Chandra Reddi, J.-This is an appeal from the judgment of the Principal Subordinate Judge of Madura in I.A.No. 11 of 1945. This appeal involves the interpretation of section 14 of Act IX of 1938. The facts of the case are not in dispute. For an appreciation of the question that arises for decision in this appeal a few material facts may be stated. A mortgage was executed by the 1st defendant for himself and as the guardian of his son, the 2nd defendant, in September 1921, for a sum of Rs. 50,000. As the debt was not discharged, the mortgagee filed a suit O.S.No. 114 of 1925, on the file of the Sub-Court, Madura, on foot of the mortgage against defendants 1 and 2 on the basis that the properties mortgaged were the self-acquired properties of the 1st defendant, though the father of the 1st defendant, Thothan Chetti, and his paternal uncle were alive. During the pendency of that suit Thothan Chetti, the father, and Muthuvedugan Chetti, the uncle, filed two applications, I.A. Nos. 159 and 160 of 1926 to get themselves impleaded as parties to that suit alleging that the properties mortgaged were joint family properties, and that Thothan Chetti was the manager of the family. These applications were dismissed on the ground that the properties were mortgaged as the self-acquired properties of the 1st defendant, and that the applicants were claiming a title paramount to the mortgagor. In January, 1930, the Court passed a decree for sale as against the first defendant but dismissed the suit so far as the 2nd defendant was concerned on the ground that the mortgage was not binding on him. The matter was carried in appeal to the High Court which confirmed the decree against the 1st defendant and passed a simple money decree against the 2nd defendant to the extent of his share in the family property holding that the mortgage as such was not binding on him. In execution of the mortgage decree passed by the Sub-Court against the 1st defendant a sum of Rs. 42,513 was realised by bringing to sale his share of the property in E.P.No. 48 of 1931 on 5th October, 1931. Another sum of Rs. In execution of the mortgage decree passed by the Sub-Court against the 1st defendant a sum of Rs. 42,513 was realised by bringing to sale his share of the property in E.P.No. 48 of 1931 on 5th October, 1931. Another sum of Rs. 24,300 was realised in execution of the money decree passed against the 2nd defendant by bringing his interest in the mortgaged properties to sale in E.P.No. 55 of 1935, on 13th July, 1936. In further execution various sums amounting to Rs. 6,070-7-9 were realised between nth July, 1941 and 13th September, 1943. After the 1st defendant’s share of the mortgaged property was sold in E.P.No. 48 of 1931, the plaintiff obtained a personal decree in November, 1932 under Ex. D-2 for a sum of Rs. 1,14,398-7-9 against the 1st defendant. The plaintiff who purchased these properties in Court auction filed O.S. No. 75 of 1934 on the same mortgage against Thothan Chetti, Muthuvedugan Chetti and others for a decree for sale of their interest in the mortgage properties on the basis that the properties mortgaged were the joint family properties of the entire family. The Court holding that the mortgage was binding on Thothan Chetti as it was executed by the 1st defendant as the de facto manager of the family and for binding purposes, passed a mortgage decree against Thothan Chetti for the full amount deducting the amounts already realised in execution of the decree in O.S.No. 114 of 1925. It also held that Muthuvedugan Chetti had become divided and had therefore no interest in the mortgaged properties. Thothan Chetti sought relief under Madras Act, IV of 1938, as by the time the judgment was pronounced the Act had come into force; but he was refused relief under the Act as it was found that the 1st defendant who was the de facto manager was assessed to house tax on an annual rental of more than Rs. 600. Against the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, there was an appeal to the High Court which while confirming the decree of the trial Court held that Thothan Chetti was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, as the 1st defendant must be deemed to have been assessed to property tax only as an individual and that the joint family was not disqualified from claiming relief under the Act. In the result relief was granted to Thothan Chetti under sections 8 and 14 of the Act, and he was thereby made liable only for a moiety of the principal amount. It may be mentioned that the 1st defendant also applied to the Court which passed the decree against them for scaling down the debt under sections 18 and 19 of the Act as soon as Madras Act, IV of 1938 came into force; but that petition was dismissed as the 1st defendant was not an agriculturist as defined in the Act, since he was assessed to house tax on an annual rental value of more than Rs. 600. I.A.No. 11 of 1935, which has given rise to the present appeal was filed by the 1st defendant under sections 8 and 14 of the Act for scaling down the debt after the judgment of the High Court in O.S.No. 75 of 1934 granting relief to Thothan Chetti under the same provisions of the Act. This application was opposed by the plaintiff on various grounds, the main ground being that the decree now subsisting was a personal decree against the 1st defendant and not a family debt so as to attract the application of section 14 of the Act. The trial Court overruling the objections raised on behalf of the plaintiff granted relief to the 1st defendant under section 14 of the Act declaring that he would be liable only for a moiety of the