THADANI, C. J: This is a Second Miscellaneous Appeal from the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge, Cachar, dated 24-6-49, by which he affirmed the order of the learned Munsiff of Karimganj who had ordered execution of the de­cree in T. S. No. 165 of 1941 to proceed negativing the objection of the J.D., that in view of the terms of the compromise decree passed in that suit, he was not liable to be evicted, and that the D. H. should be relegated to a suit. (2) The D. H. had brought a suit for recovery of arrears of rent and for an order of eviction. During the pendency of the suit, the parties filed an appli­cation under the provisions of O. 23, R. 3, C.P. Code, for recording a compromise, which is in these terms: "It has been settled that the deft, will be a tenant for 3 years from 1st Bhadra 1349 B.S. = 16-8-1942, till Sravan 1352, B.S. in respect of the dis­puted land and the house at an annual rental of Rs. 967- at the rate of Rs. 8/- per month. On the 1st Bhadra, 1352, B.S., he will deliver possession of the land and the house to the plaintiffs. A decree will be passed for Rs. 12/8-/0, against the deft, as rent for the months of Baisakh and Jaistha 1348, B.S., the period in suit. The deft, will pay up the said Rs. 12/87- as also the rent for 14 months from Asar 1343 B.S., to Sravan 1349 B.S., being a sum of Rs. 87/8/- (out of which repair charge of Rs. 6/- will be deducted), thus leaving a balance of Rs. 81/8/-, in all Rs. 94/-. I, the defendant, will pay up to the plaintiffs the decretal sum of Rs. 12/87- as also a sum of Rs. 11/8/- out of the said sum of Rs. 35/- within Magh and another sum of Rs. 35/- within Chaitra. If I make default in paying up the instalments, plffs. 81/8/-, in all Rs. 94/-. I, the defendant, will pay up to the plaintiffs the decretal sum of Rs. 12/87- as also a sum of Rs. 11/8/- out of the said sum of Rs. 35/- within Magh and another sum of Rs. 35/- within Chaitra. If I make default in paying up the instalments, plffs. will be entitled to demand the entire sum at a time and will be entitled, to take recourse to legal proceedings to realise the money with damages and other reliefs." (3) It was contended on behalf of the J.D. that the suit was partly compromised in that the arrears of rent claimed in the suit were made pay­able in the manner indicated in the compromise and that a decree was passed in accordance with the terms of the compromise in that behalf, but that in so far as the suit related to his eviction, it was abandoned by the plaintiff and a fresh tenancy was created between him and the D.H., on terms entirely different to those which were the subject-matter of the tenancy, upon the determination of which the plff. brought the suit; under the new tenancy, the rent was Rs. 8/ per mensem, and not Rs. 6/4/- as was the case in respect of the tenancy which was determined by notice prior to the insti­tution of the suit; whereas the determined tenancy was not for any specified period, the new tenancy was for a period of 3 years com­mencing from 16-8-42 - indeed a date after the judgment and decree was passed in T. S. No. 165 of 1941; that the new tenancy was merely recited as a fact in the compromise and was not intended to be treated as a part of the adjustment of the suit; such adjustment as was made related only to the manner of the payment of the decree for arrears of rent; that rights arising out of the new agreement of tenancy recited in the compromise can be enforced only by a suit, and not in exe­cution of the compromise decree. (4) In support of his contention, Mr. Chaudhuri has referred us to a decision reported in 'Jasimud-din Biswas v. Bhuban Jelini', 34 Cal 456, in which a solenama was filed in the suit by which the plffs. agreed to take a smaller sum than the amount claimed as damages, and the defts. (4) In support of his contention, Mr. Chaudhuri has referred us to a decision reported in 'Jasimud-din Biswas v. Bhuban Jelini', 34 Cal 456, in which a solenama was filed in the suit by which the plffs. agreed to take a smaller sum than the amount claimed as damages, and the defts. agreed to take a permanent lease of the 'jalkar' from the plffs. at a yearly rental of Rs. 413/- with a provision that so long as the contract was not completed, the defts. would be at liberty to use the 'jalkai" and pay rent from the year 1300 B.S. A decree was passed in terms of the solenama. The learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court held that the terms of the solenama regarding the taking of the lease could not be enforced in execution of the decree. We think that the principle of this decision is appli­cable