Govinda Menon, J.-The suit out of which this appeal arises was for a declaration of the plaintiff’s title and right of management as well as for recovery of possession, of the suit house together with past and future rent or damages by way of use and occupation. The Subordinate Judge of Coimbatore has held that the plaintiff is entitled to the property claimed by him with all the rights of management of the said property; but the relief for possession was disallowed. There is a further direction that the plaintiff is entitled to collect the rents from such of the defendants as are occupying portions of the suit house and utilise the funds for the ceremonies stipulated in the will of Ranoji Rao. There were directions regarding the deposit of rent by the second to the fourth defendants along with the order to pay future rent at the same rate. Other minor reliefs were awarded to the plaintiff which it is not necessary to mention in detail. The first defendant has appealed against that decision of the learned Subordinate Judge and the second defendant has filed a memorandum of cross-objections against that portion of the decree which went against his contentions. The basis of the plaintiff’s title is that he has been appointed as the managing trustee of Sri Koniamman Devasthanam by the Hindu Religious Endowments Board and as such he is entitled to ask for the reliefs claimed by him in the plaint. The first defendant is said to be the nearest heir of Ranoji Rao who was originally the owner of the property. On the 25th October, 1918, Ranoji Rao executed a will by which he made certain bequests and the question for consideration is whether that will created a trust so far as the bequests are concerned. It is common ground that Ranoji Rao’s wife Parvathi Bai who was a legatee of some of the items died only in July, 1943. The plaintiff states that the widow Parvathi Bai was in possession and enjoyment of the suit house according to the provisions of the will and died in July, 1943. Before her death she had leased out portions of the house to defendants 2 to 4 separately. The plaintiff states that the widow Parvathi Bai was in possession and enjoyment of the suit house according to the provisions of the will and died in July, 1943. Before her death she had leased out portions of the house to defendants 2 to 4 separately. The first defendant is the son of Parvathi Bai’s sister and as stated in the plaint he got into possession of the properties after the death of Parvathi Bai and is managing the same. Though the plaintiff, as the managing trustee of Sri Koniamman Temple to which the property has been dedicated in the will, demanded from the first defendant such possession as he was entitled to have, he sent a reply repudiating the will and containing false allegations. Therefore the plaintiff prayed that as the trustee of Sri Koniamman Devasthanam he is obliged to file a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession of the suit house. The Hindu Religious Endowments Board has granted him sanction to file the suit by its order dated 21st October, 1943. The first defendant’s plea as set forth in the written statement is that the plaintiff has no cause of action and that there was no dedication or creation of a trust by Ranoji Rao and consequently on his death and on the death of his widow Parvathi Bai, the property must, in law, be held to have passed to the heirs of Ranoji Rao. Therefore, neither the Koniamman Devasthanam nor the Hindu Religious Endowments Committee nor any trustee, has any manner of right to the suit property and as such the plaintiff’s claim for possession was unsustainable. The alternative case set up by the first defendant was that even on the footing that the properties have been allotted for religious and charitable trusts, Parvathi Bai was the sole person entitled to the management thereof and in the absence of any provision for the management of the charities made by the founder, after Parvathi Bai’s lifetime, the right of management passes on to the heirs of the founder, especially as before the death of Parvathi Bai, the Taluk Devasthanam Committee named in the will has ceased to exist. Therefore in any event there has been an intestacy in respect of the suit property and the major portion of the income. Therefore in any event there has been an intestacy in respect of the suit property and the major portion of the income. In any view of the case it was contended that as there has been an intestacy in respect of the suit property and the major portion of the income barring the sums directed to be spent for specified purposes, the property should, in law, be deemed to have passed to the heirs of Ranoji Rao subject to a charge for the performance of specific charities. Defendants 2 to 4 who were tenants of the suit property were willing to pay the rent into Court and they further said that during the lifetime of Parvathi Bai they had paid all the rent to her. On these pleadings the learned Subordinate Judge framed five issues of which the