decree amount, after giving credit for the various amounts realised in execution of the decree. The plaintiff has preferred the present appeal against this order of the learned Subordinate Judge. It was urged before us on behalf of the appellant by his learned counsel, Mr. Rama Rao Saheb, that the decree remaining to be satisfied being only a personal decree against the 1st defendant, it does not attract the provisions of section 14 of Act, IV of 1938. According to the learned counsel, sub-section (a) of section 14 applies only to a case where the share of a non-agriculturist member in the family property is sought to be proceeded against in respect of his share of the family property and not to a case like the present where there is only a personal liability against the non-agriculturist member. According to the learned counsel, sub-section (a) of section 14 applies only to a case where the share of a non-agriculturist member in the family property is sought to be proceeded against in respect of his share of the family property and not to a case like the present where there is only a personal liability against the non-agriculturist member. In support of his contention that the personal liability of the mortgagor is not affected by the provisions of section 14 of the Act, the learned counsel for the appellant cited to us two decisions, one reported in Jagannatha Aiyangar v. Subbiah Chettiar1 and the other in Nalanunni v. Dakshayani Amma2. Before I proceed to examine the cases cited before us I propose to set out the provisions of section 14 of the Act. Section 14 provides: “Notwithstanding anything contained in section 3(ii) and subject to the provisions of sections 5 and 6, where in a Hindu family, whether divided or undivided, some of the members liable in respect of a family debt are not agriculturists while others are agriculturists, the creditor shall, notwithstanding any law to the contrary, be entitled to proceed- (a) against the non-agriculturist member or members and his or their share of the family property, to the extent only of his or their proportionate share of the debt; and (b) against the agriculturist member or members and his or their share of the family property, to the extent only of his or (heir proportionate share of the debt which shall be scaled down in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” Of the two decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant the first is no authority for his proposition. The facts of that case are the following: A personal decree was obtained against defendants 1 to 5 on a promissory note executed by them for a debt binding on the family. Defendants 6 and 7 who did not join the execution of the promissory note were also made liable as the debt was binding on the family. Defendants 3 to 7 applied for scaling down the debt and it was accordingly scaled down under section 8 of the Act. Defendants 6 and 7 who did not join the execution of the promissory note were also made liable as the debt was binding on the family. Defendants 3 to 7 applied for scaling down the debt and it was accordingly scaled down under section 8 of the Act. Having regard to the fact that the first defendant was adjudged an insolvent and the second defendant ceased to have any interest in the family the question arose whether the creditor could proceed individually against each of the judgment-debtors for his share of the debt, and whether section 14 of the Act was applicable or not. The lower Court held that section 14 had no application to the case as it was a contractual debt and not a family debt. While revising that judgment Horwill, J., held that if a debt is a family debt, it must be a family debt with regard to every member of the family and that where there are agriculturists as well as non-agriculturists members in a joint Hindu family, the agriculturist members thereof were liable for their share of the scaled down debt as a group, while the latter were liable for their share of the unsealed down debt as another group. So there is nothing in that decision on which reliance could be placed by the learned counsel for the appellant. But the case reported in Nalanunni v. Dhakshayani Amma1, lends support to the argument advanced by him. In that case, one of the questions that arose for decision was whether the personal liability of the executants of a promissory note who were sued on the note along with the other members of the family was covered by section 14 of the Act. The argument that section 14 applies only to the liability of a member in respect of his share of the family property and does not affect his personal liability found favour with the learned Judges and they held that the operation of section 14 did not in any way affect the personal liability of the executants of the promissory note. The argument that section 14 applies only to the liability of a member in respect of his share of the family property and does not affect his personal liability found favour with the learned Judges and they held that the operation of section 14 did not in any way affect the personal liability of the executants of the promissory note. In coming to that conclusion the reasoning adopted by the learned Judges was that the acceptance of the other interpretation would necessarily involve reading into the section some qualifying words to the effect that the creditor shall be entitled to proceed personally only if he can claim a personal remedy against the debtor and that it also involved “the creation of a liability which does not exist in the contract, in order to limit a contractual liability in favour of a class of