Judgment.- This second appeal raises a very interesting point of law, namely, whether a judgment-debtor husband in a maintenance decree, after having been committed to a civil prison for six months, in an execution petition for recovering the movables and costs, and been there for the entire period prescribed in section 58(1), Civil Procedure Code, can, in another execution for recovering the maintenance which had accrued by then, be again sent to the civil prison for another period of six months, and so on and so forth, for recurring periods of six months for recurring maintenance amounts for later periods. The trial Court held that he can be so sent if he having means to pay the maintenance amount, refuses to pay, but confessed that the matter was not free from doubt, and gave the judgment-debtor some time to pay up before ordering his arrest again. On appeal, by the judgment-debtor, the District Judge of Mathurai held that a maintenance decree cannot be held to be a different decree in respect of each matter adjudicated in it, for the purpose of re-arrest and committal to civil prison under section 58 (1) and 58 (2), Civil Procedure Code, distinguishing the rulings in Harak Narain Singh v. Babban1,and Mt. Prem Kuer v. Ram Lagan Rai2, as not applicable to arrests at all. He relied on the ruling in Damodar Shaligram v. Malhari3, and the plain wording of section 58 (2), Civil Procedure Code and held that once the judgment-debtor has been arrested and detained in civil prison for the full period of six months mentioned in section 58, Civil Procedure Code,in execution of a maintenance decree, he is not liable to be arrested again in execution of the same decree though for an amount due under a different head in the decree. He relied most strongly on the clause: “But he shall not be liable to be re-arrested under the decree in execution of which he was detained in the civil prison”. in section 58 (2), Civil Procedure Code, and held that the judgment-debtor was not liable to be arrested again and committed to jail for this maintenance amount accruing after he had been previously arrested and committed to jail. in section 58 (2), Civil Procedure Code, and held that the judgment-debtor was not liable to be arrested again and committed to jail for this maintenance amount accruing after he had been previously arrested and committed to jail. Mr.T.S. Vaidyanatha Ayyar, for the maintenance-holder wife, urged that the learned District Judge’s view was wrong and unsustainable in law and that it virtully condemned the wife to death by starvation by the husband’s abuse of law. He urged that a maintenance decree is a composite decree and that every time the decree-holder is proceeding by way of execution it is a fresh decree that is being put in execution, as held in Debendranath v. Trinayani Dasi1, and that, therefore, a judgment-debtor husband can be sent to civil jail for six months at a time, for every maintenance amount above Rs. 50 accruing for each period, and that as the first arrest and committal were for the value of the movables and costs awarded to the appellant, and the re-arrest was applied for the first maintenance amount due the case for re-arrest was even stronger. I cannot agree. I have no doubt whatever that the learned District Judge was right in his view in the circumstances of this case, as the re-arrest was being asked for: “Under the decree in execution of which he was detained in the civil prison” within the meaning of section 58 (2), Civil Procedure Code. If any man, layman or lawyer is asked, he will have certainly to reply that the re-arrest was being asked for only in execution of the decree in O.S.No. 313 of 1946, though under a different branch of it. The tree was the same. So, when section 58 (2), Civil Procedure Code cut the trunk at the root, all the branches fell down automatically with it, and no re-arrest was possible. Of course, the debt and the liability for maintenance remain, under section 58 (2), Civil Procedure Code, itself, despite the release after a six months period in the civil prison, and can be recovered by other methods, like proceeding against the charged properties, and other properties of the judgment-debtor. Of course, the debt and the liability for maintenance remain, under section 58 (2), Civil Procedure Code, itself, despite the release after a six months period in the civil prison, and can be recovered by other methods, like proceeding against the charged properties, and other properties of the judgment-debtor. Sending a judgment-debtor to the civil prison, though once very frequent is, in every civilised country, now hedged in with many restrictions, and is only allowed in rare cases, mostly cases, of fraud, contumacious refusal to pay though there are ample means, etc. It has been held in another way also, by fixing the maximum duration of the stay in civil prison in respect of each decree, section 58(1) making it six months in cases like this. Of course, Mr. Vaidyanatha Ayyar is right in saying that section 58, Civil Procedure Code, will not make the maximum period in civil prison for any man in his lifetime six months. The maximum applies only for the execution of the same decree. The decree-holder in a different decree can take advantage of section 58 and send the same man to the civil prison for another period of six months, if he is liable otherwise. A “decree” clearly includes the adjudication of “all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit” under section 2 (2), Civil Procedure Code. So the adjudication on various matters in the same suit cannot be termed to constitute separate decrees or fresh decrees for the purposes of section 58, Civil Procedure Code, as urged by Mr. Vaidyanatha Aiyar. As remarked by the learned Judges in Damodar Shaligram v. Mathari2: “The section (section 58) is one clearly intended to operate in restriction of the power of arrest and in favour of personal liberty and should be construed according to the plain meaning of the