The Chief Justice.-This is an appeal against the order made by our learned brother Satyanarayana Rao on the 25th May, 1948 as one of the vacation Judges during the summer recess of that year in the following circumstances. The Srirangam Municipality which is the appellant before us, issued a notice to the respondent purporting to be under section 182 of the Madras District Municipalities Act directing him to deliver possession of an extent of 30 cents of land in T.S.No. 1513 on the northern and eastern side of T.S.No. 1509 and to remove the fence he had put up thereon on the ground that the respondent had encroached on land belonging to the Municipality. This notice was served on the respondent on the 25th February, 1948. He thereupon filed a suit O.S.No. 250 of 1948 in the Court of the District Munsiff of Trichinopoly against the Municipality represented by its Commissioner for a declaration of his title to and for the maintenance of his possession of the land in dispute. Along with the plaint he filed an application for an interim injunction restraining the Commissioner of the Municipality From interfering with his possession pending disposal of the suit. Notice of the application for interim injunction was ordered by the learned District Munsiff and it was served on the Commissioner on the 24th April, 1948. The petition itself was posted for hearing on the 12th June 1948, evidently because the Court of the District Munsiff was closed meanwhile for the summer recess. After receipt of this notice from the Court, the Commissioner had the fence and the trees on the disputed land cut out and removed on the 27th April, 1948. As the District Munsiff’s Court was closed, the respondent filed two applications to this Court. In C.M.P.No. 3114 of1948, he prayed that this Court may be pleased to transfer the suit to this Court and to retransfer the. same aftergranting him the necessary relief. In C.M.P.No. 3115 of 1948, he prayed for an order directing the Commissioner of the Municipality to put back the fence in its original state and to restore the status quo ante pending disposal of the suit. Both the applications were disposed of finally by Satyanarayana Rao, J., on 25th May, 1948. same aftergranting him the necessary relief. In C.M.P.No. 3115 of 1948, he prayed for an order directing the Commissioner of the Municipality to put back the fence in its original state and to restore the status quo ante pending disposal of the suit. Both the applications were disposed of finally by Satyanarayana Rao, J., on 25th May, 1948. He ordered a transfer of the suit to the file of this Court and after hearing both sides, granted a mandatory injunction directing the Commissioner of the Municipality to restore the fence to a length of 355 feet within a period of ten days from the date of his order failing which the respondent herein was given liberty to move the Court to have the order carried out and to recover the cost of such execution from the defendant Municipality. As the petition for injunction had been disposed of and as it was unnecessary to keep the suit pending in this Court, the learned Judge retransferred it to the District Munsiff’s Court for disposal. The appeal before us is against the order granting the mandatory injunction. Mr. V.V.Srinivasa Aiyangar for the appellant before dealing with the merits, raised certain objections to the maintainability of the petitions before Satyanarayana Rao, J., and certain procedural defects in the applications. We may mention at the outset that none of these objections was raised before the learned Judge himself Some of the objections particularly those which were procedural, could have easily been met, if they had any substance, by appropriate amendments by the respondent We do not think it is open to the appellant to raise these objections for the first time in the appeal. However as the objections relate to matters of some general importance, especially to the practice now obtaining during the vacation of this Court, we shall briefly deal with the several points raised by him. It was contended that the application for transfer must have been made to the Original Side of this Court by means of an Original Petition bearing the proper court fee The application was made under section 24 and 151, Civil Procedure Code In the cause title the application was described as a Civil Miscellaneous Petition in this Court. It was contended that the application for transfer must have been made to the Original Side of this Court by means of an Original Petition bearing the proper court fee The application was made under section 24 and 151, Civil Procedure Code In the cause title the application was described as a Civil Miscellaneous Petition in this Court. Learned counsel relied on a ruling in Srinivasa Aiyar v Balakrishna Devai1, and certain observations of Ramesam, J., in Jumna Bai v. Ramanathan Chetti2, in support of his contention that the application should have been made to this Court on its Original Side. In our opinion there is nothing in the language of section 24, Civil Procedure Code to indicate on which side of this Court the application should be made. In dealing with this question it is important to bear in mind that section 24, Civil Procedure Code gives the power of transfer and withdrawal not only to this Court but also to the District Court and it gives such power of transfer and withdrawal not only in respect of suits but also m respect of appeals and other proceedings pending in any Court subordinate to it. It would therefore be certainly wrong to say that every application under section 24 when made to this Court should be made on the Original Side. Obviously an application to withdraw an appeal pending