This appeal presents a problem, the solution of which depends upon the legal effect of the annulment of an adjudication in an insolvency. The material facts may be stated. Palani Goundan and his son Chinnathambi Goundan were adjudicated insolvents by the Subordinate Judge of Coimbatore on the 26th September, 1928. In the year 1935 their adjudication was annulled by the Subordinate Judge under section 35 of the Provincial Insolvency Act On appeal the District Judge reversed that decision and set aside the order of annulment. The High Court, in a revision petition, by an order dated 15th November, 1939, restored the order of the Subordinate Judge annulling the adjudication After annulment the High Court directed the assets of the insolvents to be handed over to them, except a sum of Rs. 3,600 which the insolvent paid fraudulently to one Periakaruppa Chettiar. In regard to this, the same was vested in the Official Receiver for distribution among the creditors under section 37 of Provincial Insolvency Act. The petitioner, Arunachalam Chettiar, obtained a decree against Palani Goundan, Chinnathambi Goundan and the respondent, in O.S.No.109 of 1924. That suit had a prolonged existence on account of the intervening insolvency and the varying situations that arose and in view of the different orders of the Courts. After the annulment of the adjudication by the High Court the respondent who is the 4th defendant in the suit, filed I.A.No.905 of 1946 on the file of the Court of the District Munsiff, Tirupur, for scaling down the decree under Madras Act IV of 1938. The decree-holder contended that the petitioner was not entitled to the relief under the Act in respect of the insolvents’ shares in the debt as when the insolvency was pending, a dividend had been declared out of their assets Both the District Munsiff and on appeal the Subordinate Judge held that section 21 of Madras Act IV of 1938 had no application as the adjudication was annulled and therefore there was no pending insolvency. The plaintiff has preferred the above appeal. Mr.Sivaramakrishna Aiyar, learned counsel for the appellant, contends that though adjudication was annulled in the year 1939, the insolvents had no saleable interests either on 1st October, 1937, or 22nd March, 1938, and therefore the respondent, not being an agriculturist within the definition of the Act, would not be entitled to a relief thereunder. Mr.Sivaramakrishna Aiyar, learned counsel for the appellant, contends that though adjudication was annulled in the year 1939, the insolvents had no saleable interests either on 1st October, 1937, or 22nd March, 1938, and therefore the respondent, not being an agriculturist within the definition of the Act, would not be entitled to a relief thereunder. In support of his argument he relied upon a decision of Wadsworth and Patanjali Sastri, JJ., in Kudithipudi Venkatramayya. v. Mallacheruvu Pundareekakshudu1. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent argued that the effect of annulment of adjudication was as if the adjudication had never taken place and therefore on the crucial dates the respondent had saleable interests. To substantiate his contention he pressed into service the decision of Horwill and Balakrishna Aiyar, JJ., in Gamoji Venkata Ramakrishna Rao v. Gullapalli Sambamoorthi2. We find it difficult to reconcile the two decisions on any sound principle of law. The relevant facts in the decision in Kudithipudi Venkatramayya v. Mallacheruvu Pundareekakshudu1 are: The first defendant had been adjudicated an insolvent in November, 1932. On the 1st November, 1938, the insolvency Court passed an order annulling the adjudication owing to the default of the insolvent and directing that under section 37 of the Provincial Insolvency Act the properties should vest in the Official Receiver. After the order was passed the first defendant filed an application for scaling down the debt. The vesting order under section 37 continued to be in force when the said application came to be disposed of. Two contentions were raised before the learned Judges: (1) that section 21 of Act IV of 1938 applied to any person who had been adjudicated insolvent whether or not he remained an adjudicated insolvent during the relevant period, and (2) that by reason of the vesting order the insolvency continued so that the section applied even though it referred to only insolvencies which continued up to the date of the application. The two arguments were negatived. The first contention was negatived on the ground that the words ‘who has been adjudicated insolvent under section 21’ implied that the debtor should continue to be an insolvent at the time of the application. The two arguments were negatived. The first contention was negatived on the ground that the words ‘who has been adjudicated insolvent under section 21’ implied that the debtor should continue to be an insolvent