The Chief Justice.-This is an application by the Panchayat Board of Kankipada in the Vijayawada Taluk, Krishna district, respresented by its President, praying for the issue of a Writ of Certiorari to quash the order of the Inspector of Municipal Councils and Local Boards dated the 30th March, 1950, purporting to supersede the Kankipadu Panchayat Board under section 45-A(1) of the Madras Local Boards Act for a period of one year with effect from the date of publication of the notification in the Fort St. George Gazette. The order was passed by the Inspector of Local Boards in exercise of the powers delegated to him by Government under section 233 of the Act. The reason for his action is contained in the preamble to the order which runs thus: “Whereas in the opinion of the Inspector of Municipal Councils and Local Boards the Kankipadu Panchayat Board in the Vijayawada Taluk of Krishna District is incompetent to perform the duties imposed on it by law.” It was not disputed by learned counsel for the petitioner that the power of the Local Government under section 45-A(1) of the Act was delegated to the Inspector of Local Boards. Among the papers filed by him in this Court, there is an order of the Government dated 19th January, 1940, under which the Government delegated to the Inspector of Municipal Councils and Local Boards, inter alia, the power under section 45-A of the Act to supersede a Panchayat and all the powers in connection therewith which are conferred on the Provincial Government by that section. Something was said about the effect of Madras Act XI of 1946 but nothing turns on that Act because, as the learned Government Pleader informed us, it never comes into operation and also for the reason that even if it did come into operation, it would cease to be on the statute book two years after it came into force as it was an Act made by the Governor under section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Learned Counsel for the petitioner argued that under section 45-A(1), before the Inspector could pass an order of supersession, he had to form independently an opinion that the conditions in section 45 have been fulfilled in respect of the particular Panchayat Board in question. Learned Counsel for the petitioner argued that under section 45-A(1), before the Inspector could pass an order of supersession, he had to form independently an opinion that the conditions in section 45 have been fulfilled in respect of the particular Panchayat Board in question. Under section 45-A read with section 45, it is the opinion of the Provincial Government and therefore the opinion of the Inspector of Municipal Councils after delegation that really matters and in this case, the Inspector was not given an opportunity to form his own individual opinion on the material available to him without interference by any outside individual or authority. So the argument of the petitioner’s counsel ran. If there is evidence, he contended, that there has been an interference with his right to form his own independent opinion, then his order cannot be said to have been made bona fide and such an order can be quashed by this Court. The gravamen of the charge consists in the fact that sometime before proceedings under section 45-A(1) commenced by the issue of a notice on 21st December, 1949, to show cause why the Panchayat Board should not be superseded, the Government had expressed their view in unequivocal terms. that there was sufficient reason for such a supersession. Learned counsel referred us to a letter from one of the Secretaries to the Government to the Inspector of Local Boards, dated 8th December, 1949. It is a demi-official communication requesting the Inspector to take necessary steps to supersede the Kankipadu Panchayat Board for one year. It was also definitely suggested in this letter that during the period of supersession, one T. Lakshmiah may be appointed as a special officer of the Panchayat Board. As appears from this letter itself, it was addressed on behalf of the Government after the current file relating to the subject had been summoned from the office of the Inspector by the Government. It was thereafter on the 21st December, 1949, that the Inspector issued the notice under section 45-A(1). The Panchayat Board sent up an elaborate reply meeting the charges made against it in the notice. The District Board, Krishna, to which also a copy of the notice issued to the Panchayat Board had been sent, wanted further time to submit their report. The Panchayat Board sent up an elaborate reply meeting the charges made against it in the notice. The District Board, Krishna, to which also a copy of the notice issued to the Panchayat Board had been sent, wanted further time to submit their report. The District Panchayat Officer, Krishna, was requested by the Inspector of Local Boards to offer his remarks urgently on the reply of the Panchayat Board and it is in evidence that the Officer offered his remarks on 12th January, 1950 and that the Inspector of Local Boards endorsed his remarks. They were both obviously for supersession. The Inspector forwarded the file once again to the Government and the Government passed an order on 14th March, 1950, accepting the recommendation of the Inspector that the Panchayat Board should be superseded and permitting the Inspector to proceed to take further action in the matter accordingly. On 30th March, 1950, the notification superseding the Panchayat Board was made, and it was published on 11th April, 1950, in the Fort St. George Gazette. We must confess to an impression left on us that, having delegated their power under section 45-A of the Act to the Inspector of Municipal Councils and Local Boards, the Government interfered with the actual exercise of such powers by the Inspector in this case. There was an enquiry by the Panchayat Officer. He had submitted his report and, in the ordinary course, the Inspector would have himself proceeded to take necessary action under section 45-A(1) of the Act. It is unfortunate that he was not, as it were, allowed to do so. The file was taken away from his office by the Government and sent back with a demi-official communication indicating that the Government would desire the Inspector to take further steps to supersede the Panchayat Board. Ordinarily, not only should such