Judgment These are all connected matters and present a story of tangled, and chronic litigation. The facts in a nut-shell are these. Saradambal is the judgment-debtor in O.S. No. 153 of 1940, a mortgage suit. The preliminary decree in the suit was passed against her and in favour of Gavaramma, the decree-holder, for more than Rs. 3,400 on 28th August, 1941. The final decree was passed on 16th February, 1945. The sum due by the judgment-debtor at the time of the sale, on 11th March, 1946, of 2 acres 40 cents, out of the mortgaged properties amounting to 6 acres 16 cents, was about Rs. 4,250, according to her counsel, and Rs. 4,500, according to the decree-holder’s counsel. The 2 acres 40 cents were, admittedly, sold on 11th March, 1946, for Rs. 4, 150, leaving only a sum of Rs. 100 as balance, according to the judgment-debtor, and a sum of Rs. 300 or Rs. 35a as balance, according to the decree-holder. The judgment-debtor alleged that there was an agreement entered into with her by the decree-holder some time in March, 1944-the exact date is not given-agreeing to take Rs. 2,700 in full quit and allowing her to pay the amount before the end of April, 1946, and promising that the final decree proceedings and execution would not be taken out till the end of April, 1946. But the said agreement, according to her, was broken by the decree-holder, when she got a final dercree, behind her back, on 16th February, 1945, and took out execution and brought her properties to sale on 11th March, 1946. One curious thing here is that the agreement itself was not produced in Court by the judgment-debtor and that not one pie was paid actually by her before the end of April, 1946, to the decree-holder or deposited into Court, though it is alleged that the judgment-debtor once tried to take Rs. 1,500 to the decree-holder but without succeeding in making her accept that sum. What is more, the judgment-debtor’s attempt to get the final decree (alleged to have been passed without notice to her) set aside collapsed and the final decree became conclusive ten months before the filing of E.A. No. 4 of 1946 to record the alleged arrangement, of March 1944. What is more, the judgment-debtor’s attempt to get the final decree (alleged to have been passed without notice to her) set aside collapsed and the final decree became conclusive ten months before the filing of E.A. No. 4 of 1946 to record the alleged arrangement, of March 1944. The judgment-debtor tried in both the lower Courts to get an enquiry made into this alleged agreement after execution was taken out regarding the final decree; but both the lower Courts held that there was no merit in the application and that such an application was not maintainable after the passing of the final decree and the knowledge of the final decree by the judgment-debtor months before. C.M. S.A. No. 102 of 1948, is filed against the order of the lower appellate Court confirming the first Court’s order refusing to go into this alleged agreement. Mr. Satyanarayana, the learned counsel for the judgment-debtor, relied on the Full Bench rulings in Chidambaram Chettiar v. Krishna Vathiar1, and Adappa Papamma v. Dhanba Venkayya2, and argued that such an agreement should be enquired into even during the execution proceedings, despite the passing of a decree. But the question really is not that. The question is whether this agreement deserved to be enquired into in the circumstances of this case, where the judgment-debtor knew about the final decree preoceedings and did not raise the question then. I am of opinion that this agreement was rightly refused to be gone into by both the Courts below in view of this and the ruling of the Privy Council in Madan Theatres v. Dinshaw and Co.3, though but for it, it might be technically maintainable. The alleged agreement is of uncertain but ancient date. The time fixed for payment of the alleged Rs. 2,700 in full satisfaction has also elapsed without a pie being paid. Four years have gone by, and nothing has been paid. So, there is no question of recording any agreement, compromise or satisfaction in the execution petition proceedings. The agreement itself was not produced in the Courts below The final decree was passed after sufficient service, and therefore will be binding on the judgment-debtor, all whose attempts to get it set aside proved futile. So, there is no question of recording any agreement, compromise or satisfaction in the execution petition proceedings. The agreement itself was not produced in the Courts below The final decree was passed after sufficient service, and therefore will be binding on the judgment-debtor, all whose attempts to get it set aside proved futile. In these circumstances no useful purpose of any kind would have been served by the lower Courts’ going into this alleged stale agreement of March, 1944, even if it was open to them to do so which I doubt. I, therefore, dismiss C.M.S.A. No. 102 of 1948 with costs. Leave refused. Now I come to the other three matters. The facts relating to these may be briefly stated. The judgment-debtor filed a petition under Order 21, rule 90, Civil Procedure Code on 8th April, 1946, for setting aside the sale of the 2 acres-40 cents, of the mortgaged properties held on 11th March, 1946, relying on various grounds. She was