at the time of the application. The second contention was not accepted as the order of annulment relegated the debtor to the position which he occupied before he was adjudicated and the vesting order under section 37 of the Act would not affect the question. As the debtor was an insolvent on the 1st of October, 1937, and 22nd March, 1938. they held that the debtor had no saleable interest on those two crucial dates and therefore he would not be entitled to a relief despite the fact that the adjudication was annulled in 1939. The facts in Gamoji Venkata Ramakrishna Rao v. Gullapalli Sambamoorthi2 may briefly be noticed. In that case a decree was sought to be scaled down. The debtor was adjudicated insolvent on 16th April, 1937. On account of his own laches the adjudication was annulled on 5th March, 1941. There was no order-vesting the properties or any part thereof in the Official Receiver or any other nominee of the Court under section 37 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. On the facts the learned Judges held that the effect of the annulment of adjudication was to bring about the same state of affairs as if the adjudication has never taken place and therefore on the relevant dates, viz., 1st October, 1937 and 22nd March, 1938, the properties vested in the debtor and he had a saleable interest in the same. The decision in Kudithipuri Venkatramayya v. Mallacheruvu Pundareekakshudu1 was cited before the learned Judges. They distinguished that case as follows: "In that case as in the present case the relevant dates occurred during the period between the adjudication and the annulment of the adjudication. But the learned Judge (District Judge) overlooked the distinction between that case and this, in that there, upon the annulment of the adjudication, it was ordered that the property should continue to vest in the Official Receiver. If it had. revested in the insolvent then the date on which the revesting would be deemed to have taken place would be the date on which the original order of adjudication was passed, which would in effect mean the wiping out of the intermediate period. If it had. revested in the insolvent then the date on which the revesting would be deemed to have taken place would be the date on which the original order of adjudication was passed, which would in effect mean the wiping out of the intermediate period. Where, however, at the time of annulment of the adjudication the order is passed continuing the property in the Official Receiver, no question arises of revesting of the property in the insolvent, nor does the annulment of adjudication have the effect of putting the insolvent in the same position with regard to his properties as he would have been in,. had he not been adjudicated an insolvent “. It is apparent from the above passage that the learned Judges held that different consequences would follow if adjudication was annulled simpliciter and if though the adjudication was annulled, an order was passed by the Court vesting the properties in its nominee for a particular purpose. In our view this distinction is not based upon any legal principle. Indeed the learned Judges who decided Kudithipudi Venkatramayya v. Mallacheruvu Pundareekakshudu1, did not accept such a contention. At page 495 they say:- "A further contention has been advanced that by reason of the vesting order the insolvency continues even after the adjudication has been annulled. This contention seems to us unsound. The annulment of the adjudication relegates the debtor to the position which he occupied before he was adjudicated, except in so far as the vesting order places the residue of the properties at the disposition of the appointee for the benefit of the creditors. Although to this limited extent the administration of the estate continues to be in insolvency the debtor ceases to be an insolvent." They relied upon for this view on the Full Bench decision in Official Receiver, Guntur v. Secretary of State for India2. Whether a debtor has a saleable interest or not on the crucial dates does not depend upon the question whether his properties continued to be vested in an appointee of the Court under section 37 for a specific purpose. It turns upon the question whether the adjudication was annulled or not. Whether a debtor has a saleable interest or not on the crucial dates does not depend upon the question whether his properties continued to be vested in an appointee of the Court under section 37 for a specific purpose. It turns upon the question whether the adjudication was annulled or not. If the adjudication was annulled two views are possible: (1) that the effect of the annulment of the adjudication is to bring about the some state of affairs as if the adjudication had never taken place and (2) that for the purpose of ascertaining whether a debtor had saleable interest or not on 1st October, 1937, and 22rd March, 1938, it would be enough if as a matter of fact he was an adjudicated insolvent on the crucial dates. The aforesaid two decisions express conflicting views and it is necessary to resolve the conflict. We therefore refer the following two questions for an authoritative decision by a Full Bench of this Court: 1. Whether a debtor who was an insolvent on 1st October, 1937 and 22nd March, 1938, but whose adjudication was subsequently annulled has saleable interest in the property on the two crucial dates? 