Judgment There are two connected cases before me, a Civil Revision Petition and a Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal with a memo, of objections in the latter. They arise out of E.P. No. 62 of 1944, in O.S. No. 28 of 1934 on the file of the District Munsiff of Eluru. The E.P. was held to be out of time by the learned District Munsiff but has been held on appeal to be in time. No question arises in regard to that on the facts and the dates which are not in controversy between the parties, and I need only say that I uphold the view of the lower appellate Court in this respect. Having held the E.P. in time the lower appellate Court said in regard to a certain attachment before judgment in the case that although the decree-holder did not make a prayer for a sale in pursuance of that attachment in his original petition, the learned District Munsiff should allow him to amend the petition by praying for it. The decree was passed on 19th September, 1934. The attachment before judgment referred to above had already been effected on 24th January, 1934. The E.P. with which we are concerned was filed on 17th February, 1944, and has been held to be in time on account of certain proceedings in insolvency which eventually resulted in an annulment of the adjudication of the debtor and of certain proceedings for amendment of the decree by way of a scaling down of the debt, which had all intervened between the date of the decree and the date of the E.P. The question of limitation decided by the lower appellate Court in favour of the decree-holder is, as I have already said, no longer a matter for consideration here. The propriety and legality of the"direction of the learned District Judge in appeal to the learned District Munsiff to allow the decree-holder an amendment of his execution petition by the insertion of a prayer for a sale in pursuance of the attachment is the only matter which has been the subject of a fairly long and able argument of both sides in this case before me and which calls for determination by me. It is contended for the judgment-debtors that there was no execution petition filed in this case within three years of the decree and that consequently the attachment before judgment lapsed and could not be availed of by the decree-holder, though the execution petition itself filed by him in 1944 might be regarded as in time. Mr. Bapiraju says that this is the true legal position emerging from the decision of a Full Bench of this Court reported in Sahul Hameed v. Arunachalam1. If so, the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction, and that is the next contention to direct the learned District Munsiff to allow an amendment of the execution petition in the manner mentioned above. Learned counsel says that a prayer for execution by way of fresh attachment ought to have been made in the E.P. and that an amendment of the E.P. in the manner directed by the learned District Judge more than 12 years after the passing of the decree would be illegal. He relies in support of his contention upon a ruling reported in Pattath Veeran Kutty v. Kuni Kandi Shaghath Veethil Appu.2 There in execution of a decree for money the decree-holder applied to proclaim and sell certain properties without having attached them. The District Munsiff dismissed the application while the Sub-Judge on appeal allowed the petitioner to amend the petition by inserting a prayer for attachment also. When the Subordinate Judge’s order was passed, the decree had become barred by limitation. It was held by the learned Judges (Abdur Rahim and Ayling, JJ.), relying upon the well-known principle of procedure laid down by Lord Esher, M.R., in Weldon v. Neal3, viz., that as a general rule amendments ought not to be allowed when they would prejudice the rights of the other parties as existing at the date of such amendment-that the Subordinate Judge had acted wrongly in ordering the amendment in question. To take up the first contention of Mr. Bapiraju that with the lapse of three years from the date of the decree without any execution petition being filed within that period the attachment before judgment became altogether dead, I have after careful consideration come to the conclusion that it is well founded. Learned counsel relies upon what is ruled by the judgment of the Full Bench delivered by Leach, C.J., in Sahul Hameed v. Arunachalam1, at page 94 of the Report. Learned counsel relies upon what is ruled by the judgment of the Full Bench delivered by Leach, C.J., in Sahul Hameed v. Arunachalam1, at page 94 of the Report. There after referring to Ramanadhan v. Veerappa4, decided by Pandrang Row, J., on the basis of an earlier Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Meyyappa Chettiar v. Chidambaram Chettiar5, the learned Chief Justice observes with reference to certain observations of that learned Judge as follows: “It is said that here Pandrang Row, J., was laying down the proposition that an intention to execute is all that is necessary to keep an attachment before judgment alive. It matters not whether the decree-holder applies for execution provided that an intention to do so is to be gathered from what has happened in other proceedings. In this connection the learned advocate for the appellant points to the fact that the first respondent had opposed the second respondent’s application to have the decree in O.S. No. 95 of 1932 set off by way of part satisfaction of the decree in O.S. No. 11 of 1931. If the opinion expressed by Pandrang Row, J., is correct in law, the first respondent’s action would probably have been sufficient for the appellant, but we are unable to accept what the learned Judge said in Ramanadhan v. Veerappa4, as correctly expressing the law. Whether an attachment before judgment continues indefinitely after judgment cannot depend on what has happened in other proceedings. For continuance beyond three years from the date of the decree an application for execution must be filed within that period, otherwise the decree-holder lopes his remedy.” I consider the ruling of the Full Bench to be categorically clear and perfectly decisive of the point in favour of the contention of Mr. Bapiraju. Mr. Balapara-meswari Rao, on the other side urges that the Full Bench case is distinguishable from the present case on the ground that here, unlike there, there was an amendment of the decree in the scaling down proceedings which gave his client a fresh start of limitation for the execution from its date. The distinction, in my opinion, does not affect the legal position now under discussion. It has a bearing only on the question whether the E.P. itself should or should not be regarded as in time. The further contention of Mr. The distinction, in my opinion, does not affect the legal position now under discussion. It has a bearing only on the question whether the E.P. itself should or should not be regarded as in time. The further contention of Mr. Bapiraju founded upon Pattath Veeran Kutty v. Kuni Kandi Shazhath Veethil Appu1, already referred to has given me greater trouble. On the one hand I was feeling obsessed by the observation of Lord Esher, M.R., in Weldon v. Neal2 that “Under very peculiar circumstances the Court might perhaps have power to allow such an amendment but certainly as a general rule it will not do so.” On the other hand I was wondering whether the discretion exercised by the lower appellate Court by way of allowing the amendment in the present case should be interfered with by me sitting in revision. It seems to me on close reflection that possibly the pleader who filed the E. P. did not have, in framing it as he did, a sufficiently clear and accurate appreciation of the legal position with reference to the subsistence or cessation of the attachment before judgment after the lapse of three years from the date of the decree without any execution petition being filed by the decree-holder within that period. In fact at the time that he filed the E.P. the Full Bench ruling in Sahul Hameed v. Arunachalam3, had not come into being. The Full Bench ruling was of 4th April, 1944, while the E.P. was of 17th February, 1944. On the latter date the authority of Ramanadhan v. Veerappa4, was intact, and the pleader who filed the E.P. was entitled to assume and presumably did assume that no prayer for a fresh attachment was necessary, because the attachment before judgment had not, according to that authority, lapsed by that time. I am on the whole not prepared in these circumstances to interfere either in C.R.P. No. 354 of 1948, and the memo, of objections in C.M.S.A. No. 103 of 1948, questioning the propriety of the amendment allowed by the lower appel-late Court or in C.M.S.A. No. 103 of 1948 itself, maintaining that the attachment before judgment never lapsed; with the result that all of them shall stand dismissed with no order as to costs in any of them. No leave. V.S. ----- Appeal and Petition dismissed.