persons whom the Act was not specifically designed to benefit.” They further observed that the word “and” in the phrase “member or members and his or their share” must be read as equivalent to “in respect of” and that section 14 must be read as relating only to the liability of such a member in respect of his share of the family property. It was the opinion of the learned Judges that the interpretation adopted by them would involve the least deviation from the language and the apparent scope of the section. With this view, I express my respectful disagreement. In my opinion by construing section 14 in that manner we have to import words and meaning into that section which it does not contain. It appears to me that the apparent scope of the section is that the agriculturist or non-agriculturist member who is liable in respect of a family debt can be made liable only to the extent of his share of the debt, irrespective of the nature of the liability. The section does not seem to postulate the existence of a share in the family property as a condition precedent to his claiming relief under the section. The debtor whether agriculturist or non-agriculturist can seek the benefit of the provisions of section 14, whether the liability is a personal one or that of the property, so long as the liability is annexed to the family debt. The debtor whether agriculturist or non-agriculturist can seek the benefit of the provisions of section 14, whether the liability is a personal one or that of the property, so long as the liability is annexed to the family debt. I think the intendment of the section is that a creditor can proceed against a non-agriculturist member or members of a family for a family debt, both against him or them and his or their share in the family property only to the extent of his or their proportionate share of the debt. It only means that whether the creditor seeks to proceed personally against the agriculturist or non-agriculturist member of the family or against his share in the family property, he could do it only to the extent of his share of the debt. I believe that this section deals with the apportionment of liability of a family debt between agriculturist and non-agriculturist members of the family, the agriculturist members being made liable in respect of their share of the scaled down debt, while the non-agriculturist members are answerable to their share of the debt as not scaled down. I am therefore unable to accept the principle laid down in Nalanunni v. Dhakshayani Amma.1 As I am inclined to take a view different from that taken by the learned Judges in that case with regard to the construction of section 14 of Act IV of 1938 and having regard to the frequency with which the matter arises for decision I consider that the matter should be placed before my Lord the Chief Justice for referring the following for decision by a Full Bench: "When there is a personal decree obtained on a mortgage against the executant thereof, who is a non-agriculturist member of the family, does it attract the application of section 14 of Madras Act IV of 1938?" Subba Rao, J.-I agree with my learned brother that the question may be referred to a Full Bench. The facts have been fully stated by the Subordinate Judge and also by my learned brother in his judgment and it is not, therefore, necessary to restate them. The facts have been fully stated by the Subordinate Judge and also by my learned brother in his judgment and it is not, therefore, necessary to restate them. As we are differing from the judgment of a Bench of this Court in Ekkanathtavazhi Karnavan and Manager Dahshayani Kunchi Amma’s children Nalanunni alias Ponnunni v. Manikkath Kunhi Ammu Amma’s children Dahshayani Amma1, I think it is as well that I give some of my reasons for doing so. The relevant section of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act reads as follows: "Notwithstanding anything contained in section 3(ii) and subject to the provisions of sections. 5 and 6, where in a Hindu family, whether divided or undivided, some of the members liable in respect of a family debt are not agriculturists while others are agriculturists, the creditor shall, notwithstanding any law to the contrary, be entitled to proceed- (a) against the non-agriculturist member or members and his or their share of the family property, to the extent only of his or their proportionate share of the debt; and (b) against the agriculturist member or members and his or their share of the family property, to the extent only of his or their proportionate share of the debt which shall be scaled down in accordance with the provisions of this Act." The section applies if two conditions are complied with (1) the debt is a family debt, (2) some of the debtors are agriculturists and others are non-agriculturists Under the section the creditor is empowered to proceed against a non-agriculturist member and his share of the family property in regard to his share of the unsealed debt and against the agriculturist and his share of the family property in regard to his share of the scaled down debt. The debt is split up notwithstanding any law to the contrary. The principle behind this section is apparent. It is obviously designed to give relief for a non-agriculturist member of a family from being overburdened or unnecessarily harassed by reason of the debt being scaled down in regard to the agriculturist member of the family. But for the section the creditor would be entitled to proceed to recover the entire debt against the share of the non-agriculturist member. A heavy burden would be east on the non-agriculturist member