2. Would it make any difference if, though the adjudication was annulled, the properties of the insolvent either, in whole or in part, were vested in an appointee of the court under section 37 of the Provincial Insolvency Act and continued to be so vested at the time when the application for scaling down was filed? The papers may be placed before His Lordships, the Chief Justice, for constituting a Full Bench. (In pursuance of the aforesaid Order of Reference, this appeal coming on forbearing the Court expressed the following) OPINION: Balakrishna Aiyar, J.-The two questions referred to the Full Bench are: 1. Whether a debtor who was an insolvent on 1st October, 1937, and 22nd March, 1938, but whose adjudication was subsequently annulled has saleable interest in the property on the two crucial dates? 2. Would it make any difference if, though the adjudication was annulled, the properties of the insolvent, either in whole or in part, were vested in an appointee of the Court under section 37 of the Provincial Insolvency Act and continued to be so vested at the time when the application for scaling down was filed? 2. Would it make any difference if, though the adjudication was annulled, the properties of the insolvent, either in whole or in part, were vested in an appointee of the Court under section 37 of the Provincial Insolvency Act and continued to be so vested at the time when the application for scaling down was filed? These are the circumstances under which the two questions have arisen: In 1927 one Palani Goundan and his son executed a mortgage over some of their immoveable properties in favour of one of their creditors named Somasundaram Chettiar. Another creditor named Arunachalam Chettiar applied to have the mortgagors adjudicated insolvents on the ground that the mortgage in favour of Somasundara amounted to a fraudulent preference. The mortgagors did not enter appearance and in September, 1928, an order of adjudication was passed without opposition. Thereafter in October, 1929, Arunachala applied to the Court for an order under the provisions of section 54 of the Provincial Insolvency Act for setting aside the mortgage in favour of Somasundara. The Subordinate Judge allowed the application and set aside the transaction. In appeal to the District Court the order of the Subordinate Judge was set aside. Arunachala then came up to this Court in second appeal but this Court agreed with the District ‘Court in holding that there was no fraudulent preference and dismissed the appeal. It thus having been established that there had been no fraudulent preference the mortgagors applied in March 1935, to the Sub-Court for annulment of their adjudication. The petition was allowed and the adjudication set aside under section 35 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. On appeal the District Judge reversed that decision whereupon there was a second appeal to this Court which was disposed of in 1940 (The case has been reported in Periakaruppan v. Arunachala1.) This Court discharged the order of the District Judge and restored the order of the Subordinate Judge. In respect of the properties of the insolvent this Court made the following Order: "The petitioning creditor here asks that certain other assets in the hands of the Official Receiver:should be distributed by him amongst the creditors. There are no special circumstances which justify an order of this nature. The Official Receiver will be directed to deliver the assets, other than the Rs. 3,600, to the debtors two months hence. There are no special circumstances which justify an order of this nature. The Official Receiver will be directed to deliver the assets, other than the Rs. 3,600, to the debtors two months hence. The properties will be handed over to them then, subject, of course, to any order of the Court which may be passed in the meantime." In 1946 one Narayanaswami Goundar, a son of one of the mortgagors, applied in I.A.No.905 of 1946 to the District Munsiff, Tirupur, 10 scale down the decree debt in O.S.No.108 of 1924, on the file of this Court under the provisions of Madras Act IV of 1938. The decree in that case had been passed against the father and the grandfather of the petitioner, who had been adjudged insolvents. The petition was opposed on the ground that the petitioner was not an agriculturist either on 1st October, 1937, or 22nd March, 1938, because