most important one for consideration was whether the dedication is true and valid and whether the suit by the plaintiff is maintainable. Though in the trial Court the question of the genuineness of the will was raised by the contesting defendants and the Judge gave a finding that it was the last will and testament of late Ranoji Rao, that contention has not been seriously raised in this Court. What we have therefore to decide is whether there was a valid dedication of the property in favour of the trust, and secondly even if there is a valid dedication, whether the plaintiff is entitled to bring this suit. The relevant portions of the will are as follows: “My wife Parvathi Bai Ammal shall, after my lifetime, enjoy the undermentioned property till her lifetime without effecting any alienation whatsoever. If she were to effect any such alienation, it shall not be valid. She shall, after deducting the amount utilised for the expenses of her maintenance from out of the income thereof, spend according to her pleasure a sum of not less than Rs.70 (Rupees seventy) every year from out of the balance left over and conduct Skanda Shashti and Soorasamhara festival for Sri Subramaniaswami at Coimbatore Fort. My gold and silver jewels as well as other movable properties shall belong only to my wife. My gold and silver jewels as well as other movable properties shall belong only to my wife. After her lifetime, the Hindu Religious Endowments Committee, Coimbatore taluk, and the Dharmakarthas (trustees) of the above Devasthanam shall take possession of the undermentioned property and shall from out of the balance left over after deducting from the income thereof the expenses of repairs and municipal tax in respect of the building, erect a mantapam in front of my house and conduct mandapa kattalai every year for the Amman for ten days during the time of Radhotsavam (car festival) in the month of Masi (February-March) in Sri Koniamman temple, offer neivethya prasadam and deeparadhana at a cost of not less than Rs. 30 (Rupees thirty) on the tenth day darshan and distribute the prasadam to the people. Further, on the day of Vinayaka Chathurthi in the month of Avani of every year, Sri Vinayakar deity in Sri Subramaniaswami temple at Fort shall be taken round in procession from the temple by spending a sum of not less than Rs. 15 (Rupees fifteen). Abhishekam and archana shall be conducted in my name and in the name of my wife for Sri Sangameswaraswami during the time of festival at a cost of Rs. 15 (Rupees fifteen). Further repairs, etc., shall be effected to the aforesaid temple. And during the time of festival in the month of Panguni (March-April) and the festival on the day of Arudra Darshanam in Sri Nataraja Devasthanam at Perur, abhishekam and archana shall be conducted every year in my name and in the name of my wife Parvathi Bai Ammal at a cost of not less than Rs. 40 (Rupees forty) for each festival. The Hindu Religious Endowments Committee and the Dharmakarthas shall, in co-operation, duly perform all the above acts without fail, maintain proper account and submit every year without fail the abstract of the balance sheet in respect of the account of each year to the District Court or the Subordinate Court of Coimbatore.” In the translation furnished it is conceded that there is some slight mistake and that is that the will does not make any distinction between the Hindu Religious Endowments Committee and the Dharmakartha of the Devasthanam. What the will contemplates is that the Hindu Religious Endowments Committee shall be the Dharmakartha so far as the performance of the various charities is concerned. What the will contemplates is that the Hindu Religious Endowments Committee shall be the Dharmakartha so far as the performance of the various charities is concerned. The exact Tamil expression is as follows: The correct interpretation of this sentence is that the testator does not make any distinction between the Hindu Religious Endowments Committee and the Dharmakartha. What the testator contemplates is the conferment of the right of dharmakartha or trustee of these charities on the Hindu Religious Endowments Committee. Therefore his intention was that after the death of his wife, the Hindu Religious Endowments Committee of Coimbatore Taluk shall function as the Dharmakartha of the Devasthanam for the performance of the charities, viz., the erection of a mantapam in front of the house and conducting the mantapam kattalai every year for the Amman for ten days during the radhotsavam in the month of Masi in the Sri Koniamman temple and offering neivethya prasadam and deeparadhana at a cost of not less than Rs. 30. The dharmakartha was to take in procession the Sri Vinayakar deity in Sri Subramaniaswami temple at Fort in the month of Avani on the Vinayakachathurthi day. The trustee has to conduct the abhishekams and archanas in the names of the testator and his wife at a cost of Rs. 15 in the Sri Sangameswaraswami temple; and lastly, during the festival in the month of Panguni