Ram Labhaya J. - This order will dispose of civ. App. No. 13 of 1948 and civ. Revn. No. 78 of 1949, Both are directed against the order of the learned District Judge, L. A. D, dated 6-5-1949 by which the order of the learned Munsiff of Shillong dated 8-6-1948 dismissing the application of the decree-holder for execution of his ejectment decree against the defendant was affirmed. The decree was based on a compromise between the parties. It was passed admittedly after the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act of 1946 had come into force. It was open to the defendant in the case to resist his ejectment under s. 6 of the Act, which provides as follows: "No order or decree for the recovery of possession of any house shall be made or executed so long as the tenant pays rent to the full extent allowable under this Act and perform the conditions of the tenancy: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply in a suit or proceedings for eviction of the tenant from the house- (a) where the tenant has done any act contrary to the provisions of clause (en), clause (o) or clause (p) of S. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or to the spirit of the aforesaid clauses in areas where the Act does not apply, or (b) where the tenant has been guilty of conduct which is a nuisance or an annoyance to the occupiers of the adjoining or neighbouring houses, or (c) where the house is bona fide required by the landlord either for purposes of repairs or re-building, or for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the house is held, or where the landlord can show any other cause which may be deemed satisfactory by the Court." [2] The defendant instead of taking advan­tage of the privilege conferred on' him by 8. 6, cl. (l), entered into a compromise with the plain­tiff by which be agreed' to vacate the house in question on 31-12-1947. The execution application out of which this appeal and the petition of revision arise was put in on 16-1-1948. The judgment-debtor resisted the execution of the decree on the ground that the decree-holder did not require the house bona fide for purposes enumerated in cl. (o) of the proviso to S. 6 of the Act. The execution application out of which this appeal and the petition of revision arise was put in on 16-1-1948. The judgment-debtor resisted the execution of the decree on the ground that the decree-holder did not require the house bona fide for purposes enumerated in cl. (o) of the proviso to S. 6 of the Act. The Courts below have found in favour of the tenant and as a result the petition was dismissed by the executing Court and the order of dismissal was affirmed in appeal. The defendant was not sure whether a second appeal was competent. He preferred both an appeal and a revision petition against the order. The learned counsel now seeks to withdraw his revision petition as he finds that the appeal is competent. There is non objection to the com­petency of the appeal. The petition of revision is thus allowed to be withdrawn and the appeal has been heard and is being disposed of, on the merits. [3] It is now contended on behalf of the decree-holder that the Courts below has erred in law in going behind the decree. They had no power to do so. It is pointed out that the decree was passed when the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act was in force. The suit could have been resisted if the bona fide nature of the decree-holder's requirement was questionable. [4] The objection raised in execution was based on the fact that the decree-holder bad another house. It fell vacant on 1-1-1948. He occupied it for some time and gave it on rent to someone else even though the judgment, debtor was willing to take that house on rent. Other circumstances found against the decree-holder ate that his son and son-in-law were serving in Pakistan and were living therein with their families. The decree holder also was held to have come recently from Pakistan and it was further found as a fact that his intention was to get the house vacated and then to give it on rent to others. [5] We think the Courts below have exceeded their jurisdiction in entertaining the objection from the judgment-debtor in the course of exe­cution proceedings, that the decree-holder did not require the house bona fide and, therefore, could not execute the decree. [5] We think the Courts below have exceeded their jurisdiction in entertaining the objection from the judgment-debtor in the course of exe­cution proceedings, that the decree-holder did not require the house bona fide and, therefore, could not execute the decree. The decree is based on a compromise, By agreeing to vacate the house in question on a date fixed by agree­ment of parties, the defendant waived the pri­vilege of resisting the ejectment suit which the law allowed him, assuming that it was possible to resist it on the ground that the landlord did not require the house bona fide for purposes stated in cl. (c) of the proviso to S. 6 of the Act. This section confers a privilege on the tenant. It imposes no liability on him. A tenant may vacate the house at any time that the landlord desires. There is nothing to prevent him from doing so. If any ejectment suit is instituted, the tenant may again agree to vacate on a date fixed by agreement of parties. Such a compro­mise would be perfectly valid. There is nothing in the Act which prevents the tenant from con­tracting himself out of the privilege allowed to him by the Act. Instead, of utilising the privi­lege given, he may agree to vacate on a date that is convenient to him. When he does so, the compromise or tbe arrangement between the parties must be accepted and given effect to by the Court under o. 23, E. 3, Civil P. C. The compromise in this case, therefore, was accepted and embodied in the decree of the Court. The decree binds the parties and is enforceable like any other valid contract between parties. The defendant cannot after remaining in possession of the house till 31st December under the arrange­ment made with the plaintiff turn round and take advantage also of the provisions contained in the Act which he waived at the time of the decree in order to be able to vacate the house on a date that suited his convenience. The decree was passed on 16-5-1947 and the house had to be vacated on 31-12 1947. The Court may not have allowed this period for vacating the house if it had decided in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant waived his privilege under the Act in consideration of some concession which he valued. The decree was passed on 16-5-1947 and the house had to be vacated on 31-12 1947. The Court may not have allowed this period for vacating the house if it had decided in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant waived his privilege under the Act in consideration of some concession which he valued. The privilege having been waived once cannot be revived. The consent decree was not a decree under S. 6 and its operation could not be controlled by 8. 6, Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act. The decree would be binding and the Executing Court will be exceeding its jurisdiction in going behind such a decree. A; judgment by consent of parties operates as estop­pel and is valid and binding until set aside by an appropriate judicial proceeding. The vali­dity of the decree has not been challenged before us or at any earlier stage of the litigation. In these circumstances, we are firmly of the opinion that it was not open to the defendant to resist its execution on the ground that his landlord did not require the house bona fide for such pur­poses as were recognised by law. [6] According to the provisions of S. 6, no» order of ejectment can be passed against as tenant unless he has been guilty of conduct covered by cls. (a) and (b) of the proviso or the house is required bona fide by the landlord. If a landlord wants to eject a tenant, he shall have to place his case under one of the three clauses of the proviso. Such a necessity does not arise in the case of landlord who has got a consent decree. The question of his bona fide requirement, therefore, does not arise when he is exe­cuting his decree. In fact the consent decree may be deemed to be a satisfactory cause within the meaning of cl. (c) of S. 6, and plaintiff's case may be regarded as covered by the proviso assuming that the objection in question can be raised in execution. [7] The learned counsel for the respondent has contended that under S. 6, no order or decree or decree for the recovery of possession of any house can be made or executed so long as the tenant pays the rent and performs the condi­tions of the tenancy. [7] The learned counsel for the respondent has contended that under S. 6, no order or decree or decree for the recovery of possession of any house can be made or executed so long as the tenant pays the rent and performs the condi­tions of the tenancy. He urges that the prohibition is against the execution of the decree aleo and it is open to the tenant to object to the execution of a decree even though the decree or order sought to be executed has not disposed of the question whether the landlord required the house bona fide. [8] In the view of the matter that we have taken, it is not necessary for us to decide this question. The consent decree stands on a differ­ent footing from a decree passed on contest and there is nothing in S. 6 or in any other provision of this Act which limits the effect of a compro­mise decree. The parties were bound by the compromise decree and the executing Court had no jurisdiction to go behind it or to alter it even in the light of events taking place after the pas­sing of the decree. [9] For the reasons given above, this appeal must succeed. The orders of the Courts below are reversed and the execution application is returned to the executing Court with the direc­tion that possession shall be delivered to the decree-holder in accordance with law. [10] Thadani Ag. C. J-I agree. Appeal allowed.