on those dates both the petitioner’s father and grandfather had been adjudicated insolvents and their properties remained vested in the Official Receiver. The District Munsiff overruled this objection and held that the petitioner was entitled to have the decree debt scaled down. An appeal to the District Court having failed a second appeal was preferred to this Court. When the appeal was before a Division Bench Mr.Sivaramakrishna Aiyar the learned counsel for the appellant contended on the strength of the decision in Kudithipudi Venkatramayya v. Mallacheruvu Pundareekakshudu2, that notwithstanding the annulment of the adjudication the insolvent had no saleable interest in any agricultural property either on 1st October, 1937 or 22nd March, 1938 and that therefore, the debt was not liable to be scaled down. The learned advocate for the respondent however argued on the basis of the decision in Gamoji Venkata Ramakrishna Rao v. Gullapalli Sambamoorthi3,that the effect of the annulment of the adjudication was to restore the status quo ante and that the true position was as if there had been no adjudication at all and that in consequence both on 1st October, 1937, and:22nd March, 1938, the respondent had a saleable interest in agricultural land. The Division Bench felt that it was difficult to reconcile these two decisions and hence formulated the two questions extracted above for determination by a Full Bench. The Division Bench felt that it was difficult to reconcile these two decisions and hence formulated the two questions extracted above for determination by a Full Bench. So far as the second of these two questions is concerned, it may be stated at once that in view of the fuller exposition of the facts that was made before us it does not really arise. The direction which this Court gave in 1940 was that except in respect of the sum of Rs.3,600, the Official Receiver should deliver the properties back to the debtors "two months hence". That period of two months expired long before Narayanaswami Goundan made his application out of which the present proceedings have arisen. The properties did not continue to remain vested in an appointee of the Court under section 37 of the Provincial Insolvency Act at the time when the application for scaling down the debt was filed. It is therefore sufficient to answer the first question. Before proceeding to examine the authorities cited on either side let us try to find out what would happen in a simple case like this: let us suppose that a debtor who owns some agricultural land, some flocks of sheep, some money in a savings bank account and some shares in companies, is adjudicated an insolvent on the 1st January, 1937. Let us also suppose that the adjudication is annulled on the 1st of January, 1939 and no vesting order is made in respect of any of these properties under section 37 of the Act. If during this period arrears of rent have accrued in respect of his lands, if there has been a natural increase to his flocks if interest has been earned on his deposits in the savings bank account and if dividends have been declared in respect of the shares he held who would be entitled to these? Obviously, the debtor. But he would be entitled to them only if he had remained the owner of these properties thoughout the period, which means that on 1st October, 1937, and 22nd March, 1938, also he must have been their owner. And if he was their owner it goes without saying that he would have a saleable interest in them. That is a conclusion which emerges as a matter of first impression and also of principle. And if he was their owner it goes without saying that he would have a saleable interest in them. That is a conclusion which emerges as a matter of first impression and also of principle. Now excepting one or two passages in the decision in Kudithipudi Venkataramanayya v. Mallacheruvu Pundareekakshudu1, which Mr.Sivaramakrishna Aiyar cited, there is nothing in any of the other authorities to which our attention was drawn which requires or even suggests that a different view should be taken. The case of White v. Chitty2, is the oldest of the cases cited before us. In that a testator devised freeholds to C for life, with a clause of forfeiture on bankruptcy. In the testator’s lifetime, C was adjudicated a bankrupt, and had not obtained his order of discharge at the time the testator died. But no creditors’ assignee was appointed and within four months after the death of the testator, the bankrupt applied for and obtained an annulment of the bankruptcy. The Official Assignee had not during the interval, applied for or obtained possession of the rents C himself having been in occupation of the estate. The Court held that the forfeiture had not occurred. In disposing of that case the learned Judges observed: “Down to the case of Smallcombe v. Olivier3, it seems to have been thought that the effect of