and on the Arudra Darshanam day in the Sri Nataraja Devasthanam in Perur, the trustee has to conduct abhishekams and archanas in his name and in his wife’s name. It is conceded that the Koniamman temple trustee, the Subramaniaswami temple trustee, the Sangameswaraswami temple trustee and the Nataraja Devasthanam trustee at Perur are all different individuals. Therefore what we have to find is whether, for the purpose of these religious ceremonies in each of these temples, the Hindu Religious Devasthanam Committee of Coimbatore is made the trustee. It cannot for a moment be contended that Parvathi Bai had any absolute right in the property. The question whether the Devasthanam Committee becomes the dharmakartha for the performance of these religious ceremonies will arise only after Parvathi Bai’s death. It cannot for a moment be contended that Parvathi Bai had any absolute right in the property. The question whether the Devasthanam Committee becomes the dharmakartha for the performance of these religious ceremonies will arise only after Parvathi Bai’s death. On a careful reading of the above provisions in the will, we have no doubt whatever that what the testator contemplated was the creation of a trust in favour of the various temples as specified in the will and the utilisation of the income for those expenses. Whatever might be said with regard to the spending of the amount during the lifetime of Parvathi Bai, after her lifetime the person mentioned in the will has to take up the management and administer the trust. The chief contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the will does not transfer ownership to any of the religious institutions in respect of which directions have been given by the testator providing for the performance of the specified kattalais or ceremonies. What we have to see is whether there has been any transfer of ownership in favour of the trustee. We do not read the aforesaid provisions of the will as amounting to a dedication of the income for certain purposes and the right in the corpus remaining with the testator’s widow and after her lifetime vesting in the heirs at law. The appellant’s contention is that it is only intended as a charge for the performance of the various ubayams. For this purpose our attention was invited to a passage in page 922 of Mayne’s Hindu Law 10th edition as well as to decisions in Sree Sree Ishwaree Thakurani v. Braja Nath De1 Ramappa Naidu v. Lakshmanan Chettiar2, Thiruvengadamudayanaiya v. Narasimhaswamiaiya3and Jainambukanni Ammal v. Ruthrapathi Pillai 4.On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the earlier passage in page 922 of Mayne’s Hindu Law and contended that the appropriation of the income for the specific purpose was tantamount to dedication of the property to the trust. What is mentioned in the document, reading it as a whole, is that a legal agency, viz., the Hindu Religious Endowments Committee, was constituted to take charge of the property and perform the ceremonies mentioned in the various temples and such agency as takes possession should be the trustee and as such the Hindu Religious Endowments Committee shall be the trustee and the dharmakartha. It is further contended that a vested right is created in favour of the Committee. At page 922 in paragraph 791 of Mayne’s Hindu Law it is stated that in order to create a valid dedication, a trust is not required and that an appropriation of property for a specific religious or charitable purpose is all that is necessary for a valid dedication. In our opinion that is what has been done in the present case. There is a direction that the income of the property should be appropriated for specific religious and charitable purposes and as such there has been a valid dedication. The learned author cites a number of cases, viz., Ram Dhan v. Prayag Narain 1, Nagappa Chettiar v. O.R.M.O.M.S.P. Firm2,which was confirmed by the Privy Council in O.RM. O.M.SP. (Firm) v. Nagappa Chettiar 3and other cases. It is unnecessary for us to discuss any of these cases because, in our opinion, what has been done is not the earmarking of the income for a specific purpose but there has been a complete direction to appropriate the property for specific religious purposes. The argument of Mr.S. Ramachandra Ayyar for the appellant that we should read this document as a partial dedication, where a charge is created on the property, or there is a trust to receive, and apply for, a portion of the income for religious purposes is, in our opinion, unsound. What is decided here is that the property is given out and out for the performance of the religious purposes and the testator does not retain any proprietary rights in the property in favour of any of his heirs at law. The observations of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Sree Sree Ishwari Bhubaneswari Thakurani v. Braja Nath De4, do not in any way help the appellant’s contention. Their Lordships there observe: “The effect of a valid deed of dedication is to place the property comprised