Judgment.- This is a petition by the plaintiff to revise the order of the Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonam dismissing his suit, S.C.S.No. 278 of 1948. The suit was for arrears of rent. Govindammal, the owner of the properties, leased them to Periaswami Padayachi, the defendant, for a term of 3 years commencing from 7th July, 1945. On 30th October, 1946, Govindammal granted a second lease of the properties in favour of one Koorathalwar for 10 years. It will be noticed that the currency of the second lease partially overlaps the currency of the first lease. It appears that on 8th November, 1946, Koorathalwar issued a notice to Peraswami Padayachi informing him of the lease in his favour. On 7th January, 1947, when both these leases had yet some time to run, Govindammal granted a usufructuary mortgage of the properties in favour of the plaintiff. Thereafter, on 28th January, 1947, Govindammal sent a notice to Periaswami Padayachi the original lessee, informing him of the usufructuary mortgage that she had created. On 31st January, 1947, the plaintiff too sent a similar notice. On 15th September, 1947, the plaintiff sent a second notice through a vakil and as the rent he claimed was not paid, he instituted the action out of which the present revision petition arises. Periaswami Padayachi pleaded that on receipt of the plaintiff’s notice, he informed him that he was willing to pay him the arrears of rent, provided the plaintiff would indemnify him against loss arising from the claims of Koorathalwar that the plaintiff failed to comply with this requirement and therefore he paid the amount to Koorathalwar and that the plaintiff is therefore not entitled to recover any rent from him. The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit on the ground that the defendant had never attorned to the plaintiff that the proper remedy of the plaintiff was to file a suit for possession and mesne profits against his mortgagor and that he could not seek to establish his title on the mortgage deed in a small cause suit. The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit on the ground that the defendant had never attorned to the plaintiff that the proper remedy of the plaintiff was to file a suit for possession and mesne profits against his mortgagor and that he could not seek to establish his title on the mortgage deed in a small cause suit. The argument of Mr.T.S. Venkatarama Iyer, learned counsel for the petitioner, was that Koorathalwar was merely a subsequent lessee of the properties, that the subsequent lease would not entitle him to collect the rent from Peria swami Padayachi the earlier lessee, and that he being the mortgagee was the proper person entitled to receive the arrears of rent from Periaswami. The reply on the other side was that the lease in favour of Koorathalwar operates as an assignment of the reversion, that this entitles him to recover the rent from the earlier lessee and also to possession of the properties on the termination of the earlier lease and that it is only subject to these rights, which Govindammal had already created, that the usufructuary mortgage would take effect. The English law on the point is stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 20, page 81 as follows: "After a lease has been granted, another lease of the same premises is sometimes, granted, the term being either concurrent with or subsequent to that of (he existing lease. A concurrent lease, provided it is made by deed, operates as a grant of the reversion upon the existing term. If the concurrent term is equal to or exceeds the residue of the existing term, the concurrent lessee is entitled to the rent for the whole of such residue, and afterwards to possession for the remainder (if any) of his own term. If the concurrent term is less than the existing term, the concurrent lessee is entitled to the rent during his own term." Of the English decisions cited, the earliest is Wordsley Brewery Co. v. Halford1. The facts of that case were these. One Mrs. Ann Whiting had granted a lease from year to year in favour of one Halford. Subsequently, Mrs. Whiting granted a lease for 14 years in favour of a brewery company called Wordsley Brewery Co. Thereafter Mr. Whiting, acting as the agent of his wife, issued a notice to Halford to vacate the premises. One Mrs. Ann Whiting had granted a lease from year to year in favour of one Halford. Subsequently, Mrs. Whiting granted a lease for 14 years in favour of a brewery company called Wordsley Brewery Co. Thereafter Mr. Whiting, acting as the agent of his wife, issued a notice to Halford to vacate the premises. It was held that the person who should have issued the notice was the Brewery Company and that the notice on behalf of the original lessor was bad. Lord Alverstone, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Court stated "The grant of the lease, therefore, passes the reversion, and not merely the attornment". On the basis of this decision, it was argued that the lease to Koorathalwar passed the reversion and entitled him to collect the rent from the earlier lessee, Periaswami Padayachi. This decision has been followed in this Court in Manickam Pillai v. Rathnaswami Nadar2. In that case, when a tenancy from month to month was outstanding, the properties were leased for a term of 20 years in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff issued a notice to quit and sought to eject the earlier tenant from possession. It was held that it was competent to the plaintiff to do so. The decision in Wordsley Brewery Co. v. Halford1, was referred to and the learned Judges stated: "We must adopt this rule unless the Indian law under the Transfer of Properly Act is clearly different. Although the matter is not free from difficulty we are inclined to think that the provisions of that Act are not inconsistent with the English rule". In Ratnaswami Moopanar v. Nagaraja Moopanar3 the decision in Manickam Pillai v. Rathnaswami Nadar2, is referred with approval and followed. "Under the English law it is open to a landlord to create concurrent leases, that is, he can execute a lease today for a term and tomorrow he can execute another lease for another term to run from the date on which he executed the latter lease. Such a lease has always been held to be valid and in law would operate as an assignment upon the existing term . . . . . There is nothing to preclude the application of this principle to India and it has been adopted by the Indian High Courts-Vide Manikam Pillai v. Ratnaswami Nadar1. Such a lease has always been held to be valid and in law would operate as an assignment upon the existing term . . . . . There is nothing to preclude the application of this principle to India and it has been adopted by the Indian High Courts-Vide Manikam Pillai v. Ratnaswami Nadar1. Therefore, the question is, ‘would Exhibit A be a valid lease according to the Transfer of Property Act?‘ It is conceded that it is. If Exhibit A had mentioned simply that a lease of the lands which were also the subject-matter of the prior lease is being granted that would in law without anything more operate as an assignment of the reversion and entitle the lessee under the latter lease to recover the rent due and payable under the former lease". Both these are Bench decisions and hold the field. It follows that by virtue of the lease in his favour Koorathalwar was the person entitled to recover rent from Periaswami Padayachi and the right of the plaintiff would be only to proceed against Koorathalwar. The plaintiff’s suit was therefore rightly dismissed. Koorathalwar was not made a party in the Court below. So I was asked to remand the suit in order to give the plaintiff an opportunity to implead this Koorathalwar. I do not feel disposed to do so, because the claim against Koorathalwar for the period covered by the suit is now time-barred. In the result, the revision petition fails and is dismissed with costs. V.P.S. ----- Petition dismissed.