Judgment.- This Civil Revision Petition raises a question as to the amount of court-fee payable by the petitioner on a memorandum of appeal filed by her in the Court of the District Judge of Anantapur against the decree of dismissal of her suit, O.S.No. 199 of 1947, by the District Munsiff’s Court of Gooty. In paragraph 13 of the plaint she prayed for a decree: “Cancelling the decree in O.S.No.29 of 1942 on the file of this Court and all the proceedings in the appeal therefrom and the decree passed in the appeal A.S.No. 91 of 1944; or declaring the same to be void, invalid, and not binding in the plaintiff; and directing the defendants or such of them as may be found liable, to pay the plaintiff the costs of this suit”. O.S.No. 29 of 1942 was a suit filed by the present 1st defendant for possession of the lands described in schedules A and B of the plaint, claiming title under a will executed by the plaintiff’s deceased husband. The plaintiff was impleaded as the 3rd defendant and as a major in that suit, which ended in a decree in favour of the 1st defendant, then plaintiff. The decree was affirmed on appeal in A.S. No.91 of 1944. In her plaint the plaintiff alleged that though she was impleaded as a major, she was in fact a minor when O.S.No. 29 of 1942 was decided and that she was not represented by any guardian. She also alleged that she had all along been in possession of the lands described in schedules A and B to her plaint and that the 1st defendant recently attempted to interfere with her possession under colour of a delivery of the properties to him in execution of the decree in O.S.No. 29 of 1942. The plaint was valued under section 7 (iv-A) of the Court-fees Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and ad valorem court-fee was paid on the value of the lands in schedules A and B, calculated in the manner provided by section 7 (v) of the Act. The suit having been dismissed, an appeal was filed from the decree with a court-fee of Rs. 15 treating the suit as one falling within Article 17-A of schedule II of the Act. The suit having been dismissed, an appeal was filed from the decree with a court-fee of Rs. 15 treating the suit as one falling within Article 17-A of schedule II of the Act. On 28th October, 1948, the Appellate Court passed an order fixing the market-value of the lands in schedules A and B at Rs. 2,712 and calling upon the appellant to pay ad valorem court-fee on that amount both on the plaint and the memorandum of appeal. The court-fee demanded not having been paid, the memorandum of appeal was rejected by an order dated 22nd November, 1948. It is against this order that the Civil Revision Petition has been preferred. It is argued for the petitioner that the allegations in the plaint must be taken to be correct for the purpose of levying court-fee; that her case was that though she was impleaded as a major in O.S.No. 29 of 1942, which ended in a decree against her she was in fact a minor; and that the decree was, for that reason, wholly void. Though she engaged a pleader and gave evidence in that suit to the effect that her husband had died intestate and the will relied upon by the plaintiff was not genuine, it is her case now that she was a minor all along, that she was not aware of the nature of the dispute in that suit and that no guardian had been appointed to represent her. The decree in O.S.No. 29 of 1942, affirmed on appeal in A.S.No. 91 of 1944, was ex facie a decree against the plaintiff, then the 3rd defendant, as a major, and it is this decree that is sought to be declared invalid by the plaintiff. The question is, what is the provision of the Court-fees Act that is applicable to the case and on what basis Should court-fee be paid. It is contended for the petitioner that though she has prayed only for cancellation of the decree in O.S.No. 29 of 1942, yet the Court must have regard to the substance of the plaint and treat the suit as one merely for a declaratory relief. It is contended for the petitioner that though she has prayed only for cancellation of the decree in O.S.No. 29 of 1942, yet the Court must have regard to the substance of the plaint and treat the suit as one merely for a declaratory relief. Reliance is placed on a decision of Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., in Azima Bibi v. Sohara Bibi1, where the facts were somewhat similar to those of the present case, except that the plaintiff in that case had also prayed for recovery of possession paying court-fee under section 7 (v) besides a fixed court-fee of Rs. 15 for a declaratory relief under schedule II, Article 17-A of the Act. The learned Judge observed: It is well established that when a person is a party to the decree he should necessarily ask for relief to have the decree set aside before he could claim a share in the property and the question in this case is whether the plaintiff was a party to the decree in O.S.No. 328 of 1943. On the allegations. in the plaint she was a minor and there was no guardian ad litem appointed for her. Reference is made to the decision reported in Abdulla v. Subramania Pattar2, where it was held that the minors could not be deemed to be parties to a prior decree since they alleged that the decree was obtained fraudulently and collusively and that the guardian had acted mala fide and negligently. In this case there Was no guardian at all that represented the minors and a decree passed against a minor without representation by a proper guardian would be a nullity. This view is supported by the decision of Ramesam, J., in Gangaraju v. Satyanarayana3. Since the decree is a nullity the petitioner is. not bound to have the decree set aside and so the court-fee under section 7, clause (iv-A), is not payable." The learned Judge distinguished Ramasami v. Rangachari4, on the ground that in that case the plaintiff who, as a minor, was a party to the