that of the owner. The decree of the lower Court is therefore correct. Both the appeals are dismissed with costs. K.G. ----- Appeals dismissed.