JUDGMENT Seth, J. - These five applications in revision have been connected together because they are directed against one judgment by which five suits were disposed of by the learned Judge of the Court of Small Causes at Bareilly. These five suits were instituted by five different, Plaintiffs but the Defendants, in all of them were the same, the first Defendant being the H.R. Sugar Factory, Bareilly and the second being the District, Go-operative Sugarcane Society, Bareilly. The Plaintiffs alleged that they had supplied certain quantity of sugar-cane to the factory but the factory had failed to pay the price there of to the Plaintiffs in spite of demands having been made for it. The suits were, therefore, brought for the recovery of the price of the sugarcane supplied. All the five suits have been decreed against the factory alone. It is not, therefore, necessary, to refer to the defence raised by the society against which the suits have been dismissed. So far as the factory is concerned, the suits were defended on the ground that the Plaintiffs did not supply the sugarcane direct to the factory, that they may supply to the society, that there was no agreement between the factory and the Plaintiffs, that the factory was not liable to pay anything to the Plaintiffs for the supply of sugarcane and that the liability for the payment of price to the Plaintiffs was that of the society. It was further alleged on behalf of the factory that it had paid the price of the sugarcane supplied to the society. It was also pleaded that the claims were statute barred. 2. The findings of fact recorded by the courts below are that the agreement for the supply of the sugarcane was direct between the Plaintiffs and the factory, that there was no agreement between the Plaintiffs and the society for the supply of the sugarcane, that the supply was made by the Plaintiffs directly to the factory within the factory premises, that the factory had not made any payment in respect of this supply to the society and that claims were hot statute-barred. 3. The findings of fact recorded by the courts below are not open to question in a revision and the learned Counsel for the applicant has very properly not questioned them. 3. The findings of fact recorded by the courts below are not open to question in a revision and the learned Counsel for the applicant has very properly not questioned them. He has attacked the decision of the court below on two points: The first contention is that the agreement for the supply of sugarcane could not have been orally made, it should have been in writing and as the law requires a written agreement for the supply of sugarcane, the suit was not maintainable on the basis of an oral agreement. In order to support this contention, learned Counsel has placed reliance on Rule 15(3) of the U.P. Sugar Factories' Control Rules, 1938 which runs as follows: The occupier or manager of the factory for which the area is reserved, shall enter into an agreement with the cane-grower or the cane-growers' co-operative society, as the case may be, in forms 15 and 12 respectively or any other form approved by the Cane Commissioner within a month of the offer mentioned in Sub-rule (2). 4. This rule makes it obligatory upon the occupier or manager of the factory to enter into a written agreement with the cane-grower or the cane-growers' co-operative society. It thus imposes a statutory duty upon the occupiers and managers for the benefit of the cane-growers. I do not understand this rule to mean that if the occupier or the manager fails to perform this statutory duty, the oral agreement itself shall be null and void. In any view of the matter, it does not impose any duty upon the cane-growers and does, not provide that unless as cane-grower supplies sugar canes in pursuance of an agreement entered into in accordance with this rule, he shall not be entitled to recover the price of the sugarcane supplied by him. Even if I were to ignore the agreement alleged by the Plaintiffs on the ground that that agreement cannot be proved for want of a written agreement contemplated by Rule 15(3), the applicant would nevertheless be liable for the price of the goods supplied by the Plaintiffs and obtained by "the applicant, u/s 70 of the Indian Contract Act. There is thus no force in this contention of the learned Counsel. 5. The second contention of the learned Counsel with regard to limitation is based upon Rule 20(5) of the same rules. There is thus no force in this contention of the learned Counsel. 5. The second contention of the learned Counsel with regard to limitation is based upon Rule 20(5) of the same rules. This rule obviously applies to a case where the supply is not made directly to a factory but to a purchasing agent of a factory. In such a case, although the primary liability is of the purchasing agents, a statutory liability has been imposed upon the occupier of the factory also. Any body desiring to enforce this statutory liability has been required to give a notice in writing to the occupier of the factory within the period prescribed by the proviso. In the present case it is not the statutory liability imposed by Rule 20(5) which is sought to be enforced. According to the finding of the court below, the cane was supplied to the factory itself and not to a purchasing agent of the factory Rule 20(5) and its proviso therefore, have no application to the facts of the present case. I, therefore, overrule this contention of the learned Counsel also. 6. I thus find that there is no force in either of the two contentions put forward on behalf of the applicant Even if I had found that there is some force in these technical objections, I would have refrained from giving effect to them for the reason that the powers of revision are to be exercised for promoting ends of justice and not for giving effect to technical objections. It is obvious that the decision of the court below according to which the Plaintiffs have been allowed to recover their dues is eminently just and proper. 7. These applications in revision are, therefore, dismissed with costs.