annulling a bankruptcy was to render the state of things such as if the bankruptcy had never taken place But the Court of Exchequer held, not only that there was, or ought to be, indemnity for all acts done before the annulment, but that, before and upto the annulling of the fiat, everything remained as it was by force of the bankruptcy-that upto that period the bankruptcy operated fully; and according to that ratio decidendi although the adjudication of bankruptcy may have been most improper the act of the sheriff would have been right; because, at the time of the return, the sheriff could know no better, and, therefore, made a proper return of nulla bona”. Though Mr.Sivaramakrishna Aiyar did not state so explicitly, he seemed to suggest at one stage of his arguments that the old English rule that on an annulment of an adjudication the position would be as if there had been no bankruptcy at all would not apply where the properties had vested in the Official Receiver. Though Mr.Sivaramakrishna Aiyar did not state so explicitly, he seemed to suggest at one stage of his arguments that the old English rule that on an annulment of an adjudication the position would be as if there had been no bankruptcy at all would not apply where the properties had vested in the Official Receiver. We do not think that there is any warant for such an assumption in this decision. All that this decision is an authority for is that if there had been no vesting of properties in the Official Receiver the position on the annulment of an adjudication would be as if there had been no bankruptcy at all; but acts done in pursuance of the order of adjudication would be valid. The principle of this decision is that subject to what has been done the insolvency is wiped out. The second decision is of the year 1868 and it is reported in Cox x. Fonblanque4. In that case a legacy was given to A “if not an uncertificated bankrupt at the testator’s death”. A was a bankrupt at the testator’s death, but his bankruptcy was annulled four months afterwards. The Court held in that case that A was not entitled to the legacy because the bequest of the annuity was made on the express condition that the annuitant should not be a bankrupt at the testator’s. death, and that condition had not been fulfilled. On the question before us this decision throws no light whatsoever; it turned wholly on the construction of the will. More interesting is the case of Bailey v. Johnson1 . That was a case decided under section 81 of the English Bankruptcy Act, 1869. The facts were these: The defendant was adjudged a bankrupt on a debtor summons issued by a banking firm of Harvey and Hudson; a trustee was appointed, who realised the estate and paid the proceeds into the bank of Harvey and Hudson. Subsequently the firm of Harvey and Hudson were adjudged bankrupts. The sum paid in by the trustee in the bankruptcy of the defendant was then standing to his credit in their books. Subsequently the order adjudicating the defendant bankrupt, was reversed on appeal, and no vesting order was made under section 81 of the Bankruptcy Act as to his property. Subsequently the firm of Harvey and Hudson were adjudged bankrupts. The sum paid in by the trustee in the bankruptcy of the defendant was then standing to his credit in their books. Subsequently the order adjudicating the defendant bankrupt, was reversed on appeal, and no vesting order was made under section 81 of the Bankruptcy Act as to his property. The plaintiff as trustee in the bankruptcy of Harvey and Hudson, sued the defendant to recover the amount due from him. The defendant then claimed to set-off the money that had been paid by the trustee in his bankruptcy. The Court of Exchequer allowed the set-off and there was an appeal from that decision. Affirming the decision of the Court of Exchequer, Cockburn, C.J., observed as follows: "The effect of section 81 is, subject to any bona fide disposition lawfully made by the trustee prior to the annulling of the bankruptcy, and subject to any condition which the Court annulling the bankrupcy may by its order impose, to remit the party whose bankruptcy is set aside to his original situation. Here the Court of Bankruptcy had imposed no condition; the general provision of the section has therefore its full effect, and that effect is to remit the bankrupt, at the moment the decree annulling his bankruptcy is pronounced, to his original powers and rights in respect of his property. Here the Court of Bankruptcy had imposed no condition; the general provision of the section has therefore its full effect, and that effect is to remit the bankrupt, at the moment the decree annulling his bankruptcy is pronounced, to his original powers and rights in respect of his property. We must therefore look at the money as though it were money paid in his name instead of in the name of Bullard, (the trustee for the estate of