terras.” Mr. Vaidyanatha Ayyar urged that this construction would put intolerable restrictions on the rights of the decree-holder. But where the law puts such restriction deliberately, in the interests of the public or of personal liberty Courts are bound to carry it out as in the case of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, Slavery Abolition Act, Devadasi Act, Zamindari Abolition Act, etc., If Mr. But where the law puts such restriction deliberately, in the interests of the public or of personal liberty Courts are bound to carry it out as in the case of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, Slavery Abolition Act, Devadasi Act, Zamindari Abolition Act, etc., If Mr. Vaidyanatha Ayyar’s contention is accepted, a wife holding a maintenance decree can make the husband go to jail the day after he comes back, for the maintenance which has accrued for the six months, when he was in jail. The old story of Vikramaditya, of spending six months in one place and six months in another, every year, will be repeated, with the sole difference that the alternation of six months will not be in town and forest, as in the romantic case of Vikramaditya, but in jail and hiding! The cases relied on by Mr. Vaidyanatha Ayyar, like Debendranath v. Trinayani Dasi1, do not relate to section 58, Civil Procedure Code, or to sending a judgment-debtor who had undergone six months civil imprisonment once more to civil jail for another sum of maintenance which accrued since. They refer only to enforcing subsequent amounts payable by the judgment-debtor by sale of his charged properties. Mr. Vaidyanatha Ayyar says that this judgment-debtor sets up frivolous defences when his charged properties are proceeded against, by falsely alleging that they are trust properties. It is up to his client and Advocate to prick those frivolous defences and convince the executing Court that the charged properties are not trust properties and can be sold. The right to raise a defence is elementary, and is given to every party under the law, and the judgment-debtor cannot be sent to civil prison for raising any defence allowed by law, for the use of law can never be an abuse of law. Nor can the hardship caused to the wife by postponing payment of her maintenance by setting up absence of means be any ground for overlooking the clear dictates of law. I may add also that the trial Court was not right in holding that the finding in E.P.No. 212 of 1947 against the decree-holder’s plea of no means when he was arrested and committed concluded the matter regarding his pleas of no means in E.P.No. 58 of 1948 when sought to be arrested again. I may add also that the trial Court was not right in holding that the finding in E.P.No. 212 of 1947 against the decree-holder’s plea of no means when he was arrested and committed concluded the matter regarding his pleas of no means in E.P.No. 58 of 1948 when sought to be arrested again. A man’s plea of no means may be false in 1947, but may be true in 1948. Means and health may change rapidly during a year and a year-old finding may not be safe to rely on. Being a question of fact, liable to quick change by time, the former finding cannot be conclusive in the later E. P., where a distinct finding would have been necessary if there was a legal possibility of re-arrest and re-committal. It was urged next that a maintenance decree is a composite decree, and really a bundle of many different or separate decrees, and, so, many re-arrests and re-commitments are possible. I cannot agree. A composite decree is like a many-branched tree, like a mango tree or tamarind tree. Other decrees are like cocoanut trees, having no branches. But both kinds of trees have only one main trunk which can be cut at the root. It is not as if a composite decree will become many different decrees which are capable of independent execution, and with different periods of limitation, incidents, etc., any more than a many-branched tree has many roots and trunks. Though the original branches are many and new branches spring into being, the trunk and root are one. The origin of a maintenance decree, like this, is the date when it was passed. The end of it is the date when the maintenance-holder dies. In essence, newly accruing maintenance amounts are like newly accruing instalments, as in Damodar Shaligram v. Malhari1, and a re-arrest and re-commitment to civil prison will be barred under section 58 (2), Civil Procedure Code, in the circumstances of this case. The ruling in Ghanasamdas Goorsamull v. Johorimull Kedarinath2, also shows that in such cases the total period in civil prison in execution of the decree in the same suit can never exceed six months. It was lastly urged by Mr. The ruling in Ghanasamdas Goorsamull v. Johorimull Kedarinath2, also shows that in such cases the total period in civil prison in execution of the decree in the same suit can never exceed six months. It was lastly urged by Mr. Vaidyanatha Aiyar that the decree-holder wife gains nothing by sending her husband to jail again at her own expense, like this, and that, therefore, it must be presumed that she is driven to it by sheer necessity and is not doing it for pleasure. We are not concerned with gain or loss, pleasure or pain, when considering a mandatory provision of law, as here. But I may add that Mr. Vaidyanatha Ayyar himself admitted that the husband in this case has married another woman and is living with her alone. So, the judgment-creditor, aggrieved at his not living with her, may probably derive some pleasure by keeping him in jail and preventing him from living with the other wife, even by spending more money of hers on maintaining him in jail than the Rs. 15 awarded to her as monthly maintenance against him. Persons acquainted with human psychology will not be surprised at such an act. In the end, therefore, I see no merits in this Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal, It deserves to be and is hereby dismissed with costs. V.S. ----- Leave refused.