JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal arises out of execution proceedings taken out by the decree-holder of a compromise-decree passed by the Court of District Judge, Gwalior. The agreement was to the effect that Rs.44,000 should be paid to the decree, holder, that the amount which has been deposited in the Court should be taken by the decree-holder and debited from the total sum decreed and that the judgment-debtor should pay the remaining sum within a period of two-months. 2. According to the terms of the decree the decree-holder received Rs. 29,731 and a sum of Rs. 15,800 is still due. According to the decree this decretal amount ought to have been paid within two months. In the lower Court the judgment-debtor filed an application stating therein that he had not been able to manage as was contemplated at the time of compromise and so he was not in a position to pay the amount and, therefore, requested the Court for extension of the time. This application was rejected by the learned District Judge. Against this order the judgment-debtor has preferred this appeal and has filed an application that the sale of the property ordered by the District Judge should be stayed pending the decision in. this appeal. 3. Arguments have been heard by me or the appeal as well as on the application for stay order because the question involved in the appeal as well as in the application of stay order is the same viz., whether the executing Court can enlarge or extend the period for payment of the decretal amount prescribed in a compromise decree. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant places his reliance on the wording of S. 148, Civil P. C. But note 3 to this section in Chitaley's Commentary is quite clear that the Allahabad, Lahore and Patra High Courts and the Oudh Judicial Commissioner's Court have held that the time fixed by the consent decree cannot be extended. 5. Evidently the compromise decree passed in this case is final decree and is executable as such. 6. 5. Evidently the compromise decree passed in this case is final decree and is executable as such. 6. The general rule in all such cases has been that if the time stipulated is an essential part of the terms of the contract embodied in the decree and rot a mere threat of a penal nature, there is no power in the Court to make a new contract for the parties fixing some other time than that which has been stipulated. A perusal of the compromise decree in this case will make it quite clear that the time stipulated was an essential part of the terms of the contract embodied in the decree and in such cases I do not think the Court can, or should, vary the period fixed for payment or enlarge the time. I respectfully agree to the following observations of Wadsworth J. in Ammoo v. Pokkan, a. I. R. (27) 1940 Mad. 817 : (1940-2 M. l. J. 311) : "It seems to me a self-evident proposition that when there is a decree based on an agreement between the parties, an essential term of that agreement embodied in the decree cannot be changed by an act of the Court on the application of one only of the parties, but the consent of both the parties to the original agreement would be necessary for its modification. The Court after all is doing nothing more than give judicial force to a contract and there is no basis for the decree other than the contract. It follows that the decree cannot be varied except by content of the contracting parties. It seems to me that this principle must apply to the terms of contract which fixes a definite period for the performance of an obligation as an essential part of the contract." 7. In this view of the law which I take, the appeal fails. An order of staying sale cannot be passed. I, therefore, dismiss this appeal with costs.