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1950 DIGILAW 33 (KER)

Abraham Upadesi v. Mathai Titus

1950-06-13

KUNHI RAMAN, SANKARAN

body1950
Judgment :- 1. The point raised in this batch of criminal revision petitions refers to the legality of an order passed by the Stationary First Class Magistrate, Pathanamthitta, under S.113(3), Travancore Criminal P.C. The petitions are resisted both by the learned Public Prosecutor and by the respondents here (the petitioners in the Court below). The respondents wanted the Magistrate to demand security for keeping the peace from the counter-petitioners in the Court below who are the petitioners here. 2. There is a dispute between the two rival parties regarding the right of the petitioners here to retain possession of a compound and certain houses in that compound. Respondent 1 in this court claims to be the owner of the property and his contention is that the petitioners here were really his lessees in respect of the compound and the tenements, that the leases had terminated and that he had actually taken possession of the property from the petitioners here. After remaining in possession for a time, he seems to have granted a fresh lease in favour of Respondent 2 in this Court. Under that lease, when Respondent 2 attempted to gather the usufruct, the petitioners here offered resistance. It was in those circumstances that the proceedings commenced before the Stationary First Class Magistrate for taking security from the petitioners here for keeping the peace. The Magistrate passed a preliminary order. The petitioners in this Court were not present when that order was passed. They however, appeared voluntarily before the Magistrate before the date fixed for their appearance in Court, and asked for bail, which seems to have been granted. After bail was granted, the question had to be considered as to whether an interim bond for keeping the peace should be taken from the petitioners in this Court, under S.113(3). The police had filed a report to the effect that there was imminent danger of a breach of the peace taking place if prompt action was not taken under S.113(3). The Magistrate, believing the version given in the police report, made an order directing the execution of an interim bond. 3. It is contended by Mr. Thomas on behalf of the petitioners here, that the order is not in accordance with law. The Magistrate, believing the version given in the police report, made an order directing the execution of an interim bond. 3. It is contended by Mr. Thomas on behalf of the petitioners here, that the order is not in accordance with law. Learned Counsel bases his argument on sub-s. (3) of S. 113 which sets forth that, for reasons to be recorded in writing direct the person in respect of whom the order under S. 108 has been made to execute a bond, with or without sureties " 4. According to the learned Counsel, the inquiry had not commenced in the present case to warrant the passing of any such order. He argues that "proceedings" might be said to have commenced but that they had not reached the stage of "inquiry" mentioned in S.113. It is for that highly technical reason that he contends that the order is not in accordance with law. Another contention urged on behalf of the petitioners is that the Magistrate has not exercised a judicial discretion in directing the execution of an interim bond, but that he has merely acted on the report of the police because he said that in view of the police report he considers it necessary that an interim bond should be taken. Both the learned Public Prosecutor on behalf of the State, and the counter-petitioners who are represented by Mr. Kuruvila resist this contention. Their contentions are that the order was passed strictly in accordance with the provisions of S.113(3). To consider whether the arguments of the petitioners' learned Counsel are well founded, one has to go through the provisions of S.113. Sub-s. (1) refers to two distinct classes of cases. The first is the case of an order under S.108, which is read and explained under S. 109, to a person present in Court. The second refers to a case in which a person appears (as in the present case) or is brought before a Magistrate in compliance with or in execution of a summons before warrant issued under S.110. It is the second of these classes in sub-s. (1), that is relevant for the purpose of the present case. According to this part of the section, where proceedings are started under this chapter (Chap. It is the second of these classes in sub-s. (1), that is relevant for the purpose of the present case. According to this part of the section, where proceedings are started under this chapter (Chap. VIII) and the person against whom a summons or warrant is issued under S.110, appears before a Magistrate "the Magistrate shall proceed to inquire into the truth of the information upon which action has been taken and shall ". In the present case there is no doubt whatsoever that this stage had been reached. The petitioners here were persons against whom proceedings under Chap. VIII were started. They appeared before the Magistrate while the proceedings were pending. At that time the Magistrate became competent to proceed to inquire into the truth of the information upon which he had originally taken action. That we consider to be the stage at which the inquiry commenced within the meaning of sub-s. (1) of S.113. Therefore sub-s. (3) of S.113, which refers to the stage at which an interim bond can be demanded, applies to the present case, because such an order for an interim bond can be made by a Magistrate pending the completion of the inquiry. We have no doubt whatsoever that in the present case, since the petitioners appeared before the Magistrate voluntarily and filed a statement showing their reasons for resisting the application, the Magistrate was competent to decide for himself whether an emergency had arisen for exercising the powers vested in him by sub-s. (3) of S.113 on going through the statement and the report made by the police. This power is vested in Magistrates for meeting an emergency. Unwarranted interference with the action taken by a Magistrate under this sub-section, would only lead to public peace and tranquillity being disturbed. In the present case, the order was passed pending the completion of the inquiry, in view of the circumstances already narrated. The Magistrate has stated in his order that he has heard both parties. He has referred to the contents of the police report. He has no doubt paid a compliment to the police by saying that it is their version that has to be accepted in applications of this nature. The Magistrate has stated in his order that he has heard both parties. He has referred to the contents of the police report. He has no doubt paid a compliment to the police by saying that it is their version that has to be accepted in applications of this nature. The sum and substance of what is stated is that the Magistrate is satisfied from what he has heard from both parties and from the report submitted by the police that an emergency had arisen for exercising the special power conferred upon him by sub-s. (3) of S.113. There is therefore no illegality in the order. Mr. Thomas on behalf of the petitioners, states that the counter-petitioners are highly influential persons and that the effect of this interim order made by the Magistrate may be to deprive his clients of their legitimate rights in respect of the usufruct of the property where they are residing. But it is conceded that the present petitioners have already filed more than one suit in the civil Court. That is the proper forum where appropriate relief can be obtained and where any possible miscarriage of justice can be avoided. Since they have taken steps to establish their clams to the property, we are not satisfied that any hardship will be caused to them by the order made by the Court below. In this connection we must also refer to the provisions of S.446, Travancore Criminal P.C., which refers to irregularities which have not occasioned a failure of justice. The explanation to this section is of importance in the present case, because it refers to the opportunity which a party may have had at an earlier stage of the proceedings when failure to take advantage of it may be taken as a circumstance against him. In the present case, there is nothing to indicate that when the Magistrate was dealing with the case, any objection similar to the one pressed before us was raised that the stage for directing the execution of an interim bond had not been reached. That is a circumstance that has to be taken into consideration in the disposal of these revision petitions. 5. For the reason that the order made by the Court below is not in any way opposed to law, we decline to interfere and dismiss this batch of criminal revision petitions. That is a circumstance that has to be taken into consideration in the disposal of these revision petitions. 5. For the reason that the order made by the Court below is not in any way opposed to law, we decline to interfere and dismiss this batch of criminal revision petitions. The order of interim stay of proceedings is automatically vacated. Petitions dismissed.