ORDER : C. Kunhi Raman, J. An interesting question is raised for decision in this Criminal Revision case presented on behalf of the Municipal Council of Alleppey. The facts that led up to the filing of the petition are briefly as follows:- The Municipal Council charged the respondent, who is the manager of the Bombay Company Ltd., at Alleppey, with having committed the offence punishable under the bye-laws framed under S. 326 (13) and S. 334 of the District Municipalities Act (Travancore). The petitioner's case was that the respondent did not apply for and take out a license is respect of a canteen which he was conducting for the benefit of the workmen employed in the Bombay Company at Alleppey at which such workmen could get refreshment. According to the petitioner, for running such a canteen it is necessary that a license should be obtained from the Municipality the fee for which is Rs. 30. The respondent not having obtained such license has become liable to punishment under the provision of law mentioned above. 2. The First Class Bench of Magistrates at Alleppey tried the case and arrived at the conclusion that the accused was not guilty and acquitted him. There were three Magistrates who presided at the trial. Two of them took the view that "there is no provision in the District Municipalities Act, XXIII of 1116, under which the prosecution was launched which entitled the Municipality to require a license to be taken or to charge a fee for such license". The bye-laws framed by the Municipal Council which require the taking of such license in the view of the two Magistrates were ultra vires of the powers given to the Municipal Council and, therefore, cannot be enforced in law. Any contravention or breach of the bye-laws cannot, therefore, be regarded as an offence in law. The third Magistrate while agreeing with the conclusion reached by his two colleagues stated that the question as to whether the bye-laws were ultra vires or not need not be considered in deciding the case, but that in his view S. 326 (13) of the District Municipalities Act empowers the Municipality to make bye-laws for the regulation of the places mentioned therein to which the public are admitted for repose or for the consumption of any food or drink does not apply to the labour hands in the employment of the company. Only such labour hands have access to be canteen. It is not a place to which the public are admitted and, therefore, the bye-laws framed under S. 326 (13) will not apply to the canteen. For that reason he agreed with the other two Magistrates in their conclusion that the accused was not guilty. 3. The facts alleged in the complaint were not disputed and the Bench of Magistrates acted on the assumption that all those facts are admitted. In their view there was only a question of law that arose for determination in the case, viz., whether the accused has contravened the provisions of the District Municipalities Act or the bye-laws framed thereunder by the Municipality in the professed exercise of the powers vested in it by the Act. 4. It is argued on behalf of the Municipality by their learned councel Mr. T.K. Joseph, that the view taken by the Bench of Magistrates is erroneous in law inasmuch as neither of the two reasons given by the Magistrates is well-founded. To appreciate this contention it is necessary to read the provisions of law relied upon by the Municipality and which came for consideration at the trial of the case in the court below. S. 326 of the District Municipalities Act, XXIII of 1116, occurs under the sub-heading "Bye-laws". The relevant portion of the section is as follows:- "The council may make bye-laws, not inconsistent with this Act or with any other law to provide. ** * * (13) for the regulation of hotels, lodging houses, boarding houses, choultries, rest-houses, emigration depots, restaurants, eating houses, cafes, refreshment rooms, coffee houses, and any premises to which the public are admitted for repose or for the consumption of any food or drink". 5. It is conceded that nearly 300 workmen are employed in the respondent company at Alleppey who resort to this canteen for food and drink. Therefore, it is a place to which they are admitted "for repose or for the consumption of any food or drink" under sub-clause 13 read above. The reason given by one of the Magistrates that the canteen is not open to the public but only to the workmen employed in the respondent company can easily be disposed. The petitioner's learned Counsel relies upon the definition of the word 'Public' in the General Clauses Act (Travancore). The reason given by one of the Magistrates that the canteen is not open to the public but only to the workmen employed in the respondent company can easily be disposed. The petitioner's learned Counsel relies upon the definition of the word 'Public' in the General Clauses Act (Travancore). According to this definition "public" includes any class or section of the public". The provisions of the General Clauses Act will apply to the District Municipalities Act and if the word "public" as used in S. 326 (13) is understood in the sense in which it is explained in S. 2 (15) present S. 2 (28) of Act VII of 1125) of the General Clauses Act, II of 1073, then it is obvious that the reason given by one of the Magistrates that the canteen not being open to the public does not require a licence cannot be supported. Although it is not open to the public, it is open to a section of the public and that is sufficient according to the definition of the word "public" to attract the provisions of Clause 13. 