of the family. But for the section the creditor would be entitled to proceed to recover the entire debt against the share of the non-agriculturist member. A heavy burden would be east on the non-agriculturist member of the family. By reason of this section the family debt is apportioned and the necessary relief given to the non-agriculturist member. The learned advocate relied upon the aforesaid decision and contended that as there was a personal decree against the respondent, section 14 ceased to have any application. No doubt, that judgment goes a long way in supporting this contention. But an essential distinction between that case and the case before us may be pointed out. The suit in that case was brought on a promissory note executed by some of the members of a family in regard to a family debt binding on the tavazhi of which the defendants were members. There was a decree against the executants personally and against others to be realised from and out of the family assets. So far as the executants were concerned, they were liable to pay the debt apart from the family debt. In the present case, the respondent was one of the executants of the mortgage deed. Further, at its origin, at the time the final decree for sale was passed, and even after the personal decree was obtained, the debt continued to be a family debt. The personal decree under Order 34, Civil Procedure Code is only a mode of realising the family debt after the mortgaged properties are exhausted. Under that decree, not only the debtor’s separate properties but also his share in the other family properties not covered by the mortgage can be proceeded against. That decision may therefore be distinguished on the ground that in that case there was a personal liability, apart from the family liability, whereas in the present case the personal liability is only the working out of the family liability merged in the decree. Apart from this distinction on facts, with great respect, I cannot agree with the reasons given by the learned Judges in support of their conclusion. Apart from this distinction on facts, with great respect, I cannot agree with the reasons given by the learned Judges in support of their conclusion. The learned Judges noticed that in the most literal interpretation the section would seem to mean that whatever the nature of the liability, so long as it was annexed to the family debt, both the personal property of the non-agriculturist and his share of the family property would be liable only to the extent of his proportionate share of the debt. If so, I fail to see why the literal interpretation should not be accepted,, especially as in my opinion, the intention of the Legislature would be given full effect to. The learned Judges gave the following two reasons for not accepting the literal interpretation, (i) The section cannot be read as imposing a personal liability regardless of the nature of the contract in which the debt is embodied. (2) The apportionment of joint liability between agriculturists and non-agriculturists is really not a matter arising with reference to the personal liability of the actual executants. Therefore, to effectuate the supposed intention of the Legislature, the learned Judges read into the section the words “in respect of his or their share.” I do not think that by giving the literal interpretation the Court is imposing any personal liability, regardless of the nature of the contract in which the debt is embodied. The section cannot be understood to impose a personal liability where there is none, but only to cover those cases where personal liability existed either under a contract or in law. The second reason also does not appear to me to be sound. The splitting up of the debt provided under the section depends upon the nature of the debt and not upon the character of the properties sought to be proceeded against for the debt. If the debt is a family debt, the liability is split up and only proportionate shares of the debt would be realised from the debtors or from their shares of the joint family properties. In my opinion the intention of the Legislature could be given full effect to by accepting the plain meaning of the words used rather than assuming the intention of the Legislature and adding words in the section which are not there. In my opinion the intention of the Legislature could be given full effect to by accepting the plain meaning of the words used rather than assuming the intention of the Legislature and adding words in the section which are not there. The interpretation of the section accepted by the learned Judges would defeat the object of the Legislature. It would enable the creditor to realise the entire unsealed debt from the other properties of the non-agriculturist. If this argument is accepted it will lead to anomalous and startling results. The “non-agriculturist” will not only be liable to his share of the debt but also may be made liable personally for the entire debt. The extent of his liability will depend upon the fact whether he applied for the relief before or after the mortgage properties were sold away for realising the debt. It may be argued that even if the application under section 14 was filed prior to the sale of the properties, the relief under section 14 should be confined only to the decree on the mortgage. The decision is also based on the assumption that the character of the debt is changed after the personal decree was passed. If on the other hand the interpretation suggested by me is accepted, not only the literal interpretation would be given but the section would be worked out smoothly and equitably. The debt would be split up according to the shares of non-agriculturist and agriculturist members and if the debt so allocated is not satisfied by the sale of the share of the members, the debtor, as the case may be, will be personally liable if that relief is otherwise available to the creditor. For the foregoing reasons, I agree for referring the question of law for the Full Bench. In pursuance of the aforesaid Order of Reference, this appeal coming for hearing, the Court expressed the following OPINION: Subba Rao, J.