previous decree had been duly represented in the suit by a guardian appointed by the Court and therefore it was incumbent upon him to sue for a cancellation of that decree. Assuming the correctness of the petitioner’s contention that the suit in substance was for a mere declaration that the decree in O.S.No. 29 of 1942 was not binding on her, and that to the decree purporting to have been passed against her as a major she could not legally be considered to have been a party by reason of her minority and non-representation by a guardian, we are of the opinion that when the plaintiff came to Court with a prayer that the decree in O.S.No. 29 of 1942 should be declared to be invalid, she had to pay court-fee on the plaint under rule 2 of the Court-fee Rules framed under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act. The rule which came into force on 1st November, 1943, runs thus: "In suits for a declaration or for an injunction consequent on a declaration that a decree for money or any other property having a money value is not binding on the plaintiff who was not a party to the decree, the subject-matter of the suit shall, for purposes of jurisdiction and court-fee, be valued at the amount or value of the property for which the decree was passed: Provided that if the value of the property or the interest which the plaintiff seeks to be declared not liable for the decree is less than the value of the decree the plaint should be valued as if it were one for the possession of such property or interest". This rule was not brought to our notice by the learned counsel in this case, nor does the attention of the learned Judge who decided Azima Bibi v. Zokara Bibi1, appear to have been drawn to it. Under this rule ad valorem court-fee would be payable on the value of the subject-matter of the suit, that is, the land described in the schedules A and B to the plaint and decreed in the previous suit. The manner in which that value has to be calculated will be dealt with later. As the arguments before us were confined to the applicability of section 7 (iv-A) of the Act, we shall indicate our opinion on this point. Not only persons who are parties to’ a decree but persons not eo nomine parties but represented by those on record may, under the personal law governing the parties, be bound by the decree. As the arguments before us were confined to the applicability of section 7 (iv-A) of the Act, we shall indicate our opinion on this point. Not only persons who are parties to’ a decree but persons not eo nomine parties but represented by those on record may, under the personal law governing the parties, be bound by the decree. Both these sets of persons have a right to set aside the decree or to have it declared invalid by a separate suit if there are justifying reasons recognised by law. But as pointed out by Venkataramana Rao, J., in Vallabhacharyulu v. Rangacharyulu5, there was, with reference to the court-fee payable, a distinction between an obligation imposed on a party by a decree against him and an obli- gation imposed on him in pursuance of the decree by the personal law to which he was subject. The learned Judge said: V"In the one case he seeks to get rid of the obligation existing under the decree; in the other he seeks to have it declared that he or his interest in the estate, which is sought to be made liable cannot be rendered liable under the decree by virtue of the said personal law. In the latter case he is not bound to sue for cancellation of the decree; in the former case he is bound to sue for cancellation. Even if he sues for a bare declaration, it necessarily involves cancellation and the form of the relief he prays for is immaterial, as pointed out in Venkatasiva Rao v. Satyanarayanamurti1. The same distinction was drawn by the Full Bench in Ramaswami v. Rangachari2 the relevant passage being as follows: "In respect of decrees passed against him (minor) in suits in which he had been eo nomine impleaded as a party, it is plain that he must pay the fee prescribed by section 7(iv-A). Such decrees bind him until set aside and therefore he cannot seek to obtain a decision on the footing that his interest in the joint family property is not affected by them. It makes no difference that the plaintiff is a minor or merely a junior member of the family, as the considerations which apply to the decree of a competent Court once it is passed are essentially different from those applicable to the transactions of a party. It makes no difference that the plaintiff is a minor or merely a junior member of the family, as the considerations which apply to the decree of a competent Court once it is passed are essentially different from those applicable to the transactions of a party. The plaintiff must be held to have impliedly asked for a cancellation of the decrees passed against him and must accordingly stamp his plaint ad valorem on the amount of the decrees and not merely on his share fraction, as his liability is for the full amount though necessarily limited to the extent of his share in the joint family assets." Section 7(iv-A) of the Act was held to be applicable only to a case where a person who was eo nomine a party to the decree sought to set it aside or to have it declared invalid. In such a case ad valorem court-fee was payable on the amount of the decree sought to be set aside or the value of the property forming the subject-matter of such decree. In other cases, Article 17-A of Schedule II was held to be applicable and a fixed court-fee was payable. Rule 2 of the Court-Fee Rules has effected a change in the law as previously understood. Where a person not a party to a decree sues for a declaration that the decree is not binding on him or his interest,, he must pay ad valorem court-fee on the amount of the decree or the value of the property decreed. If however the value of the property or the interest