Judgment These two second appeals arise out of two summary suits for rent on the file of the Special Deputy Collector, Bezwada, and Bandar division. The lands in respect of which rents were claimed are situate in the inam village of Kuchi-, pudi in the district of Krishna, which, according to the line of argument adopted in this Court, must be taken to have become an estate for the first time under the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act (XVIII of 1936). At the time that the Act came into force there was Exhibit C, a khat of 12th April, 1932, in force between the Agraharamdars, the plaintiffs and the tenant, the defendant. The Deputy Collector held that the rent fixed by that document had to be altered suitably to the fact of permanent occupancy right which the Act for the first time conferred upon the defendant, and that a fair and equitable rent payable should be ascertained by him by substituting for the bags of paddy stipulated under that document what might represent a half of the net income of the land as proved by the evidence. This he did following the decision of Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J., in S.A. No. 1366 of 1942 (not reported). Referring to that decision he says: “In S.A. No. 1366 of 1942, on the file of the High Court, the question of fixing a fair and equitable rent in respect, of lands in another inam village of this district arose for consideration. There also, kattubadi was being paid at so many bags per acre as in the present case. His Lordship observed that in fixing the rent the conferment of occupancy rights should be taken into account and adopted the rate under the waram system where the landlord and the tenant would take half and half in the net income.” Against his judgments there were appeals to the Court of the District Judge of Krishna at Masulipatam who held reversing him that: “the rent payable by the defendant shall be as stipulated under Exhibit C, the terms of which shall be presumed to enure for the suit faslis under the presumption enacted by section 27 of the Act.‘‘ The point arising for decision on the argument here is whether the rate of the Special Deputy Collector or of the District Judge should be accepted by me. In the initial stages of the argument I was inclined to think that the Special Deputy Collector did right and the learned District Judge did wrong, although at the close of the argument my mind was not made up one way or the other. I have, since reservation of judgment, carefully considered the matter and have come to the conclusion that these appeals should fail. The argument of Mr. Ramanarasu that what the Special Deputy Collector did was right has been attempted to be supported by reference to a decision of this Court in Raja of Pithapuram v. Jonnalagodda Venkatasubba Rao1, as well as to the unreported decision of Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J., above mentioned. In Raja of Pithapuram v. Jonnalagodda Venkatasubba Rao1, Seshagiri Aiyar and Napier, JJ., held that an agreement to pay an increased rate of rent entered into before the Madras Estates Land Act came into force by a person who was a yearly tenant did not bind him after the Act came into force, as his status became changed by the Act. Dealing with section 52 of the Madras Estates Land Act relied upon in support of the argument that the agreement would bind the tenant notwithstanding the change of status created by the Act, the learned Judges held that the section applied only to pattas and muchilikas exchanged since the Act came into force, and that no retrospective effect could be given to that section so as to bring within its operation pattas and muchilikas executed under the Rent Recovery Act (VIII of 1865) and tenable for a year only. It must be noted however that this view did not commend itself to a Bench of this Court (Oldfield and Phillips, JJ.) in a later case reported in Radhakrishna Aiyar v. Swaminatha Aiyar2. There the Court observed: "The more important objection is that Exhibit C-1 was obtained for fasli 1311 under Act-VIII of 1865 in a Court, which would not be competent to try the suit, in which it is now proposed to plead it, and,. therefore, it cannot be res judicata under section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. There the Court observed: "The more important objection is that Exhibit C-1 was obtained for fasli 1311 under Act-VIII of 1865 in a Court, which would not be competent to try the suit, in which it is now proposed to plead it, and,. therefore, it cannot be res judicata under section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. The answer is that the general doctrine of res judicata is not in question, but the application of the special rule stated in section 52(3), Estates Land Act, under which muchilikas decreed for any revenue year remain in force until the beginning of the year for which fresh ones are exchanged or decreed, and that there is no reason for restricting the scope of the general reference to muchilikas decreed to those decreed by any particular description of Court. Such a restriction was, no doubt, imposed on the interpretation of the section in Vaddadi Jagannadha Bhupathi Deo Garu v. Paddala Appalaswami3 on the