asked to furnish sufficient immoveable property security or cash security, and she offered 2 acres 91 cents out of the unsold mortgaged lands stating that they would be worth seven thousands even after deducting the Rs. 100 due to the decree-holder. An amin of the first Court valued these 2 acres 91 cents at Rs. 7,000 and certified that the only encumbrance on these lands was the sum due to the decree-holder which is admitted by the decree-holder’s counsel before me to have been only Rs. 300 or Rs. 350 at the time the security was offered. Even supposing that these 2 acres 91 cents were only worth at the same rate as 2 acres 40 cents, sold on nth March, 1946, it being admitted that these lands are at least of equal value with the lands sold, their value would be nearly Rs. 5,000, and deducting the Rs. 300 or Rs. 350 due to the decree-holder, they would be worth more than Rs. 4,500, and should have sufficed as ample security. But, somehow, the first Court considered that the properties mortgaged to the decree-holder should not be offered as security, and that cash security should have been. 5,000, and deducting the Rs. 300 or Rs. 350 due to the decree-holder, they would be worth more than Rs. 4,500, and should have sufficed as ample security. But, somehow, the first Court considered that the properties mortgaged to the decree-holder should not be offered as security, and that cash security should have been. given, though I see no distinction in principle between the properties mortgaged to the decree-holder and properties mortgaged to others, in the matter of security, and though in this case there was no doubt that the properties offered as security were more than ample to serve as security for this petition under Order 21, rule 90, of the Code, but no cash security was really necessary. Every order rejecting security has, of course, to be based on sound judicial grounds. Nor was even time given for furnishing cash security after this ample security was rejected offhand. What is even more curious is that the first Court confirmed the sale on 16th April, 1946, even before rejecting the security, nay, even before the Amin’s report regarding the test was received on 17th May, 1946. It rejected the security only on 5th July, 1946. C.R.P. No. 672 of 1947 and C.M.S.A. No. 78 of 1947 have been filed against the order rejecting the unregistered petition under Order 21, rule 90, Civil Procedure Code without any enquiry, after rejecting the security on 5th July, 1946. The C.R.P. and C.M.S.A. have both been filed by way of abundant caution owing to the doubt as to which of them would be maintainable in the circumstances. C.R.P. No. 241 of 1949 has been filed against the order of the District Judge, West Godavari, dismissing A.S. No. 338 of 1946 confirming the first Court’s order dated 6th July, 1946, confirming the sale without enquiring into the petition under Order 21, rule 90, Civil Procedure Code filed long before the confirmation. After hearing the learned counsel for the judgment-debtor and the learned counsel for the decree-holder, I have no doubt whatever that the first Court should have accepted the security of 2 acres 91 cents tendered by the judgment-debtor and gone into the petition under Order 21, rule 90, Civil Procedure Code, and decided it on the merits, and deferred the confirmation of the sale held on nth March, 1946, till such decision. After all, a Court of justice, equity and good conscience, (every Court in the Indian Republic is that) should not stand on mere technicalities, especially when these technicalities are also no real bar, as here. As a Court of equity, the first Court could and should have tempered the rigour of law, and rendered justice by accepting the ample security tendered, and numbering the petition under Order 21, rule 90, Civil Procedure Code and deciding it on merits. Mr. Satya-narayana urged that the judgment-debtor was a helpless and ignorant woman and so deserved some more consideration than the usual run of litigants. This is not allowable under the law, which looks not to caste, creed, colour, class, sex or country, though it is well known that, sometimes our Courts view minors, women, temples, trusts etc., with a little extra indulgence. But, here, no extra indulgence was required. The judgment-debtor was entitled as of right under the law to have her security accepted and to have her petition numbered and enquired into. In the result, I set aside the orders of both the Courts below, dismissing the petition, filed by the judgment-debtor under Order 21, rule 90, Civil Procedure Code and direct the District Munsiff of Tanku to take the petition under Order 21, rule 90, Civil Procedure Code, on his file, after accepting the security of 2 acres 91 cents tendered and taking a bond in the proper form, and to proceed with it and dispose of it according to law. The confirmation of the sale held on 11th March, 1946, is also set aside, and the confirmation will await the disposal of the petition under Order 21, rule 90, Civil Procedure Code. In the circumstances, there will be no orders as to costs in these three matters. Leave refused in C.M.S.A. No. 78 of 1947. V.P.S. ----- C.M.S.A. No. 102 of 1948, dismissed. C.R.P. No. 672 of 1947, C.R.P. No. 241 of 1949 and C.M.S.A. No. 78 of 1947, allowed.