JUDGMENT Agarwala. J. 1. This is a plaintiff's appeal arising out of a suit for possession. The facts briefly stated are as follows : One Manna Singh Was the owner of the property in dispute. He died in 1921 leaving three daughters. Changura, Dhanauta and Chaura. There was one Tribeni Shingh. a collateral of Manna Singh. He objected to the mutation of the names of the three daughters in place of Manna Singh, but his objection was overruled and the names of the three daughters were mutated on the property left by Manna Singh. In the year 1922 Tribeni Singh sued the daughters in the civil court for possession on the ground that they were not the daughters of Manna Singh. This suit was dismissed and an appeal was also dismissed in 1924. On 8th of August, 1925. Chaura and Dhanauta, along with Bhagwan Singh, husband of Dhanauta, and Bikram Singh and Jant Singh, sons of Dhanauta and Kumar Singh, husband's brother of Chaura, her husband having died previously and her son Ram Chandra being a minor at that time, executed a simple mortgage in favour of Nandan Singh and ten others, members of joint Hindu family for a sum of Rs. 3500. The property mortgaged was a two-third share in the property of Manna Singh. In the sale-deed it was provided that if, in any case, the mortgagee could not realise his money by sale of the property mortgaged he was entitled to sell property mentioned in list B which was the property of the husbands of Dhanauta and Chaura. On the 27 of August, 1925, all the three daughters, Changura, Dahnauta and Chaura, joined in executing a the mama in respect of the entire property in favour of one Badri Singh, a relation of the mortgagee Nandan Singh. On the 8th of June. 1927, Changura, one of the daughters, and her son Jhilatu, the present appellant, executed a sale deed of one-third share of the property in favour of Tribeni Singh and his brothers Chaura and Dhanauta filed a suit for pre-emption in respect of this sale-deed This suit was decreed on the 4th November, 1928. They deposited the pre-emption money and entered into possession over the property. In order to raise the money required for payment of the decree in the pre-emption . They deposited the pre-emption money and entered into possession over the property. In order to raise the money required for payment of the decree in the pre-emption . suit Dhanauta and Chaura had executed a Sorbhat in favour of Jadunath, a son of Nandan Singh, who filed a suit in 1934 of recovery of the amount due to him as against Dhanauta and Chaura. On the 8th of December, 1934, a consent decree was passed against Dhanauta and Chaura and in execution of this decree the entire property left by Manna Singh which at that time was in possession of Dhanauta and Chaura (one-third share of Changura having been obtained in the per-emption decree) was transferred to Jadunath. Jadunath Singh thus came into possession of the entire property. Chaura died in 1939 leaving her son Bam Chandra; died in 1940 leaving Jhilatu Singh, the present appellant; and Dhanauta died in 1942 leaving two sons, Bikaram Singh and Jeut Singh. After the death of the three daughters a suit was filed by Jhilatu Singh, Bikaram Singh and Jeut Singh on the 9th of January, 1943, as against Jadunath and some subsequent transferees impleading Earn Chandra son of Chaura, as a pro-forma defendant. The relief claimed in the suit was that possession be decreed in favour of the three plaintiffs along with Earn Chandra proforma defendant. The allegations in the plaint were that the transfers made by the daughters were not binding on the plaintiffs and that after the death of the daughters the plaintiffs and Earn Chandar inherited the entire property as reversioners of Manna Singh. 2. The defence to the suit, inter alia, was that the plaintiffs were estopped from challenging the various transfer made by the widows along with the plaintiffs and that, in any case, the suit. was bared u/s 43 of the Transfer of property Act. During the pendency of the suit Bikaram Singh and Jeut Singh, sons of Dhanauta, with drew from the suit having compromised the case with the defendants and Ram Chandra pre-forma defendant stated that he claimed no interest in the property. The fight was, therefore, confined between Jhilatu Singh on the one side and Jadunath Singh and his transferees on the other. The trial court rejected the defence and decreed the suit. The fight was, therefore, confined between Jhilatu Singh on the one side and Jadunath Singh and his transferees on the other. The trial court rejected the defence and decreed the suit. On appeal the lower appellate court held that the suit was barred by the principle of estoppel as also by Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. 3. In this second appeal it has been urged on behalf of Jhilatu Singh that the suit was neither barred by estoppel nor by Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. The first question urged is that the sale-deed by Changura and Jhilatu of one-third share in the property made on the 8th June, 1927, in favour of Tribeni Singh and his brothers was not binding on Jhilatu Singh. 4. In the sale-deed of the 8th of June, 1927, it was stated that Changura had obtained the property sold by inheritance from her father Manna Singh and that thereafter both Changura and Jhilatu Singh had been in proprietary possession of the same. The property transferred was the absolute interest in the same and not merely the widow's interest of Changura. 5. Now it is well settled that a reversioner who consents to an alienation by a widow or other limited heir even though made without legal necessity is precluded from disputing the validity of the alienation, vide Fateh Singh v. Thakur Rukmini ILR 45 All. 339 (F.B.) Basappa v. Fakirappa, ILR 46 Bom. 292 Akhaewa Sayed Khan, I.L.R 51 Bom. 475. 