in the endowment extra commercium and beyond the reach of creditors. The observations of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Sree Sree Ishwari Bhubaneswari Thakurani v. Braja Nath De4, do not in any way help the appellant’s contention. Their Lordships there observe: “The effect of a valid deed of dedication is to place the property comprised in the endowment extra commercium and beyond the reach of creditors. The dedication is not invalidated by reason of the fact that members of the settlor’s family are nominated as shebait and given reasonable remuneration out of the endowment and also rights of residence in the dedicated property.” Their Lordships further draw the distinction between absolute and partial dedication and on the facts of that case they agreed with the lower Court that the deed in question effectively dedicated the properties to the service of the idol. We do not think that the learned advocate for the appellant can gain any support for his contention from the observations of their Lordships. The facts of the case in Ramappa Naidu v. Lakshmanan Chettiar5,are absolutely different. It was found there that the charities which were detailed in the will would not consume any considerable portion of the income even if they were conducted on a lavish scale and that a very large amount of the income was left intact for the enjoyment of the family; nor was it satisfactorily shown that all other properties were given to the son of the testator by the will at all. On these facts, the learned Judges Madhavan Nair and Curgenven, JJ., were of opinion that the properties covered by the will were not absolutely dedicated to the trust but were only charged with carrying out the trust as the dominating purpose and the intention of the testator, in executing the will, was to provide for the members of his family, and the maintenance and conduct of the charity was only of subsidiary importance. The facts of the present case are absolutely different from what the learned Judges had to consider therein. The facts of the present case are absolutely different from what the learned Judges had to consider therein. Similarly if we look at the facts of the case in Thiruvengadamudayanaiya v. Narasimhaswamiaiya6, it will be seen that the surplus income from the property, after expending a portion of the same for certain charitable purposes, was far greater than what was required to comply with the directions of the testa- trix with regard to the religious and charitable purposes and under those circumstances the proper inference was that the property was merely charged to charitable uses and that the residuary legatee took the property subject to the charge. It is difficult to see how the decision in Jainambukanni Ammal v. Ruthrapathy Pillai1, can be of any assistance to the appellant. What the learned judges held was that on reading the settlement deed as a whole, there was no gift of the surplus income to the sons or the members of the family in general and that the charity itself is the true beneficiary and that the testator’s son-in-law should be considered to be a trustee of the charity and the only obligation of the trustee, for the time being, was to utilise the surplus income, if any, for the maintenance of the three specified relatives after whose death or effacement otherwise, there will be no obligation on the trustee to utilise any part of the income from the property for any object other than the charitable object mentioned in the document. There are observations in the judgment which tend to show that the proper construction was that there was a dedication of the property to charity. As observed by Rajamannar, J., as he then was, in that case after quoting the decision of the Judicial Committee in Har Narayan v. Surja Konwari2, in such cases the only rule which appears to be established is that there cannot be any fixed and absolute rule to construe the effect of any particular document. We do not think that any of the cases cited by the appellant’s counsel is against the interpretation which we are inclined to put upon the will. We do not think that any of the cases cited by the appellant’s counsel is against the interpretation which we are inclined to put upon the will. We have no doubt whatever that on the death of Parvathi Bai the testator intended that the Hindu Religious Endowments Committee of Coimbatore taluk, as the dharmakartha for these charities, should take over possession of the house and utilise portions of the income for the specific objects mentioned in the will. The reason why it was found necessary to appoint the Hindu Religious Endowments Committee as the dharmakartha was that the religious ceremonies were to be conducted in, or with respect to, institutions of which the trustees were different individuals and not one and the same. It is also important to note that the entire income has to be utilised for the various religious ceremonies. The document does not show that any surplus is to be had after meeting the expenses