This petition of revision arises out of a complaint instituted by the Opposite Party (Complainant) against the petitioner under sec­tions 420 and 406 I. P. C. (2) On the 10th January 1950, the trial Magis­trate, to whom the case had been transferred, ordered the Executive Engineer, P. W. D., Haflong, to stop payment of the pending bills of the accused to the extent of Rs. 7,025 until fur­ther orders from the Court. (3) The petitioner has urged by this revision petition that the allegations made in the complaint do not disclose any offence. The dispute between the parties was of a civil na­ture and in these circumstances there was no justification for initiating proceedings against him. In any case, the order dated the 10th January 1950 stopping payment of the amount due to the accused on his bills to the extent of Rs. 7,025 was illegal and 'ultra vires'. His learned counsel does not press that the proceed­ings following the complaint be quashed. He has confined his argument only to the invali­dity of the order dated the 10th January 1950 and has asked for its cancellation only. (4) The case of the complainant was that the. accused received from him by instalments a sum of Rs. 7,025 by means of false pretences. He promised that he would pay him half of the profits of a contract which he had obtained and1 which the complainant agreed to finance. He further stated that the accused got payments from the P. W. D. and did not deposit the amount with him according to the terms of the contract between them and requested that further payments to him be stopped as he was a Pakistani and intended leaving the jurisdiction1 of the Court soon after receiving the money from the Government. (5) In the order dated 10-1-50 the learned Magistrate has not indicated under what pro­vision of the Code he was acting. He merely , ordered that the Executive Engineer, P. W. D. Haflong, be asked to stop payment of the pend­ing bills of the accused to the extent 01 Rs. 7,025. The learned Advocate for the com­plainant has referred to S. 94 of the Cr. P. C. as the only possible provision which may cover the order. He agrees that it would be difficult to place the order within the terms of the sec­tion. 7,025. The learned Advocate for the com­plainant has referred to S. 94 of the Cr. P. C. as the only possible provision which may cover the order. He agrees that it would be difficult to place the order within the terms of the sec­tion. This section provides that: "Whenever any Court or any Officer in charge of a police station beyond certain limits con­siders that the production of any document or other thing is necessary or desirable for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code by or before such Court or officer, such Court may issue a summons, or such officer a written order, to the person in whose possession or power such docu­ment or thing is believed to be, requiring him to attend and produce it, or to produce it, at the time and place stated in the summons or order." All that the section authorises is that a docu­ment or thing necessary or desirable for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the Cr. P. C. may be ordered to be produced. Stopping of payment of certain bills presumably with a view to pass­ing some order with regard to the amount due, to the accused at the termination of the proceed­ings is evidently not covered by this section. The order is in the nature of attachment before judgment. Such an order would not be covered even by S. 561A, which recognises the inherent power of the Court to pass any orders which it may consider necessary in order to secure the ends of justice. In a criminal case the accused has to be presumed innocent till he is adjudged guilty. An order to his prejudice which has the effect of attaching property would be inconsis­tent with this fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence. The order, therefore, is not covered by any provision of the Code and is illegal. (6) As held in 'In re, Lloyds Bank Ltd.', AIR (21) 1934 Bom 74: "the use of extraordinary powers u/s. 561-A ought to be reserved as far as possible for extra­ordinary cases. They are not usually invoked when there is another remedy available. The order, therefore, is not covered by any provision of the Code and is illegal. (6) As held in 'In re, Lloyds Bank Ltd.', AIR (21) 1934 Bom 74: "the use of extraordinary powers u/s. 561-A ought to be reserved as far as possible for extra­ordinary cases. They are not usually invoked when there is another remedy available. Orders in the nature of attachment before judgment are not altogether consistent with the spirit of criminal proceedings, in view of the presumption that the accused is innocent until "he is found guilty." (7) The order dated the 10th January 1950 is set aside. The case shall be sent back to the Court of the Trial Magistrate for disposal of the complaint in accordance with law. Revision allowed.