6. But it is urged that, in the present case, the deed is void because the widow had no power to transfer the property even for legal necessity, because of the existence of the two other daughters of Manna Singh who along with Changura represented the estate. In this connection reference is made to the Privy Council decision reported in Gauri Nath Kdkaji v. Gaya Kuar 26 A.L.J. 1174. That case is an authority for the proposition that where two widows succeeded to the estate of their husband, they do so as joint tenants with a right of survivorship and are of them cannot prejudice the right of survivorship of the other by alienating, even though for legal necessity, any portion of the property, save by the consent of the other. It is therefore not a case of a transfer which is invalid whatever be the faces. It is therefore not a case of a transfer which is invalid whatever be the faces. It is a case of a transfer being made by a person who could make the transfer if certain facts existed. A person who joins in the transfer must be deemed to hare represented that all those facts existed which would authorize the making of the transfer. Such a person is estopped from challenging the transfer on the ground that those facts did not exist. 7. There is, however, one exception' to this rule. Where the transferee knows the true position and cannot be Said to have acted to his detriment upon the representation made, he is not entitled to rely upon the doctrine of estoppel. But, then, it would be for the transferors to prove that the vendee knew that the facte which would validate the transfer were not in existence. This has not been proved in the present case. On the other hand, the facts of the case suggest that the vendee may have possibly believed in the existence of the fact that the transferor had the consent of the other daughters to the transfer. We have seen that two of the daughters, Dhanauta and Chaura, had made a transfer by a simple mortgage of two-third share of their property. This was not challenged by Changura. Then Ghangura herself along with Jhilatu Singh made the transfer of the remaining one-third share. In the circumstances it would not be surprising if Tribeni Singh believed that Changura and Jhilatu Singh had the consent of Dhanauta and Chaura to the making of the transfer. The point is not whether he did believe these facts to be true. The point is that it has not been shown that he knew that the other daughters had not given their consent to the transfer. Jhilatu Singh, to my mind, is estopped from challenging the validity of the transfer to which he was a party. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to consider whether the defendants are protected u/s 43 of the' Transfer of property Act. 8. Jhilatu Singh, to my mind, is estopped from challenging the validity of the transfer to which he was a party. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to consider whether the defendants are protected u/s 43 of the' Transfer of property Act. 8. It is next urged that even though so far as the sale-deed executed by Changura and Jhilatu Singh is concerned Jhilatu Singh may by estopped from challenging its validity or the defendants may be entitled to claim the benefit of Section .43 of the Transfer of Property Act, neither the doctrine of estoppel nor the principle underlying Section 43 can be applied to the transfers made by Dhanauta and Chaura and their sons in respect of the two-third share of the property. I think that this argument is sound. It will be observed that Jhilatu Singh was not a party to the transfers in respect of the two-third share of the property. No question, therefore, of estoppel or of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act can arise in respect of those transfers. It is, however, purged by Mr. Pyare Lal Banerji on behalf of the defendant-respondents that 'there was a settlement between the three daughters and their sons whereby the estate was surrendered by the daughters and conveyed to the sons and the sons in their turn enjoyed it as owners along with their mothers. This family arrangement was not set up In the written statement. There was no issue upon it in the trial court. It does not appear to have been raise in arguments before the trial court. Some such arrangement, though not in the form in which it has been put before me, appears to have been urged in arguments before the lower appellate court. But the lower appellate court did not entertain the plea as the point was not urged in the written statement. This being essentially a question of fact I cannot allow it to be urged in second appeal. The position, therefore, is that Jhilatu Singh plaintiff is entitled to claim one fourth share out of two-third share of the property which was not covered by the sale-deed of the 8th of June, 1927. Mr. This being essentially a question of fact I cannot allow it to be urged in second appeal. The position, therefore, is that Jhilatu Singh plaintiff is entitled to claim one fourth share out of two-third share of the property which was not covered by the sale-deed of the 8th of June, 1927. Mr. Pyarelal Banerji has urged that it may be that the simple mortgage executed by Dhanauta and Chaura on the 8th of Angus, 1925, was for legal necessity and that this question has not been gone into in the present case. The plaintiff no doubt challenged this document also in the plaint; but the question whether this simple mortgage was for legal necessity or not has not been gone into in the present case, and, since it is not necessary to decide it in the present case, as the mortgage is a simple one and does not affect the title of the plaintiff to recover possession, 1 need not express any opinion upon it. It will, therefore, remain an open question between the parties. 9. I, therefore, allow this appeal in part and modify the decree of the court below and decree the suit of plaintiff Jhilatn Singh for recovery of possession over one-fourth of two-third share in the property in dispute. The parties shall receive and pay costs according to their success and failure in all the courts. 10. Leave to appeal under the Letters Patent is granted to both parties.