JUDGMENT Ghulam Hasan, J. - The circumstances out of which this revision arises are somewhat unusual. 2. The applicant Mangal Misra son of Prabodh Misra, describing himself in the plaint as the resident of village Jaitha, pargana Amsin, district, Faizabad, and now staying in Poundey city, district Prome Burma, filed a suit for possession against the opposite-parties as long ago as the 9th of May, 1947. This description is repeated in the memorandum of revision. The suit was filed throughout his son Jai Narain Misra as true and Lawful attorney for his father. The power of attorney which is on the record shows the residence of the two as identical. The plaint was signed by a pleader. Issues were framed. One of the Defendants had disputed the identity of the Plaintiff, According to him the Plaintiff was not Mangal Misra but Mangal Singh Thakur. It was pointed out that before witnesses deposed, as to the Plaintiff identity it was necessary to secure his attendance in Court. On February 6, 1948, the Court ordered the Plaintiff to appear in person as ho was admittedly a resident of Faizabad district. Two applications were made on behalf of the Plaintiff one for cancellation of the order directing his appearance in person and the other for issue of a commission to him. Both these applications were dismissed by an order dated February 2l, 1948. In this order the learned Munsif observed that the Plaintiff was a permanent resident within the jurisdiction of the Court and the mere fact that the happened to be in Burma for the time being or when the suit was filed would not take away the jurisdiction of the Court to order his attendance. This order was challenged in revision to this Court but as the order was in its nature interlocutory, the revision was dismissed on July, 22, 1948. The Munsif in the meantime was transferred and an attempt was made to reopen the matter before his successor. His predecessor had ordered that if the Plaintiff did not appear on the next date of the hearing, his plaint shall be rejected. The Plaintiff again did not appear. The plaint rejected a further adjournment was given on the 12th July, 1948, to the Plaintiff to present himself on September 7, and pay Rs. 50/- as costs. Upon this date he neither presented himself nor paid the costs. The Plaintiff again did not appear. The plaint rejected a further adjournment was given on the 12th July, 1948, to the Plaintiff to present himself on September 7, and pay Rs. 50/- as costs. Upon this date he neither presented himself nor paid the costs. His Counsel, however, applied that the Plaintiff was unable to attend due to disturbances in Burma but did not support this allegation by any affidavit The Court thereupon held that the Plaintiff was avoiding appearance in Court on some pretext or other since the 6th February, 1943, and disobeying the orders of the Court. Accordingly the learned Munsif dismissed the suit under Order IX Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Against this order the present revision application has been preferred. 3. The only point, which has been urged in support of the revision, is that the lower court had no jurisdiction under Order V Rule 4 of the CPC to order the Plaintiff to appear in person, as ho did not reside within the local limits of the Court's ordinary original jurisdiction. The contention appears to me to be devoid of force. Rule 4 says. No party shall be ordered to appear in person unless he resides. (a) Within the local limits of the Court's ordinary original jurisdiction. 4. In at least three documents, the plaint, the power of attorney, and the memorandum of revision presented to this Court the Plaintiff's residence has been described as being within Faizabad district. It was for this reason that the learned Munsif ordered the Plaintiff to appear in person. The word "resides" in Order V, Rule 4 obviously means residence of a permanent character and not temporary on casual residence. Where a person owns a residential house at one place but goes to another place either for the purpose of employment or business, but he has every intention of returning to his residential house, he will be deemed to reside within the jurisdiction of the Court where the house is situate. So long as there is an antimus revertendi his temporary stay at another place however long will not have the effect of changing his permanent residence at the original place. So long as there is an antimus revertendi his temporary stay at another place however long will not have the effect of changing his permanent residence at the original place. The word "dwell" as used in Clause 12 of the Letters Patent (Calcutta) and the word "resides" as used in Sections 16, 19 and 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, have been treated as being synonymous and have been held to denote the fixed and permanent home of a man's wife and family to which he has always the intention of returning. (Chitaiey's CPC Vol. I. Section 20, Note 3 at page 33. In Fatima Begam v. Sakina Begam ILR All 51 it was observed that the words dwelling or residence are synomynous with domicile or home, and mean that place where a person has his fixed permanent home to which whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning. 5. This observation was made with reference to the meaning of the word "dwell" used in Section 5 of Act VII of 1859 (an Act for simplifying the Procedure of the Courts of Civil Judicature not established by Royal Charter) and the use of the word "reside" in Section 4 of XIII of 1861 (an Act to amend Act VIII of 1859). 6. It is not denied that the Plaintiff owns a house and property in Faizabad district when his family lives. He is employed in a business firm in Burma and there is nothing whatever to show that he has abandoned his home or has no intention of returning to his family dwelling house. In this view there cannot be the slightest doubt that the order of the learned Munsif was perfectly competent and the provisions of Order V Rule 4 did not debar him from making the order in question. 7. The case of the Municipal Board of Bareilly v. Hafiz Ala Bakhsh 22 All. L.J.R 457 has no application. That was case in which the question arose whether certain persons were to be taxed as residing or carrying on any trade within the notified area of Aonla or whether they were to be taxed as non residents, the amount of tax being smaller in the latter case. L.J.R 457 has no application. That was case in which the question arose whether certain persons were to be taxed as residing or carrying on any trade within the notified area of Aonla or whether they were to be taxed as non residents, the amount of tax being smaller in the latter case. Upon the facts it appeared that the persons were carrying on business in Calcutta and they returned to their native district for two months in the year either for rest or on occasions of family ceremonies. Under these circumstances it was held that their place of residence was the place where they earned a living and did their daily work. 8. Equally inapplicable is the case of Kishori Lal v. Ram Sundar 19 All. L.J.R. 822. There the Defendants actually resided outside the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court but they had the ancestral home within the local limits of the Court. It was rightly held that that could not give the court the jurisdiction. 9. I hold, therefore, that the order of the lower Court was not devoid of jurisdiction. The revision application fails and is dismissed with costs.