Judgment The facts of this case lie in a short and narrow compass. The suit property consists of 4 acres of land in the village of Tiruvarur Vadakusethi. It was originally a village by itself known as Settikulam. A title deed (Exhibit P-5, dated 26th April, 1865) was granted to the plaintiff by the Inam Commissioner as appears from Exhibit D-5, an extract from the register of inams of 13th August, 1864. Under column 21 in that document the following appears: “This is entered and recognised in the district accounts as an entire inam village though small in extent. It may have been originally part of another village, but it is not known now whether it was so.” In later documents beginning with Exhibit P-9 of 1896, a descriptive memoir of Tiruvarur Vadakusethi of the Nagapattinam taluk, the suit property appears as part of this latter village. The plaintiff temple sued the defendants in the present case for recovery of the plaint property with past rent and future damages for use and occupation on the footing that it was the absolute owner thereof, and that the order of the prior executive officer of the temple fixing the rent of Rs. 2-4-0 per year permanently was not binding on it. The defendant maintained the validity of that order and claimed a permanent right of occupancy under the Madras Estates Land Act, in answer to the action. The Courts below have held that the suit land is not ryoti land situated in an“estate”within the meaning of the Act, and that consequently the defendants have no right to remain in possession of the property against the plaintiff’s claim. The decree in favour of the plaintiff temple is challenged by the learned advocate for the defendants appellants on the ground that it must be shown by the plaintiff seeking ejectment that there is a subsisting right in him to claim ejectment at the date of suit, and that there is no such right in the plaintiff in the present case having regard to the original character of the property as by itself a separate village constituting an estate within section 3(2)(d) of the Act. His point is that the subsequent amalgamation of the suit property in a different village is immaterial to the question of occupancy right raised by him with reference to section 6 of the Madras Estates Land Act. His point is that the subsequent amalgamation of the suit property in a different village is immaterial to the question of occupancy right raised by him with reference to section 6 of the Madras Estates Land Act. Section 6(1) of the Act runs as follows: “Subject to the provisions of this Act, every ryot now in possession or who shall hereafter be admitted by a landholder to possession of ryoti land situated in the estate of such landholder shall have a permanent right of occupancy in his holding.” Explanation (2) thereto is in the following terms: “In relation to any inam village which was not an estate before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, but became an estate by virtue of that Act or in relation to any land in an inam village which ceased to be part of an estate before the commencement of that Act, the expression ‘now’ and ‘commencement of this Act’ in this sub-section and Explanation (1) shall be construed as meaning the thirtieth day of June, 1934, and the expression ‘hereafter’ in the sub-section shall be construed as meaning the period after the thirtieth day of June, 1934.” It is fairly clear on the language of these provisions of the statute that the occupancy right conferred by the statute cannot operate except in favour of a ryot “now in possession or who shall hereafter be admitted by a landholder to possession of ryoti land situated in the estate of such landholder”. It is also clear that Explanation (2) can have no application to the present case, because it is not as if there was an inam village as such which could be postulated for consideration under the Explanation as not an estate before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, which however became an estate by virtue of that Act so that the expressions “now” and “commencement of this Act” can be construed as meaning 30th June, 1934 and the expression “hereafter” can be construed as meaning the period after the 30th June, 1934. What has really to be considered therefore is whether the suit land can be regarded as ryoti land in the possession of the defendant situated in the estate of the landholder on the date of the passing of the Act of 1908. What has really to be considered therefore is whether the suit land can be regarded as ryoti land in the possession of the defendant situated in the estate of the landholder on the date of the passing of the Act of 1908. On that date it is common ground that the suit property having many many years before become amalgamated in the village of Tiruvarur Vadakusethi was not an estate, because it lost its integrity as such, which was no doubt its characteristic feature at the inception of the tenure created by the original grant as referred to in Exhibit D-5. That being so, it follows that the land in question cannot be regarded as ryoti land situated in an estate for the purposes of section 6 of the Act. The view of the Courts below must accordingly be accepted and this second appeal must be dismissed with costs. No leave. K.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.