JUDGMENT Kidwai, J. - On the 15th of April 1943 Abdul Ghafoor, general agent of Khan, Sahib khurshed Hasan Khan proprietor(sic) of village Budhani, a hamlet Tilyani, in the district of Sitapur, executed an agricultural lease of 8 plots of land in the village in favour of Ganga Bux Singh. On the 6th of December, 1943, Ganga Bux Singh presented this lease for registration and he applied for extention of time under the provisions of Section 25 of the Indian Registration Act. Time was extended by an order of the District Registrar dated the 17th of December 1943. Thereupon the document was sent to the Sub-Registrar for registration. 2. On the 12th of January, 1944 notice was issued by the Sub-Registrar to Abdul Ghafoor to appear and get the document registered. Abdul Ghafoor did not appear. The Sub-Registrar treated his non appearance as a denial of execution and refused to register the document. After this Ganga Bux Singh appealed u/s 73 of the Registration Act to the District Registrar, but the District Registrar also refused to register the document by his order dated the 24th of March 1944. 3. On the 13th April, 1944, that is to say within thirty days of the order of the District Registrar refusing to register the document, Ganga Bux Singh instituted the suit out of which this appeal arises claiming registration of the document. He impleaded only Abdul Ghafoor as the Defendant. He alleged that Abdul Ghafoor had no valid reason for failure to get the document registered. 4. In the defence it was pleaded(sic) that the signature of Abdul Ghafoor had been obtained by misrepresentation and fraud: that Khurshed Hasan Khan is a necessary party to the suit and that the order of the District Registrar dated the 17th of December 1943 granting an extension of time is invalid. 5. The trial court found that misrepresentation and fraud alleged by the Defendant have not been proved. It also found that Khurshed Hasan khan was not a necessary party to the suit since it was not he who executed the document, but Abdul Ghafoor. It remarked that if Abdul Ghafoor was not duly authorized to register the document that would be a matter that would be decided when Ganga Bux Singh claimed possession under the document. It also found that Khurshed Hasan khan was not a necessary party to the suit since it was not he who executed the document, but Abdul Ghafoor. It remarked that if Abdul Ghafoor was not duly authorized to register the document that would be a matter that would be decided when Ganga Bux Singh claimed possession under the document. The court also held that the civil court cannot interfere into the validity of the order passed by the District Registrar extending time. In view of its findings on the various issues the learned Munsif of Sitapur decreed the suit with costs and directed the registration of the document at the Misrik Registration Office. 6. Abdul Ghafoor appealed. The learned District Judge of Sitapur upheld the findings of the Munsif and dismissed the appeal. The Defendant has now come in second appeal. His learned Advocate has contended that no registration could be effected because the presentation was illegal and that the order allowing extension of time pissed by the District Registrar on the 17th of December 1943 was ultra vires. He has also repeated the plea that Khurshed Hasan Khan was a necessary party to these proceedings. 7. u/s 23 of the Indian Registration Act, a document has to be presented for registration within four months from the date of its execution. In this case, therefore, the lease should have been presented for registration before the 15th of August 1943. It was not so presented. There are, however, several exceptions to the rule contained in Section 23. One of these exceptions is contained in Section 25 which provides that, if, owing to urgent necessity or unavoidable accident any document is not presented for registration till after the expiry of the time prescribed in that behalf, the Registrar, "in cases where the delay in presentation does not exceed four months" may direct such document to be accepted for registration. By virtue of this section it was open to the District Registrar to allow the document to be accepted for registration if it was presented before the 15th of December 1943. In the present case the document was presented on the 6th of December 1943. The presentation was, therefore, in accordance with the provisions of Section 25. 8. By virtue of this section it was open to the District Registrar to allow the document to be accepted for registration if it was presented before the 15th of December 1943. In the present case the document was presented on the 6th of December 1943. The presentation was, therefore, in accordance with the provisions of Section 25. 8. As to whether there was an urgent necessity or unavoidable accident which led to the delay, it was for the District Registrar to determine, and it is not the function of the civil court to sit in appeal over his decision when no such appeal is allowed by the provisions of the Indian Registration Act. Thus there was a valid presentation for registration. 9. There is nothing in Section 25 which requires the District Registrar to pass his order also within the period of eight months which Section 25 contemplates. To read such a provision into the Act would mean that there would be a curtailment of the period allowed to the applicant to present the document because the order of the District Registrar would naturally be passed after some inquiries. This means that the applicant would have to present the document in good time before the expiry of eight months in order to enable the District Registrar to satisfy himself as to the correctness of the allegations. There is no justification in Section 25 for this view. The order of the 17th of December, 1943, extending time was, therefore, not without jurisdiction and was an exercise of discretion by the District Registrar with which the Civil Court cannot interfere. 10. The plea the Khurshed Hasan Khan was a necessary party was negatived by the trial court. In the grounds of appeal to the lower appellate court it was not taken, but it has been taken again in the appeal to this Court. Since the plea was not taken in the lower appellate court it would not really be open in a second appeal. 11. The learned Advocate for the Appellant has, however, contended that it is a pure question of law which should be allowed to be agitated since it finds place in the grounds of appeal to this Court. Even if this plea is allowed to be taken, it has no substance. 12. 11. The learned Advocate for the Appellant has, however, contended that it is a pure question of law which should be allowed to be agitated since it finds place in the grounds of appeal to this Court. Even if this plea is allowed to be taken, it has no substance. 12. In the present case Abdul Ghafoor was not an agent authorized to present a document executed by his principal for registration. He himself had executed the document. Whether he had authority to do so or not is a matter which does not arise for consideration in this suit. As the tiral Court has printed out, that would be a matter to be determined When Ganga Bux Singh claims possession under the document. The only question at present involved is whether Abdul Ghafoor can be compelled to get registered a document which he himself has executed. Khurshed Hasan Khan could not have been called before the Sub-Registrar to register the document when Abdul Ghafoor refused to get it registered. Notice was only necessary to Abdul Ghafoor. That being so Abdul Ghafoor was the only person who could have been impleaded as Defendant in this suit out of which this appeal arises. Khurshed Hasan Khan was, therefore, not a necessary party. 13. The decree of the lower court is not challenged on any other ground. The pleas of fraud and mis-representation have been negatived. The document must therefore, be held to have been executed by Abdul Ghafoor and there is no defect in the order of the courts below directing the registration in accordance with Section 77 of the Indian Registration Act. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.