and as such, even according to the decisions cited by the appellant’s learned counsel to which we have referred, when there is no surplus income to be enjoyed by the legatees or the heirs of the testator, the only inference that is possible is that the entire property is dedicated as a trust. It is next contended by the appellant that even if the intention of the testator was that after the death of his widow Parvathi Bai the Hindu Religious Endowments Committee of Coimbatore shall be the dharmakartha and perform these religious kattalais in the various institutions mentioned therein, the Taluk Endowments Committee, as constituted, was not a body competent to hold any property on behalf of the trust and such being the case the trustee designated under the will was incapable of holding property and therefore the trust failed on the death of Parvathi Bai. For this contention, our attention was invited to various provisions of Act XX or 1863, viz., an Act to enable the Government to divest itself of the management of Religious Endowments. We were invited to consider the scope and effect of sections 3, 4, 7, 11, 12 and 13. Section 3 contemplates that the local government should make provision respecting temples and mosques with regard to their management because Regulation VII of 1817, so far as Madras Province was concerned, related to the appointment of managers, trustees and superintendents. We were invited to consider the scope and effect of sections 3, 4, 7, 11, 12 and 13. Section 3 contemplates that the local government should make provision respecting temples and mosques with regard to their management because Regulation VII of 1817, so far as Madras Province was concerned, related to the appointment of managers, trustees and superintendents. Section 5 provided the procedure in case of disputes as to right of succession to vacated trusteeship and to apply to the Civil Court to appoint a manager of such mosque, temple or religious institution and the manager so appointed shall exercise all the powers under the Act which the trustee, manager, or superintendent under Regulation VII of 1817 had. We may, in this connection, refer to section 4 of the Act which contemplates transfer of property to independent trustees, etc., belonging to their trusts, etc., remaining in charge of Revenue Board or others. It contemplates transfer to a trustee if there is one and if not to the Committee. Section 11 prohibits any member of a Committee from acting as the trustee or manager or superintendent of a mosque or temple; and section 12 lays down that on the appointment of a Committee, the Board and local agents shall transfer properties to the Committee. Section 13 provides for keeping of accounts of receipts and disbursements. According to Regulation VII of 1817 which was repealed by Act XX of 1863, the Board of Revenue was the supervisory body but. when Act XX came into existence and a Committee was constituted, the supervisory power was given to the Committee. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that according to clause VII, Regulation VII of 1817, which enacted that to enable the Board of Revenue to better carry into effect the duties entrusted to them by this regulation, local agents shall be appointed in each zillah, subject to the authority, control and orders of that Board it might have been possible for a local agent to hold property but not to the Board and when this regulation was repealed by Act XX of 1863, the Committee that was constituted could not take upon itself the trusteeship of any religious endowment. We do not think that there is any absolute prohibition so far as the functioning as trustee by the Committee is concerned. We do not think that there is any absolute prohibition so far as the functioning as trustee by the Committee is concerned. Sections 5 to 7 of Act XX of 1863 by implication allow the committee to hold the property. Section 12 speaks of the management of the affairs. We may also refer to the preamble in Regulation VII of 1817, viz., the collection of rents and profits and clause XV of the Regulation which provided that the Board had the right to appropriate the income, which meant that it had the power of management as mentioned in clause XII. On a careful consideration of the various provisions of Regulation VII of 1817 and Act XX of 1863, we are not satisfied that the contention of the learned counsel that the Hindu Religious Endowments Committee cannot hold the property as trustee, is sound. No doubt section 11 of Act XX of 1863 states that no member of a committee shall act as trustee, manager, etc., of a temple, mosque or religious establishment for the management of which such committee shall have been appointed. The literal meaning of this section is that any person who happens to be a member of a Committee which was a collective body cannot function as a trustee of an institution over which the Committee as such has got superintendence. But in Panduranga v. Nagappa1, Muttuswami Ayyar and Parker, JJ., have held that the