the defendant), for having become his by virtue of the annulling of his bankruptcy, it is to be considered as his at the moment when it was paid in;........" Brett, J., in concurring stated: "I am of the same opinion, and I agree with the Lord Chief Justice that it is impossible logically to stop short of giving to the word revert in section 81 the full interpretation which he has placed upon it." That the English Bankruptcy Act, 1914, has made no change as regards this part of the Bankruptcy Law appears from page 152, 16th Edition of Williams on Bankruptcy: "As to the consequences of ‘annulling’ the law was but little changed by the Act of 1869, and in this respect the present section does not seem to differ from section 81 of that Act." Now section 37, of our Provincial Insolvency Act is practically in the same terms as section 29 of the English Bankruptcy Act, 1914. Coming to the decisions of this Court: The case in Venkatasubbiah v. Venkatasubbaiah2, throws no light on the question before us because in that case there was an order under section 37 of the Act vesting the properties in the Official Receiver and it was held that the properties did not revert to the insolvent. The case in Suryanarayanamurti v. Veeraju3, is more to the point. The material facts in that case were these: A Hindu father was adjudged an insolvent. He had only one son at the time and that son filed a suit for partition. Subsequently, a second son was born to him. Thereafter, the adjudication was annulled. The case in Suryanarayanamurti v. Veeraju3, is more to the point. The material facts in that case were these: A Hindu father was adjudged an insolvent. He had only one son at the time and that son filed a suit for partition. Subsequently, a second son was born to him. Thereafter, the adjudication was annulled. The District Court passed a vesting order under section 37 of the Insolvency Act but on appeal this Court set aside the order of the District Judge in so far as it vested the properties of the insolvent in the Official Receiver but directed that officer to retain the cash realisations in his hands pending the disposal of certain appeals. On this state of things, Patanjali Sastri, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court remarked: "The position, therefore, is that the properties of the first defendant which had, on his adjudication, vested in the Official Receiver, now ‘reverted’ to him as provided in section 37 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. The question next arises as to whether, on such reverter, the properties are held by the first defendant as his separate properties, or as family properties liable to be divided among the members along with the other assets of the family; for, as has been stated, the third defendant was born after the first defendant was adjudicated and his share (then one half) in the family properties was vested in the Official Receiver, and if such share now reverts to him as his separate property the plaintiff and the third defendant would each be entitled only to a fourth share, while, if the first defendant’s share comes back to him only as family property, which it undoubtedly was when it vested in the Official Receiver, the father and the sons would each be entitled to a third share in the entire properties." The Court decided: "We are accordingly of opinion that on the annulment of the adjudication the surplus assets in the hands of the Official Receiver reverted to the first defendant as joint family property". Now this decision practically destroys the case which Mr.Sivaramakrishna Aiyar had been consistently urging. His reasoning was that when an adjudication is annulled and no vesting order is made under section 37, the property merely re-vests in the insolvent and does not revert to him. In other words, the argument of Mr. Now this decision practically destroys the case which Mr.Sivaramakrishna Aiyar had been consistently urging. His reasoning was that when an adjudication is annulled and no vesting order is made under section 37, the property merely re-vests in the insolvent and does not revert to him. In other words, the argument of Mr. Sivaramakrishna Aiyar was that though the property goes back to the insolvent it goes back only with effect from the date of annulment and not with effect from any anterior date. It must be clear that if the true legal position is that the property merely re-vests in the insolvent and does not revert to him the Court could not have given the decision it did in Suryanarayanamurthy’s case.1 The position is made even clearer in the decision that appears as Sakhamuri Peraya v. Nimmarju Kondayya2: "The effect of the present section 37 has been considered by Beasley, C.J., in Lingappa v. Official Receiver of Bellary3, King, J., in Dharmasamarajya v. Sankamma4 and Somayya, J., in Ratnavelu Chettiar v. Franciscu Udayar5and the learned Judges