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Rajasthan High Court · body

1950 DIGILAW 27 (RAJ)

Ramchandra v. Jailal

1950-02-28

BAPNA, NAWAL KISHORE

body1950
Bapna, J. —This is a first appeal in execution proceedings by the pre-emptor. The appellant Ramchandra obtained a decree from the court of District Judge on 30th of June 1948 for posse-ssioh of certain house property by preemption on condition that he pays into the court within two months from the date of the decree Rs. 3359/- to the vendee Jailal. Ramchandra was also awarded costs of the suit to be paid by the vendee. 2. Ramchandra " deposited the said amount of Rs. 3359/- or payment to the vendee on 20th of July 1948 and applied for execution of his decree for possession of the property. The vendee in the meanwhile filed an appeal to the High Court, Jodhpur, and the said Court by its decision dated 4th of December 1948 increased the amount payable by the pre-emptor to Rs. 4,159/- and directed that the amount of Rs. 800- in excess of the sum already deposited be paid into the court on or before the 4th of January, 1949 and left the parties to bear their own costs of the appeal. It may be stated that the price for which the property was purchased by the vendee from the vendor was Rs. 3,300/-. The trial court added Rs. 59/- by way of expenses incurred for registration of the deed of sale and patta fees. The costs which were awarded by the trial court to the plaintiff Ramchandra against the defendant vendee amounted to Rs. 397/8/-. The amount of Rs. 800/- directed by the High Court to be paid to the vendee in excess of the amount fixed by the Lower Court were by way of compensation for certain improvements made by the vendee after his purchase but before the suit for pre-emption. 3. After the disposal of the High Court, Ramchandra deposited Rs. 500/-on 3rd of January, 1949 for payment to the vendee and intimated to the court that he did not consider it necessary to deposit the remaining amount of Rs. 300/ to make up the total amount of Rs. 800/-as directed by the High Court in view of the fact that he was entitled to recover Rs. 397/8/- on account of costs from the vendee. He prayed for possession of the property in execution of his decree. 300/ to make up the total amount of Rs. 800/-as directed by the High Court in view of the fact that he was entitled to recover Rs. 397/8/- on account of costs from the vendee. He prayed for possession of the property in execution of his decree. On a technical objection that the decree executable was the decree of the High Court, a fresh application for execution of that decree was submitted by Ramchandra on 25th of February, 1949 reiterating his earlier prayer. 4. The vendee put in objections that the non-deposit of Rs 300/- on or before the 4th of January, 1949 involved non-compliance with the condition on which the decree of pre-emption was passed an according to the terms of the decree, the suit was to be deemed to have been dismissed. It was contended that Ramchandra was not entitled to set off any portion of the costs allowed to him while making a deposit of money as directed by the decree. 5. The learned District Judge relying on 1927 Oudh 69. was of opinion that the decree was to be strictly construed and the pre-emptor Ramchandra was not entitled under the law to deduct his costs out of the amount directed to be deposited by him for payment to the vendee under the decree. Such amount under the decree of High Court was Rs. 4,159/-and as the total sum deposited amounted to Rs. 3859/- only, the learned District Judge was of the opinion that the suit be deemed to have been dismissed and the plaintiff had lost his right of pre-emption. 6. The pre-emptor has filed this appeal. In this appeal, it is argued that under the provisions of law, only the purchase money is required to be paid within the time specified by the court and that such purchase money in this case was only Rs. 3,300/- which had already been deposited within the time prescribed by the court It was also argued that under the doctrine of equitable set off, the pre-emptor was entitled to deduct the costs awarded to him while depositing the money directed under the decree. 7. The provisions of the Marwar Law of Pre-emption relevant to the matter in issue are contained in Sections 9 & 10 of that enactment. 7. The provisions of the Marwar Law of Pre-emption relevant to the matter in issue are contained in Sections 9 & 10 of that enactment. Section 9 If the court finds for the plaintiff the decree shall specify a day on or before which the purchase money shall be paid in court". Section 10 "If such money is not paid into the court before it arises on that day, the decree shall become void and the plaintiff shall, so far as related to such sale, lose his right of pre-emption over the property to which the decree relates". 8. It may also be useful to refer to the provisions of O. 20 R. 14 of the Civil Procedure Code which is also in force in Marwar (1. Sheoram V. Tula). Order 20 Rule 14. "Where the court decrees a claim to pre-emption in respect of a particular sale of property and the purchase money has not been paid into court the decree shall- (a) Specify a day on or before which the purchase money shall be so paid, and (b) direct that on payment into court of such purchase money, together with the costs (if any) decreed against the plaintiff, on or before the day referred to in clause (a) the defendant shall deliver possession of the property to the plaintiff, whose title thereto shall be deemed to have accrued from the date of such payment, but that, if the purchase money and the costs (if any) are not so paid, the suit shall be dismissed with costs." 