plaintiffs there, who were members of a temple committee appointed under Act XX of 1863, were not entitled to claim possession of the temple and its properties from the hereditary trustee even if it were found to be subject to their jurisdiction because the learned Judges say that it is provided by section 11 of Act XX of 1863, that no member of a committee shall be capable of being, or shall act as, the trustee of a temple for the management of which such committee shall have been appointed. The learned Judges have interpreted the prohibition to possession of the temple and its properties as trustee, to the collective body of the Temple Committee and not only to the individuals. In Ramanatha Chettiar v. Swaminatha Aiyar2, the learned Judges, Benson and Sadasiva Ayyar; JJ., have considered the powers of a Committee appointed under the Hindu Religious Endowments’ Act and at page 281 they refer to Panduranga v. Nagappa1. In Ramanatha Chettiar v. Swaminatha Aiyar2, the learned Judges, Benson and Sadasiva Ayyar; JJ., have considered the powers of a Committee appointed under the Hindu Religious Endowments’ Act and at page 281 they refer to Panduranga v. Nagappa1. In the opinion of the learned Judges if the Committee members usurp the powers of a temple trustee, such usurpation cannot prevent the trustee from claiming and taking back the powers at any time; the usurping committee members are trustees de son tort and as such are liable for the trust monies to the cestui que trust. One thing is deducible from this decision and it is that if the members of a Committee begin to function as trustee, they are liable to be proceeded against as trustees. In the well-known Srirangam case 3, the powers of a Temple Committee are discussed and considered by Wallis, C.J. and Seshagiri Ayyar, J. Seshagiri Ayyar, J., at page 717 considered this aspect of the case and held that the intention of the Legislature was not to give larger powers to the committee than were possessed by the Revenue Board under Regulation VII of 1817. Here also reference has been made to a number of cases. In none of these cases has the question been considered or decided as to whether the Committee as such can accept and hold property on behalf of the trust. As we have already remarked sections 5 and 7 of Act XX of 1863 read with the preamble to Recusation VII and clause XV of the Regulation contemplate that the Committee can receive and hold property. We are therefore of opinion that the dedication of the property and the constitution of the Temple Committee to manage as dharmakartha cannot be questioned. The further point arising from this conclusion is whether, assuming that the Committee can accept the trusteeship as an obligation and function as such on the death of Parvathi Bai in 1943, the rights and obligations did not devolve upon the Hindu Religious Endowments Board and as such the plaintiff could not have been invested with any powers to file the suit by the Hindu Religious Endowments Board. The earliest of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act was Act I of 1925 which was repealed and re-enacted as consolidated Act by the Madras Act II of 1927, Section 4 of Act I of 1925 which corresponds to section 8 of the Act II of 1927 repealed the Hindu Religious Endowments Act of 1863 and the Madras Endowment and Escheats Regulations of 1817, Regulation VII of 1817 in so far as they apply to Hindu Religious Endowments in the Province of Madras Section 6 of Madras Act II of 1927 repealed Madras Act I of 1925. Section 79 of Madras Act I of 1925 which corresponds to section 83 of Madras Act II of 1927 laid down that every Committee established under the Religious Endowments Act 1863, which was in existence at the commencement of Act I of 1925, shall be deemed to have been duly constituted under the provisions of that Act. Such being the case the Devasthanam Committees which were in existence when Madras Act I of 1925 came into force should be deemed to have been constituted under the provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act. The result is it cannot be construed that those Committees were continued in existence but that such Committees were newly constituted after the notional dissolution of the existing Committees, especially since the words of the section are “shall be deemed to have been duly constituted under the provisions of this Act.” There can therefore be no devolution or perpetuation of the old Committee under section 79 of Act I of 1925 but only the creation and the continuation of new Committees under this Act. Section 5; sub-section (2) of Madras Act I of 1925 corresponding to section 0 sub-section (2) of Act II of 1927 states that the “Committee” means “a Committee as constituted under section 16 of Act I of 1925,” corresponding to section 20 of Act 11 of 1927. Section 16 of Madras Act I of 1925 which is ad idem with section 20 of Act II of 1927 empowers the local government by notification, to direct the constitution of a Committee for any temple or temples or