Judgment.-The facts of this case are simple and further not many. They lie in a short and narrow compass and require but a brief statement. The plaintiff was a clerk in the service of the defendant, the Andhra University, down to 3rd January, 1940, the date of his dismissal by its Vice-Chancellor, Sir C.R. Reddi, after his inquiry into the offence of theft of a B.Ed., diploma from the record of the University of which he found the plaintiff guilty. On appeal taken by the plaintiff to the Syndicate, the Syndicate finding no power of dismissal vested in the Vice-Chancellor treated his order as a recommendation which it accepted by its order dated 20th June, 1940, after constituting a Committee to go into the matter and obtaining a report from it without any independent inquiry by the committee. The plaintiff thereupon sued for a declaration that the orders were unjust and illegal. The defendant resisted the suit by pleading that the orders were just and legal, as also that the suit for a bare declaration was not maintainable without a consequential prayer as for damages. The Additional Subordinate Judge of Vizagapatam who tried the cause held the dismissal to be wrongful for want of an inquiry by the Syndicate notwithstanding the fairness of the inquiry by the Vice-Chancellor and on the ground of a violation of rules of natural justice by the Syndicate in that neither the Syndicate nor the Committee appointed by it gave the plaintiff any chance of any hearing of his case or any notice to show cause why the dismissal order of the Vice-Chancellor should not be treated as a recommendation which it might accept and act upon. The learned Subordinate Judge however nonsuited the plaintiff on the ground that even assuming the suit for a bare declaration to be otherwise maintainable, no declaratory relief could be granted to the plaintiff who had already earned employment elsewhere, since the granting of such relief would only serve as a stepping stone for further litigation to get himself restored to his position before dismissal which must end in a futility. On appeal by the plaintiff to the learned District Judge of Vizakapatnam, that Judge reversing the trial Court has held that the jural relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff was the ordinary one of master and servant under which the servant can always be dismissed for misconduct which however is a matter for proof by the master in Court when the dismissal is challenged, and that the suit for a mere declaration was maintainable and would not end in a futility, as the declaration, if granted, although ineffective to reinstate the plaintiff except on the good sense of the master, would be a valuable gain to him as a vindication of his character. In the result, the learned District Judge remanded the case to the Court of first instance for the trial of an additional issue framed by him, “Was the plaintiff guilty or not guilty of the charge of theft made against him?”, and for fresh disposal of the suit in the light of the finding to be recorded by the trial Court on that issue. Against the order of remand by the learned District Judge the defendant has preferred this appeal. Although in the initial stages of the argument stress was laid by Sri Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar, learned counsel for the appellant, on cases like Lennox Arthur Patrick O’Reilly v. Cyril Cuthbert Gittens1, laying down that: "Provided that a domestic tribunal (like the stewards of a turf club) does not exceed its jurisdiction and acts honestly and in good faith, the civil Court cannot intervene, even if it thinks that the penalty is severe or that a very strict standard has been applied ". Learned counsel in the later stages of the argument gave up such stress, maintaining only that, if as also contended by him, the contract of service in the present case is to be regarded as containing an implied term that the defendant should have the power to dismiss the plaintiff on due inquiry into suspected misconduct in accordance with rules of natural justice, the question of honesty and bona fides about the conduct of the defendant would become relevant. This line of contention was not raised in the Courts below and cannot be entertained by me, turning as it does on evidence as to the intention of the parties which could and would have been adduced and canvassed, had it been appropriately raised. This line of contention was not raised in the Courts below and cannot be entertained by me, turning as it does on evidence as to the intention of the parties which could and would have been adduced and canvassed, had it been appropriately raised. Moreover, I am not satisfied prima facie that any such term can be implied by the Court into the contract of service in the present case and any question of honesty and good faith about the conduct of the Vice-Chancellor and the Syndicate in suspending and dismissing the plaintiff falls to be considered as at all relevant to the present case. The rule as to implication of terms not expressly found in a contract is stated thus in Halsbury’s Laws of England, 2nd Edn., Vol. VII, at page 322: "Such an implication must in all cases be founded on the presumed intention of the parties and upon reason and will only be made when it is necessary in order to give the transaction that efficacy that both parties must have