-The question referred to the Full Bench is: “When there is a personal decree obtained on a mortgage against the executant thereof, who is a non-agriculturist member of a family, does it attract the application of section 14 of Madras Act IV of 1938?” The facts are fully stated in the Order of Reference and they need not be re-stated at length. It would be enough if relevant facts necessary to appreciate the question referred to the Full Bench are noticed. Thothan Chetti is the father of Vyravan Chetti. Shanmugham Chetti is the son of Vyravan Chetti. Muthuvadugan Chetti is the divided brother of Thothan Chetti. Vyravan Chetti was the de facto manager of the family and in that capacity he executed a mortgage deed in favour of the plaintiff in September, 1921. The mortgagee instituted O.S.No. 114 of 1925 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Mathurai against Vyravan Chetti and his son, who were the first and second defendants in that suit. He obtained a mortgage decree against the first defendant and a money decree against the second defendant. Another suit was filed by the plaintiff, being O.S. No. 75 of 1934 on the file of the Sub-Court, Mathurai, on the same mortgage against Thothan Chetti and Muthuvadugan Chetti. In that suit it was held that Muthuvadugan Chetti had become divided from the family and therefore he was not liable, but a decree was given against Thothan Chetti on the ground that his son Vyravan Chetti was the de facto manager of the family when he executed the mortgage deed. The decree obtained against Thothan Chetti was scaled down under the provisions of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act and a decree was given against him for Rs. 25,000, being half of the principal amount with interest at 6¼ per cent, from 1st October, 1937. Meanwhile, the decree against Vyravan Chetti was executed and large amounts were realised by selling the mortgage properties. For the balance of the amounts due, namely, Rs. 1,14,000 and odd, the plaintiff obtained a personal decree against Vyravan Chettiar in November, 1932. Vyravan Chettiar filed I.A. No. 11 of 1945 for relief under section 14 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act. His son filed I.A. No. 161 of 1945 for similar relief. Vyravan Chettiar is not an agriculturist, but the son is an agriculturist. But under section 6, if any member of an undivided Hindu family is not an agriculturist, none of his sons and descendants in the male line shall be deemed to be an agriculturist. So, it is not disputed that defendants 1 and 2 should be treated as one unit for the application of section 14 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act. So, it is not disputed that defendants 1 and 2 should be treated as one unit for the application of section 14 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act. It is also conceded that for the purpose of this reference, both the suits may be treated as one and arguments were addressed on the assumption that there was only one mortgage decree for a family debt against the first defendant, his son and his father and a personal decree alone against the first defendant. The position, therefore, is that the judgment-debtor Thothan Chetti is an agriculturist, but the said Vyravan Chetti and his son Shanmugha are non-agriculturists. There is a personal decree only against Vyravan Chetti, the first defendant. Section 14 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act reads: “Notwithstanding anything contained in section 3(ii) and subject to the provisions of sections 5 and 6 where in a Hindu family, whether divided or undivided, some of the members liable in respect of a family debt are not agriculturists while others are agriculturists, the creditor, shall, notwithstanding any law to the contrary, be entitled to proceed- (a) against the non-agriculturist member or members and his or their share of the family property, to the extent only of his or their proportionate share of the debt; and (b) against the agriculturist member or members and his or their share of the family property, to the extent only of his or their proportionate share of the debt which shall be scaled down in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” especially when without adding such words the section is intelligible and each part thereof is reconcilable. Clauses (a) and (b) only mean that in the contingency contemplated by the section, the creditor shall be entitled to proceed both against the member or members personally if there is a personal obligation and against his or their property in the case of property obligation of the family. To my mind, the use of the singular “share” also does not create any difficulty. To my mind, the use of the singular “share” also does not create any difficulty. The contention is by reason of the use of the singular “share” in clauses (a) and (b) of section 14, the personal liability of the executant cannot be separately worked out apart from the group of non-agriculturists of which he would be a component part, for it would lead to complications if in one group some of the