Judgment This second appeal arises out of a suit under section 21 of the Malabar Tenancy Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) for restoration of possession of land which the plaintiff having held it on a kanom under the first defendant surrendered to him after expiry of the term in response to a demand by the first defendant that he required it for his own cultivation. The plaintiff’s case is that he did not bona fide so require it because the first defendant having thus obtained possession on 16th March, 1943, made a transfer of the property to the second defendant on 28th March, 1943, barely 12 days afterwards. The answer to the action so far as material to the disposal of this second appeal-was twofold: (1) that there was no eviction of the plaintiff in a suit under section 20 of the Act for any right of suit for restoration under section 21 to arise or accrue; and (2) that the suit laid on 9th October, 1944, more than one year from the date of the transfer is time barred under section 43(1)(a) of the Act. The Courts below have concurrently negatived the first line of defence. As to the second, the lower appellate Court has upheld it differing from the trial Court and has consequently dismissed the suit as time barred. Mr. Pocker assails the judgment of the lower appellate Court on the point of limitation, while Mr. Ramakrishna Aiyar besides maintaining it as correct, attacks the view of the Courts below on the first line of defence as erroneous. The ground of difference between the Courts below on the question of limitation lies in this: that whereas the trial Court holds that the date of the second defendant getting into possession which was one year after the surrender is the terminus a quo the lower appellate Court holds the date of the transfer to the second defendant to be the starting point of limitation. In my judgment, the transfer contemplated by section 43(1)(a) of the Act is clearly the transfer referred to in section 21(1) as “on any kind of lease or mortgage with possession or on kanom, kuzhikanom or verumpattam”. In my judgment, the transfer contemplated by section 43(1)(a) of the Act is clearly the transfer referred to in section 21(1) as “on any kind of lease or mortgage with possession or on kanom, kuzhikanom or verumpattam”. In the present case the transfer to the second defendant is what is evidenced by Exhibits D-3 and D-1 executed on one and the same date, the registered mortgage by the first defendant to the second and the registered panaya kychit by the second defendant to the first, respectively. If possession under the transfer passed to the second defendant only one year thereafter as held by the learned District Munsif in the trial Court the suit would be in time. That question has not been considered by the learned Subordinate Judge on appeal in the erroneous view that he took that it is immaterial, what is material according to him being only the date of the transfer. This case must therefore go back to the lower appellate Court for a fresh determination of the question subject to my decision on the first line of defence to the suit repelled by the Courts below but sought to be supported by Mr. Ramakrishna Aiyar before me. The view of the Courts below as to this is that in terms of section 21(1) of the Act the present is a case in which eviction as defined by section 3(e), i.e., recovery of possession of land from a tenant, was obtained by the first defendant on the ground specified in clause (5) of section 20, no matter that he obtained it by merely making a private demand and without having recourse to a suit under section 20. No doubt section 21(1) following, and it does, closely upon section 20 which relates to a suit for eviction prima facie suggests that the eviction referred to in section 21(1) is one obtained by means of a suit as mentioned in section 20(1). I am not however satisfied on the careful thought bestowed by me since reservation of judgment that the view of the Courts below is erroneous. It seems to me that while juxtaposition of sections in a statute may well afford sometimes a helpful clue to their interpretation, the language of each section by itself is the more material matter on a question of its interpretation. It seems to me that while juxtaposition of sections in a statute may well afford sometimes a helpful clue to their interpretation, the language of each section by itself is the more material matter on a question of its interpretation. “Eviction” in the marginal note to section 20 means, as the section itself shows, eviction by means of a suit, That however is no reason why eviction in section 21(1) should not be understood as covering eviction otherwise than by suit, if the wider connotation is, as I hold, warranted by the definition of “eviction” in section 3(e), namely, that it means recovery of possession of land from a tenant, simpliciter and no matter how. The definition does not of course govern where there is something repugnant to in the subject or context. In my opinion, there is nothing however in the subject or context of section 21(1) which is repugnant to the application of the definition to the word “eviction” occurring there. “In any case” is the expression with which the section begins, not “in the case of any suit”. “On the ground specified” in clause (5) of section 20 and not “under clause (5) of section 20” are again the words which we have in the section. Far from there being anything in the subject or context of section 21(1) to preclude the importation thereinto of the general definition of “eviction” in section 3(e) it seems to me that there is in the language of section 21(1) as chosen by the Legislature an intention revealed not to restrict the beneficent operation of this section only to cases of eviction obtained by means of suits as provided for in the immediately preceding section. It is true, as I had occasion to observe in Ramayya v. Venkata Subba Rao1, that the equity of the statute, as it is sometimes