have held that the effect of the annulment of the adjudication relates back to the date of the adjudication and is as if no adjudication had taken place, except as regards the acts of the Court and the Official Receiver which are validated by that section. Section 37 says:......Somayya, J., very pertinently points out in Ratnavelu Chettiar v. Franciscu Udayar5 , that if the annulment was not to have retrospective effect, there would be no need for the clause validating acts done by the Court or by the Receiver, as they would be valid: because they were done at a time when the insolvent had been adjudicated and before the adjudication had been annulled; and so had jurisdiction to do the acts they did. If, however, the annulment were to date back to the date of adjudication, it would, unless validating clauses were introduced, have the effect of setting at nought all that they had done to disturb the rights in property created by the Court and the receiver". And this legal position is stated again in Venkataramakrishna Rao v. Sambamurti6. It will thus be seen that of the decisions that have been placed before us the only one that can be pressed into service to support the contention of Mr. Sivaramakrishna Aiyar is the one in Kudithipudi Venkataramanayya v. Mallacheruvu Pundareekakshudu7. And this legal position is stated again in Venkataramakrishna Rao v. Sambamurti6. It will thus be seen that of the decisions that have been placed before us the only one that can be pressed into service to support the contention of Mr. Sivaramakrishna Aiyar is the one in Kudithipudi Venkataramanayya v. Mallacheruvu Pundareekakshudu7. In the penultimate paragraph of the judgment in that case, the following sentences occur: "The position therefore is that the appellant on 1st October, 1937, and on 22nd March 1938, was not an agriculturist because his property was vested in the Official Receiver and he had no saleable interest therein. We cannot accept the view of the District Judge that after the annulment of the adjudication he had a saleable interest in the properties vested in the Official Receiver. The most that he could have had in those properties was a possible expectation of a surplus, if any, after satisfying the creditors. That is not, in our opinion, to be treated as a saleable interest in those properties". The argument of Mr. Sivaramakrishna Aiyar here was that the learned Judges meant to say that because the properties remained vested in the Official Receiver on the 1st October, 1937 and on the 22nd March 1938, the insolvent could have had no saleable interest in them on either of those dates. In view of the earlier statement in the same paragraph that "the annulment of the adjudication relegates the debtor to the position which he occupied before he was adjudicated, except in so far as the vesting order places the residue of the properties at the disposition of the appointee for the benefit of the creditors." It is not very clear whether the learned Judges meant to go as far as Mr. Sivaramakrishna Aiyar suggest they did. However if they did mean to go so far and say that because on the 1st October, 1937, and 22nd March, 1938, the properties remained vested in the Official Receiver, the result would be that in spite of the reverter on the annulment of the adjudication the insolvent would not be the owner of the properties on the 1st October, 1937, and 22nd March, 1938, I would say with respect that they were wrong. The answer to the first question referred to the Full Bench is therefore in the affirmative. Subba Rao, J.-I agree. The answer to the first question referred to the Full Bench is therefore in the affirmative. Subba Rao, J.-I agree. I am not expressing my views on the second question referred to the Full Bench as it does not arise for consideration. Panchapakesa Aiyar, J.-I agree. I too consider that the second question does not arise for consideration here. So I do not express any opinion on it. This appeal coming on for final hearing before the Court, after the expression of the opinion of the Full Bench, the Court (Subba Rao, J.,) delivered the following Judgment: (8th September, 1950).-After the judgment delivered by the Full Bench this case comes up before me for final disposal. Mr. Sivaramakrishna Aiyar raised a further point namely that under section 21 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, if, prior to the coming into force of the Act, a dividend has been declared out of the assets of an insolvent, the fact that the adjudication has been subsequently annulled would not affect his rights. This question was expressly raised in Venkataramayya v. Pundarikakshudu1, and negatived by a Bench of this Court. I am bound by this decision. The civil miscellaneous second appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. (Leave to appeal is refused). K.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.