The Chief Justice: R.C.Nos. 9 to 11 of 1950.-These three references under rule 17, Schedule IV of the City Municipal Act raise the same question for decision formulated by the Court of Small Causes, "Whether a notice of intention to appeal given not after, but before the decision of the Taxation Appeals Committee is communicated to the assessee is a good notice under rule 15 (a) (i) of the Taxation Rules in Schedule IV of the City Municipal Act." There were three assessments of property tax by the Commissioner of three properties belonging to the assessee and there were three appeals to the Taxation Appeals Committee against the assessment of the Commissioner. These three appeals were dismissed by the Committee on the 24th February, 1949. On 1st March, 1949, the assessee gave to the Commissioner notice of his intention to appeal against the decision of the Taxation Appeals Committee. He followed up by presenting petitions of appeal on 9th March, 1949. The decision of the Appeals Committee was communicated to the party on 7th March, 1949 by registered post. When the appeals came up for hearing before the Court of Small Causes, a preliminary objection was taken that the appeals were not maintainable, because the requirements of rule 15 (a) (i) had not been complied with. The objection was based on the fact that the appeals were filed before the party was served with the decision of the Appeals Committee. The learned Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes upheld this objection and dismissed the appeals in limine. Rule 15 (a) (i) originally ran thus: "An appeal shall lie to the Court of Small Causes against any decision of the Taxation Appeals Committee constituted under rule 14 but no such appeal shall be heard by the said court, unless-(1) a notice of intention to appeal has been given to the Commisioner within ten days from the date of the decision." By Notification, No. 662, Local Administration, dated 14th August, 1942, published in the Fort St. George Gazette, for the words "from the date of the decision" the following words were substituted, viz.,”from the date on which such decision was communicated by registered post“. It may be mentioned that a similar substitution was made in sub-clause (ii) of section 15 (a) providing for the presentation of appeals. George Gazette, for the words "from the date of the decision" the following words were substituted, viz.,”from the date on which such decision was communicated by registered post“. It may be mentioned that a similar substitution was made in sub-clause (ii) of section 15 (a) providing for the presentation of appeals. The learned Judge thought that the language of the rule strictly construed supported the objection on behalf of the Corporation, because the rule contemplated a notice only after the communication of the decision of the Appeals Committee. We fail to see anything in the language which compels us to agree with the learned Judge. There is nothing in that provision which makes it incumbent on the assessee who is aggrieved by the decision of the Taxation Appeals Committee to give notice only after the communication of the decision of the Committee The only relevant words as regards the time limit are”within ten days from the date on which the decision was communicated by registered post“. All that is material is to find out when the ten days expire. Any notice of intention to appeal given before that date would be sufficient compliance with the require ment of the rule.”Within ten days“should be read as”not beyond ten days“. The learned Judge referred to cases decided on a construction of Order 41, rule 22 Civil Procedure Code, which contains the words”within one month from the date when he (the respondent) receives notice of the hearing of the appeal“A Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in Mst. Koshalia. Riazuddin1 (the learned Judge was wrong in thinking it was the decision of a single Judge) took the view that a memorandum of cross-objections filed by a respondent before he was served with notice of the appeal would not be a valid memorandum. The reasoning of the learned Judges can be best stated in their own words, "The use of the word ‘within’ would fix two limits, an interior limit starting from the date of receipt of the notice and a posterior limit of one month after that date. The ‘cross-objections’ filed before that date would not be cross-objections at all in the strict legal sense of the word. It appears from the report that this position was conceded by learned counsel. This view, however, did not prevail in that order. The ‘cross-objections’ filed before that date would not be cross-objections at all in the strict legal sense of the word. It appears from the report that this position was conceded by learned counsel. This view, however, did not prevail in that order. In Labhu Ram v. Ram Partap1, it was inter alia decided by a Full Bench of that Court that a respondent could submit a memorandum of cross-objections as soon as an order was made issuing notice of the date of appeal though service was not actually effected on him. At page 41 of the report Din Mohammad, J., who delivered the leading judgment after referring to the case in Mst. Koshalia v. Riazuddin2said: “The only question is whether the right of a respondent to file his cross-objections is so restricted as is adumbrated in Mst. Koshalia v. Riazuddin2. In other words, could it be the intention of the Legislature in enacting Order 41, rule 22, to specify the point of time in which such cross-objections could be filed at both ends?” Abdur Rahman, J., dealt with the question at greater length and his observations are very useful, “I agree and should like to add in connection with the last point discussed by my learned brother that the word ‘within’ has been used, in my opinion, in Order 41, rule 22 (1), Civil Procedure Code, to convey what may be expressed by the words ‘not beyond ‘. Having regard to the period given to an appellant for preferring an appeal and apparently with the intention of preventing an unnecessary delay, the period of one month was being given to a respondent from the date of service on him of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal beyond which he was not to be ordinarily allowed to put in his cross-objections. That a respondent can file cross-objections at any time after an appeal has been admitted even before he is actually served with the notice of hearing of appeal is not open to doubt. In such a case service will be deemed to have been effected on the respondent on the day on which he files cross-objections. That a respondent can file cross-objections at any time after an appeal has been admitted even before he is actually served with the notice of hearing of appeal is not open to doubt. In such a case service will be deemed to have been effected on the respondent on the day on which he files cross-objections. If that be the correct position it would seem to follow that the words ‘within one month from the date of service on him’ were, meant to provide the maximum number of days during which cross-objections could be filed by a respondent as of right unless the period was extended by the appellate Court.” In Dasrulal v. Narayan3, the learned Judge Pollock, J., took the same view as the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court above referred to. We agree with these decisions. We are unable to see why the word ‘within’ should suggest two ends. The plain language of the rule suggests only one limit, the date before which the notice of intention to appeal should be given. As already mentioned, it does not prescribe any more than Order 41, rule 22, Civil Procedure Code, that either notice of intention to appeal or the presentation of the appeal should be only after a particular date. The learned Judge appears to have been unnecessarily obsessed by what was supposed to have been decided by this Court in Ahmed Ali &38; Co. v. Commissioner of Corporation of Madras 4.That decision has no bearing on the question which falls for decision in this case and Dr. John very properly did not rely upon our prior ruling in any manner. We only decided that an appeal would be incompetent unless the requirements of rule 15 had been satisfied and in that case we found one of the requirements, namely, the payment of tax, had not been complied with. We hold, therefore, that the appeals were competent. The Corporation will pay to the assessee the costs of this reference. Referred Case No. 29 of 1950.-The answer to the question in this case which is the same which was decided in R.C.Nos. 9, 10 and 11 of 1950 is that the notice of intention to appeal was properly given and the appeal was competent. The Corporation will pay the costs of the reference to the assessee. K.C. ----- Reference answered.