6. The next question is whether the framing of bye-laws requiring the taking out of a license on payment of the prescribed fee of Rs. 30/- is ultra vires of the provisions of the Act. The reason given in the judgment of the lower court on this point is that the bye-law relied upon by the petitioner imposes a pecuniary burden on people coming within its purview and that since there is no express provision in the statute or indication in it that the legislature contemplated conferring such a power upon the corporation the bye-law is ultra vires. They point out that Chapter XII of the Act deals with the General provision for licensing and fees and that neither in this chapter nor in Schedule III attached to it can be traced any provision that hotels, lodging houses, & c. can be licensed. They refer to the provisions of the City Municipal Act, IV of 1116, which was enacted prior to the District Municipalities Act in Travancore. The provision corresponding to S. 326, Clause (13) is S. 366, Clause (12) of the City Municipal Act. It makes express provision for licensing of hotels, lodging houses, & c., because the clause reads "for regulation and licensing of hotels, lodging houses .................. The provision corresponding to S. 326, Clause (13) is S. 366, Clause (12) of the City Municipal Act. It makes express provision for licensing of hotels, lodging houses, & c., because the clause reads "for regulation and licensing of hotels, lodging houses .................. They, therefore, adopt the reasoning that in the absence of similar words in the District Municipalities Act, it must be presumed that no power is conferred upon the District Municipalities to insist upon a license being taken or upon a license fee being paid in the case of hotels, lodging houses, & c. According to them, although the bye-law was properly passed by the Municipality and it has been accepted and confirmed by the Government, it cannot have any binding force in the view that they have taken of the powers of the Municipality. To meet the contention that there is no provision in the District Municipalities Act which empowers payment of a license fee Mr. Joseph for the petitioner invites the attention of the Court to S. 261 and the items in Schedule III of the District Municipalities Act. According to S. 261 the Council is given the power of publishing a notification "that no place within Municipal limits or at a distance within three miles of such limits shall be used for any one or more of the purposes specified in Schedule III without the license of the executive authority and except in accordance with the conditions specified. We are satisfied that this contention is well-founded. 7. Reference was made by the respondent's learned counsel to the decision reported in M.S. Ayyer & Co. by C.R.V. Das and others v. G. Srinivasalu Naidu (A.I.R. 1941 Madras 749) and in The South Indian Railway Company Ltd., Trichinopoly v. The Panchayat Board, Mandapam ( 1943 (2) M.L.J. 307 ). The first of these decisions refers to the legality of collecting an advertisement tax which can be distinguished from the present case in as much as there is express provision here for insisting upon a license and payment of a fee therefore when certain kinds of articles of food not meant for domestic consumption are manufactured or stored in a place. The learned Judge refers to the absence of a similar provision with regard to advertisements in corresponding provisions of the Madras District Municipalities Act, (V of 1920), Chapter XII, in which licenses and fees are comprehensively dealth with. In the second case to which I was a party the decision was based upon the construction of the Indian Railways Act (IX of 1890) which required a notification by Government of India as a condition precedent to the levying of a property tax. Since such a notification was absent it was held that the tax could not be collected. In the Judgment in that case I quoted the decision of the Privy Council in Bank of Chettinad v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras (1940) (2) M.L.J. 851; L.R. 67; I.A. 394 (P.C.) The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in that case summarised the principle applicable to taxation cases as follows:- "The subject is not taxable by inference or by analogy, but only by the plain words of a statute applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case". Their Lordships quoted the observations of Lord Cairns in Partington v. Attorney General (1868) 4 H.L. 1000". As I understand the principle of fiscal legislation it is this: If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be": In the present case where it is a licence fee and not a tax which is objected to we have attempted to show that the levying of the license fee comes within the letter of the law and, therefore, the Municipality was justified in demanding under the bye-law framed by it that the fee should be paid and a license taken for running a canteen. In these circumstances, the order made by the court below is set aside. Petition allowed.