ground that pattas and muchilikas under Act VIII of 1865 were current for one year only and that the Legislature cannot be supposed to have intended to enlarge their currency. But the words of the section are clear, as they stand, and there is, in my opinion, no necessity or justification for reference to extrinsic considerations in order to their construction. It Raja of Pithapuram v. Jonnalagolda Venkatasubba Rao1, the restricted interpretation was supported also on the ground that any other would have given retrospective operation to the section, in the sense presumably that the effect of the exchange of patta and muchilika would be extended beyond the period originally contemplated by the parlies to it. But, if that case cannot be distinguished on the ground that, unlike the present, it deals with non-occupancy tenants, there is still no reason for treating this objection as decisive. But, if that case cannot be distinguished on the ground that, unlike the present, it deals with non-occupancy tenants, there is still no reason for treating this objection as decisive. For the presumption against a retrospective construction is not applicable, simply because a part of the requisite for the action of the Statute is drawn from the time antecedent to its passing (Maxwell’s Interpretation of Statutes, 3rd Edition, page 307) or where the Statute affects only the procedure of the Courts (page 313); and in the present case, the unrestricted effect of the section is only to recognise a relation, which existed before the Act, and to direct its continuance until it is terminated by the method for which the Act provides." It is significant too that the decision in Radhakriskna Aiyar v. Swaminatha Aiyar2, was affirmed by the Privy Council in Radhakriskna Aiyar v. Sundaraswamier3. Lord Shaw in the Privy Council expresses the full agreement of the Board with this view at page 484 of the report. I may add however that the position before me is not strictly one covered, by the rulings of the High Court in Raja of Pithapuram v. Jonnalagodda Venkalasubba Rao1 and Radhakriskna Aiyar v. Swaminatha Aiyar2 or the decision of the Privy Council in Radhakriskna Aiyar v. Sundaraswamier3. The question here really is how the proviso to section 28 of the Madras Estates Land Act of 1908 introduced by the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act of 1936 is to be understood. The language of the proviso is, in my opinion, sufficiently clear that in the case of an estate within the meaning of sub-clause (d) of clause (2) of section 3 the rent or the rate of rent lawfully payable by a ryot or tenant on the 1st day of November, 1933., shall be presumed to be fair and equitable at the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act (XVIII of 1936), until the contrary is proved. The sole and simple question for determination is whether the rate stipulated by Exhibit C which was current on the 1st day of November, 1933, is or is not to be regarded as the rent lawfully payable within the proviso. The sole and simple question for determination is whether the rate stipulated by Exhibit C which was current on the 1st day of November, 1933, is or is not to be regarded as the rent lawfully payable within the proviso. No ground has been suggested for the invalidation of the bargain between the parties as evidenced by Exhibit C except that it must prima facie be unfair to regard the rent obtaining between the parties prior to the coming into force of the Act of 1936 as the lawful rent, after conferment of occupancy right on the tenant by that Act. That, in my opinion, is not a consideration which can enter into the construction of the statute which is perfectly clear. Of course where no rent is found to have been fixed by a bargain between the parties continuing in operation on the 1st day of November, 1933, the Court may have to fix the rent and in so doing it may have to adopt a basis like the one adopted by Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J., in the unreported decision referred to in the foregoing. As observed by Somayya, J., in Ramakriskna Somayajulu v. Krisknayya4: "Where it is not a case in which there was no rent payable on the land on the date when the amending Act came into force and the villages in question became converted into estates, whether the terms expired before the Act came into force or whether they were still running, section 27 of the Estates Land Act would apply, namely, that the rent payable for previous years would be presumed to be the fair rent under the Act." There, no doubt, the question of the proviso to section 28 and the proper construction of the words "lawfully payable" occurring in the proviso did not arise for determination: but the principle which to my mind seems to be obvious is that a distinction must of course be made between cases in which on the 1st day of November, 1933, there is no rent obtaining under a lawful bargain between the parties and cases in which there is rent so obtaining."Lawfully payable"in the proviso can mean nothing more than payable under a lawful bargain between the parties on the date in question. For these reasons these second appeals must be dismissed with costs. (No leave.) V.S. ----- Appeals dismissed.