called, cannot override its plain language; nor is any benevolent interpretation of a statute permissible which extends the spirit of a section of the statute beyond its plain letter and unequivocal tenor. It is true, as I had occasion to observe in Ramayya v. Venkata Subba Rao1, that the equity of the statute, as it is sometimes called, cannot override its plain language; nor is any benevolent interpretation of a statute permissible which extends the spirit of a section of the statute beyond its plain letter and unequivocal tenor. It is equally clear however to my mind that where the language of a section is sufficiently wide to indicate a beneficial operation wider than what another section may suggest, the Court ought not to whittle down or curtail such beneficial operation which is in accord with the general design of the statute by reference to the narrower scope and ambit of that other section. It is suggested by Mr. Ramakrishna Aiyar that a distinction ought to be made on principle between cases where eviction is obtained by means of a suit under section 20 of the Act and cases where eviction is obtained by private treaty between the landlord and the tenant. The principle according to the learned counsel, is that in the former case there is unimpeachable record in a judicial proceeding that the landlord did require the premises for his own cultivation but not bona fide as his later conduct-might show, while in the latter case proof of such requirement by the landlord and the lack of bona fides about it as well as a decision by the Court on such proof would be a matter more difficult in rerum nature, especially when the question happens to arise after a long lapse of time, as it may well do, in view of the provision of so long a period as six years which the statute contains for any subsequent transfer by the landlord as giving rise to the right on the part of the tenant to be restored to possession on the ground of such transfer. I am not prepared to say that this difference, really affects the principle applicable to the situation with which I am called upon to deal, which is one of proper construction of the statute on its language. “Eviction” according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary is derived from vincere, to conquer, and means expulsion, especially of a tenant from land, or more generally recovery of property from a person by legal process. “Eviction” according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary is derived from vincere, to conquer, and means expulsion, especially of a tenant from land, or more generally recovery of property from a person by legal process. As pointed out in Ramanatha Aiyar’s Law Lexicon of British India the word is derived from evinco, to overcome, and according to Tomlin’s Law Dictionary quoted by the author means, a recovery of land, etc., by form of law. The author further observes: “In its original and technical meaning it is an expulsion by the assertion of a paramount title and by process of law; a recovery of land, etc., by form of law; a lawful dispossession by judgment of law: an ouster. Act of the landlord with the intention and having the effect of depriving the tenant of the enjoyment of the demised premises; the term is now popularly applied to every class of expulsion.” The definition of the word “eviction” in section 3(e) of the Act, it will be seen, is not restricted to cases of expulsion in the sense of ejection by force which is the ordinary meaning of the word as given in the Dictionaries, for instance, the Concise Oxford Dictionary. Much less is it restricted to dispossession by judgment in a suit. It means purely and simply recovery of possession according to the statutory defini-tion-no matter how the recovery comes about. As indicated by the very opening words of section 3 and as also observed in Halsbury’s Laws of England, 2nd edition, volume 31, page 477 in paragraph 591: “If a defined expression is used in a context which the definition will not fit, it may be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning..” I am unable to see how the definition of“eviction”in the interpretation section does not fit the context of section 21 unless it be that the very juxtaposition of that section with section 20 is to entail a different result. As already indicated by me, such a result does not necessarily follow from the juxtaposition. Another rule of interpretation of statutes applicable to the matter on hand is thus stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England, 2nd edn., vol. As already indicated by me, such a result does not necessarily follow from the juxtaposition. Another rule of interpretation of statutes applicable to the matter on hand is thus stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England, 2nd edn., vol. 31, at page 464 in paragraph 566 and again at page 483 in paragraph 603: “Notwithstanding that every section of a statute is a substantive enactment in itself, the statute must be read and construed as a whole, though one section may bear a wider, another a more limited meaning.” Applying the rule thus stated to the case on hand I am of opinion that section 21(1) of the Act which is a substantive enactment in itself is not controlled in the wider meaning of “eviction” which it prima facie carries with it by anything in section 20 with which it occurs in juxtaposition in the statute, with which it no doubt has to be read in order that the statute may be read and construed as a whole, but in which is to be found nothing repugnant, to that wider meaning. This being my view of this aspect of the matter I must remit the case to the Court of First Instance, as agreed upon by both sides before me for a disposal of the suit, with reference to the question of limitation after giving the parties an opportunity for such fresh evidence as they may have on the question. Appellant to have refund of court-fee as well as costs of this appeal. All other costs to abide. No leave. V.S. ----- Case remitted.