intended it to have and to prevent such a failure of consideration as could not have been within the contemplation of the parties." The terms sought to be implied in the present case is not, strictly speaking, necessary in the sense indicated in the passage quoted and cannot be allowed to be imported into the interpretation of the conduct of service between the plaintiff and the defendant. The two main contentions for the appellant before me have been (1) that the office of the plaintiff under the defendant is one held during pleasure and no misconduct need be proved by the master as in the case of an office held during good behaviour but subject to reasonable notice, and (2) that the learned District Judge should, like the learned Subordinate Judge, have refused the declaratory relief sought in the circumstances of the case. In support of the first contention reliance has been placed on Chellam Aiyar v. Corporation of Madras2, which was the case of a servant under the Corporation of Madras dismissed by its President. In support of the first contention reliance has been placed on Chellam Aiyar v. Corporation of Madras2, which was the case of a servant under the Corporation of Madras dismissed by its President. The office of the servant was regarded by the Court (Wallis, C.J., and Oldfield, J.) as one held at pleasure, and it was ruled that in the case of such an office, no notice or framing of charges was necessary to validate the dismissal of its holder and that the servant had no cause of action against the Corporation for his dismissal by its President. Notwithstanding the highly critical and erudite scrutiny to which this decision has been subjected by Varadachariar, J., in Venkateswara Aiyar v. Sri Minakshi Sundareswarar1, so far as it was sought to be applied to the case of the servant of a Devasthanam holding office in accordance with a scheme of management governing it, I am satisfied that this decision is still good authority with reference to the kind of office dealt with by it. It is urged by Mr. Narasaraju that Varadachariar, J., must be taken to have disapproved of the reasoning of the case in Chellam Aiyar v. Corporation of Madras2, so far as it is founded on the two English decisions in Smyth v. Letham3 and Motley v. London County Council4 . That may be; but the decision, as being that of a Bench was binding as much on the learned Judge as it is on me. His Lordship could not and did not dissent from it. It is also urged by Mr. Narasaraju that another single Judge of this Court (Newsam, J.) has in Lakshminarayana Deo v. Imperial Bank of India, Guntur5, accepted and acted upon Varadachariar, J.‘s critical appreciation of Chellam Aiyar v. Corporation of Madras2,in Venkateswara Aiyar v. Sri Minakshi Sundareswarar1,as expressing the true legal position. In Lakshminarayana Deo v. Imperial Bank of India, Guntur5,the Courts below having held that a servant of the Imperial Bank of India holds his office at pleasure and is liable to be dismissed without notice, the learned Judge here observes: “This view is based on Chellam Aiyar v. Corporation of Madras2, in which case provisions similar to section 50 of schedule II of the Imperial Bank of India Act were considered and interpreted in that light. The decision along with others has been fully considered in Venkateswara Aiyar v. Sri Minakshi Sundareswarar1, which I take as my authority for the true position. Servants of the Crown hold office during the pleasure of the Crown-not by virtue of any special prerogative of the Crown but because such are the terms of their engagement (Shenton v. Smith5). But servants even of a statutory body do not hold office at their pleasure merely because the statute provides the body or persons by whom they may be dismissed. It is not right to assume that the power of dismissal is a power of summary dismissal”. With the actual decision or even the real reasoning in Laskshminarayana Deo v. Imperial Bank of India, Guntur5, I have no quarrel; but I must at the same time discountenance any suggestion that Chellam Aiyar v. Corporation of Madras2 has ceased to be authoritative in this Court by reason of Venkateswara Aiyar v. Sri Minakshi Sundareswarar1 and Lakshminarayana Deo v. Imperial Bank of India, Guntur5, with reference to the kind of office with which the Court was concerned in that case. Newsam, J., even like Varadachariar, J., had no power to say any such thing as that; nor do I understand them to have meant, much less said, any such thing. I consider the ruling in Chellam Aiyar v. Corporation of Madras 2 , to be correct, not merely and generally with reference to the distinction made by it between offices which are held during good behaviour or freehold offices and offices which are held at pleasure but also with reference to the conclusion reached therein on the basis of the English decisions in Smyth v. Letham3and Notley v. London County Council4, that it is well settled that when an officer in the position of the President of the Madras Corporation is empowered by statute to appoint and dismiss subordinate officers and servants, these officers and servants hold their office at pleasure. As observed in Halsbury’s Laws of England, 2nd Edn., Vol. XXII, at page 146: “Public servants hold their office during the pleasure of the Crown. As observed in Halsbury’s Laws of England, 2nd Edn., Vol. XXII, at page 146: “Public servants hold their office during the pleasure of the Crown. Officers of local authorities usually hold the office during the pleasure of the local authority.” I need only observe that the word “usually” in the second sentence of the quotation rather suggests that in the case of Crown offices the rule is absolute while in the case of offices under local authorities the rule is one of presumption liable to rebuttal by proof to the contrary. I am not satisfied however that the kind of office with which I am concerned here is governed by the ruling in Chellam Aiyar v. Corporation of Madras1.No authority English or Indian has been brought to my notice which has extended the rule of office held during pleasure beyond offices under the Grown and offices under local authorities to offices under a University or such other authority. Nor am I prepared solely from the power of appointment and dismissal provided for in favour of the Syndicate in the Andhra University Act, to presume that officers and servants of the University are persons holding their offices and places during the pleasure of the Syndicate. Such a view would, however high the legitimate place of honour which a statutory body like the University ought to enjoy in the public life of the country, not only exalt it to a higher place then is warranted by needlessly assimilating it to a Governmental authority or a body connected with Local Self-Government but also involve far-reaching consequences which ought not to be countenanced in regard to the security of tenure which ought to be assured to public officers and servants holding employment under it. It is significant too to bear in mind in this connection what the learned District Judge says in paragraph 6 of his judgment: “Not the slightest attempt has been made before me to contend that the service of the plaintiff was at the pleasure of the University. It must be held that the service was during good behaviour subject to reasonable notice. It must be held that the service was during good behaviour subject to reasonable notice. In this case notice was not given and the question is whether the dismissal was or was not for proper reason.” On the whole it seems to me that the proper approach to the case has been made by the learned District Judge with due regard to the legal status and authority of the University as appears from his observations in paragraph 13 to this effect: “In the circumstances it was not necessary for the Syndicate to frame charges against the plaintiff or to give a hearing to the plaintiff. The Syndicate had the power of dismissal. No enquiry was needed. If the cause for dismissal was not true or proper, that dismissal would be wrong. But the dismissal cannot be challenged on the ground that no opportunity had been given to the plaintiff to. show cause or that the plaintiff was not heard.” He has rightly reversed the learned Subordinate Judge who proceeded on the basis that an inquiry on the part of the Syndicate in accordance with rules of natural justice was necessary, and he has at the same time rightly held it incumbent on the defendant to satisfy the Court about the propriety of its dismissal of the plaintiff. The issue framed by him has been correctly raised, and the order of remand must accordingly stand, subject to the next contention of the petitioner already indicated and to be immediately dealt with. On this contention the point is put by counsel in a twofold way: (a) This case attracts section 42 of the Specific Relief Act and falls within its proviso. The plaintiff must therefore sue for damages, nominal though they may be; (b) Even quite apart from that section and its proviso, a suit for a bare declaration of the present kind is something unheard of in and unknown to law. The plaintiff cannot sue for such declaration if it only be to vindicate his character. That will be a suit for damages in tort, not in contract. Where there is a breach of contract plaintiff may accept it and ask for damages or repudiate it and ask for reinstatement in office if possible. He cannot have a tertium quid-a bare declaration to vindicate character. That will be a suit for damages in tort, not in contract. Where there is a breach of contract plaintiff may accept it and ask for damages or repudiate it and ask for reinstatement in office if possible. He cannot have a tertium quid-a bare declaration to vindicate character. In the present case the plaintiff has accepted the breach and gone about employment elsewhere and in fact got it. Therefore the suit must go. As to the first way of putting the point I am perfectly clear that it must fail. The present suit is not one of the kind contemplated by section 42 of the Specific Relief Act and no question of the proviso applying or not applying therefore arises. The section contemplates only a suit for a judicial declaration of the legal character or status of a party or of his right as to any property, and this suit is not of that kind. As Mr. Narasaraju rightly argues, the section is not, according to well-settled authority of this Court, exhaustive of all possible declaratory suits; but the question still remains whether the present one is maintainable otherwise than with reference to the section. This leads me to a consideration of the second breach of the contention. On this branch the appellant cites first Ramakrishna