Judgment:- This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal arises out of E.A.No.1929 of 1949 in E.P.No.2779 of 1949, on the file of the City Civil Court of Madras. That Court ordered the E.A., and the respondent therein appeals. The E.P. and E.A. were in connection with an order for eviction passed in favour of the applicant in the court below, that is, of the respondent before me, in a proceeding for eviction under section 7 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act XV of 1946. Under section 9 of the Act, so far as material to the present case, every order made under section 7 shall be executed in the City of Madras by the Principal Judge of the Madras City Civil Court as if it were a decree passed by him. Mr.Ramaswami Aiyangar has taken two points before me against the order of the court below. The first is that an execution application by a person seeking to come on record as a legal representative is not maintainable in law as a substantive application by itself, without the prayers of a regular execution petition. He relies on a judgment of this court reported in Ramachandra Aiyer v. Subramania Chettiar1. Mr.Justice Bhashyam Aiyangar has ruled in that case that a transferee decree-holder can only apply to execute the decree under section 232, Civil Procedure Code and that he can make no application merely for recognising him as a transferee as there is no provision of law requiring the Court to recognise the validity of the transfer before the transferee applies for execution. The ruling has, in my opinion, no application to the facts of the present case. The son of the landlord applied in the present case for execution in E.P.No.2779 of 1949, asking to be recognised as a transferee decree-holder, and asking to have the order for eviction executed. Since it was objected that a separate petition by him to come on record as legal representative was necessary, he filed E.A.No.1929 of 1949. There was nothing irregular, much less illegal, about what the respondent before me did. He did in fact the only right thing that he could do in the circumstances of the case. I must accordingly repel this contention of the learned advocate for the appellant. The next argument of Mr. There was nothing irregular, much less illegal, about what the respondent before me did. He did in fact the only right thing that he could do in the circumstances of the case. I must accordingly repel this contention of the learned advocate for the appellant. The next argument of Mr. Ramaswami Aiyangar is one founded on the analogy of certain decisions of this Court which have held that where there is a decree passed by a certain Court which has transmitted it for execution to another Court, it is not the latter Court but the former which has the power to entertain an application to bring on record a person as legal representative of the decree-holder. Prima facie that line of decisions has, in my opinion, no relevancy to the case on hand because we are not concerned here with a case of rival jurisdiction between two Courts between which it is necessary to determine which has jurisdiction but with the question how far under the terms of section 9 of the Rent Control Act, the City Civil Court has the jurisdiction to bring on record the petitioner as the legal representative of the original applicant for eviction. Looking at the language of the section, it seems to me that the City Civil Court being the only Court which has to execute the order for eviction as if it were a decree passed by itself, it has the jurisdiction to entertain the petition of the respondent before me to come on record as the legal representative of his father. Mr.Ramaswami Aiyangar argues that the expression “shall be executed as if it were a decree passed by him” has reference only to the procedure to be adopted by the Principal Judge of the Madras City Civil Court in the process of execution, but has no reference to the right of the respondent to execute the order for eviction, which right is under challenge here. I am not satisfied that this restricted interpretation of the expression is correct. It seems to me that once the City Civil Court became seised of the case for the purpose of execution, it had the right to execute it as if it were a decree passed by that Court itself in every sense of the term. I am not satisfied that this restricted interpretation of the expression is correct. It seems to me that once the City Civil Court became seised of the case for the purpose of execution, it had the right to execute it as if it were a decree passed by that Court itself in every sense of the term. The determination of the question whether the respondent before me has the right to come on record as legal representative of his father is itself part of the procedure which has to be gone through by that Court under section 9 in the matter of execution. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Chandrasekhara Aiyar in Kandaswami v. Neelamegham Pillai1,the words: “as if it were a decree of this Court” in section 7-A(2-A) of the Madras House Rent Control Act, has the effect of rendering the order of the Rent Controller, the decree of the particular Court for purposes of execution. So in the view of the learned Judge, the provisions of section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code become applicable to the case, and the parties had a right of appeal from orders of the executing Court. The question that arose before His Lordship was whether the provisions of section 47, Civil Procedure Code, became applicable to the case of an order of the executing Court so as to give the parties a right of appeal therefrom, although the order of the Rent Controller himself directing eviction was final and could not be challenged in the civil Court. The question was answered by the learned Judge in the affirmative. This ruling has been followed in a later case decided by a Bench of this Court (Horwill and Balakrishna Ayyar, JJ.), which is reported in Thangasami Chettiar v. Bapoo Sahib 2.In that case, in an application for eviction of a tenant on the ground of arrears of rent the landlord obtained an order for eviction and actually got possession of the building in execution. On appeal to the Subordinate Judge, the appellate authority, the order was reversed. On appeal to the Subordinate Judge, the appellate authority, the order was reversed. After five days the tenant applied to the Subordinate Judge himself for restitution and re-delivery, which was ordered, and on appeal to this Court against that order on the ground of want of jurisdiction in the sub-Court to make such an order, it has been held by the learned Judges, that the application for restitution is an application for execution and that once execution proceedings under the Madras Act XV of 1946 come to be placed in the hands of the ordinary Courts, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code relating to the subject must apply mutatis mutandis and so far as the machinery set up by the Act and the provisions thereof permitted. Reference is made in the course of the decision to the principle of the House of Lords decision in National Telephone Co., Ltd. v. Post Master-General3: “When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more, it imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach, and also that any general right of appeal from its decision likewise attaches.” The argument for the appellant is opposed to principle as well as precedents which have construed the relevant provisions of the statute and must accordingly be repelled. Mr.Subramanyam for the respondent has, in support of the order of the Court below also drawn my attention to certain decisions under the Madras Cooperative Societies Act, reported in Kannappa Mudali v. Varadachariar4 and Munisami Chetti v. Chenchu Naidu5, the principle of which is according to learned counsel applicable to the case on hand. Both are decisions of the same Judge, Mr. Justice Wadsworth, and are to the same effect. The question which arose in these cases was the competency of the executing Court to recognise the assignment of an award decree which had been passed by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. At page 599 of the report of the former case this is what the learned Judge observes: “There is very little authority on this subject. Cases under the old Co-operative Societies Act have no direct bearing, for under the old rules the award of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies-could be executed only by a procedure similar to that applicable to an award of an ordinary arbitrator. Cases under the old Co-operative Societies Act have no direct bearing, for under the old rules the award of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies-could be executed only by a procedure similar to that applicable to an award of an ordinary arbitrator. It is established that under the old Act when an award was transferred to the Civil Court for execution the Civil Court had the necessary power to treat the decree as its own decree for purposes incidental to execution including the granting of a certificate transferring the decree to any Court for execution, vide Krishnaji Shridhar v. Mahadeo Sakharam1. There is authority for the view that the award of an arbitrator when it has been filed in Court and has become the decree of the Court can be assigned and the assignment can by recognised by the Court in which that award is filed. Gladstone Wyllie v. Joosub Pear Mahmood2. It is contended for the appellants that the provision of Rule 15, sub-rule 8, is significant and that this rule contemplates that the person to be recognised as the decree-holder by the Civil Court must always be the person in whose favour the Registrar has granted an award and cannot be his assignee, for the original holder of the award is given the power to apply to the Court for the return of the award with a certificate of non-satisfaction. It seems to me to be going too far to hold that because the person in whose favour an award has been passed may apply to the Court for its transfer back to the Registrar, the Court has necessarily no power to recognise an assignment.” It is not necessary for me to express any opinion in regard to the correctness of the point of view of the learned Judge expressed in those two cases. It is sufficient for me to say that, for the reason that I have already given, viz., that the language of section 9 of the Madras Rent Control Act is sufficiently wide to cover the case of an execution application like the one filed by the respondent before me this appeal must fail and be dismissed with costs. K.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.