interference be deprecated, but an order passed after such interference, would have been also quashed as an order not made in the bona fide exercise of the powers conferred on the Inspector by delegation. We, however, do not propose to do so for two reasons. It appears clear from the file that though official orders had not been actually passed by the Inspector, the Inspector himself proposed to take steps for supersession. The report of the Panchayat Officer suggested drastic action as necessary having regard to the irregularities which he discovered after inquiry. We, however, do not propose to do so for two reasons. It appears clear from the file that though official orders had not been actually passed by the Inspector, the Inspector himself proposed to take steps for supersession. The report of the Panchayat Officer suggested drastic action as necessary having regard to the irregularities which he discovered after inquiry. The fact that the Government set its seal of approval on the action which the Inspector had decided upon should not, we think, render the order eventually passed as an order not passed bona fide in the exercise of the powers of the Inspector. After all, the Government was the body entrusted with powers of supervision over the administration of local bodies by the statute itself. No doubt, for the sake of administrative convenience, the Government were also given the power to delegate some of their duties and functions to their officers. But this delegation itself would not divorce the Government completely from all attention to the affairs of Local Board administration. It was incumbent upon them to see that the Local Boards were functioning properly and if it came to their notice that any Board was not functioning properly, it would be within the scope of their legitimate duties to draw the attention even of their officer, the Inspector to take appropriate action in the matter. Of course, they cannot dictate to him as to what ultimately he should do; but they can certainly initiate proceedings in the sense that they can move the Inspector to take action, appropriate in the circumstances, just as any member of the public can move the Inspector after bringing to his notice irregularities or abuse of powers on the part of a local body to induce him to take action under section 45-A(1). Another reason why we have refrained from interfering with the order is that after the preliminary notice was issued, an explanation was submitted by the Panchayat Board and presumably it was considered and both the District Panchayat Officer ‘and the Inspector of Local Boards came to the conclusion that there was a case for supersession. The fact that finally the Government also agreed with them would not render their opinion any the less their own opinion. We are therefore unable to hold that the order of the Inspector was not an order made bona fide in the exercise of his powers. The fact that finally the Government also agreed with them would not render their opinion any the less their own opinion. We are therefore unable to hold that the order of the Inspector was not an order made bona fide in the exercise of his powers. We cannot, however, refrain from expressing our surprise that long before the order of supersession had been made, and in fact long before even the preliminary notice under section 45-A(1) had issued, the Government should suggest a particular individual to the Inspector to be appointed as the Special Officer after supersession, practically indicating that the supersession would follow as a matter of course. But we do not think that the order itself would be vitiated because of this action of the Government. Learned counsel for the petitioner tried to make some point out of the fact that the Inspector did not wait for a reply from the District Board, Krishna, to which the notice under section 45-A (1) was sent in accordance with the statutory provision. 7’he records, however, show clearly that the District Board did not send their reply within the time fixed in the notice, viz., two weeks from the date of receipt of the notice. It is clear that even as late as 28th January, 1950, no communication had been received from the District Board. The Inspector is not bound to wait indefinitely for a reply from the District Board even though the time fixed under the notice had expired. It was contended by the petitioner’s learned counsel that the Inspector did not make any inquiry as regards the several charges made against the Board in the preliminary notice and therefore the order was bad. We do not see anything in the material provisions of the Act which compels the Inspector to make an inquiry. He did call for a report from the Deputy Panchayat Officer and he must have considered that report as well as other material available to him. No doubt, the order of the Inspector is very cryptic and is practically a reproduction of a part of section 45 (1) of the Act. The Officers on whom statutory powers are conferred should realise that there should be a substantial compliance with the conditions laid down by a statute before they can validly exercise the powers conferred on them. No doubt, the order of the Inspector is very cryptic and is practically a reproduction of a part of section 45 (1) of the Act. The Officers on whom statutory powers are conferred should realise that there should be a substantial compliance with the conditions laid down by a statute before they can validly exercise the powers conferred on them. It is not sufficient merely to reproduce the section under which they are acting. There must be something ex facie the order passed by them to show that there are reasons for the order and that the conclusion is based on materials before them. But merely because the order of the Inspector could have been more full, we do not think it can be said that the order as it stands is without jurisdiction. or that there is any error apparent on its face. So far as merits are concerned, we have recently held that it is not for this Court in certiorari to embark on an enquiry and find whether particular charges have or have not been made out. The same view was taken by a learned Judge of this Court in Muhammad Bhukari v. Inspector, Municipal Councils1. The application is therefore dismissed. V.P.S. ----- Petition dismissed.