v. Narayana1 . There the suit was by a purchaser of rights from the second defendant, a subscriber to a half ticket in a kuri started by the first defendant as its proprietor and sought a declaration against the latter that the plaintiff was not a defaulter and was in a position to continue to pay subscriptions to the kuri. The Court (Sadasiva Aiyar and Napier, JJ.) after holding section 42 of the Specific Relief Act not to be exhaustive ruled that: “a declaratory relief will not be given in respect of rights arising out of a contract which would affect only the pecuniary relationship between the parties to the contract, unless there are exceptional circumstances in a case to take it out of the ordinary rule”. In the particular case before the Court the learned Judges held that there were no such exceptional circumstances. In the particular case before the Court the learned Judges held that there were no such exceptional circumstances. I am not prepared to say that in the present case the declaratory relief if granted would affect only the pecuniary relationship between the parties or that there are not, at any rate, exceptional circumstances taking this case out of the ordinary rule, if regard is had to the view of the learned District Judge that the relief, if granted, would be a valuable gain to the plaintiff as vindicating his character and preserving his reputation. The ruling in Ramakrishna v. Narayana1, has been followed in Nathuram v. Nula and others2 and Gopaldas Parmanand v. Mulraj3, which take the appellant’s case no further. It may be, by the way, observed that in these two Lahore cases decided by the same learned Judges (Abdul Rashid and Addison, JJ.) the mistake is committed of supposing that Ramakrishna v. Narayana1, ruled the unmaintainability of a suit for a declaration affecting only the pecuniary relationship between the parties with reference to section 42, Specific Relief Act only. Ramakrishna v. Narayana1, ruled such unmaintainability also quite apart from that section on the footing that it is not exhaustive of all declaratory suits. The next case cited worth considering is Addis v. Gramophone Co, Ltd.,4 which holds as the headnote rightly bears, that “Where a servant is wrongfully dismissed from his employment the damages for the dismissal cannot include compensation for the manner of the dismissal, for his injured feelings, or for the loss he may sustain from the fact that the dismissal of itself makes it more difficult for him to obtain fresh employment”. Although the actual conclusion of the majority of the House in that case does not cover the point on hand, what counsel stresses is the following passage in the judgment of Lord Atkinson at page 496 of the report: “In many other cases of breach of contract there may be circumstances of malice, fraud, defamation, or violence, which would sustain an action of tort, as an alternative remedy to an action for breach of contract. If one should select the former mode of redress, he may, no doubt, recover exemplary damages, or what is sometimes styled vindictive damages; but if he should choose to seek redress in the form of an action for breach of contract, he lets in all the consequences of that form of action, Thorpe v. Thorpe5. One of these consequences is, I think, this: that he is to be paid adequate compensation in money for the loss of that which he would have received had his contract been kept and no more”. The passage cited does no doubt draw a distinction between the two forms of action -in delicto and in contractu-arising out of the same wrongful act of the defendant in the matter of damages recoverable in each. It has hardly any bearing, in my opinion, on the maintainability of a suit for a bare declaration of the present kind framed without reference to a claim for damages of the one kind or the other and purely with a view to the vindication of character and preservation of the reputation of the plaintiff. The last case cited worth considering is Thomas v. Moore6. There was a contention in that case that the declaration as to conspiracy to slander on the part of the several defendants could be made, although damages with regard to the conspiracy had been waived. Pickford, L.J., dealing with the contention observes thus at page 567 of the report somewhere about the bottom of the page: “If what Bowen, L.J., called the gist of the action is waived, it seems to me that the cause of action is abandoned. But I will not put it that the plaintiffs abandoned their cause of action. It may be convenient to have a claim for a declaration as to the rights of the parties in respect of contracts extending over a long space of time, and not to wait until there is a breach to have the rights determined. But I have never heard of a declaration that a defendant is doing wrong, unless perhaps it is followed by a statement that damage has accrued or is likely to accrue, and that the defendant threatens to continue his wrongful act against the plaintiff”. But I have never heard of a declaration that a defendant is doing wrong, unless perhaps it is followed by a statement that damage has accrued or is likely to accrue, and that the defendant threatens to continue his wrongful act against the plaintiff”. The learned Lord Justice was dealing with a case of tort-conspiracy to slander-in which as observed by His Lordship earlier in the judgment