Abdul Rahiman v. Mattancherry Municipal Commissioner
1950-06-12
GOVINDA PILLAI
body1950
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- 1. The petition is by a tea-shop keeper in Mattancherry and he has filed it under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. He had obtained from the Mattancherry Municipality a small plot of poramboke land measuring roughly 9 koles by 7 koles on the western side of the Krishna Talkies in Mattancherry. He got it for conducting a temporary tea-shop. The term had expired by the end of Karkadakom 1124. It was stated that after this date the Executive Authority of the Mattancherry Municipality served him with a notice to quit after removing the shed and that his appeal against the notice of the Municipal Council went against him as the said Council on 3.5.1950 passed a Resolution authorising the Commissioner to forcibly demolish the shed and take possession of the premises immediately. The petitioner would say that the plot of ground where the shed has been erected was leased out to him by the Municipality, that the Executive Authority by summary process was incompetent to secure possession of the plot by evicting him, that the action of the Commissioner who was the Executive Authority was ultra vires, that being a lease the Municipal Council was also incompetent to a resolution supporting the Commissioner, that their resolution also was ultra vires, illegal and unenforcible and that therefore this court might be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus and prohibition restraining - the counter-petitioner from carrying out the resolution of the Municipal Council until the matter is adjudicated by a Civil Court. 2. The Commissioner of the Municipal Council is the counter-petitioner. On notice given to him he has entered appearance and filed a counter affidavit. He had also produced along with the affidavit the necessary records in support of his contentions. The plot according to him, was never leased out to the petitioner. The plot referred to in the petition was a portion of a compound about 26 cents in extent. This compound had vested in the Municipality for the purpose of town improvement. The Municipality had never leased a portion of this compound nor had the Municipality any authority to lease it out to the petitioner. On 15.11.1124 the petitioner applied to the Municipality for permission to put up a temporary shed for the purpose of conducting a tea-shop on the site in question.
The Municipality had never leased a portion of this compound nor had the Municipality any authority to lease it out to the petitioner. On 15.11.1124 the petitioner applied to the Municipality for permission to put up a temporary shed for the purpose of conducting a tea-shop on the site in question. In that petition he had undertaken to demolish and remove at his own cost the shed he wanted to put up after obtaining sanction within 24 hours of a demand made by the Municipality in that behalf. On the basis of this undertaking the council at its meeting held on 22.11.1124 granted the petitioner a license terminable on the last day of Karkadakam 1124 in respect of the site in question for the purpose of putting up a temporary shed for conducting a tea-shop till the end of 1124. On the strength of the license thus granted the petitioner put up a small shed agreeing to pay the license fee Rs. 6 for the site in question. This arrangement was never intended to be a lease. Since the petitioner did not remove the shed after the expiry of the license, a notice was served on him on 1.10.1949 to demolish and remove the shed at once. The petitioner accepted the notice and after that he by a petition moved the Council to extend the period of the license in respect of the site in question till the end of Karkadakom 1125. This prayer was not allowed and so the petitioner was incompetent to remain on the site any further. The action taken by the Commissioner and the Municipality were intra vires and supported by the provisions of the Municipal Act XVIII of 1113 (Cochin). The petition was therefore prayed to be dismissed with costs. The petition of 15.11.1124 filed by the petitioner before the Council for permission to put up the shed on the land belonging to the Municipality has been filed by the counter-petitioner in this court. It contains the resolution of the council. The resolution allowed the plot in question being used by the petitioner on license till the end of Karkadakom 1124 on the condition mentioned in the petition. There is no room for any doubt or dispute as to the meaning of this resolution, ie.
It contains the resolution of the council. The resolution allowed the plot in question being used by the petitioner on license till the end of Karkadakom 1124 on the condition mentioned in the petition. There is no room for any doubt or dispute as to the meaning of this resolution, ie. that the plot of ground 9 koles by 7 koles had been allowed to be used by the petitioner only as a licensee. By no stretch of imagination could this resolution be interpreted to mean that the Municipality allowed to import the incidents of a lease in this resolution. It was therefore not necessary to go into a discussion as to the effect of this resolution or as to the difference between the lease and the license. Cl. 2 of S.178 of the Municipal Council Act enables the Executive Authority of the Council to grant a license for the temporary erection of pandals or other structures in a public street vested in the Council or any other public place the control of which is vested in the council. The plot of ground over which the petitioner was allowed to put up a temporary shed forms portion of a bigger area. It is admitted even in the petition that this plot is portion of a poramboke land which had vested in the Council. Thus the sanction given to the petitioner could only be under C1.2 S.178. S.366 of the same Act laid down that any person occupying any land or building belonging to the Municipality or vested in the Municipality and occupying it under licenses for specific periods may on refusal to quit at the expiry of the period and after notice in writing to quit, be summarily evicted by the executive authority without recourse to a civil court. Since I am of the view that it is under a license that the petitioner is in occupation of the plot in question he could be evicted summarily by the executive authority. It was admitted even in the petition that a notice to quit had been served on the petitioner; and so the Commissioner was competent to proceed summarily to secure possession. It was seen that against the notice issued by the Commissioner the petitioner had approached the Council to set aside his notice and to grant his permission to have the shop till the end of 1125.
It was seen that against the notice issued by the Commissioner the petitioner had approached the Council to set aside his notice and to grant his permission to have the shop till the end of 1125. The Council passed a resolution confirming the decision of the executive authority. There is nothing ultra vires in the procedure adopted by the Commissioner and the Municipal Council or the decisions taken by them. This is an ill-conceived petition probably filed with the object of retaining possession of the plot as long as possible. Even if the petitioner had a case it is not a writ of mandamus which could be issued in such cases. It is also doubtful whether the writ of prohibition is also the appropriate remedy. At any rate since the petitioner has not made out a case to invoke the extraordinary powers of this court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India the petition is dismissed. Since in my view this was a most vexatious petition I think that the petitioner must be made liable for the whole costs of the counter-petitioner. Such costs will include Advocate's fee of Rs. 75/- The petition is therefore dismissed with cost. Petition dismissed.