judgment-debtors are under personal liability and others under property liability. This complication, if I may say so, is not created by the section, but by the ingenuity of the arguments advanced before us. Under section 3(35) of the Madras General Glauses Act words in the singular shall include the plural and words in the plural shall include the singular. Therefore, there is no difficulty in construing the word “share” as to mean “shares” when circumstances demand. If so construed, this objection disappears. In support of his contention the learned counsel relied upon the decision of Wadsworth and Patanjali Sastri, JJ., in Nalanunni v. Dakshayani Amma1. It certainly lends support to his argument. In that case a promissory note was executed by 13. defendants, who were all members of a tavazhi for a family debt. The tavazhi consisted of 25 members. There was a personal decree against the executant of the promissory note and a property liability against the non-executant members of the family. It was argued that section 14 had no application in regard to the personal liability of the executants. The learned Judges observe: “In the most literal interpretation, it would seem to mean that whatever the nature of the liability, so long as it is annexed to the family debt, both the personal property of the non-agriculturist and his share of the family property would be liable only to the extent of his proportionate share of the debt. But surely the section cannot be read as imposing a personal liability, regardless of the nature of the contract in which the debt is embodied. But surely the section cannot be read as imposing a personal liability, regardless of the nature of the contract in which the debt is embodied. If the section is intended at all to govern the personal liability of the agriculturist members of a family, we must necessarily read into it some qualifying words to the effect that the creditor shall be entitled to proceed personally only if he can claim a personal remedy against the debtor.” For construing the section in the manner stated above, they have read the word “and” in the phrase “member or members and his or their share” as equivalent to “in respect of”. They have so read the words, as in the learned Judge’s view the literal interpretation of the section would involve the creation of a liability, which does not exist in the contract, in order to limit a contractual liability in favour of a class of persons whom the Act was not specially designed to benefit. They assumed that the section was only intended for the benefit of the agriculturists and was concerned only with the liability of the family property. I do not think that the section is conceived entirely in the interests of the agriculturists. No doubt, the Agriculturists Relief Act was enacted to provide for the relief of indebted agriculturists in the Province of Madras. But, at the same time, the Legislature took care to see that in applying the provisions of the Act for the benefit of the agriculturists, the non-agriculturist debtors are not prejudiced. In enacting section 14, it appears to me that the Legislature gave relief to the agriculturists and also lightened the burden cast on the non-agriculturist debtors as a consequence of the relief afforded to agriculturist members. If the debt is scaled down in respect of the agriculturist member of the family, but for the section the entire burden of the debt would fall on the non-agriculturist members and their property. Though the intention of the Legislature is to protect the agriculturist, certainly it is not its intention to increase the burden of the non-agriculturist debtors. To avoid this, section 14 is enacted. Under that section, if there is a family debt and some of the members are agriculturists and others are non-agriculturists, the creditor is entitled to proceed for the proportionate share against the agriculturists and non-agriculturists, as the case may be. To avoid this, section 14 is enacted. Under that section, if there is a family debt and some of the members are agriculturists and others are non-agriculturists, the creditor is entitled to proceed for the proportionate share against the agriculturists and non-agriculturists, as the case may be. Though the literal interpretation of the section may, in one sense, involve the creation of a liability, which does not exist in the contract, it does not really impose any fresh liability on the non-executant members of the family. If the debt was a family debt, the executants would be acting only on behalf of the members of the family. Though, in the first instance, the personal decree may be executed only against the executant and his properties, the ultimate liability of the family to the executant remains. The Legislature in enacting the section and in providing relief to the agriculturist might well have taken the ultimate liability of the entire family for apportionment between agriculturist and non-agriculturist members of the family. I cannot also accept the view of the learned Judges that the section is concerned only with the liability of the family property. The section is concerned with the liability "in respect of a family debt "and the fact that in the working out of the provisions of the section, even assuming some unexpected results may flow, is not a ground for ignoring the plain provisions of the section. I cannot, therefore, accept the view of the learned Judges on the interpretation of section 14 of the Act. Whether a debt is a family debt or not, does not depend upon the personal liability cast on the executant. Documents on behalf of the family for