ORDER :- A suit for eviction was filed by Rajkumari Snatombi Devi against Birachandra Singh in the Cheirap Court on 27-2-40, which was decided by that Court on 30-5-40. Against this decree an appeal was preferred to the Judicial Darbar on 12-6-40, which was ultimately transferred to the Chief Court by means of order No. 60 of 7-1-47. The. Chief Court Bench in its turn decided the appeal on 8-11-47, in absence of the parties and without issuing any notice. The appeal was allowed and the Cheirap Courts order set aside. Against the above order dated 8-11-47, this application for review was filed on 17-6-49 in the same Court by the legal representatives (as they claim themselves to be) of the deceased respondent. No notice was ever issued to the parties regarding this application by that Court. The Chief Court was abolished by order No. 43 of 1950 with effect from January 25, 1950. By means of another order of the Governor-General the Court of Judicial Commissioner was created. 2. The main ground now pressed before this Court by the learned counsel of the petitioners who are the daughters of Rajkumari Snatombi Devi, Respondent, (in the appeal) is that their mother, the respondent was already dead at the time of decision of the appeal and that the appellant got order from the Chief Court against a dead person. It is contended that the decree is a nullity as it was passed against a dead person without bringing her legal representatives on record and therefore, incapable of execution against them i.e., the petitioner. That may be so. This allegation of the petitioners may be correct as some traces of its correctness are found from the reports of the process server on some summons. But, there is no mention of it in any of the grounds for review and neither there is any affidavit to this effect. A strict proof of the allegation of death of Snatombi Devi respondent before the date of decision by the Chief Court in appeal, is required. The proper course for the petitioners would be, under the circumstances to seek their remedy if necessary by way of proper suit. 3. Whether this Court is a successor of the Chief Court is yet another point to be considered here. It is argued that Civil Procedure Code was not strictly followed in the State, much less adopted. The proper course for the petitioners would be, under the circumstances to seek their remedy if necessary by way of proper suit. 3. Whether this Court is a successor of the Chief Court is yet another point to be considered here. It is argued that Civil Procedure Code was not strictly followed in the State, much less adopted. This also cannot be denied that the spirit of the Code has always been followed. This argument, therefore, does not help the petitioner to a carrying point. It is true that an application for review of a decree or order passed by the Judge of a High Court can be made to or disposed of by his successor in office because O. 47, R. 2, Civil P. C., does not apply to High Court. The point is whether Judicial Commissioner to whom cases pending in the Chief Court which was abolished were transferred is a successor to that Court and as" such can grant review in the present case. I hold the view that this Court i.e., the Court of Judicial Commisisoner cannot be said to be a successor of the Chief Court (which was abolished) only on the assumption that some cases were transferred to it which were pending there. 4. A review is permissible where a judgment is passed without notice to the parties but in this case judgment is alleged to have been passed against a dead respondent whose legal representatives were not brought on the record by the appellant. The appellant is to suffer for his mistake. The present petitioners who claim to be legal representatives of the deceased, though may be aggrieved by that judgment may not be bound by it. The order may not be effectual against them. They may take their objection in the execution proceeding, if any, or bring a regular suit for annulment. Under the circumstances it is difficult to hold that the petitioners are aggrieved persons for the purpose of O. 47, R.1, Civil P. C. 5. Again there is a point of limitation. The judgment sought to be reviewed was passed on 8-11-47. Against it the application for review was presented on 17-6-49. Under the circumstances it is difficult to hold that the petitioners are aggrieved persons for the purpose of O. 47, R.1, Civil P. C. 5. Again there is a point of limitation. The judgment sought to be reviewed was passed on 8-11-47. Against it the application for review was presented on 17-6-49. At the most 90 days are allowed to a petitioner under Art. 173 of the Limitation Act for review from the date of order or decree irrespective of the fact that they had any knowledge of the decree or order or not. In the present case the order could not be communicated to the petitioners as they were not parties to the case and as such were quite unknown to it. At the same time there is no prayer for extension of the period of limitation under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. 6. The result is that this application for review fails and is rejected. Application rejected.