claimed by the plaintiff in the later suit is less than the value of the decree, he need pay court-fee as in a suit for possession of that interest or property alone. To this extent there is a difference between the position of a person who is a party to a decree and one who is not a party, but no further. Neither Article 17-A of Schedule II of the Act nor section 7 (iv) (c) can now be invoked by a person seeking to have a decree declared invalid even where he was not a party to the decree. The Court-Fees Act does not however compel anybody to seek such a declaration if it is unnecessary under the substantive law. Neither Article 17-A of Schedule II of the Act nor section 7 (iv) (c) can now be invoked by a person seeking to have a decree declared invalid even where he was not a party to the decree. The Court-Fees Act does not however compel anybody to seek such a declaration if it is unnecessary under the substantive law. In Balakrishna Nair v. Vishnu Nambudiri3, Ramesam, J., observed that in the case of decrees: "the proper prayer is not to set aside the decrees but one for a declaration that the decrees are not binding on the plaintiffs". In Venkatasiva Rao v. Satyanarayanamurthi1, Reilly and Ananthakrishna Aiyar, JJ. pointed out that this distinction was merely verbal and that a suit to set aside a decree was a well-known form of action both in England and in India. In the view of the learned Judges, the intention of the Legislature in enacting section 7 (iv-A) of the Act was to bring within its ambit suits in which the plaintiff prayed that a previous decree obtained against him was of no effect, whether he worded his prayer as one "to declare a decree void" or to "set aside a decree" or to "cancel the decree." This decision was followed by another Division Bench in Secretary of State v. Lakhanna4. The distinction between a decree to which the plaintiff was a party and a decree to which he was not a party and the distinction between void and voidable decrees, may be relevant in connection with other branches of the law, as for instance, in determining the period of limitation applicable to a suit to set aside the decree and the rights of innocent third parties who have acquired for value an interest in the subject-matter of the suit. But so far as the Court-Fees Act is concerned, a suit by a party to the decree, which is ex facie regular and within the jurisdiction of the Court, to have it declared void as against him is taken out of Article 17-A of Schedule II and section 7 (iv) (c) and brought within section 7(iv-A) of the Act. But so far as the Court-Fees Act is concerned, a suit by a party to the decree, which is ex facie regular and within the jurisdiction of the Court, to have it declared void as against him is taken out of Article 17-A of Schedule II and section 7 (iv) (c) and brought within section 7(iv-A) of the Act. Mr.P.N. Srinivasa Aiyangar for the petitioner relied on a decision of Cornish, J., in Abdullah v. Subramania Pattar1, where the learned Judge held that a suit by a minor to set aside a decree to which he was a party, on the ground that his interests had been sacrified by his guardian ad litem, fell within Article 17-A of Schedule II and outside section 7 (iv-A) of the Act. With great respect we are unable to accept the correctness of this decision. The decree sought to be set aside in that case was not on the face of it a nullity or one passed without jurisdiction, but was a decree capable of execution until declared inoperative by a decree in a subsequent suit. The minor could not have resisted execution of the decree on the ground put forward in the subsequent suit. In such a case a subsequent suit by the minor to have the decree set aside would clearly fall within section 7 (iv-A) of the Act. It is possible to conceive of cases where a decree might be held to be void on its face without any further investigation or enquiry. Where a minor is impleaded in a suit statedly as a minor without any guardian at all being appointed to represent him, the decree on its face would bear the stamp of nullity against him. Ramanathan v. Palaniappa2 is such a case. A dispute may arise as regards the identity of the person whose name appears on the face of the decree and it might be open to a person to say that he was not the person impleaded as a party to the suit but some one else. Where a person is impleaded as a major defendant in a suit and a decree is passed against him by a Court having jurisdiction the decree is ex facie regular. It is true that a Court cannot legally pass a decree against a person not a party to the suit at all or not properly represented on the record. Where a person is impleaded as a major defendant in a suit and a decree is passed against him by a Court having jurisdiction the decree is ex facie regular. It is true that a Court cannot legally pass a decree against a person not a party to the suit at all or not properly represented on the record. It is also settled law that an executing Court cannot go behind the decree, but must take it at its face value. If the objection to the validity of the decree is not apparent from the decree itself, but requires a separate investigation or enquiry involving, it may be, the reception of evidence, oral or documentary, the executing Court cannot entertain the objection as a bar to execution. It is not as though the objector in such cases has no remedy except in the executing Court. It is open to him to bring a suit to set aside the decree or for declaring it invalid as against him. The petitioner’s learned counsel relied upon the decision in Rashid-un-nissa v. Mohammad3. But in our opinion this decision does not support his contention that a decree passed against a minor without his being represented by a duly qualified guardian ad litem is a nullity in the sense that its existence can be ignored even by the executing