JUDGMENT : This second appeal arises out of a suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent for declaration that he is the owner of a certain piece of land measuring 12 Bighas, in Thikana Sujaota in the former Jaora State and asking for an injunction restraining the defendant-appellant from interfering with the plaintiff's possession. The suit was decreed by the trial Court and the defendant's appeal was dismissed by the first appellate Court. It is not disputed that the suit relates to some land in Thikana Sujaota which was sold for Rs. 1101/- by Thakur Khushalsingh the father of the present appellant in the year 1881 A. D. to one Ramdayal, uncle of the present plaintiff-respondent. It further remains undisputed that the plaintiff remained in possession over this land since 1881 to the present day. The Thakur of the Thikana made various attempts to challenge the sale and also the possession. In 1909 a decision was given by the Kamdar of Jaora, in an appeal from a decision of the Tehsildar holding that the sale of 1881, was valid and Ramdayal had become owner of the property in dispute. This decision being inter partes is, in my opinion binding on the parties. In this appeal, it is not disputed that this decision was not a decision of a Court of competent jurisdiction. If it was a decision of a competent Court then it is clear that no rules subsequently made could have had the force of defeating the rights of the parties which had become final and had crystallised as far back as 1909 A. D. No rule, circular, regulation, or bye-laws are shown to me either of 1881, or made afterwards, which lay down that in 1881 it was invalid or illegal to transfer any portion of inam lands. 2. The learned counsel for the appellant places reliance on Inam Rules promulgated in the year 1910. But even in these rules, an exception has been laid down which states that transfers of Inami lands made before the year 1884 will be deemed to have been valid. 3. The letter from the Political Agent in Malwa, to the Chief Secretary Darbar Jaora, dated 12th February 1920, relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant has absolutely no bearing on the question before me. It is only an advice to the Darbar Jaora, for exercising sovereign powers. 3. The letter from the Political Agent in Malwa, to the Chief Secretary Darbar Jaora, dated 12th February 1920, relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant has absolutely no bearing on the question before me. It is only an advice to the Darbar Jaora, for exercising sovereign powers. This letter cannot be taken to lay down a rule of law, asking the civil Courts not to entertain such suits. In fact the learned counsel for the appellant has failed to show to me any rule of the Jaora State, which prohibits civil Courts from taking cognisance of such cases. So far as this point is concerned I do not think there is any force in this appeal. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant then argues that it was not proved that the original sale-deed of 1881 was lost and secondary evidence could not have been admitted till this fact was proved. I do not find any strength in this contention. A Court is to decide the preliminary question of admissibility of secondary evidence on consideration of the evidence and the surrounding circumstances. Where it so decides, the question decided is a question of fact - not of law; and the Privy Council has definitely laid down that it is proper to be decided by the Judge of the first instance, as it depends very much on his discretion and his conclusion should not be overruled except in very clear cases of miscarriage. 'Srimati Rani Hurripria v. Rukmini Devi', 19 Ind App 79, (PC). In the case before me it is apparent that the document was produced in the Tehsil, and then lost before 1901 A. D. These facts are quite clear from the decision of the Kamdar and no further proof of it was needed. As regards the objection now taken that a copy of a copy was produced, it is sufficient to state that no objection was taken when this document was produced and admitted by the Court of the first instance. An objection to the improper mode of proof of a fact should be taken at the time when the fact is sought to be proved in an unauthorised manner, and if not taken at that time it cannot be taken subsequently. 'Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurji', AIR (30) 1943 PC 83. 5. The third point urged by Mr. An objection to the improper mode of proof of a fact should be taken at the time when the fact is sought to be proved in an unauthorised manner, and if not taken at that time it cannot be taken subsequently. 'Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurji', AIR (30) 1943 PC 83. 5. The third point urged by Mr. Pandey is about the misjoinder of parties. He contends that the members of the family of the plaintiff were not joined either as plaintiffs or defendants in the suit and as such the suit must fail. I think this matter is covered by 'Ahmad Sahib v. Magnesite Syndicate Ltd.', 39 Mad 501, and 'Mahomed Fariq v. Sidik', AIR (12) 1925 Sind 36, where it has been held that one of several co-owners can maintain an action against a trespasser without joining the other co-owners as parties to the action. It is not contended that in the absence of other members of the family an effective decree cannot be passed in this case. 6. The last point developed by Mr. Pandey based upon the fact that the Thakur of Sujaota on 11th May 1942 gave a notice to the plaintiff calling upon him to show evidence of his title to the land in dispute and then on 25th July 1942, passed an order that the transfer of the disputed land in 1881 was bogus and fraudulent. He also passed an order for recovery of possession from the plaintiff asking the subtenants not to pay Toji to the plaintiff. 7. Mr. Pandey contends that the Inam rules of 1935 authorised the Thakur to take this action. These rules provided an appeal to the Darbar against an order of the Thakur and the plaintiff ought to have preferred his appeal to the Darbar. Mr. Pandey contends that where an appeal is provided to the Darbar the Civil Courts could not have taken cognisance of the case. 8. A perusal of the Inam Rules of 1935 inclines me to the view that Mr. Pandey's contention cannot be supported. Mr. Pandey contends that where an appeal is provided to the Darbar the Civil Courts could not have taken cognisance of the case. 8. A perusal of the Inam Rules of 1935 inclines me to the view that Mr. Pandey's contention cannot be supported. There is nothing in these rules to indicate that it was intended to cancel that portion of the Inam rules of 1910 A. D. which validated those transfers of Inam lands which had taken place prior to 1884 A. D. The object of the Inam rules of 1935 was never to invalidate these transactions which had become final as far back as 1909 and reopen the disputes which had long been settled by judicial decisions. The said rules could not be deemed to have authorised the Thakur to set aside a decision of a Court of competent jurisdiction. If he passed any order purporting to do it under the Inam Rules of 1935, his order was ultra vires, null and void; and a void order is not binding on any party much less on a civil Court. I, therefore, hold that a civil Court was competent to take cognisance of the case. This disposes of all the arguments put forward by the learned counsel for the appellant. The appeal fails and I, therefore, dismiss it with costs. Appeal dismissed.