Judgment:- The principal question of law that I have to determine in these two Civil Revision Petitions is whether when a Full Bench of the Small Cause Court in the Presidency Town, Madras, has dismissed an application for a new trial for default of appearance it is competent to that Court to entertain an application to set aside the order of dismissal for default. In support of his contention that it is competent to do so the learned advocate for the petitioner advanced three arguments. The first was this. It has been decided in Lodd Govindoss Krishnadoss v. Rukmani Bai1, that when two or more Judges of the Small Cause Court are sitting together for the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction conferred by section 38 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, they are sitting “in a suit” within the meaning of those words in section 69, and if a reference is made to the High Court under its provisions, such reference is valid. Order 9, rule 9, empowers a Court to set aside an order dismissing a suit for default when a party satisfies it that he had sufficient cause for his non-appearance when the suit was called for hearing. As the Small Cause Court is sitting “in a suit” when it deals with a matter under section 38 of the Act it has got jurisdiction to set aside the order of dismissal for default. The second argument, in a sense overlaps the first and it was to the effect that even if a proceeding under section 38 of the Act cannot itself be considered to be a suit it might very properly be regarded as a continuation of the suit or at least as in the nature of a suit and when so regarded section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code will apply and therefore the procedure laid down in Order 9, rule 9, can be availed of. To reinforce this argument the learned advocate referred to the decision in K. Venkatanarasimha Rao v. Hemadri Suryanarayana2,where the facts were these: A suit having been dismissed for default an application to restore the suit was put in. This application was also dismissed. A second application was then filed to set aside the dismissal of the earlier application. To reinforce this argument the learned advocate referred to the decision in K. Venkatanarasimha Rao v. Hemadri Suryanarayana2,where the facts were these: A suit having been dismissed for default an application to restore the suit was put in. This application was also dismissed. A second application was then filed to set aside the dismissal of the earlier application. The question having arisen whether it was competent to the Court to entertain that application it was ruled that by virtue of section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Court had jurisdiction to restore the application the reason given being that though an application under Order 9, is not a petition in a suit, it is an original matter in the nature of a suit covered by section 141, Civil Procedure Code. Reference was also made to Chinta Venkatasundara Venugopdlasami v. President of the Board of Commissioners, H.R.E., Madras1, which was a case under the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act. There it was decided that Order 9, Civil Procedure Code applies to an application presented to the District Court under section 84 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act and that when such an application is dismissed for default the Court has power to restore it when it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for the failure of the applicant to appear. I was asked to extend by way of analogy the scope of these two decisions to a proceeding under section 38 of the Small Cause Courts Act. Now the principal difficulty in accepting this line of reasoning is that it is not possible to treat a proceeding under section 38 of the Small Cause Courts Act as being either a suit or a proceeding in the nature of a suit. A reference to Order 41, rule 7 of the rules framed under the Small Cause Courts Act makes it very plain that the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court under section 38 is substantially in the nature of a revisional jurisdiction. That order is as follows: “7. A reference to Order 41, rule 7 of the rules framed under the Small Cause Courts Act makes it very plain that the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court under section 38 is substantially in the nature of a revisional jurisdiction. That order is as follows: “7. The application will not ordinarily be granted unless one of the grounds specified in the following clauses is established: (a) That the decree or order is contrary to some specified law or usage having the force of law; (b) That there was a substantial error in the procedure as prescribed by these rules or by any other enactment applicable to the Court which has produced error in the decision of the case on merits, (c) That the applicant has discovered new and important matter or evidence which would affect the decision of the case on the merits and which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge and could not be produced by him before the Court at the time when the decision was passed.” The decisions of this Court confirm the impression produced by a reading of this order. In M. Doraiswami Iyengar v. Radhakrishna Chetti2, it is stated that though section 38 of the Act is couched in general terms a number of cases decided by this Court beginning with Sadasook Gambirchand v. Kannayya3 and ending with the case Sikandar Rowther v. Ghose Mohideen Marakayar4, have laid down in clear terms that a Full Bench of Small Cause Court when called upon to exercise its powers under section 38 is not a Court of appeal and cannot, therefore, arrogate to itself the powers of an appellate Court. “In other words, its jurisdiction is merely revisional in nature.” It is not, therefore, possible to extend the scope of the decisions in K. Venkatanarasimha Rao v. Hemadri Suryanarayana 5 and in Chinta Venkata Sundara Venugopalasami v. President, Board of Commissioners, H.R.E. Madras1 by way of analogy to proceedings under section 38 of the Small Cause Courts Act. “In other words, its jurisdiction is merely revisional in nature.” It is not, therefore, possible to extend the scope of the decisions in K. Venkatanarasimha Rao v. Hemadri Suryanarayana 5 and in Chinta Venkata Sundara Venugopalasami v. President, Board of Commissioners, H.R.E. Madras1 by way of analogy to proceedings under section 38 of the Small Cause Courts Act. The third argument of the learned advocate for the petitioner was based on an amendment made to section 41 of the Appellate Side Rules of the High Court, which is in these terms: “41-B. The provisions of rule 11(2), 17, 18, 10 and 21 of Order XII, Civil Procedure Code, shall apply mutatis mutandis to Civil Revision Petitions.” The argument was that if this Court can restore a Civil Revision Petition dismissed for default it may be assumed that the Small Cause Court may do likewise in respect of a matter under section 38. I am not sure that this inference necessarily follows. When dealing with a matter under section 38 of the Small Cause Courts Act that Court has to conform to the rules made by this Court and it is difficult to see’ how it can adopt a procedure which is not provided for by those rules. In A. Ramamurthi Iyer and others v. T.A. Meenakshisundarammal and another6 and Subbama v. Venkatareddi7, it was laid down that “this Court has no jurisdiction to restore to file a Revision Petition which has been dismissed for default as Order 9, rule 9, Civil Procedure Code is not applicable to the revision petitions. Section 151, Civil Procedure Code does not confer upon the Court the power to exercise a jurisdiction which it does not otherwise possess.” In fact it was apparently to get over the difficulty created by these two decisions that the Appellate Side Rules were amended in the manner indicated above. But no such amendment has been made in the rules binding the Small Cause Court. Following these decisions, I must hold that a Bench of the Small Cause Court has no power to entertain an application to restore a matter under section 38 that has been dismissed for default. I, however, think that on occasions considerable hardship might be caused to litigants if the Court is not empowered in a proper case to restore a petition dismissed for default. I, however, think that on occasions considerable hardship might be caused to litigants if the Court is not empowered in a proper case to restore a petition dismissed for default. I would therefore suggest that the rules applicable to the Small Cause Court be amended, as was done in the case of the Appellate Side Rules of this High Court. These two Revision Petitions are dismissed with costs. K.C. ----- Petitions dismissed.