before a Subordinate Court to this Court or to transfer it to any other Subordinate Court cannot be made to the Original Side of this Court. It is also obvious that an application to transfer any suit pending in a Subordinate Court to another Subordinate Court for trial cannot be made to this Court on the Original Side because the subordination of Courts can only be to this Court as such and not to the Original Side of this Court. There is nothing in section 24 to confine its application to Chartered High Courts which alone have Ordinary and Extraordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction. According to us, the correct position is that an application under section 24, Civil Procedure Code should be made to this Court as such in the same manner as it might be made to the District Court and such an application can be validly heard and disposed of by any Judge of this Court deputed by the Chief Justice to hear such applications. We find actually in the Appellate Side Rules that an application under section 24 for transfer of any suit, appeal or other proceedings or in execution of a decree from one civil Court subordinate to the High Court to another such Court or to the High Court can be disposed of by a single judge. As a matter of practice, it is the learned Judge sitting in the Admission Court who deals with these applications. It may be true, as was held in Alla Subba Reddi v. Lankireddi Narayanaswami Reddi1, that an application under section 24 is in the nature of an original proceeding to which section 141, Civil Procedure Code may apply, but to say that, is far from saying that the application is one made on the Original Side of this Court. In Srinivasa Aiyar v. Balakrishna Thevan2, the learned Judges dealt with an application there made for the transfer of a suit from the Presidency Court of Small Causes to this Court for trial and disposal as an application falling under clause 13 of the Letters Patent. Obviously an application under that clause must be made to the High Court on the Original Side because it invokes the Extraordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction conferred on this Court by that clause. No doubt there is an observation in the course of the judgment that section 24, Civil Procedure Code has nothing to do with the question whether the High Court should exercise the power as a Court of original or appellate jurisdiction. That is true, but it is equally true to say that the section viz., section 24 does not indicate that the High Court should exercise the power on its Original Side. The application before the learned Judges in that case clearly fell within clause 13 of the Letters Patent. It was an application simpliciter for the transfer of a suit from the Presidency Small Causes Court to this Court to be heard and disposed of on the Original Side. There was no application there for a retransfer which could not be made to the Original Side of this Court. We do not think this decision should be deemed to be an authority for the position that an application under section 24, Civil Procedure Code should he made on the Original Side of this Court. There was no application there for a retransfer which could not be made to the Original Side of this Court. We do not think this decision should be deemed to be an authority for the position that an application under section 24, Civil Procedure Code should he made on the Original Side of this Court. The observations of Ramesam, J., in Jumna Bai v. Ramanathan Chetti3, were made on the assumption that clause 13 of the Letters Patent would enable this Court to transfer a suit pending in the mofussil to the file of this Court and to retransfer it after passing appropriate interim orders. It is one thing to say that when the application for transfer is granted and the suit itself is withdrawn to the file of this Court, then it should be tried on the Original Side of the High Court; but it is quite a different thing to say that the application for such a transfer should be made to the Original Side of this Court. Under section 24 (1) (b) what this Court does is to first withdraw any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending in any Court subordinate to it and then decide to do one of three things. If it decides to try and dispose of the same, obviously such a trial or disposal would be on the Original Side of this Court. If it decides to either transfer it to any Subordinate Court or to retransfer it to the Court from which it was withdrawn, obviously there is no necessity to send the suit to the Original Side of this Court. There is an observation in Manindra Chandra Nandy v. Lal Mohan Ray4, that section 24, Civil Procedure Code confers certain powers on the High Court in its Original Jurisdiction. But we do not understand the learned Chief Justice to mean that, therefore, the application has to be made to the High Court on its Original Side. As an application under section 24, Civil Procedure Code is a substantive application made for the first time in this Court, it is true to say that it is an original proceeding as we have already said. But that does not necessarily imply that the application must be made to the Original Side of this Court. As an application under section 24, Civil Procedure Code is a substantive application made for the first time in this Court, it is true to say that it is an original proceeding as we have already said. But that does not necessarily imply that the application must be made to the Original Side of this Court. In Krishna Mudaliar v. Sabapathi Mudaliar1 , Leach, C.J., delivering the judgment of the Full Bench clearly pointed out the difference between the powers conferred on the High Court by clause 