9. The first point for consideration is what is meant by "purchase money". It is settled law that pre-emption is not a right of re-purchase either from the vendor or from the vendee; it is simply a right of substitution entitling the preemptor by reason of a legal incident to which the sale itself was subject, to stand in the shoes of vendee in respect of all the rights and obligations arising from the sale under which he has derived his title. 1946 Oudh 127 (1. Sant Bux Singh V. Ali Raza Khan) 1934 Lahore 429 (2. Mohd. Shafi V. Allah Din) and 1934 Allahabad 461 (3. Sheikh Moinuddin V. Maqbul Alam). 1946 Oudh 127 (1. Sant Bux Singh V. Ali Raza Khan) 1934 Lahore 429 (2. Mohd. Shafi V. Allah Din) and 1934 Allahabad 461 (3. Sheikh Moinuddin V. Maqbul Alam). What the pre-emptor is, therefore, called upon to pay is not the money for re-purchasing the property from the vendee but is the puce which the vendee has paid or in certain circumstances deemed to have paid to the vend6r. The words "purchase money" used in Sections 9 & 10 of the Marwar law of pre-emption or in O. 20. R-14 of the Civil Procedure Code should, therefore, mean the money which formed the consideration for the sale by the vendor to the vendee. Under the Marwar Law of Pre-emption the penalty referred to in Section 10 comes into operation on non-payment of the aforesaid purchase money within the time fixed by the court while under O. 20, R—14 Civil Procedure Code, the decree is passed so as to attract the penalty not only in the case of non-payment of purchase money but also the costs, if any, decreed against the plaintiff on or before the day specified by the court. Any amount directed by the court to be paid over and above the aforesaid purchase money may be justifiable in view of the particular circumstances of any case. But that wouldbe on other considerations ascompensation to be paid for improvements which the court thinks justifiable in the circumstances of any particular case. In the present case as stated above, the purchase money amounted to Rs. 3300/-. The sum of Rs.59/- may also be treated as part of the purchase money, in case, under the terms of the sale, the vendee was to bear these charges, but the amount of Rs. 800/-which the vendee spent on improvements did not concern the sale, but was an act of the vendee after, and unconnected with the sale. While the court held the pre-emptor liable to pay this amount in order to enable him to take advantage of the improvements made by the vendee it could not form part of the purchase money. It is not disputed that the amount of Rs. 3359/- was deposited within the time allowed by the court. Therefore, the penal provisions of section 10 of the Marwar Pre-emption Act or of O. 20, R. 14 of the Civil Procedure Code are not applicable in this case. It is not disputed that the amount of Rs. 3359/- was deposited within the time allowed by the court. Therefore, the penal provisions of section 10 of the Marwar Pre-emption Act or of O. 20, R. 14 of the Civil Procedure Code are not applicable in this case. In cases where the money and the costs, if any, directed to be paid by the vendee are not so paid, the decree of course will not be executed till the entire amount directed by the decree is paid into the court, but the penal provisions as discussed will not be attracted. 10 The next point for consideration is whether the pre-emptor has a right to deduct the costs from the amount which he was called upon to deposit under the decree. Thers is a divergence of opinion among the High Courts. The Allahabad and the Lahore High Courts are of the view that though O. 20, R. 14 does not make any provision to meet cases where costs instead being awarded against the pre-emptor are awarded in his favour by the decree, yet under the doctrine of equitable set-off, he is entitled to deduct the costs while depositing the purchase money. 6 All. 351: (1. shri V Gopalsaran)1933 All. 113 (2. Umraosingh V. Kanwal) and 1922 Lahore 142 (3. Kapurichand V. Walimuhammed.) 11. A different view prevails in Oudh where it has been held that the matter is not governed by the Code of Civil Procedure but by Sections 14 and 15 of the Oudh Laws Act. 1876. The reasoning underlying the decisions is not very clear but granting for a moment that this is so, it will be highly inequitable if a pre-emptor should be called upon to pay up the purchase money to the judgment debtor in ready cash and to wait possibly for years before recovering from him the costs awarded to him by the court, and it is conceivable that he may never be able to recover them at all. If it be assumed that the preemptor while making the deposit can make a separate application for attachment of a portion of that amount equal to his costs, it would be like coming to the court with the full purchase money in the one hand, offering it to the judgment, debtor and stretch out the other hand asking the judgment debtor to give him the costs out of the same purchase money. With great respect we agree with the reasoning of their lordships of the Allahabad High Court that the courts are bound to administer law according to the principles of justice equity and good conscience and agree with the statement of law that the pre-emptor is entitled on the principle of equitable doctrine of setoff when depositing the purchase money directed by the court to deduct therefrom such sum as may have been awarded to him by way of costs. In the present case, the costs awarded to him were Rs. 397/8/-The pre-emptor-decree-holder only deducted Rs. 300/- out of the entire sum directed to be deposited. He was, as held above, within his right to do so. The appeal is, therefore, accepted, the order of the lower court is set aside and the case is remanded with directions that the decree be executed according to law. The respondent will pay the appellants costs in this appeal.