Judgement G. N. DAS, J. :- This appeal is by the plaintiff against a decision of our learned brother Sen, J. The only question which has been canvassed before us on behalf of the appellant is a question of res judicata. The facts which bear on this question may be briefly stated as follows : Ramdhan, Panubala and Hiran Bala were co-sharer tenants of a holding, the share of Ramdhan being 8 annas and those of Panu and Hiran Bala 4 as. each. In March 1940 Ramdhan sold his 8 annas share to the plaintiff stating that the holding which was sold was an occupancy holding. The other co-sharers Panu Bala and Hiran Bala thereupon made an application for preemption under S. 26F, Bengal Tenancy Act as amended in 1938 (hereinafter called the Act). The plaintiff who was the opposite party in the pre-emption proceedings disputed the claim of the pre-emptors inter alia on the ground that the holding in question was a mokrari mourashi holding and that pre-emption under S. 26F, Bengal Tenancy Act could not be allowed. The learned Munsif held that the holding in question was an occupancy holding and on this finding made an order under S. 26F of the Act. The plaintiff who was the opposite party in those proceedings unsuccessfully filed an appeal before the lower appellate Court. Thereafter on 12th September 1941 the plaintiff raised the present suit for a declaration that he had a right to the tenancy as a mokrari mourashi raiyat to the extent of 8 annas share and for a permanent in junction restraining the defendant from taking possession on the ground that the decision in Misc. Appeal No. 12 of the 1st Court, Subordinate Judge, Hooghly, was erroneous. 2. One of the defences taken to this suit was that the question whether the plaintiff was a mokrari mourashi tenant or an occupancy raiyat was concluded by the decision in the pre-emption proceedings. Both the Courts below concurred in holding that the status of the plaintiff was that of a mokrari mourashi raiyat and that the decision in the pre-emption proceedings did not operate as a bar to the re-agitation of this question and on these findings gave the plaintiff, a decree. Both the Courts below concurred in holding that the status of the plaintiff was that of a mokrari mourashi raiyat and that the decision in the pre-emption proceedings did not operate as a bar to the re-agitation of this question and on these findings gave the plaintiff, a decree. On appeal to this Court, Sen, J. took a contrary view and held that the question of the status of the plaintiff was decided in the pre emption proceedings and that this decision operated as res judicata,. The appeal was accordingly allowed by the learned Judge. It is against this decision that the present appeal has been taken. 3. The sole question between the parties in this appeal is whether the decision in a proceeding under S. 26F of the amended Bengal Tenancy Act to the effect that the tenancy in question is an occupancy holding, is res judicata in a subsequent suit between the same parties for a declaration that the tenancy is a mokrari mourashi holding and not an occupancy holding. 4. The proceedings under S. 26F of the Act start on an application and not by a suit. The procedure to be followed in such cases is by force of S. 143(2) of the Act, not regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure but is subject to any rules which may be passed by this Court under S. 143(1) of the Act. 5. It is now fairly well settled that a question of title can be determined in such proceedings, though the Court is not bound to do so. Hosssin Ali v. Bala Chand, 51 CWN 415 : (AIR (34) 1947 Cal 444), Balai Chand v. Nibaran Chandra, 51 CWN 644 : (AIR (34) 1947 Cal 410). 6. It has also been decided in this Court that S. 26F cl. (10) of the Act provides for only one appeal, a second appeal being incompetent-Lord Bishop of Mylapur v. Meher Ali, 41 CWN 993 : (ILR (1937) 2 Cal 496) : Kulada Prosad v. Pratibhanath, 62 Cal 149 : (AIR (22) 1935 Cal 91). Though cl. 10 does not expressly say that the order passed on such an appeal is final, the necessary implication is that the order passed on an appeal under S. 26F is final. 7. Though cl. 10 does not expressly say that the order passed on such an appeal is final, the necessary implication is that the order passed on an appeal under S. 26F is final. 7. As the proceedings under S. 26F are instituted by an application and are not suits strictly so called S. 11, Civil P.C. does not in terms apply, but as has been held in numerous cases principles analogous to those embodied in the said section apply. I may refer, in particular, to the latest pronouncement of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Shivaraj v. Edappakath Ayissa Bi, 54 CWN 55 : (AIR (36) 1949 PC 302) where the principles of constructive res judicata were made applicable to procedure in execution of a decree. 