13 of the Letters Patent and those conferred by section 24, Civil Procedure Code. The learned Chief Justice disagreed with Ramesam, J., in so far as he held that clause 13 of the Letters Patent would enable an application for transfer to be made on the Original Side of the High Court along with an application for an injunction or other interlocutory relief with another application for a retransfer of the entire proceedings back to the mofussil Court. We hold that the application need not have been made to the Original Side of this Court. Learned counsel next contended that an application for transfer of a suit pending in any Court subordinate to this Court should only be made when it is intended that the suit should be tried and disposed of in this Court and not to enable this Court to pass an interim order and to retransfer it immediately after passing of that order. It is obvious that after the ruling of the Full Bench in Krishna Mudaliar v. Sabapathi Mudaliar 1 ,this contention cannot prevail. In that case which was an appeal from the order of Byers, J., passed during the vacation, the learned Judge entertained applications exactly similar to the applications before our learned brother Satyanarayana Rao. There was an application for transfer of an interlocutory application for injunction and for retransfer immediately after disposal of the interim injunction application. The Full Bench held that section 24, Civil Procedure Code, gave power to the High Court to transfer a suit to this Court and afterwards retransfer it for trial to the Court in which it was originally filed after passing an interim order. It was next urged by Mr. Srinivasa Aiyangar that such a procedure was an abuse of the process and a fraud on the power conferred on the High Court. We entirely disagree. It was next urged by Mr. Srinivasa Aiyangar that such a procedure was an abuse of the process and a fraud on the power conferred on the High Court. We entirely disagree. The Courts in this land including this Court which is the highest in the State, are intended to give adequate redress to aggrieved litigants. If on account of the closure of the Subordinate Court, it becomes impossible for a litigant to obtain relief which is urgently needed, we do not see why it should be an abuse of process or fraud on the power, if the litigant approaches this Court to exercise the power certainly conferred on it by section 24, Civil Procedure Code. There was one other minor point incidentally raised which had probably some substance at the time of the hearing of the application by Satyanarayana Rao, J., but is of mere academic interest hereafter. This related to the court-fee which would be payable on a suit withdrawn to and taken on the file of this Court. In cases where court-fee less than the minimum court-fee payable on the Original Side of this Court had been paid by the plaintiff who files an application under section 24, Civil Procedure Code, he must be made to pay the difference. That might have been so; but after the recent amendment under which there is no difference in the court-fee charged on plaints presented to the Original Side of this Court and the plaints presented in mofussil Courts there can be no occasion when a party would have to pay an excess court-fee. We are, therefore, of opinion that the applications made to Satyanarayana Rao, J., in this case were all competent and in any event, it is not open to the appellant to urge these objections before us in appeal. On the merits, we are emphatically of opinion that there can be no other conclusion than that arrived at by our learned brother on the facts of this case. The action of the Commissioner in destroying the fence and cutting away the trees on the land in dispute three days after receipt of the notice of the application for interim injunction was very highhanded. There was obviously no such special urgency as would justify such hasty action especially when the application itself was posted for hearing immediately after the reopening of the District Munsiff’s Court. There was obviously no such special urgency as would justify such hasty action especially when the application itself was posted for hearing immediately after the reopening of the District Munsiff’s Court. It appears to us clear that the Commissioner actually took advantage of the fact that the District Munsiff’s Court was closed and acted in that arbitrary manner. In the circumstances, the least that the respondent was entitled to was a restoration of the status quo ante in so far as such restoration was possible and that is what our learned brother has directed. In view of the ruling in Kandaswami Chetty v. Subramania Chetty1, learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the jurisdiction of the learned Judge to grant a temporary mandatory injunction; but he complained that the order should not have been made when in a few days the District Munsiff’s Court would reopen. This argument does not come with grace from a party who, three days after receipt of the notice from the District Munsiff’s Court would not wait till the reopening and during the vacation would take such precipitate action as to destroy a fence and cut down trees on land as regards the title to which there was dispute. We therefore see no reason to interfere with the order of Satyanarayana Rao, J., and we dismiss the appeal with costs. We wish however to mention one thing. In dealing with the application for mandatory injunction, the learned Judge naturally had to find out whether the respondent plaintiff made out a prima facie case. He therefore went into such evidence as was placed before him and arrived at a finding that the plaintiff had established a prima facie title