at page 566 (bottom) and page 567 (top) of the report quoting from Bowen, L.J., in The Mogul Steamship Co., Ltd. v. Mcgregor Gow &38; Co.1, it is the damage wrongfully done, and not the conspiracy that is the gist of the action. His Lordship was not dealing with a case of contract in respect to which a declaration as to breach is sought by one party as against the other without a claim of damages. On the other hand, His Lordship’s observations recognise the possibility of suits for declarations as to contracts although not of a suit precisely like the present. It cannot be said of a contract broken, as it can and must be said of the tort of slander committed, that damage is the gist of the action. It may be that damage cannot be waived in the latter case. It does not follow that it cannot be waived in the former. Divorced from the context the last sentence of the locus citatus may seem to warrant its applicability as much to the case of a declaration that the defendant is doing or has done wrong in respect of a contract as to the case of a declaration that he is doing or has done wrong by way of tort. Read however in conjunction with the rest of the passage and in the light of the facts of the case before the learned Lord Justice and in the context in which the sentence occurs, that sentence, in my opinion, does not admit of the unqualified interpretation sought to be imposed on it by learned counsel for the appellant. Read however in conjunction with the rest of the passage and in the light of the facts of the case before the learned Lord Justice and in the context in which the sentence occurs, that sentence, in my opinion, does not admit of the unqualified interpretation sought to be imposed on it by learned counsel for the appellant. The position therefore is that there has been no case cited to me which holds that a suit for a declaration of breach of contract lying in the wrongful dismissal of the plaintiff from the defendant’s service uncoupled with a claim of damages for such breach but conceived solely with a view to the vindication of the plaintiff’s character which stands tarnished by such wrongful dismissal is unmaintainable. The passage cited from Thomas v. Moore2, even on the unqualified interpretation pressed by learned counsel for the appellant suggests that if the plaint couples the declaration with a statement that damage has accrued or is likely to accrue the suit may possible be in order. In my judgment, the damage need not compulsorily lie in the loss of remuneration for service or such other pecuniary advantage but may well lie in detriment to reputation which is sometimes far more serious. I do not and cannot subscribe to the argument of learned counsel for the appellant that in every case like this there can only be a suit for damages or a suit for restoration to office and there cannot be a tertium quid in the nature of a suit like the present, although there is no doubt that that is ordinarily so. The fact that the plaintiff may well have pursued the remedy of an action for damages in tort does not, in my opinion, necessarily preclude the present form of suit if otherwise in order. The plaintiff has not accepted the breach, and the circumstance that on account of his procurement of employment elsewhere he has not asked for damages does not disentitle him to sue as he has done. It is said that the plaintiff ought to have asked for damages however nominal-be it a pie at the lowest or at the least. I see no magic about such a claim-that its presence in the plaint should give it life and that its absence should leave it lifeless. It is said that the plaintiff ought to have asked for damages however nominal-be it a pie at the lowest or at the least. I see no magic about such a claim-that its presence in the plaint should give it life and that its absence should leave it lifeless. In my view the learned Subordinate Judge did not appreciate the legal or the actual position in the case aright in holding that the declaration sought, if granted would serve as a stepping stone to further litigation by the plaintiff to get himself restored to his position before dismissal which must end in a futility. The learned District Judge has, on the other hand, appreciated the legal as well as the factual position aright from the standpoint of legal sense as well as commonsense in holding that the declaration, if granted, would not, although ineffective to bring about the plaintiff’s restoration to office except on the good sense of the master, end in a futility but in a valuable gain to the plaintiff as he shall have thereby vindicated himself. I need only remark in conclusion that no Court ought to be unduly solicitous to throw out a declaratory suit unless its unmaintainability or the inexpediency of its entertainment is made out in strictissimi juris and beyond the slightest shadow of a doubt. In the result this appeal fails and must be and is hereby dismissed with costs. As regards the advocate’s fee, having regard to the importance of the questions raised and the length of time taken up by argument I fix it at Rs. 250 in the exercise of my discretion under the Rules. No leave. (The case having been set down for being mentioned, the Court made the following Order): I see no reason to re-consider my order refusing leave in this case. V.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.