a family debt are ordinarily executed by the manager de jure or de facto. Some time all the members of the family who have attained majority join in the document. The test to ascertain whether a debt is a family debt or not, depends upon the character of the debt, but not on the person who executes it, though in law the person executing the document makes himself personally liable, though ultimately the family would be bound to recoup him. The same Bench had considered the question, what is a family debt in connection with section 8 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act. The same Bench had considered the question, what is a family debt in connection with section 8 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act. In the chain of renewals, though the documents were executed by different members of the family, the learned Judges held that if the debt is a family debt, the later document would be a renewal of the earlier one, though in law the executants are liable personally. In Doraikannu Odayar v. Veerasami Padayachi1, the facts are a purchaser of a hypotheca executed a promissory note to the mortgagee for the balance due under the mortgage. The mortgagee obtained a decree under the promissory note against the maker and his sons as members of a joint family. In an application by the son for scaling down the decree, the learned Judges held that when a member of a joint family executes a fresh document for a pre-existing liability binding on the family, but incurred on its behalf by another member, such previous debt can be regarded as renewed or included in a fresh document within the meaning of the Explanation to section 8 of the Act. In Vasudevan v. Unnimaya Anterjanam2, it was contended that when an individual coparcener makes himself personally liable for a joint family debt, it must be deemed that there are two liabilities due from two persons, one the liability due from the joint family "person" and the other the liability due from the individual coparcener becoming liable under a subsequent note, and hence he cannot claim that his liability was in renewal of the earlier joint family liability. After negativing the said contention and holding that even in regard to his liability it was a renewal of the earlier family liability, the learned Judges observed at page 89: "When we have a debt due from a joint family acknowledged by the execution of promissory notes by different coparceners, each is in fact on behalf of the family renewing a liability by which the family was bound under the previous documents executed by other coparceners. Although when it comes to the execution of the decree, the coparcener’s personal properties may only be liable if he has personally signed the bond, he is in fact signing as a coparcener and as a coparcener he has been liable through the whole series of bonds." The same view was expressed by Wadsworth, J., in Kesava Menon v. Achuthan Nair3, a case relating to Malabar tarwad. At page 42 the learned Judge states: "In two cases Doraikannu Odayar v. Veeraswami Padayachi1, and Periakaruppan Chettiar v. Appaji Naidu4 , a Bench of which I was a member, has indicated that when there is a family debt renewed in various documents by different coparceners, any member of the family liable for that debt may get the debt scaled down on the basis of the original liability by which he was bound as a member of the family throughout all the various renewals actually executed by different coparceners." When the decision in Nalanunni v. Dakshayani Amma1, was cited, the learned Judge distinguished it on the ground that that decision only turned upon the interpretation of section 14 as applied to Malabar tarwad in respect of the personal liability of the executant members of the tarwad. From these decisions it follows that though the executant may be personally liable, the debt which he undertakes to discharge is a family debt and the ultimate liability to discharge the same rests on the family. Another aspect also may be considered. It cannot be disputed that the mortgage decree was for the recovery of the family debt. At the time the debt was incurred, at the time the mortgage decree was passed, and even at the time the personal decree was obtained, the debt did not lose its character as a family debt. Order 34, rule 6, Civil Procedure Code, which provides for the passing of a personal decree, is a rule relating to procedure of working out the decree, which is passed in the suit for the sale of the mortgaged property. After the properties mortgaged are sold, if the proceeds realised do not wipe out the debt completely, the balance of the family debt will be realised in the manner provided by Order 34, rule 6, Civil Procedure Code. The executant is made personally liable for the balance of the family debt. After the properties mortgaged are sold, if the proceeds realised do not wipe out the debt completely, the balance of the family debt will be realised in the manner provided by Order 34, rule 6, Civil Procedure Code. The executant is made personally liable for the balance of the family debt. It cannot, therefore, be said that the liability of the first defendant is not in respect of the family debt. For the foregoing reasons I hold that section 14 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act is applicable to a non-agriculturist member of a family in regard to the personal decree obtained against him in respect of the balance of the family debt. Panchapakesa Ayyar, J.-I agree. Balakrishna Aiyar, J.