for any class of temples and varying the strength or the jurisdiction of any such Committee. There are provisos to that section which we need not refer at present. There are provisos to that section which we need not refer at present. Under section 32 of Madras Act II of 1927, every Committee shall, by such name as the Local Government may determine, be a body corporate and shall have perpetual succession and a common seal and shall, by the said name, sue and be sued, so that Temple Committees are corporations as Constituted under the Act. The Hindu Religious Endowments Act II of 1927 was further amended by Madras Act V of 1944 which by section 34 omitted section 83 of Madras Act II of 1927, which, as we have said corresponded to section 79 of Madras Act I of 1925. The result of this is that all the Committees constituted either under Madras Act I of 1925 or under Act II of 1927 have got dissolved and did not have any legal existence after the coming into operation of Madras Act V of 1944 which received the assent of the Governor on the 7th March, 1944 and was published in Fort St. George Gazette, on the same day. Therefore, on and after the 7th March, 1944, in the Province of Madras there could have been no Temple Committee constituted or created by any Hindu Religious Endowments Act. . Granting therefore that on the death of Parvathi Bai in 1943, the Coimbatore Taluk Devasthanam Committee began to function as the trustee of the various endowments charged with the duties of conducting the religious ceremonies in the temples, this Committee became dissolved and was functus officio by the enactment of section 34 of Madras Act V of 1944. There are provisions in Madras Act V of 1944 by which the Hindu Religious Endowments Board itself could, in certain cases, assign the duties of the Committee to various officers. But it has to be borne in mind here that the Committee ceased to exist on the 7th March, 1944, whereas in the present case the suit was filed by the plaintiff on 15th January, 1944, when the Committee was in existence. But it has to be borne in mind here that the Committee ceased to exist on the 7th March, 1944, whereas in the present case the suit was filed by the plaintiff on 15th January, 1944, when the Committee was in existence. In Lakshmana Ayyar v. R.S. Nayudu1, this Court held that under section 79 (1) of Madras Act I of 1925, any Committee established under the Act of 1863 in existence at the commencement of the Act of 1925, is to be regarded by law as if it were one constituted under section 16 of the latter Act and the Local Government has, by virtue of section 16, power to vary or abolish such a Committee. It was further held that even if the Local Government has no power to vary or abolish the Committee under the Act of 1925 still, under Act II of 1927, under section 20 (1) such powers have become vested in the Government. This decision was cited in support of the contention that the Committee could have filed a suit so far as the trust in question is concerned. In our opinion there is nothing that can be gathered from this judgment which can be of any help for the decision of the present case. As we have remarked, if the Committee could function as a trustee, it was a body that was in existence on the 15th January, 1944, when the plaint was filed and therefore none of its powers could have been exercised by the trustee of the Koniamman temple after getting the sanction of the Hindu Religious Endowments Board. Such being the case, the plaintiff in this case, when he filed the suit, had no locus standi and had no authority to come to Court for the purpose of the reliefs asked for in the plaint. In this view it seems to us that the suit was filed by an unauthorised person who had no power to do so when he initiated the proceedings. The appellant further contended, relying on paragraph 811 at page 945 of the tenth edition of Mayne of Hindu Law and Bhaba Tarini Debt v. Asha Lata Debi2, that trusteeship is property and that the first defendant here, the appellant, should be considered to be a trustee. The appellant further contended, relying on paragraph 811 at page 945 of the tenth edition of Mayne of Hindu Law and Bhaba Tarini Debt v. Asha Lata Debi2, that trusteeship is property and that the first defendant here, the appellant, should be considered to be a trustee. We do not think it necessary, in the view which we take of the disability attaching to the plaintiff for the filing of the suit, to consider the merits of this question. As we have held that the plaintiff has no right to maintain the suit, the appeal has to be allowed and the suit dismissed with costs throughout. The plaintiff will pay one set of costs in this appeal to the first defendant-appellant and another set to the contesting defendants-tenants. The memorandum of cross-objections does not arise as we are dismissing the suit and is therefore dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. The appellant will pay the Court-fee to the Government. K.S. ----- Appeal allowed.