8. In the present case the question of status was expressly put into issue and was decided in the previous proceedings under S. 26F. 9. Mr. Banerjee appearing for the appellant strongly relies on the decision of this Court in the case of Maha Luxmi Bank v. Abdul Khaleque, 43 CWN 1046. In that case, consequent on an order under S. 26J of the Act, directing the tenant to pay to the landlord the balance of the landlords fees, the former instituted a suit for declaration that the holding in question was a mokrari mourashi holding and for a permanent injunction restraining the latter from realising the money decreed in the S. 26J proceedings. This Court held that the decision on the question of status in the 26F proceedings was not res judicata though the order directing the payment of the landlords fees was conclusive and binding between the parties and could not be impeached in a later suit. 10. This Court held that the decision on the question of status in the 26F proceedings was not res judicata though the order directing the payment of the landlords fees was conclusive and binding between the parties and could not be impeached in a later suit. 10. The reasons given in that judgment may be analysed as follows : (1) There was a vital difference between a suit and an application both as regards scope and the nature of the orders and the powers of the Court in dealing with the matter; (2) the Court dealing with an application under S. 26F cannot make any declaration as to the status of the tenant, (3) the question of the character of the tenancy cannot be deemed to be finally decided in proceedings under S. 26F which have been aptly described as summary proceedings; (4) the cases is which their Lordships of the Judicial Committee apply the principle of res judicata in cases outside S. 11, Civil P.C. fall into two classes, viz., (A) where an interlocutory judgment has been passed in a proceeding and this was held to be conclusive in a later stage of the same proceeding; (B) where a contentious proceeding which though not technically a suit culminates in a final order which has all the characteristics of a decree and is open to challenge by way of appeal; and (5) on general principles as enunciated in Barrs v. Jackson, (1842) 57 RR 461 : (14 LJ Ch 433), either party may litigate for any other purpose provided the immediate object of the decision be not attempted to be withdrawn from its operation. 11. It may be pointed out at the outset that the decision in the case of Maha Luxmi Bank v. A. Khaleque 43 CWN 1046 on the question of res judicata was obiter inasmuch the Munsif who decided the 26J proceedings expressly refrained from deciding the question of status (see p. 1054). 12. I am not unmindful of the fact that the above decision was followed in the case of Biswa Nath v. Bhupendra Nath, 46 CWN 133 : Srish Chandra v. Kala Chand 46 CWN 169 : (AIR (29) 1942 Cal 445). All the above three cases were however decided before the amendment of S. 26F in 1938, at a time when there was no provision for an appeal to a higher Court. All the above three cases were however decided before the amendment of S. 26F in 1938, at a time when there was no provision for an appeal to a higher Court. This last fact, viz. that there was no provision for an appeal to a superior tribunal, was relied on as a circumstance to indicate that the proceedings under S. 26J, Bengal Tenancy Act, were of a summary character. 13. Adverting now to the reasons given by the learned Judges in Maha Luxmi Banks case, 43 CWN 1046, I may however observe that it has been decided, as already stated, that the Court dealing with an application under S. 26F of the Act has power to decide the question of the title or of the nature of the tenancy if raised by the parties. It is also to be noted that in order to decide a question of res judicata, the Court has to look to the substance of the matter and that the previous judgment which is relied on to raise the plea operates as an estoppel not merely as regards the actual decision but also as regards all the findings which are essential to sustain the judgment. Lilabati v. Vishnu Ghobey, 6 CLJ 621 at p. 630 : Panchu Mondal v. Chandra Kanta, 14 CLJ 220 at p. 224 (12 IC 9). It may also be noted that the proceedings under S. 26F under the amended law cannot be regarded as of a summary character. The adjudication made in such proceedings is open to challenge by way of an appeal. 14. It is not, however, necessary for the purposes of the present case to pursue the matter further. All the three cases referred to already were decided prior to the amendment, in 1938 when the right of appeal was expressly conferred, and are distinguishable on this ground. The decision in the case of Prosanna Kumar v. Adyasakti Debi, 46 CWN 1022 : (AIR (29) 1942 Cal 586) has bean distinguished and dissented from in the case of Shankaracharjya v. Sademoni, 49 CWN 580 : (AIR (32) 1945 Cal 474) and Balai Chand v. Nibaran Chadra, 51 CWN 644 : (AIR (34) 1947 Cal 410). The decision in the case of Prosanna Kumar v. Adyasakti Debi, 46 CWN 1022 : (AIR (29) 1942 Cal 586) has bean distinguished and dissented from in the case of Shankaracharjya v. Sademoni, 49 CWN 580 : (AIR (32) 1945 Cal 474) and Balai Chand v. Nibaran Chadra, 51 CWN 644 : (AIR (34) 1947 Cal 410). The case is distinguishable because in that case the question of the nature of the tenancy was not raised or decided in the proceedings under S. 26F of the Act and as such the decision under S. 26F of the Act could not operate as res judicata. The case was also decided under the unamended S. 29F of the Act. 15. It is true that in applying the principle of res judicata to cases which are not suits strictly so called the tests for deciding the validity of the plea must be coveal with the conditions embodied in S. 11 of the Code subject to this that the proceedings, the decision, whereof is said to be a bar were not suits strictly so called but part of the character of suits. It was apply this principle to the facts of this case, in my opinion there is no escape from the conclusion that the express decision on the question of status which was made in the 26F proceedings is binding on the parties in the present suit on the principle of finality in litigation." This view receives support from the Bench decision of this Court in the case of Balai Chand V. Nibaran Chandra 51 CWN 644 : (AIR (34) 1947 Cal 410) 16. The sole contention raised by Mr. Banerjee in this appeal fails and this appeal must be dismissed with costs. DAS GUPTA, J. :- I agree. Appeal dismissed.