-I too agree. (After the expression of the Opinion of the Full Bench, this appeal coming on for hearing before Subba Rao and Chandra Reddi, JJ., on 10th October, 1950, the Court delivered the following’ Judgment: Subba Rao, J.- These appeals were posted before us after the Full Bench answered the question referred to it. Mr. Rama Rao Saheb, the learned counsel for the appellant, raised another point before us. He contended that the order of the Court, dated 25th October, 1938, in I.A. No. 405 of 1938 in O.S. No. 114 of 1925 on the file of the Sub-Court, Madura, operated as a bar to the maintainability of the present application. To appreciate the point raised some material facts may be recapitulated. The mortgagee filed O.S.No. 114 of 1925 against Vyravan Chetti and his son and obtained a preliminary decree against Vyravan Chetti on 16th January, 1930. The appeal against that decree was disposed of by the High Court on 14th August, 1934. The decree against Vyravan Chetti was confirmed, and a money decree was given against his son. The mortgagee filed another suit against Vyravan Chetti’s father, Thothan Chetti and obtained a decree against him on 30th November, 1939. In June, 1938, soon after the Madras Act, IV of 1938, came into force, the 1st defendant Vyravan Chetti filed applications under sections 18 and 19 of the Act for scaling down the decree obtained against him in O.S. No. 114 of 1925. That application was dismissed on 25th October, 1938, on the ground that Vyravan Chetti was not an agriculturist as defined in the Act. That application was dismissed on 25th October, 1938, on the ground that Vyravan Chetti was not an agriculturist as defined in the Act. The contention of the appellant was that as no relief under section 14 of the Act was asked for in that application he is now precluded from raising that plea on the principle of res judicata. The learned Subordinate Judge held that there is no scope for the application of the principle of res judicata on the facts of the case, and we entirely agree with him. The cause of action for filing an application under section 8 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act and the relief claimed therein are different from that claimable in an application under section 14 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act. The first defendant Vyravan Chetti filed an application for scaling down the debt on the ground that he was an agriculturist. As he was not an agriculturist the relief for scaling down was negatived. The present application is based on the allegation that though he is not an agriculturist, he will be entitled to the relief under section 14 of the Act. As the scope of the applications and the reliefs obtainable thereunder are different, the order, Exhibit D-1, dated 25th October, 1938, cannot operate as res judicata. Further, the first defendant could not have claimed the relief under section 14 of the Act in I.A. No. 405 of 1938. Section 14 presupposes the existence of agriculturist and non-agriculturist debtors and provides for apportionment of the debt between them. When he filed the application for scaling down, the suit against Thothan Chetti was not even decreed. The suit against him was decreed only in November, 1939, and he obtained the relief under the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act only on 6th September, 1943. As the matters then stood the provisions of section 14 were not applicable and he could not have asked for any relief thereunder. He became entitled to a relief only after the decree was obtained against Thothan Chetti and after Thothan Chetti was held to be an agriculturist entitled to relief under the Act. For the above reasons we hold that the present application is clearly maintainable. C.M.A. No. 644 of 1946 is dismissed with costs. C.M.A.No. 645 of 1946 is an appeal against the order of the Subordinate Judge in I.A.No. 161 of 1945. For the above reasons we hold that the present application is clearly maintainable. C.M.A. No. 644 of 1946 is dismissed with costs. C.M.A.No. 645 of 1946 is an appeal against the order of the Subordinate Judge in I.A.No. 161 of 1945. This appeal also raises the same question that arise in C.M.A.No. 644 of 1946. For the same reasons we dismiss this appeal, but in the circumstances, without costs. The respondent in C.M.A. No. 645 of 1946 filed memorandum of cross-objections. In that he claimed that relief should be given to him under the Usurious Loans Act. At the outset we may point out that this relief was not asked for in the Court below. Apart from that, we are definitely of opinion that he is not entitled to such a relief under the Act at this stage. He should have raised this plea in O.S. No. 114 of 1925. The Subordinate Judge, who gave a preliminary decree, did not give any finding on the Usurious Loans Act and that decree had become final. Under section 3(1) of the Usurious Loans Act the Court can give the relief provided by that Act in any suit to which the Act applies. This indicates that the relief under that Act should be claimed and obtained before the decree was passed. As in this case the suit ended in a decree which did not provide for any such relief, it is not now open to the defendant to raise that plea. It is not open to the defendant to go behind the decrees of Court except in so far as otherwise provided for under section 14 of the Act. Section 14 of the Act does not entitle him to get relief under the Usurious Loans Act. We cannot, therefore, agree with the arguments of the respondent that we should now give him the relief under the Usurious Loans Act. In the result, the memorandum of cross-objections is dismissed without costs. K.S. ----- Appeals and memorandum of objections dismissed.