Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J.-Accused 1 and 2 have preferred these appeals against their conviction and sentence by the learned Sessions Judge of Tirunelveli for the offences falling under sections 324 and 302, Indian Penal Code. The first accused has been convicted and sentenced to three years rigorous imprisonment under section 324 and the second accused under section 302 to death. The prosecution case is that these two accused stabbed the deceased Sudalaimani Nadar on the 4th November, 1949, when he was in the hotel of P.W.1 and also when he went out near the hotel of P.W.3 and finally at the end of the street where the fatal blow seems to have been dealt by the second accused as a result of which the deceased fell down and died. It is common ground between the prosecution and the defence that there has been enmity between the Nadars of Korangani and Navidupannai for a long time over certain temple of the village, fishery rights and other matters. The deceased himself is said to have attacked, sometimes before the date of occurrence, the first accused and was convicted. His appeal before the Sessions Court was dismissed and the matter is now pending-revision in this Court. He is said to have been released on bail. Besides this, the deceased is also said to have attacked one Naicker prior to the occurrence and the charge sheet is pending enquiry before the Magistrate and the deceased was absconding at the time when he is said to have been stabbed by these two appellants. The entire case for the prosecution depends on the evidence of P.Ws.1, 2 and 3 corroborated by that of P.Ws.10 and 12 to some extent. The learned Sessions Judge who heard the witnesses believed all of them and convicted and sentenced the accused, as stated above. Mr. Jayarama Aiyar for the appellants contends before us that the evidence of P.Ws.1, 2 and 3 cannot be relied on for convicting the appellants of the offences with which they were charged on various grounds. In the first place, he says that there has been a faction in the village and these witnesses have been suborned to give false evidence against the accused on account of the faction. In the first place, he says that there has been a faction in the village and these witnesses have been suborned to give false evidence against the accused on account of the faction. In the second place, his contention is that the evidence is all artificial and unnatural and cannot be taken as true and accepted for the purpose of convicting the appellants. In the next place, his point is that these witnesses are impecunious and men of no means and their evidence has been simply secured for money; at any rate, his attack against the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 3 seems to be based on this. As regards the evidence of P.W. 2, Mr. Jayarama Aiyar would say that his evidence is wholly improbable in that it is full of contradictions and the evidence given before the Sessions Court is at variance in many material points with that given in the Magistrate’s Court. We have been taken through the entire evidence that is relevant to the case and, in our opinion, except the evidence of P.W.1 the rest of the evidence, particularly that of P.Ws.2 and 3 does not appear to be acceptable. Taking all these facts into consideration and the evidence in the case, we feel that the guilt of the murder has not been brought home to the second accused. But what has been proved beyond reasonable doubt appears to be that he was responsible for stabbing the deceased in the hotel as spoken to by P.W.1 and for causing the injuries found on the person of the deceased as testified to by the examination of the doctor and the post-mortem certificate issued by him. In these circumstances, we feel that we shall be justified in setting aside the conviction and sentence against the second accused for the offence of murder; but we convict him for the offence under section 324, Indian Penal Code and sentence him to rigorous imprisonment for three years. We do not find that there is any justification to interfere with the sentence that has been imposed on the first appellant and that will be confirmed. With these modifications the appeals are dismissed. Before departing from this case, it is necessary to refer to a matter of procedure adopted by the learned Sessions Judge. We do not find that there is any justification to interfere with the sentence that has been imposed on the first appellant and that will be confirmed. With these modifications the appeals are dismissed. Before departing from this case, it is necessary to refer to a matter of procedure adopted by the learned Sessions Judge. During the course of the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 as well as of P.W.10, it is seen that the learned Judge has put very many questions to the witnesses both while the prosecution examined them as well as at the time when the defence cross-examined them. Large chunks of the deposition of these witnesses consist of answers to Court questions and in fact so far as P.W.10 was concerned, after he was examined and cross-examined and re-examined, he was recalled and the Court put to him quite a large number of questions with the result that a cross-examination was begun as it were de novo. More than 70 years ago in Moor Bux Kazi v. The Empress1, at page 283 Sir Richard Garth, C.J., and Tottenham, J., deprecated the practice of judges and magistrates questioning witnesses as if they were cross-examining counsel in the following words: “We think it right to point out to the Sessions Judge that the course which he adopted in the examination of the witnesses for the prosecution was irregular, opposed to the provisions of section 138, Evidence Act, and not fair to the prisoners. We find that, on the examination-in-chief being finished, the Judge questioned almost all the witnesses at considerable length upon the very points to which he must have known that the cross-examination would certainly and properly be directed. The result of this, of course, was to render the cross-examination by the prisoner’s pleaders to a great extent ineffective by assisting the witnesses to explain away, in anticipation, the point which might have afforded proper ground for useful cross-examination. It is not the province of the Court to examine the witnesses, unless the pleaders on either side have omitted to put some material question or questions; and the Court should, as a general rule leave the witnesses to the pleaders to be dealt with as laid down in section 138 of the Act. It is not the province of the Court to examine the witnesses, unless the pleaders on either side have omitted to put some material question or questions; and the Court should, as a general rule leave the witnesses to the pleaders to be dealt with as laid down in section 138 of the Act. The Judge’s power to put questions under section 165 is certainly not intended to be used in the manner which we have had occasion to notice in the present case.” The observations of the learned Judges apply very aptly to what has happened in case under consideration. Any person with some experience either of examination in chief or cross-examination would feel the embarrassment and trouble when the learned Judge puts questions during the course of either examination in chief or cross-examination which would take him away from the trend of his questions. We therefore desire to impress upon the learned Judge that the procedure adopted by him has been irregular. K.S. ----- Sentences modified.