Court. All that the Judicial Committee decided was that an objection to the validity of a decree passed against a minor on the ground that the guardian appointed for him in the suit was legally disqualified from being a guardian or had an interest adverse to that of the minor could not be the subject of enquiry under section 244, Civil Procedure Code, 1882, but could properly be agitated in a separate suit instituted by the minor. This decision does not affect the principle that a decree, however erroneous in law, is good until it is set aside or declared inoperative and can be executed according to its terms unless it appears from a perusal of the decree itself or the decree and judgment, that it was passed without jurisdiction. This decision does not affect the principle that a decree, however erroneous in law, is good until it is set aside or declared inoperative and can be executed according to its terms unless it appears from a perusal of the decree itself or the decree and judgment, that it was passed without jurisdiction. Reference was also made to a decision of Mack, J., in Satyanarayana v. Venkatachalaswami Temple4 where the learned Judge had to consider the Court-fee payable in a case where the plaintiffs sued for a declaration that a prior decree to which they had been parties, was not binding on them and for an injunction restraining execution of the decree. There was an allegation that the plaintiff’s, who had been minors at the time of the passing of the prior decree, had been impleaded as majors in the suit, The learned Judge observed: “If at the time of the decree in O.S.No. 456 of 1938 the present plaintiffs were, in fact minors, though impleaded in that litigation as majors, the decree would be a nullity so far as they were concerned, and they would be entitled to ask for a declaration without any obligation to cancel the decree and to pay Court-fee under section 7(iv-A). This is a case rather on the border line and midway between that on which a court-fee of Rs. 100 is payable under Article 17-A of Schedule II, namely, one for a pure declaration without consequential relief such as that considered in Abdulla v. Subramania Pattar1 and a suit for cancellation of a decree which should be governed by section 7 (iv-A). A via media has been adopted for court-fee valuation, namely, section 7 (iv) (c), which cannot be said in the circumstances to be incorrect or inappropriate”. We are, with respect, unable to follow this reasoning. If there is an ex facie valid decree executable as it stands against a defendant, and he seeks to get rid of its effect by a suit, he is suing for its “cancellation” which expression, as we have already observed, includes “setting aside” or “declaration of invalidity” of the decree. For the purposes of section 7(iv-A) of the Act these reliefs are treated alike. For the purposes of section 7(iv-A) of the Act these reliefs are treated alike. Even if the plaintiff in the subsequent suit be considered not to have been a party to the prior suit, still if he sues to set aside the decree in that suit, rule 2 of the Court-fee Rules would govern the case and ad valorem court-fee would be payable. In Ramasubba Iyer v. Ayyalu Naidu2, the learned Judges held that where persons not being parties to a decree sue as representatives of a trust which was represented in a prior suit by another person, for a declaration that the decree passed in the prior suit was not binding on the trust, the suit must be regarded as one on behalf of the trust for cancellation of the decree within the meaning of section 7 (iv-A) of the Act though eo nomine the parties to the subsequent suit were not on the record in the previous suit. In Sethurajan v. Gurusami Pathar3, a Division Bench of this Court had to consider the case of a decree passed against a person as a major to the execution of which objection was taken on the ground that he was a minor at the time of the decree. After an examination of the previous decisions, both of this and other High Courts, the learned Judges held that it was not open to the executing Court to consider the objection or to investigate matters relating to the validity of the decree itself when on the face of the decree or the decree read with the judgment, it did not appear that it was void and made without jurisdiction. It cannot be said that the decree in O.S.No. 29 of 1942 was ex facie void or one passed without jurisdiction. The executing Court could not have refused execution of that decree unless it went behind it and took evidence as regards the age of the plaintiff, a matter which has been made the subject of investigation in the present suit but which it was not open to the executing Court to enquire into. The present suit might be considered to be one for “cancellation” of the decree in O.S.No. 29 of 1942 falling within section 7(iv-A) of the Act. The present suit might be considered to be one for “cancellation” of the decree in O.S.No. 29 of 1942 falling within section 7(iv-A) of the Act. Even if the petitioner can be considered not to have been a party at all to the prior suit on the strength of the allegations in her plaint, still since she has chosen to sue for a declaration of the invalidity of that decree, she must pay court-fee under the main part of rule 2 of the Court-fees Rules, the proviso being inapplicable to the case. Whether the suit is governed by section 7 (iv-A) of the Act or rule 2 of the Court-fees Rules, ad valorem court-fee must be paid on the market-value of the lands in schedules A and B of the plaint which formed the subject of the previous decree. Kutumba Sastri v. Bala Tripurasundari 4. The order of the learned District Judge is therefore correct and this civil revision petition must be dismissed with costs (one set). Time for payment of the deficit court-fee is allowed till 20th October, 1950, by consent. V.S. ----- Petition dismissed.