to the facts before us. (5) In another case reported in 'Baleshar Missir v. Tekesar Missir', AIR (26) 1939 All 454, the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court who had occasion to interpret the provisions of O. 23, R. 3, C. P. C., observed: "It will be noted that the direction in (O. 23, R. 3, C.P.C.), is that the Court shall pass a decree in accordance with the compromise so far as it relates to the suit, and where the compromise does not relate to the suit, the presumption is that the rule implies that the Court should not pass a decree in regard to it. In this connection, we may refer to 'Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapore Zamindari Co. Ltd.' 17 All L Jour, 1117 where their Lordships of the Privy Council laid down as follows in regard to the corresponding section, Section 375, Civil Procedure Code of 1882: "The terms of this Section need careful scrutiny. In the first place, it is plain that the agreement or compromise, in whole and not in part, is to be recorded, and the decree is then to confine its operation to so much of the subject-matter of the suit as is dealt with by the agreement. In the first place, it is plain that the agreement or compromise, in whole and not in part, is to be recorded, and the decree is then to confine its operation to so much of the subject-matter of the suit as is dealt with by the agreement. Their Lordships are not aware of the exact system by which documents are recorded in the Courts in India, but a perfectly proper and effectually method carrying out the terms of this section would be for the decree to recite the whole of agreement and then to conclude with an order relative to that part that was the subject of the suit, or it could introduce the agreement in a sche­dule to the decree; but in either, although the operative part of the decree would be properly con­fined to the actual subject-matter of the then exist­ing litigation, the decree taken as a whole would include the agreement. This, in fact, is what the decree did in the present case. It may be that as a decree it was incapable of being executed out­side the lands of the suit, but that does not prevent it being received in evidence of its contents." (6) Interpreting the decree before us in the light of the observations made by their Lordships of the Privy Council, we think the suit was compromised in so far as it related to the arrears of rent and the manner in which they were to be paid. We do not think it was ever the intention of the parties that the J.D. would be liable to eviction in execu­tion of the compromise decree. For instance, the new rent fixed by the agreement was Rs. 8/-, and not Rs. 6/4/-, the rate at which the arrears of rent were claimed in the suit. If the terms of the fresh tenancy are to be regarded as part of the compromise decree, the plff. would be in a position to recover the arrears of rent at the new rate of Rs. 8/- per mensem, without recourse to a suit. We can find no justification for such a position. If the plaintiff then must be relegated to a suit for the recovery of arrears of rent at the new rate of Rs. would be in a position to recover the arrears of rent at the new rate of Rs. 8/- per mensem, without recourse to a suit. We can find no justification for such a position. If the plaintiff then must be relegated to a suit for the recovery of arrears of rent at the new rate of Rs. 8/- as fixed by the compromise, it is diffi­cult to see how he can enforce the Judgment-Debtor's liability to eviction arising out of the same agreement by resorting to execution proceedings. The term as to payment of rent at the new rate cannot be separated from the term as to the period of the lease, namely 3 years. It could then scarcely be the intention of the parties that the question of eviction would be decided in execution proceedings of the compromise decree. (7) We have come to the conclusion that the suit, was adjusted by the parties in so far only as it re­lated to the arrears of rent claimed in the suit. The Courts below were wrong in taking the view! that the fresh agreement of tenancy evidenced by the terms of the compromise was not to be regarded as something extraneous to the decree. Apparently it escaped the notice of the Courts below that the new agreement of lease was to commence on a future date, some days after the compromise decree was passed. (8) We, therefore, set aside the judgment and decree of the Lower Appellate Court and order the execution to be struck off. The Decree-Holder is relegated to a suit. On the facts of this case, we make no order as to costs. (9) BAM LABHAYA, J: I agree. Appeal allowed.